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ABSTRACT 
Rules of engagement, ethics of war, and codes of chivalry are all phrases which remind 
one of human attempts to rein in and regulate what is perhaps the most anarchic and 
illogical of aH human activities: organized war. The role of the great religions of the 
world both in propagating war through crusades and jihads as well as their attempts at 
transcending its savagery through images of miles Christianus or the pious ghiïzl has 
also been much discussed. The aim of this thesis is to study the ethics of war in the 
context of Islamic societies in the Early Middle Ages from several complementary 
perspectives. Our sources for the period vary greatly from decade to decade and from 
region to region. This has often led historians of ideas and mentalities to concentrate on 
one aspect to the exclusion of others. This is particularly so in the case of ethics of war 
where most of the argument seems to concentrate on a few passages from the Qur'an, 
supplemented by sorne quotations from manuals of l].adith and commentaries on them in 
the legal textbooks of the different religious schools. That all these are crucial for an 
understanding of Muslim attitudes and reactions to war throughout centuries is beyond 
dispute. But it remains, nevertheless, a lop-sided view: neglecting large areas of debate 
and speculation in literature, philosophy, and mystical meditations, presented as fully-
fledged arguments or as occasional remarks and observations embedded in the extant 
texts from the period. By evaluating these scattered sources and listening to the 
different voices heard through them, l hope to show sorne of the different attitudes and 
responses to the ethics of war and avoid the monolithic and doggedly timeless approach 
which, at its worst and most extreme, envisages a non-existing consensus among the 
Muslims from the rise of Islam to the beginning of this new century and neglects the 
evidence of regional traditions and innovative thinkers by relying solely on a handful of 
quotes. 
ABSTRACT(FRENCH) 
Les règles du combat, l'éthique de la guerre, les codes chevaleresques - autant 
d'expressions révélatrices des efforts de l'Homme pour maîtriser et réglementer celle qui, 
de toutes ses actions, est sans doute la plus anarchique et la plus illogique: la guerre 
organisée. On a ainsi pu démontrer le rôle des grandes religions du monde dans la 
propagation de la guerre par le biais des croisades ou jihiids s'efforçant de sublimer la 
sauvagerie de la guerre par la création d'images telle que celle du miles Christianus ou 
encore celle du ghiizl pieux. Le but de notre propos est d'examiner l'éthique de la guerre 
replacée dans le contexte des sociétés islamiques du début du Moyen Age, en adoptant 
diverses approches qui se complètent les unes les autres. Les sources dont nous disposons 
pour cette période varient considérablement d'une décennie et d'une région à l'autre. Ces 
variations ont souvent amené les historiens des idées et des mentalités à se concentrer sur 
un seul aspect, à l'exclusion de tous les autres. C'est tout particulièrement le cas en ce qui 
concerne l'éthique de la guerre, où l'essentiel de l'argumentation employée paraît se 
fonder uniquement sur quelques passages choisis du Coran, complétés par des citations 
des manuels de lJadith et les commentaires sur ces derniers que l'on trouve dans les 
manuels légaux des diverses écoles religieuses. Il est certes essentiel de prendre en 
compte ces dernières sources pour comprendre les attitudes des Musulmans et leurs 
réactions face à la guerre à travers les siècles . Mais cela n'en est pas moins une optique 
partiale qui ne montre qu'un seul aspect des faits. Elle choisit en effet d'ignorer de vastes 
domaines qui laisse la place au débat et à la conjecture, tant dans la littérature et la 
philosophie que dans les méditations de mystiques, qui se présentent sous la forme soit 
d'arguments pleinement développés, soit d'observations passagères, insérées dans des 
textes de l'époque qui nous sont parvenus dans leur entièreté. C'est en évaluant ces 
sources éparpillées et en écoutant les diverses voix que l'on peut y percevoir que ce 
travail se propose d'examiner ces attitudes et réponses diverses et variées à la question de 
l'éthique de la guerre, afin d'éviter l'optique monolithique qui s'est obstinément 
perpétuée à travers les temps et qui, à son pire et dans les cas les plus extrêmes, envisage 
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l'existence d'un soi-disant consensus - en réalité entièrement fictif - parmi les 
Musulmans, depuis la naissance de l'Islam jusqu'au début de notre siècle, et choisit 
d'ignorer totalement la présence bien attestée de traditions régionales et de penseurs fort 
innovateurs. 
iii 
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Preliminary Remarks 
INTRODUCTION 
" ... the errors 1 may make as 1 write can be 
corrected without harm to anyone, but those 
that are made by them (warriors) as they act 
cannot be known except with the ruins of 
empire." 
Niccolo Machiavelli' 
The great Chinese philosopher Lao-Tzu said, "1 only wished that grown-ups in war were 
like kids, with no permanent hatred, with utter impatience to resume friendship." The 
history of the world's civilizations and their relations however, shows that unfortunately 
the 'grown-ups' have still a long way to go before they reach kid's maturity in the 
realms of war and peace. But the above history is also reflective of many hard and 
sincere endeavors, on the parts of prophets, philosophers, ethicists, war strategist, and 
even profeional warriors, to contain war tragedies, and to find more civilized or kids' 
ways of conflict resolution. 
In our critical beginning years of the 21 st century, while the world is still witness 
to so many wars and conflicts, sorne of which ethically far worse than the caveman or 
medieval wars, there seems to be an urgent need to revisit the above endeavors; and 
through a search in the ashes of the past, see how the true essences of humanity and aIl 
moral systems, have been best revealed when they were tested during a personal or 
collective conflict. 
The focus of the thesis is on a cri tic al overview of the ethics of war, actual and 
ideal, and the way they are presented in Islamic cultures, with sorne detailed analysis of 
specific writers and texts. The term Islamic is used here in its widest sense, somewhat 
akin to Marshall C. Hodgson's coinage "Islamicate," to denote civilizations and 
historical periods in which Islam as a religion played a pivotaI role in the formation of 
communal beliefs and laws but without, on the other hand, treating Islam itself as a 
fixed and immutable entity. The Islamic dimension, admittedly a nebulous concept in 
1 Niccolo Machavelli, Art ofwar, Translated, edited, and commentary by Chritopher Lynch, 
(Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2003) 4. 
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itself, proved malleable enough to be influenced by other factors and traditions at work: 
sorne local and of an ancient lineage and sorne external and immediate. In the light of 
this proviso a series of inter-related questions will be posed concerning the way wars 
were conceived and conducted: What were the models, and what were the ethical 
norms? How much were they an implicit criticism of what the writers felt were 
unacceptable conduct in the wars they had been involved in directly or indirectly? What 
were the influences of specific major historical figures on the ethics of war? What were 
the sources of legitimization and justification? How did Islamic notions concerning war 
as laid down in the Qur'an and the I:Iarnth influence the ethics of war? How, in the 
course of the medieval centuries, did philosophy, literature, and historiography affect 
the same ethics? What are the tools of conceptualization used by modem scholarship in 
viewing Islamic ethics of war and how helpful, thought provo king, and comprehensive 
are they? 
Through a cri tic al reading of different texts, written in different genres and for 
different audiences but all pertaining to the conduct ofwars, this thesis will examine the 
wide spectrum oftheoretical approaches and practical attitudes regarding war ethics, the 
justifications and causes ofwar (jus ad bellum) and the methods ofwar's conduct (jus in 
bello), and assess their comparative significance and social and moral content. 
This inter-disciplinary approach should also serve as a corrective to the one-
dimension al approach, all too common in scholarship on Islamic countries, which 
perceives of the complex culture and history of Islamic lands through strictly legal or 
political perspectives and considers a paraphrase or recital of sorne standard legal texts 
as sufficient explanation for a host of complex historical issues and ethical decisions. 
Islamic law and the writing of the jurists, for various historical reasons, have 
overshadowed Islamic philosophy and its two branches namely speculative wisdom (a1-
1;.ikmat a1-n8?ariyya) and practical wisdom (a1-1;.ikmat a1- 'amaliyya) including ethics, 
and have been emphasized by later scholars at the expense of other disciplines . The 
topic of 'ethics ofwar in Islam,' for example, is mentioned in scattered pieces, often for 
sorne polemical reason, without any judicious attempt at presenting it as an independent 
and significant topic, worthy of being studied as a whole. 
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In this thesis these scattered pieces will be brought together with the aim of 
achieving three connected objectives: 1) demonstrating the wider implications of 
notions ofwar and thereby extricating the debate from the exclusive grip oflslamic law; 
2) presenting a diachronie account of theories of war; 3) and through this wider 
historical understanding, point to sorne current distortions and ideological crudities that 
one encounters in current literature on Islamic ethical views on war and jihad. 
The above objectives do not, as will be demonstrated in chapter four, imply a 
clear-cut and unbridgeable dichotomy between ethics and law. Such a border is hard to 
draw. But in an Aristotelian sense of the pre-eminence of ethics over law,2 this enquiry 
will also look for these Aristotelian moments, in the hope of fin ding instances in history 
and theory when, faced by the grim decisions between life and death, people have 
chosen humane options beyond prescribed norms and laws and manifested forgiveness, 
magnanimity, and humane acts when least expected. 
Overview of the Content 
Chapter One examines the history of the wars at the time of the Prophet, their conduct 
and underlying ethics, and those of the wars by his companions and immediate 
successors. The chapter' s main task is to assess the impact of the personal characters of 
the influential early figures of the Islamic state, their approach to war and peace, and 
their specific interpretation and implementation of the Islamic laws of war that reflects 
their specifie war ethics. 
Chapter Two looks at war ethics in the Qur'an not only through the convention al 
perspective but also through verses that have received much less attention by classical 
or contemporary exegetes of this Scripture while dealing with the topic of jihad (holy 
war). The main purpose of the chapter is to look for the main causes for enmity and war 
in the Qur'an from both the descriptive and the normative perspectives. By a critical 
2 Aristotle asserted that a society based on friendship has no need for justice (1155a). Aristotle, 
Nicomachean Ethics, 2nd ed., trans. Terence Irwin (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, 
Inc., 1999) 120. The full phrase reads: ", . .if people are friends, they have no need of justice, but if they are 
just they need friendship in addition; and the justice that is most just seems to belong to friendship," 
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'-', review of classical and contemporary works of exegeses, the chapter will also explore 
the Scriptural war goals and its limits in the light of vastly divergent views that have 
the pacifist ~ufi position on the one extreme and those who favor perpetuaI war on the 
other. 
Chapter Three deals with ShI'! writings on war. It provides an analysis of such historical 
landmarks as 'Ali Ibn Abl Talib's predicament at ~iffin (657 CE) and I:Iusayn Ibn 'Ali' 
martyrdom at Karbala' (680 CE). It also provides a critical reading of a selective 
sample of the ShI'! lJadith literature and its implications as well as a critical review of 
modem ShI'! scholarship including works by Tabataba'l (d. 1985), Iskandarl, Muqaqiq-
Damad, Mutahharl (d. 1979) and ~alihl-Najafiibadi (d. 2006). 
Chapter Four deals with philosophical, theological and mystical approaches to war 
ethics. War at it roots starts with the conception of 'self in contradistinction to 
'others.' Through comparing sorne Western and Islamic theories of ethics, this chapter 
will study their similarities, differences, and the theoretical implications of these 
theories for the ethics of war. Since the very discipline of 'theoretical ethics' (akhliiq-e 
nll?arl in Persian) is traditionally a branch of philosophy in the Islamic curriculum, the 
chapter is intended to lay the foundation for sorne of the main tenets of this thesis. 
Views relevant to war in major Islamic theological schools such as the Ash' arl and the 
Mu'tazifi schools and of moral philosophers, and ~ufis such as al-FarabI (d. 950 CE), al-
Ghazûli (d. 505/1111), Ibn Miskawayh (d. 1030 CE), al-Tusl (d. 1274 C.E.), Ruml (d. 
672 AH/1273 CE) and Ibn al-'Arabl (d. 1240 CE) will be discussed. 
Chapter Five studies the ethics of war in the didactic works of adab literature, such as 
those by Ni?am al-Mulk (d. 48511092), Fakhr Modabbir (d. 602 AH), Kai Kavus Ibn 
Iskandar (d. 1085CE), Muqammad Rawandi (d. early 13th century CE), and Mu~liq al-
DIn Sa'di (d. 1291CE). Also, references will be made to the most important work ofepic 
literature in the Eastern lands of Islam namely the Shiihniimeh of Ferdowsl (d. 
411/1020), which in itself can be regarded as a compendium of ethics. The adab genre 
provided a perfect medium through which its learned authors could express their ethical 
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concerns obliquely at a time when the perennial threat of being accused of heresy and 
blasphemy, proved an effective gag on open discussions. Written at courts with the 
intended aim of pleasing the prince, they could also influence the moral behavior in war 
of the most important figures on the battlefield, the Amirs and the Sultans, who 
frequently engaged in wars for land or booty. The chapter will also look at the mythical 
and pre-Islamic store-house of anecdotes and legends which the composers of these 
works (often referred to as 'mirror for princes' or (Na$llJat al-Muliikor Siyar al-Muliik) 
often cited as sources of authority and legitimization for their moral and political 
discourse. 
Chapter Six develops directly from the previous chapt ers and discusses various Western 
theories on war as weIl as the ethics of Islamic jihad in theories and traditions, and 
provides a brief comparative history of their relative developments. Reference will be 
made to the stimulating and sophisticated debates that have been taking place in the 
west on theories of the just war. Although the Islamic scholarship on this topie, under 
the general rubric of 'jihad,' and in the form of collected canon law is a few centuries 
older than its Western equivalent/ in recent centuries it has remained stagnant by 
comparison, and has mainly contended itselfto an uncritical recital ofpast stances. 
The impact of various Islamic schools of jurisprudence, exegeses and poli tic al 
philosophy on the theory and the practice of war ethics will be discussed in this chapter 
along with a critical reading of selective parts of the most important Siyar lit erat ure on 
laws of war in Islam written by al-Shaybanl (d. 187/803). The last part of the chapter 
will examine three distinctly different theories of Islamic war ethics and their 
relationship and relevance to sorne ofthe modem Western theories. 
Chapter Seven surveys the ethics of war among irregular military professionals, such as 
'ayyiùs,' whose ideals came from a fusion of Islamic and pre-Islamic norms and 
traditions. This chapter will explore the Persian concept of javiinmardJ as a moral 
discipline and its possible relations to, and influence upon, the medieval European 
3 It should be noted that 'just war,' and 'jihad' as discussed in the early chapters of this thesis, 
are not necessarily and technically equivalent. 
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.~ institution of chivalry. The chapter also refers to the military life of the epitome of 
Islamic medieval chivalry, ~aIa4 al-Dln Ayyiibl (d. 589/1193) and his European 
opponents. 
Chapter Eight will take a criticallook at the conduct of the Muslim caliphs, Amirs, and 
Sultans by examining a selective sample of medieval wars as narrated in various 
medieval historiographies. In the last part, this chapter reviews a major and 
authoritative military sourcebook in order to provide a basis for an overall evaluation of 
the Islamic war ethics in comparison with other medieval cultures. 
Sorne Methodological Considerations 
The methodology in this enquiry is primarily inductive, rather than deductive. The 
scope of the enquiry in this thesis is geographically lirnited to the Eastern lands of Islam 
and specifically to medieval Syria (during ~aIah al-Dln's reign), Iraq and Iran including 
Tranoxiana. 
Historically it is limited to the pre-Mongol period for the Mongol invasion 
provides a sharp break with the past and drastically changed many notions of warfare 
and its ethics. The thesis attempts to provide an analysis of ShI'! views; but even here 
limitations of space precludes any extensive description of the ethics of war from the 
dynastie perspective ofthe Biiyids, I:Iamdanids and Fa!imids. 
The theoretical approach, as reflected in various chapt ers, and technical 
terminologies used in the entire text are modem. The comparative approach ofthe thesis 
employs from time to time, nonnormative notions of descriptive ethics, as certain 
behavioral patterns in wars are considered; and metaethics, as key ethical terms are 
treated. The text also deals with catagories that correspond to normative teleological 
ethics, when the consequences of wars are discussed; deontological ethics, when 
conflicts between certain duties arise; virtue ethics, when historical characters are 
analyzed and applied ethics, when war is looked at as a specific field of human activity. 
The sources are generally mixed primary and secondary. 
Given the broad scope of the topic and its various aspects, it was unavoidable to 
be selective in viewing the works of so many thinkers in each field. However the 
6 
selections made of both characters and sources were besed on the specific criteria of 
choosing the most influentials in each area. There are too many exegetes, theologists, 
philosophers, poets, historians, ethicists and sources to be aIl accounted in this single 
volume. On the other hand, in order to arrive at specific theories of just war in Islam, 
reflective of the most predominant intellectuai and virtual trends in various fields, there 
was a need for a macro picture of these trends in Islamic history. Therefore a 
compromise had to be made between too much details and a macro perspective of war 
trends in Muslim cultures. This thesis does not c1aim to have an accurate account even 
of aIl trends, but it is an endeavor to discem the major ones or at least to provide enough 
material for war theorists. 
The transliterations in this thesis generally follow the standards of the Institute 
of the Islamic Studies, McGill University, except the Persian proper names that follow 
the standard of the Encyc10paedi Iranica. 
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CHAPTERONE 
PROPHETIC W ARS, PURPOSES AND CHARACTERS 
1 was sent to perfect noble qualities of character 
Prophetie l)adith4 
Verily thou art a man of great character 
The Qur'an, 68:4 
This chapter will touch on major issues related to the circumstances of war and peace 
during the Prophet' s lifetime. Because of his position as leader of the Islamic 
community, his sayings and actions established certain ethical standards for the 
Muslims oflater eras. 
The first question to consider is the matter of the cause or causes of war, known 
in Western literature as jus ad bellum. This inquiry will look into the main possible 
causes of the Prophetic wars, that is, the wars during the Prophet's lifetime, and will 
seek to analyze them from an ethical perspective. It will also briefly examine normative 
standards based on direct Prophetic orders about the conduct ofwar or jus in bello. This 
discussion will consider, moreover, the influence of ideological prejudices, in particular, 
whether Muslims treated Jewish tribes differently from other religious minorities. 
Finally, this chapter will treat patterns of behavior, specific models of conduct, 
and discrepancies in the conduct of the Prophetic warfare taking place either with the 
Prophet's participation (27 ghazr;vs), or his order and consent (47 sariyyas).5 The aim, in 
a spirit of the Aristotelian virtue ethics, is to show the various, and sometimes very 
conflicting, attitudes of the Prophet' s companions vis-a-vis the Islamic laws and ethics 
4 This 4adith is found, with a small variation ofwording, in Malik, al-MuwaHa' and many ShI'! 
sources. 
5 Note should be taken that ghazwor sariyya are used within the primary historians for a wide 
range of hostile confrontations from low-scale tribal raids that sometimes do not involve armed conflict to 
full-sc ale and large scale wars. Among the altogether seventy-four campaigns that are reported to have 
taken place since the advent ofIslam until the demise of the Prophet, there are only a handful of cases that 
can be called wars in the contemporary sense. However, in order to avoid the usage of too many various 
terms (i.e. campaign, war, battle, foray, razzia, corresponding with the Arabic terms ghazw, sariyya, jihad, 
qitiil etc.), this work will use the word campaign and/or battle. 
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of war, were largely rooted in their personal dispositions, and not in the Prophet's 
normative standards. 
The nuances of the causees) of war (jus ad bellum) and the rules of engagement 
(jus in bello), depending on the 'cosmology' or the 'worldview' of the warriors, are 
numerous. If the main mission of the Prophet, as reflected in the abovementioned 
4adith, were to 'perfect the noble qualities of character,' nowhere else does the true 
nature of this character (in its broader sense, the Muslim character) may manifest itself 
more than it does in war, where the risk to life is at its height. The ethics of war is the 
most difficult of aIl fields of ethics in action, for the warrior must simultaneously fight 
against his enemy and also against the wild passion within, anger. This control of the 
selfwhich is required to attain a higher goal in life is a major part ofwhat most religions 
claim to seek. 
The Cause, or Causes, of Early Muslim Wars 
There is a controversy among sorne modern scholars on the legitimate causes of war in 
Islam; notably, many contemporary Muslim scholars have an increasing tendency to 
consider the only legitimate cause ofwar as defensive. However, this tendency tends to 
become an apologetic stance. As Rahman points out: 
It is historically unacceptable, as sorne modem Muslim apologists have done, to pretend 
that the expansionist jihad of early Islam was purely defensive. Yet it is only the 
extremist Kharijites who have declared jihad to be one of the 'pillars of the faith. "6 
Almost from the outset, ShI'! jurists have controlled jihad by rigorously 
restricting leadership of the faith community. They limit the right to declare jihad solely 
to the occulted Imam, thereby de-Iegitimizing primary (offensive) wars after his 
occultation in 260 AH/ 874 CE. The views of sorne modern SunnI authorities have been 
mentioned in the preceding chapter; more critical details on both the SunnI and the ShI'! 
views will be provided in Chapt ers Two and Six. 
6 Fazlur Rahman, Islam fJ'lew York: Doubleday, 1968) 34. 
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Despite the defensive and ideological contentions of many Islamic modernists, 
an investigation into the causes of the Prophetie wars, gathered from early war 
chronicles, shows a range of causes among which are defensive, pre-emptive, 
economically driven, punitive, liberating, and ideological. Scholars such as Donner, by 
focusing on the socio-economic milieu of Northern Arabia, have expanded these causes 
to include, for example, the war-game traditions of the pre-Islamic Arab tribes.7 
Similarly, al-Waqicfi's accounts of the Prophetie wars also reflect the range of causes 
rather than a single-cause theory. Sorne scholars have come to the conclusion that Islam 
sanctions both ideological warring Gihad) and the political subjugation of other nations 
as legitimate and rewarding ends. 8 
This argument holds, however, that the campaigns in the formative period of 
Islam support different views about jihad. The Prophet did not encourage raiding in a 
manner which would have offended the sensibilities of the Arab tribes; rather, he 
channeled their energy in a direction which reinforced and protected the new Islamic 
State. Had the Prophet been able to control the warring energy of the Arab tribes, 
protect the Islamic state, and find opportunities to reach out to the common people 
throughout the peninsula, he would likely have avoided most ofhis campaigns. 
The al-I:Iudaybiyya peace treaty with the Meccan polytheists negotiated in the 
year 628 CE, against the resistance of his chief companion 'Umar b. al-KhaHab, 
demonstrates the Prophet's peaceful intentions. 'Umar, who later became the second 
caliph, insisted on fighting the Meccans to such a degree that he came close to deserting 
the Prophet and Islam altogether.9 According to al-Waqicfi, several other companions 
also were opposing the Prophet against the concessions he was giving to the Meccans in 
7 Donner, "The Sources ofIslamic Conception ofWar," 36. 
8 Bassam Tibi, as will be discussed in details in chapter six, holds this view which has its roots 
not only in the works of medieval Islamic jurists, but also in the views of the modern fundamentalist 
theologians who look at jihad as an effective instrument of domestic and international insurgence. 
9 Al-Waqidi refers to several reports including a few direct quotations from 'Umar saying that if 
he had had a few people on his side opposing the peace treaty, he would have left the Islamic faith 
altogether as he felt quite humiliated by making peace with the polytheists when they were powerful 
enough to fight. See MlÙ).ammad b. 'Umar, Al-Maghiizl: Tiirikh-e Janghiiy-e Payiimbar, 2nd ed., trans. 
Ma4miïd Ma4davl Damghiinl (Tehran: Markaze Nashre Daneshgahi, 1990) vol.2, 461-63. Also see The 
EncycJopedia of Islam, 2nd ed., s.v. "I:Iudayblya" by W. Montgomery Watt. 
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the very text of the peace treaty.IO In this case, the Prophet conducted peace with his 
opponents, and in doing so went against the wishes of many of his closest Muslim 
companions. His actions mark his clear preference for peace over combat. 
The al-f:Iudaybiyya peace treaty was supported both by script ure and statements 
·ofthe Prophet and a few ofhis chief companions, as the most important victory (fatlJ) in 
the whole history of Islam. ll In the Qur'an, chapter fort Y eight, verse one refers to this 
occasion as a clear victory "fatlJan mublna.,,12 Indeed, these assertions demilitarize the 
notions ofvictory. Although the treaty did not last for more than twenty-two months, it 
was originally signed for the duration of ten years, thus showing the lack of any 
intention by the Prophet to be in conflict with the Meccans for a significant length of 
time. 
The Prophet, moreover, established peaceful relations with the Christian state of 
Abyssinia (lfabasha).13 Abyssinia had provided a safe sanctuary for many early Muslims 
before the foundation of an Islamic state at Medina. This Prophetic legacy of peaceful 
relations with a Christian neighboring state was observed long after the demise of the 
Prophet' s normative example, which was contradicted by the tendencies of the first 
three Caliphs in their vast and monumental conquests towards aIl geographic directions. 
Most of the primary chronicled accounts of early Islam, as reflected in the works of al-
Waqidi, Ibn Hisham, Ibn A'tham, al-Tabar1, as weIl as many exegetical commentaries 
10 AI-Waqidi, A1-Maghizl, 464. 
1\ According to Ibn Is4aq, the al-f.ludaybiyya peace treaty was important because it gave the 
early Muslim community a unique immunity from war, and allowed them to spend the entire following 
twenty-two months before the fall of Mecca engaging in a vigorous outreach program. The result was the 
outgrowth of the Muslim warriors from fourteen hundred at the time of the peace treaty, to more than ten 
times in less than two years. For more on the reports of Ibn Is4aq, see Ibn Is4aq's Sin!. Rafi ' al-Œn Is4aq 
Ibn Mu4arnmad HamedïinI, trans., Sirat-e Rasü1ulliih (Tehran: Nashr-e Markaz, 1985) 413. 
12 AI-Waqidi quotes both Abu Bakr and 'Umar to have conceded later on that there has not been 
a conquest/victory in Islamic history greater and more important than the al-f.ludaybiyya Treaty. AI-
Waqidi, A1-Maghizl, 464. AIso, Ibn Mas'üd is reported to have said in reference to Q.48: 1 that "you 
(people) consider the conquest to be that of Mecca, but we consider it to be that ofal-f.ludaybiyya". 
13 f.ladith three of Chapter Fourteen of the Shi'i rulings on jihad (book of jiha<!) asserts that the 
Prophet prohibited war with Abyssinians. See Mu4arnmad Ibn al-Basan al-f.lurr al- 'AmiIi, Wasii'i1 a1-
Shi 'a i1ii TalJ~i1 Masii'i1 a1-Shari'a, vo1.6, ed. Sheikh Mu4arnmad Shirazi (Beirut: Dar I4ya' at-Turath al-
'Arabi, 1382 AH) 42. 
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and l}.adith collections, provide a wide range of Prophetie forecasting on the future 
conquests of the Muslim nation (umma).14 However, such alleged predictions, whether 
authentic or not, are far from compulsory Prophetie instructions, and thus fail to provide 
a legal ground for warring justifications. The only Prophetic quotation that cornes close 
to this realm is reflected in the reports on the last political will of the Prophet in his 
final days, where, according to al-Tabar!, the Prophet asserted that aH polytheists must 
be driven out of the Arabian Peninsula. 15 Yet, there is no mention whatsoever of the 
Prophet conceiving of campaigns outside of Arabia. 
His campaign against the Romans at Yarmiik (ghazwa) did not actually result in 
fighting. It was initiated as a defensive measure on the basis of reports claiming that the 
Roman Emperor Heraclius was preparing forces to confront the Muslim state in 
Medina. 16 
Similarly, the unsuccessful battle ofMu'ta war in 8AH resulted from the murder 
of an emissary that the Prophet had sent to the Arab tribes in Syria inviting them to join 
Islam. This venture was followed two years later by a campaign which the Prophet 
ordered but did not live long enough to witness. Apparently, the main focus of both 
Mu'ta wars was to reach out to Pagan or Christian Arabs. 17 The Prophet never issued a 
14 These prophecies are in concordance with the Qur'anic prophecy referred to by Q.30:2-4, 
regarding the defeat of the Persians by the Romans which eventuaIly paved the way for the Muslim 
warriors to conquer both lands. Ibn Is~aq narrates from 'Adi Ibn ijatam Ta'!, who narrated the foIlowing 
from the Prophet: "1 swear to God who created me that the time is near when the palaces of Caesars 
(Roman emperors) and the treasures of Kisras (Persian kings) will aIl belong to my community (umma), 
and from East to West and the borders of Babel to Andalusia will aIl be the territory of Islam." See 
Hamedanl, trans., Slrat-e Rasülullah, 515. 
15 Moqarnmad Roushan, ed., TiirIkhniime-ye Tabar!, vol.3, (Tehran: Soroush Publications, 2001) 
327. This is a 963 CE Persian translation attributed to Bal'aml. 
16 AI-Waqidi, Al-Maghiïzl, vol.3, 774. Apparently, the aborted Yarmük campaign, planned on 
sorne misinformation, proves the point mentioned by Kadivar in the previous chapter namely that when it 
cornes to the non-sacred domains of social life, even prophets are not infallible. This is also asserted by 
Tabataba'l who maintained that the Prophetie decisions on war were essentiaIly of a consultative nature 
rather than of revelations. See Moharnmad ijusayn, Tabataba'1, ShI 'ah: Les Entretien et les 
Correspondances de Professeur Henry Corbin avec 'Alliimah Taba.tabii'J (Persian), 4th ed. (Tehran: 
Mu'assese pazhuheshi Hekmat wa Falsafeh Iran, 1383/1984 CE) 212. 
17 AI-Waqidi, Al-Maghiïzl, vol.2, 576 and vol. 3, 873. 
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.-r-- legally binding de cree that there must be a military campaign outside the Arabian 
Peninsula. 
This leads to the conclusion that none of the Prophetic wars were aimed against 
non-Arab nations. The only ideological problem raised by such conclusion is that Islam, 
like Judaism, should have been primarily concemed about a certain people and a specific 
territory-namely the Arabs and the Arabian Peninsula. This is totally incompatible 
with so many Qur'anic verses that instead of focusing on the Arab people, address the 
entire humanity. True, but the universality of Islam does not entail use of force as an 
effective means of conversion. The mere historical events following the Prophet can not 
be counted as a univers al legal basis for the legitimization of the ideological primary 
(offensive) wars. The diverse postures of various Islamic legal schools on war, and also 
the arbitrary nature of war initiatives conducted by early caliphs leave no consensual 
ground in Islam for primary (offensive-expansionist) wars. 18 In other words, there are no 
legal and logical correlations between the universality of Islam and primary wars as its 
means. 
ArIother striking aspect of Prophet's campaigns was the highly consultative 
nature of his leadership. Most of the primary reports and chronicles assert that the 
Prophet did not fail to consult about both the initiation and the strategy ofwar with his 
companions. There are a few campaigns where the Prophet followed the strategy 
recommended by the majority against his own will and at very high costs in defeat and 
casualties. 19 Notably, there is no report, to the extent ofthis author's knowledge, which 
18 It is known, according to al-Waqidi (and various other reports) that 'Umar b. al-KhaHab, 
'Uthman b. 'Afran, Sa 'd b. Ab! Waqqa~, and Abu 'Ubaida b. Jarraq. severely opposed the second Mu'ta 
war on the basis that the reinforcement of post-prophetic Islamic authority in Arabia has priority over 
remote ventures. This position, however, was defeated by Abu Bakr by saying that the war was 
sanctioned by the Prophet and no other concems may delay its execution. See al-Waqidi, Al-MaghiizJ, 
vol.3. pp. 856-7. It is also known that the second Caliph 'Umar severely opposed to any marine expedition 
given his personal fear ofwater, thus Mu'awiya b. Abu ~ufiyan had to wait for the renewal ofhis rejected 
initiative towards Cyprus till 'Uthman came to power. For the full account of this st ory, see the al-Futlil). 
of Ibn. A'tham, in Herav!, MlÙ).ammad b. Al).mad Mu~towfi, Al-FutiilJ: A JJth Century Persian 
Translation, ed. Majid Gholiirnre4a Tabataba'! (Tehran: Sherkate Entesharate Elmi va Farhangi, 2001) 
293. 
19 See the cases of the Ul).ud war where the Prophet did not like to leave Medina and take the war 
to the outskirts, but followed the view of the majority against his own will and the subsequent heavy to11 
ofseventy martyrs in that war. See Al-Waqidi, Al-MaghiizJ, voU, p.152. Also look at the Ta'ifwar, in 
Al-Waqidi, Al-MaghiizJ, vol.3, p.7l3. 
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claims that a warrior was actually forced to join these wars. In other words, the 
Prophet's example illustrates that no spiritual reward can be produced under compulsion 
of participating in such campaigns. 
The question then is what justifies the imposition of political hegemony over the 
all Arab lands and peoples? It seems that given the volatile socio-economic mold of 
tribal Arabic nature, the only feasible solution to ensure stability entailed the union, 
albeit hegemonic, of the Arabs under one govemment. The early inclusion of the various 
Jewish tribes of Medina in the umma supports this notion. 
It seems therefore incorrect to conceive of warring in Islam as a goal superior to 
the propagation of religion. The Prophet could not possibly, and was not willing to, 
completely reinvent the whole of Arab culture under the Islamic banner in such a short 
time. He could only modify the existing culture through a graduaI process towards a 
moral ideal. 
War and Prejudice 
One question that lies at the core of any discussion about the causes of war is the role of 
ideological differences in determining both the quality and the severity of the war. 
There is ample scholarship, for example, on the history of Judaeo-Muslim cooperation 
and conflict in Medina during the early years of the Islamic state. The Medinese 
Constitution provided a reliable method for resolving conflicts among the residents of 
Medina and, in particular, a strong basis for Muslim and Jewish symbiosis.20 However, 
once the constitution was breached by sorne of the Jewish tribes, a series of clashes 
ensued between the Muslims and the Jews. The main point here is to seek to understand 
whether alleged 'intrinsic ideological prejudice' influenced these clashes. 
Christians, Jews, Sabaeans, and Zoroastrians were treated as legitimate 'others' 
in Islam, which afforded them the status ofprotected minorities (dhimml) in the Muslim 
community. In princip le there was no particular prejudice against any of them. Among 
the Jews, several groups managed to negotiate peace treaties with the Prophet, though 
20 For the significance of the Medinese constitution, see Firestone, Jihiid, 118. 
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these sometimes ended in disagreement.21 It is reported that during the Prophet's last 
military venture, known as the war of Tabuk, he passed through Syria and the Jewish 
village of Wadi al-Qura', where the Jewish community of BanI 'Uraiq sent him and his 
companions food as a gift. He reciprocated by sending the Jews, on an annual basis, 
fort Y camel-Ioads of dates. This assistance to the Jewish tribes of this oasis continued 
for sever al centuries.22 When the Muslim army again passed through Syria, a Jewish 
woman took care of the horse of 'Ubaid b. Yasir, one of the commanders of the Muslim 
forces. She subsequently received an annual stipend from him and the Islamic 
govemment which lasted for almost half a cent ury .z3 
The first Christian-Muslim military encounter took place in 631 CE between the 
Christian chief Ukaider Ibn' Abdulmalik, residing in the village of Dumat al-J andal, and 
Khalid b. WaIid, a Muslim commander who was dispatched by the Prophet while the 
latter was still in Tabuk. It is important to note that despite Khalid's reputation as an 
aggressive military commander, the two negotiated a peace treaty followed by a cordial 
and formidable relationship. The Christian chiefhad agreed to pay the poll taxes (jizya) 
to the Islamic govemment. Out of respect for the Christians, the Prophet personally 
signed and sealed the permanent peace treaty. This encouraged at least five other 
Christian communities, namely Duma, Ayla, Tima', Jarba' and Adhruq, to make binding 
peace treaties. The Prophet gave full immunity to these communities and stipulated 
within their agreements a penalty against any Muslim transgression of their rightS.24 
The last Prophetic military venture in Tabuk was a pre-emptive strike based on 
misleading information regarding an invasion plan of Heraclius; however, this 
confrontation was aborted by the Prophet once he leamed that he was acting on 
erroneous information. 
21 The reported major conflicts were between the Muslims of Medina and the BanI 
Qaynuqa'(early 629 CE), BanI Na4J:r (early 630 CE), BanI Quray~a, the Jews of the Khandaq war (both 
632 CE), the Jews of the Khaybar war (634 CE), and the Jews ofWam al-Qura', Fadak, and Tayma'. 
22 Al-Waqim, AI-Maghiizl, vol.3, p.766. 
23 Al-Waqim, AI-Maghiizl, vol.3, 787. 
24 Al-Waqim, AI-Maghiizl, vol.3, 785-6. 
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On the other hand, the wars that were initiated in Syria during Abiï Bakr's 
caliphate, as Ibn A'tham al-Kiïfi has reported, did not spare the Christian prisoners from 
mass executions. These resulted from the fouI moods and arbitrary choices of warriors 
like Khalid Ibn Wafid who gave no notice to the faith oftheir presumed enemy. 
Such unpredictable wartime behavior apparently had little relevance to the faith 
of the presumed enemy or any principled, intrinsic, and systematic prejudice.25 Rather, it 
had much to do, as will be explained, with the pers on al character of individu al Muslim 
warriors. 
The Rules of Engagement 
The institution of systematic campaigns (ghazwa in the Arabic or razzia in European 
terminology) was part of the fabric of Arab tribal life long before the advent of Islam. 
This activity was considered legitimate since it represented a mechanism of economic 
survival for the Arabian nomads. The Prophet chose an incremental approach to bring 
about graduaI change in the value system and habits of those who supported this 
institution. 
The ghazw institution was essentially a multifaceted tradition which the Prophet 
tried to utilize to bring Arab unit y on a new moral foundation. In doing so he faced a 
who le range of moral questions, such as the proper rules of engagement, jus in bello. 
Such questions concem both the causality and conduct ofwar. 
Almost aIl chronicles and conquest literature on Muslim wars and conque st (a1-
Futiift) document two facts: first, pre-Islamic society, including the polytheists and 
other Arab religious minorities, already had rules of engagement,26 and secondly, these 
25 It is important to note that if the Muslim treatment of the non-Muslims in war had anything to 
do with the specifie faith of the parties that the early Muslim encountered, the history of the Prophetie 
encounter with Jews and Christians of the Arabia should have been reversed. In principle, the Jewish 
concept of God's Unit y copes much better with the most important cardinal principle of Islam than the 
Christian concept of Trinity. Why then were the early Jewish-Muslim encounters much more eventful 
than the early Christian- Muslim ones? 
26 According to Donner (35), "there appear to have been definite rules of the game in raiding that 
both sides were expected to observe in the interest of faimess; attacking noncombatants with lethal 
intent, for example, was considered bad .... Harming the women or children, of course, was probably 
considered a violation of the unwritten code of honorable behavior. .. " See Donner, "The Sources of 
Islamic Conception ofWar" 34-5. See also, Firestone, Jihad, where the author maintains that according to 
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rules were adapted quickly into a comprehensive system of Islamic norms of behavior, 
whether implemented fully or not. 
There are numerous examples of such normative development; for example, 
Mu!}ammad b. al-Saba!} reports from 'Ubaidallah b. 'Abdallah b. 'Utbah that on the 
occasion of the conque st ofMecca, the Prophet made the following statement, "Slay no 
wounded person, pursue no fugitive, execute no prisoner; and whosoever closes his door 
is safe.,,27 According to al-Waqicfi, during the war in Mu'ta, the prophet ordered the 
following: 
1 advise you to be pious to God, and have goodwill towards your fellow Muslim; fight in 
the name of God, and in His way; fight only with those who are infidel to God; avoid 
deceit and treachery; do not kill children; and invite your enemy first to the three 
options of accepting Islam in which case the conflict terminates, ask them to leave their 
land in which case their rights will be observed like others, ask them to pay poIl tax 
Uizya) in which case there is no cause for conflict; and prepare for the battle only if 
these first three options fail. 28 
Another report adds the following injunctions for the same occasion: "Never kill 
women, children, and old men; avoid invading monks and their sanctuaries; do not 
uproot palm and other trees; and do not demolish any dwelling house.,,29 Perhaps the 
most succinct and yet all-encompassing Prophetic advice on war ethics is the following 
referred to by al-Tus!: 
:J-,"= ~ 4....1..:. ~~I ~ ~ ........ \..:;.. ~ J;..Jjc ..11 t..S.JU; .yl "-:lY"" ~ 1...»"1 ~ .lI ..lI) I~I ~I .JI 
JAL:;, ~ ')ti,û.. 'lJ I..l,!lJ I)W '1 J 1."t...J 'll.,li:i 'lJ IJ.J..li:i '1 J..1Y ys ÙA 1).iU..11 ~ ~ J..11 ~ Jje! 
"-:Jl! .l>i"1..:i:..:i ~ .lJ.Jii '1 ~'11..:..Jj l''';~ '1 J.~.~ Iy..l:.:i:i '1J ~Wy ."';fi '1J ~II"';~ '1J 
t..Shl ~I i"'y:...lLS 0f0y::....J1 ÙA IJ.lc ~ I~! J..Js! ÙA fJ ~ 'lI.... 'l1...........J JS.~.J:11.... r-i4-:J1 ÙA IJ';":; '1J 
.~ <....OS J ~ J,.g1..9 4:!l! rSl.J-!4-1 i'" .lLS ..::..,~ 
ancient South Arabian records, "reprisai operations were not uncommon ... but the victors are rarely cited 
as massacring captive troops" (4). He also refers to retaliation (Iextalion) or qi~as, a regularly accepted 
norm in pre-Islamic tribal wars (35). 
27 Abu'! Abbas Alpnad ibn Jabir AI-Baladhurl, The Origin of the Is1amic State (Kitab FutiiiJ a1-
Bu1diin), trans. Philip Khuri Hitti, (Piscataway N.l: Philip K. Gorgias Press, 2002) 66. 
28 A!-Waqidi, A1-Maghiizl, vol.2, 577. 
29 A!-Waqidi, A1-Maghiizl, vol.2, 578. 
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Whenever the Prophet decided to appoint an army commander, advised him first and 
then the rest to be pious to God, the Powerful, the Magnificent and uttered the 
following: "Fight in the name of God, and in the way of God. Fight whoever who has 
denied Allah. And do not resort to treachery (breaking a covenant), do not exceed the 
bounds. Do not mutilate. Do not kill children nore the monks in their monasteries. Do 
not set palm threes afire, nor destroy them by flood. Do not cut any fruit trees nore set 
the farms afire for you never know you might need them. Do not kill eatable animaIs 
uniess you have no other choice for food. And whenever you encounter your enemy from 
among the polytheists, first invite them to the three options. If they accepted, you 
shouid accept and secure them.30 
In addition, two other provisions in these instructions stress the importance of 
respecting covenants and agreements. The Prophet also sanctioned pre-Islamic inter-
tribal pacts of allegiance among newly converted Muslims. AI-Waqidi reports soon after 
the conclusion of the al-I:Iudayblyya treaty the Prophet decreed the following: "Now 
that you have converted to Islam, you may respect your covenants of friendship that you 
had before; aIl friendship pacts of the 'iiihill' (the pre-Islamic culture of Arabi a) era will 
be fully respected by Islam as well, although we will not initiate similar new pacts under 
Islam.,,31 
All sources stress the Prophet's insistence on the non-violability of treaties or 
pacts that Muslims, individually or collectively, concluded with other parties. This had 
strong scriptural backing with the Qur'anic phrases of iïfiï bi'1 'uhiïd (fulfill your 
promises, pledges, vows) and iïfiï bi'1 'uqiïd (fulfill your contracts, pacts, treaties).32 
Not only did public contracts have to be observed but it was incumbent upon all 
Muslims to respect the personal commitments oftheir fellow Muslims. The implication 
of this practice in war was significant. It gave individual soldiers -irrespective of their 
military ranks- the power to grant amnesty (aman) to enemy combatants. 
Another important war ethic, established from the time of the Prophet, was that 
Muslim forces could not initiate the actual battle; rather they had to wait until the 
30 Mu4ammad f.lassan al-Tus!, Tahdhib al-AlJkiim, (Tehran: Dar al-Kutub ai-Isiamiyya, 1365/ 
1987 CE), vo1.6, 138, 139. See Al-Sayyid f.lussay f.lussayn! ai-Zurbattl, Akliiq al-Ijarb fi al-Islam, bayna 
al-N8?ariyya wa al-Ta/biq, (Qum: Entesharat Dar al-Tafsir, 2002) 69. 
31 AI-Waqidi, AI-Maghiizl, vol.2, 594. 
32 See Q.70:32 and Q. 23:8. For a full discussion ofthis topic see Mol}.aqqiq-Damad, Protection 
ofIndividuals in Times of Anned Conniet under Intemational and Islamic Laws, (2005) 330-334. 
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enemy forces commenced attacking. This rule carried great moral significance since it 
signaled that warring was chiefly of last resort. It reflects the detested nature of war 
within Islam; a very significant negative symbol against the previous norm of a nomadic 
Arabia. 
A Mirror of the Moral Shift: Revenge and Pardon 
Perhaps one of the best criteria that shows the extent of the moral shift in the war ethics 
of Arabi a before and after Islam is the way both the jiihiH (pre-Islamic Arab culture) and 
the early Muslims dealth with the value of individu aIs on the opposite sides of the 
battleground. 
Firestone points to one of the jiihiHwar norms as following: "Within the talion 
law (law ofretaliation), however there was no equality. A hundred could be killed for 
one. 'Amir b. al-Tufayl is credited with the words, "We slew of them a hundred in 
requit al for an old man ... ,,33 In other words the jiihiH culture had little sense of faimess 
in retaliation and had no sensible accounting for numbers and no limit in revenge and 
taking lives. 
The full moral contrast is pointed by Moqaqqiq-Damad. "When the polytheists 
killed I:Iamza Ibn 'Abd al-Muttalib in the battle oflJ4ud and ferociously mutilated his 
corps," Moqaqqiq asserts, "the Prophet was deeply affected by their action because 
I:Iamza was his uncIe and the relative he loved most. Nevertheless, he never thought of 
mutilating the corps of an enemy in subsequent wars.,,34 More impressive is that later 
on, the Prophet pardoned I:Iamza's killer and only expressed his wish not to see him ever 
again as Waqidi reports. 
33 Reuven, Firestone. Jihad: the Origin ofHoly War in Islam. (New York, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1990) 35. 
34 Mo4aqqiq-Danüid, Mo~taIa. Protection of Individuals in Times of Anned Conflict under 
Intemational and Islamic Laws, (New York: Global Scholarly Publications, 2005) 412. 
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Ethics and Laws: Models of Right Conduct 
As explained in more details in the Chapters Two and Eight, ethics, as a moral force, is 
superior to law. Law, by definition, is enforced by either a mundane or a divine power; 
ethics go beyond what the law prescribes. Within established Islamic legal norms, any 
transgression willlead to one form or another ofpre-defined punishment. Law may also 
set, on rare occasions, provisions of reward. However, it secures the common and 
minimal requirements ofhumanity. 
Ethics, on the other hand, promotes ideals. It encourages measures above 
obligation and expectation, and seeks the maximum potential of humanity. On the basis 
of this, a soldier or commander who acts according to laws of war is weIl disciplined, 
but once he acts in war, on a moral basis without fear of punishment or interest in 
reward, he enters the category ofheroism. 
Both the script ure and Prophetie tradition (sunna) contain detailed instructions 
on the ethical and legal codes of behavior in battles, though chronicles of the Prophetie 
wars are full of discrepancies. One can find many cases where individuals complied with 
these standards or even acted on the level of humanitarian heroism. There were also 
cases, on the other hand, where other individuals acted harshly or inhumanely and 
committed what in modem language is called war crime. 
As such, it is important to recognize a few points. First, a full understanding of 
the laws of war, as they were newly introduced into Arabia's heterogeneous Islamic 
society, should be expected to emerge slowly-newly introduced norms can not lead to 
completely new behavior in very short spans of time. Secondly, just as people differ in 
their aptitudes and abilities so they differ in their understanding of the spirit of the law. 
For example, a warrior like Khiilid Ibn Walid, believed that physical domination over 
the target had much more priority than the details of life, death, and faith in any given 
battle. He was an accompli shed warrior both before and after his conversion. Naturally, 
it was difficult to change the morals of such a warrior. Another instance was the warrior 
'Ali Ibn Ab1 Tiilib, who probably fought more wars than al-Walid, but balanced his 
courage with compassion and was far more conscious in every single instance of battle, 
of justice than military victory. While the warrior Khiilid Ibn Walid acted outside of 
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Islamic humanitarian laws of war, 'Ali Ibn. Abl Talib acted consistently within that 
standard and became its paragon. 
In between these spectrums as demonstrated by the two warriors, there were 
various other prominent actors and warriors whose specific moral behaviors left a 
permanent imprint on the Muslim legacy in wars for the unforeseeable future. The 
foUowing selective anecdotes may shed sorne light on this conclusion. 
Khalid Ibn AI-Wand, or 'God's Sword' 
Khalid b. Walid (d. 642 CE), known as 'God's sword' (sayfulliih) presents an interesting 
case in the evolution of Islamic morals. After the capitulation of Mecca, the Prophet 
dispatched Khalid to the BanI Jadhlma tribe in order to invite them to join Islam. Khalid 
took a few hundred troops composed ofwarriors from the BanI Sulaim tribe and a group 
from both the Muhiiji1S35 and the An~i1S.36 Shortly before the arrivaI of, Khalid, the 
BanI Jadhlma leamed of Khalid's mission. They reported that they were already 
Muslims, regularly performed their prayers, accepted Mu\lammad as God's messenger, 
had already built mosques, and regularly perform the caU for prayers (adhin). However, 
once Khalid had arrived, he noticed that they were aU armed with swords; so he directed 
that they should immediately disarm and surrender to his troops. They responded that 
they were armed against a hostile tribe which had threatened them both on accounts of a 
long-standing hostility and their recent conversion to Islam. They demanded that they 
be treated like other Muslims, without need for disarmament and surrender. Khalid, 
nevertheless, insisted on their disarmament and once they complied with his orders, had 
their hands tied by his troops. Once they aU had woken the next day to perform their 
prayer, the captives requested that they be temporarily released to perform the prayer 
along with Khalid's troops. This very request caused uproar. Khalid's troops then 
questioned the legality of capturing and imprisoning other Muslims. Khalid then ordered 
his troops to behead the few hundred captives. A section of his troops, from the BanI 
Sulaim, which held long-standing ho st ilitY toward the captive tribe did not waste any 
35 The Meccan emigrant companions of the Prophet who settled with him in Medina. 
36 The Medinese resident companions of the Prophet. 
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time and started beheading them; however, the Muhiijiriïn and An~irdid not follow suit. 
Instead, they released their captives. For them, the order to kill had no legitimate 
justification. 
The tragic event was then presented to the Prophet and his companions; among 
them, 'Abdul-Ral}man b. 'Awfvehemently criticized Khalid for the unfounded massacre 
and responded with the following: "May God kill you as you (Khalid) committed this 
crime only to settle an old jihili account and get even with the unfortunate captives, just 
because they killed your unc1e Fakah in old wars."37 Wh en pressed, Khalid c1aimed that 
he had been ordered by an emissary of the Prophet to attack and plunder. 'Abdul-
Ra4man responded in anger and disgust that not only had Khalid committed a grave 
crime but had attributed a lie to the Prophet. The Prophet formally disassociated himself 
from the crime in a prayer, denied ordering the attack, and dispatched 'Ali Ibn. Abl 
Talib to the bereaved tribe in order to give full compensation for its victims. 'Ali 
returned and reported that he spent much more than blood wit (diya), to the extent that 
he "paid for the loss of a broken bowl which was serving their dog-food".38 According to 
Ibn Hisham, the Prophet, once informed about the incident, raised his arms so high that 
'his armpits could be seen' and cried three times, '0 God, 1 am innocent before Thee of 
what Khalid has done!,39 Apparently in this case, Khalid's and 'Ali's behaviors in war 
established a complete moral contrast; by modern standards, the former warrior could be 
considered a war criminal whereas the latter is a moral exemplar. 
War and Epical Tragedy 
The massacre of the BanI Jadhlma represents one of the most tragic and romantic 
episodes of the early wars in Islam. According to al-Waqidi, late in the evening of the 
day of Khalid's assault against the BanI Jadhlma, members of that tribe's long-time 
adversary, the BanI Sulaim approached a young man who had incurred their anger in one 
of the earlier tribal wars. Caught unaware and not knowing what had happened to the 
37 AI-Waqidi, AI-Maghizl, vol.3, 672. 
38 AI-Waqidi, AI-Maghizl, vol.3, 674. 
39 The story is depicted by Toshihiko Izutsu as a symbol of the jiihili war ethics. See Toshihiko 
Izutsu, Ethico-Religious Concepts in the Qur'iin, (Montreal: Mc Gill University Press, 1966) 30. 
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rest ofhis tribe, the young man resisted his attackers and even kiIled two ofthem while 
escaping. Early the next moming, however, having found that aIl of the women and 
children, including his own, had been taken captive, he retumed to tum himself in on the 
condition that the BanI Sulaim treat him in the same manner as the captive women and 
children. Khiilid's troops agreed on the terms of surrender so he surrendered, believing 
he was protected by a divine covenant. Once he became a captive, however, the BanI 
Sulaim delivered him to Khiilid against their promise. Upon leaming he was doomed, 
the young man asked as a final favor to visit the captive women. Once this request was 
granted, he dropped to the ground near a woman named I:Iubaish and uttered the 
following: 
Oh! I:Iubaish, 
l am Innocent and will read for you my last poetry: 
Come close! And bestow my reward before the separation would arrive, and they take 
away the suffered lover on the order of the commander; 
Does not love de serve to be rewarded? 
For it has walked a long way so many nights till moming, 
and so many hot days aIl along; 
Is it not true that l was in se arch ofyou? 
In the hope to find you in I:Ialya or Khawaniq.40 
l have not disclosed any secrets l was entrusted with, 
And after you, nothing ever has made me to stare; 
Whatever war and calamity that may befall on the tribe, 
Will not but strengthen love once again. 
According to al-Wiiqidi, it was reported by his executioners that, "on that day 
once l beheaded that young man, a woman approached his head and kissed him so long 
that she feIl dead afterwards and laid next to her lover.,,41 
By recanting such tragic details, al-Wiiqidi wants his reader to note the moral 
paradox of the case. Such a paradox points out that Islam's primary goal as professed by 
the Prophet was to advance human morality, whereas the tragedy that is perpetrated by 
Khiilid destroyed the most valued product ofhumanity, which is love. 
Nonetheless, the rebuke of Khiilid by the Prophet and others did little to change 
the cruel manner in which Khiilid treated his prisoners of war. In one case when Khalid 
40 Names of an Arabian desert in Ta4ama and a city in Fahm area. 
41 AI-Waqim, Al-Maghiizl, vol.3, 672. 
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was dispatched to suppress the apostates (known as ridda campaigns), he and his troops 
were hosted by Malik Ibn Nuwayra, who was then killed in an ambush by Khalid, under 
a false accusation, but in reality for his beautiful wife who was forced to have sex with 
Khalid on the same night ofher husband's murder, in clear contravention with the spirit 
and letters ofIslamic law.42 Ibn A'tham al-Ku fi reports that Khalid used to execute the 
prisoners of his Syrian campaigns. In one case, he executed eight hundred Christian 
Romans headed by the patriarch Qilqa, one by one after they aIl refused to convert.43 In 
another confrontation, when the Christian patriarch Augusta refused to convert to Islam, 
he and a hundred sixt Y ofhis soldiers were executed.44 
Prophetie Consultations with 'Umar and Abü Bakr: Different Personalities, 
Different Rulings 
The battle of the Greater Badr is known as the first serious battle in Islam, and thus a 
landmark with ramifications for the laws of war. AI-Waqicfi reports on how the Prophet 
decided the fate of prisoners from this battle. 
As soon as the battle subsided, the captives decided, out of fear of immediate 
execution, to call for the mediatory assistance of the two pro minent companions of the 
Prophet, Abu Bakr (d. 634 CE) and 'Umar Ibn al-Khan ab (d. 644 CE). Abu- Bakr was 
requested because he was a close relative to many of the Meccan captives and his 
lenient attitude; the choice of 'Umar was likely due to fear ofhis usually severe attitude. 
Abu Bakr responded that he would do his best but could not promise anything. 
'Umar responded that he would do no harm to their cause. Abu Bakr then talked to the 
42 Tabataba'l points that Abu Bakr refrained to punish KhaIid as requested by 'Umar Ibn al-
Khanab by saying: "1 can not put one ofGod's swords back into its sheath." Tabataba'1 stresses that such 
insensitivities and legal favoritism gradually became institutional and provided a wholesale immunity for 
all the twelve thousand companions of the Prophet who outlived him for about a cent ury. In his view, it 
was such a wholesale approval of many incoherent behaviors that was ultimately responsible for the 
predicament of the spiritual Islam. See Moharnmad I:lusayn, Tabataba'l, Shi 'ah: Les Entretien et les 
Correspondances de Professeur Henry Corbin avec 'Alliimah Tabii.tabii'i (Persian), 4th ed. (Tehran: 
Mu'assese pazhuheshi Hekmat wa Falsafeh Iran, 1383/1984 CE) 216-18. 
43 Ibn A'tham, Al-FutiiiJ, 74. 
44 Ibn A'tham, Al-Futiï4, 75. 
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Prophet and encouraged him to either release the prisoners unconditionaUy - most were 
close relatives of the Prophet and his companions - or to release them on ransom, as that 
would help the Muslims financiaUy. The Prophet responded with silence and asked for 
'Umar's opinion.45 'Umar responded harshly: "Oh God's Apostle! These (prisoners) are 
God's enemy, they denied your caU, and launched a war against you; as they are heads 
ofinfidelity and leaders ofways that are astray, cut their necks thereby God may bestow 
comfort over Islam, and belittle the polytheists."46 The Prophet again feU silent. Abii 
Bakr next stated: "Oh God's Apostle! May my parents be sacrificed for you; these are 
your relatives, release them unilaterally or against ransom for you must not be the first 
pers on to make them helpless; it is better if God should decide to lead them to the right 
path than their demise at your hand.,,47 Abii Bakr was concemed about the future 
ramifications of retaliatory action. Once again 'Umar took the floor, and demanded the 
immediate execution of the prisoners. He reminded the Prophet that it was these same 
polytheists who forced him into exile. 'Umar said, "Just imagine if they had won the 
battle, they would have never given us a second chance.,,48 The Prophet remained silent 
as the speakers repeated their arguments for a third time. At this point, he left the 
crowd. The controversy caused a public confrontation between the two sides on this 
question. When the Prophet retumed after an hOUT of contemplation, he stopped aU 
arguments and delivered the following speech: 
The two friends 1 consulted ('Umar and Abu Bakr) represent two distinct attitudes that 
have an old precedence: Abu Bakr resembles the Angel Michael who brings the 
contentness and forgiveness of God to earth, and the Prophet Abraham who was softer 
than honey to his people ... his people (Abraham's) threw him to fire, nevertheless he 
prayed for them and uttered 'Fie on you and those you worship besides God! Will you 
not understand?,49 He (Abraham) used to pray 'So he who follows me is truly ofme; but 
as for him who disobeys me, surely you are forgiving and kind,.50 
45 Al-Waqidi, AI-Maghiizl, vol. 1 , 80. 
46 AI-Waqidi, AI-Maghiizi, voU, 80. 
47 Al-Waqidi, AI-Maghiizl, voU, 80. 
48 Al-Waqidi, AI-Maghiizl, voU, 81. 
49 Orooj, AI-Qur'iin: A Contemporary Translation, Q.21:67. 
50 Orooj, AI-Qur'iin: A Contemporary Translation, Q.14:36. 
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He (Abu Bakr) also resembles Jesus, who used to say: 'If You punish them, 
indeed they are Your creatures; if You pardon them, indeed You are mighty and wise.51 
As for 'Umar, he resembles, among the angels, Gabriel who appears on Earth to bring 
God's anger and wrath against His enemies; and among prophets to Noah who looks to 
be tougher than stone to his people where he says '0 Lord, do not leave a single 
habitation of unbelievers on the earth, ,52 and cursed them so deep that caused the 
drowning of the entire population on the earth ... he ('Umar) also resembles Moses who 
used to say '0 Lord, destroy their possession and harden their hearts that they may not 
believe until they face the painful punishment. ,53 
In the end, the Prophet decreed that the captives either be freed by ransom or executed. 
The approximately seventy prisoners included his son-in law. According to al-Wiiqidi 
The Prophet concluded that the Muslim troops were, indeed, in serious financial need. 54 
Strict Precedence or a Tactical Ruling? 
The Prophet's ruling in theory was the middle ground between the positions proposed 
by Abu Bakr and 'Umar. However, although he espoused this intermediate position, he 
was far more moderate in practice. Quite a few were released without ransom when no 
Meccan relative approached Medina to buy their freedom; the majority was released 
upon payment of ransoms proportion al to their wealth; and a few converted and stayed 
in Medina.55 Only a couple of captives were executed for attempting to escape and other 
violations of their captivity and not on the ground that they were prisoners of war. 
During captivity, moreover, the prisoners received better food than what the Muslim 
warriors could afford for themselves.56 It is clear that the Prophet' s first ruling was a 
tactical move but it was his action that layed a legal and moral precedent in treating the 
prisoners of war. This episode can be contrasted with the previous assault of Khiilid Ibn 
Walid on the BanI Jadhlma. 
51 Orooj, Al-Qur'in: A Contemporary Translation, Q.5: 118. 
52 Orooj, Al-Qur'in: A Contemporary Translation, Q.71:26. 
53 Orooj, Al-Qur'in: A Contemporary Translation, Q.1O:88. 
54 Al-Waqidi, Al-Maghiizl, vol. 1, 81. 
55 AI-Waqidi, Al-Maghiizl, voU, 82-7. 
56 AI-Waqidi, Al-Maghiizl, voU, 88. 
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Honey and Stone at War 
The accounts of the Prophet at Badr reveal his consciousness of the militant and lenient 
tendencies among his companions, and his attempt to strike a balance between them. To 
what extent was he successful? This is a hard question to answer within the socio-
economic milieu of seventh cent ury Arabia. 'Umar seemed always to hold an extreme 
position when it came to the use of force. Similarly, another companion of the Prophet, 
Sa'd Ibn Mu'adh, supported 'Umar's radical ruling on the fate of the Badr prisoners. He 
later decided the arbitration between the Muslims and the Jews of BanI Qurai~a based 
on Jewish Books, which led to the execution of close to six hundred Jewish prisoners.57 
When the Muslims retumed from the costly battle of lJ4ud, 'Umar asked the 
Prophet to behead whatever critic who raised his voice.58 The Prophet rejected the 
request saying, "as for the Jews, they are under our protection (dhimnil) and as for the 
hypocrites, l am forbidden to transgress whoever has verbally professed the truth of 
Islam and accepted my apostleship."59 
According to an account by Ibn Isl).aq, 'Umar, before his conversion to Islam, 
sought to kill his brother-in-Iaw Sa 'id Ibn Zeid Ibn 'Amru Ibn Nufaiyl and actually 
injured his own sister Fatima Bint KhaHab for their earlier conversions to Islam.60 
In one instance, just before the conclusion of the al-f.ludaybiyya treaty, 'Umar 
criticized fellow Muslim Abü Jandal because he had spared the life of his polytheist 
57 For the full account of the story, see AI-Waqidi, AI-MaghiizJ, voU, 387. Also see Mol:laqqiq-
Damad, Protection of lndividuals in Times of Anned Connict under lntemational and lslamic Laws, 
(2005) 408. Mol:laqqiq-Damad points that the blame for the mass-execution falls upon the Jewish 
community for they "refused to have the person of the Prophet as the arbitrator, whose ruling regarding 
their Jewish neighbors, the tribes of BanI al-Naçlir and BanI Quynaqa', affected their property but not 
their lives." 
58 AI-Waqidi, AI-MaghiizJ, voU, 229. 
59 AI-Waqidi, AI-MaghiizJ, vol. 1,229. See also the reports on the Muryasa' battle (311); the 
Ta'if battle (711); and the Ja'araneh (721); Firestone's reading of the SJra literature and his conclusion 
that 'Umar "is invariably depicted as a powerful and confident man who easily wielded his sword both 
before and after becoming Muslim," in Firestone, Jihiid, 108. 
60 Hamedanl, SJrat-e Rasiilulliih, 159. 
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father in battle.61 Can there be any surprise that, when he became caliph, 'Umar 
removed the phrase 'seek the best of alI deeds' (J-,ll ~ uk i? J;.ayya 'alii khayri al-
'ama1.0 from the calI to prayer (ù1jl)? There are many reports about his arguments with 
the Prophet on this matter, as 'Umar could not accept that any deed could possibly be 
more valued than armedjihiid62 'Umar changed the phrase to 'the prayer is better than 
sleeping' (f'.;lll Ù'"~ ol).....:J1 a~-~aliitu khairun min an-nawm) , thereby diminishing its 
status from the best of deeds to a level less worthy than jihad and only better than 
sleeping.63 Perhaps the same militant spirit explains why the bulk of Islamic territorial 
conquests took place during 'Umar's caliphate. 
It is important to note that the entire three-volume chronic1es of aJ-MaghiizJ on 
the Prophetie wars do not convey a single case of similar militant behavior on the part 
of Abu Bakr. There is one report on how another companion, 'Uthman Ibn 'Affiïn,64 was 
forgiven by the Prophet for having fled battle at Uhud.65 
Given the wide range of ethical attitudes and personal habits among alI of the 
first four Caliphs after the death of the Prophet, a pertinent question would be how theis 
four most important symbols and purportedly exemplars of Islam could possibly 
establish any consistant standard of ethical order in wars? Fred Donner asserts "The 
attitudes of the first generations of Muslim toward questions of war and peace were 
primarily shaped by a) the cultural norms of the pre-Islamic societies to which they 
belonged, b) the attitudes toward war contained, implicitly or explicitly, in the Qur'an, 
61 AI-Waqidi, Al-Maghizl, 463. 
62 See Mohammad l;Iusayn, Tabataba'l, ShI 'ah: Les Entretien et les Correspondances de 
Professeur Henry Corbin avec 'Alliimah Tabii.tabii'J (Persian), 4th ed. (Tehran: Mu'assese pazhuheshi 
Helanat wa Falsafeh Iran, 1383/1984 CE) 216. 
63 Ramzl Owl).adi and Mohammad Reqa, One Thousand and One Stories about Imiim 'AH, 
(Tehran: Said Novin Publications, 1998) 381-82. Their source is Salim b. Qays. 
64 'Uthman ibn 'Affan was the third Muslim Caliph, and died in the year 656 CE. 
65 Owl).adi and Reqa, One Thousand and One, 201. 
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and c) the dramatic events of their own lifetimes.,,66To this, one should add the 
character typology of the specific chaliphs. 
Conclusions 
The moral shift of the war ethics, caused by the transition of the Arab society from the 
jiihifI into the Islamic culture, was immense and provided a full contrast. But soon after 
the demi se of the Prophet, and the acquisition of vast fortunes from the subsequent 
conquests, the lenient treatment of prisoners of war became less common as their 
economic value declined. Captives became increasingly a burden for the Muslim 
warriors. Consequently, the arbitrary treatment of prisoners of war was codified by the 
first generation of the Islamic jurists. Sorne jurists, following the examples of the 
Prophet and those companions who cared for just war norms, codified rules that are, in 
parts, still more progressive and humane than the laws of war under various modem 
international conventions. And sorne others gave war commanders a free hand to follow 
the example of al-Walid. 
'Umar's policies proved the most influential of the early caliphs. He ruled for 
more than a decade. Abu Bakr's reign, in contrast, was short lived. 'Uthman was not 
personally militant or harsh. As a caliph, nevertheless, he maintained 'Umar's war 
policies without significant modification. 'Ali was forced to take up campaigns against 
domestic foes who opposed his succession. Yet, during the Prophetic wars and 
afterwards, he maintained a just and chivalrous record. 
'Umar was the chief advocate of foreign wars. As such, he had sufficient time to 
institutionalize his war policies and ethics. The four first caliphs of Islam had four very 
different characters: a pacifist, a militant, a political instrumentalist, and a believer in 
just war. Among all the four, the most militant had the chance and long enough a reign 
to establish the post-Prophetic battle norms. The 'stone,' therefore, had ample chance 
to predominate the 'honey.' In the end, personal dispositions and characters of the 
specific caliphs and idiosyncrasy heavily mattered for the spirit of the laws and norms of 
66 Fred M. Donner, "The Sources ofIs1amic Conception ofWar," in John Ke1esay, and James T. 
Johnson, eds. Just War and Jihad, Greenwood Press, (New York, London: 1991) 33. 
29 
war formed under their rule. These norms were still far better than the global 
eonventional praetiees of the day, but mueh short of the Prophetie war ethie legacies. 
This chapter primarily foeused on the influences of charaeters on the theories 
and eonduets of eady Muslim wars. Against sueh influences, there is an ample need to 
look into principles as provided by the Qur'anie Seripture and its exegeses as provided 
by the next ehapter. 
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CHAPTER Two 
W AR ETHICS IN THE QUR' AN 
There has come to you from Allah a light 
and a clear book by which Allah guides 
those who pursue His pleasure to ways of 
peace. 
The Qur'an, 5:15,16 
In the examination of war ethics from an Islamic perspective, it is necessary to inc1ude 
an analysis of the scriptural positions on the ethics of conflict. The literature on Islamic 
war ethics is ri ch with conventional interpretations of the Qur'anic war-related verses. 
But in order to have a broader conception of the Islamic positions, it is essential to study 
these verses together with other verses that do not seem to be war-related at their face 
value, but are nevertheless helpful in the field. The analysis will start by critical review 
of c1assical and contemporary Qur'anic exegetical works, and will explore the positions 
of the Scripture on the goals and limits ofwar in the light of the vast spectrum ofviews. 
This spectrum posits the Sufi-pacifist view on the one extreme and the views of those 
who favor perpetuaI war on the other. 
Qur'anic Exegeses: Moralist Versus Legalist Approaches 
A brief look at c1assical Qur'anic exegeses reveals sorne contradictions within the 
moralist and legalist approaches to war. 67 
Within the Qur'anic text that speaks to the subjects ofwar and homicide, sever al 
verses come under the rubric of mutashiibihiit (ambiguous verses), which signal their 
capacity to stand for a broad spectrum of interpretations. To illustrate, the thirty-second 
verse of the Qur'an in Chapter Five (surat al-Ma'ida) reads as follows: 
67 Reuven Firestone attributes the presence of non-linear, dual militant-pacifist tendencies within 
the body of early Muslim literature to an early interpretive clash on the Scripture, fJadith and s/ra 
(biographical fJadith). He maintains that biographical fJadith (in his view, written primarily by militant 
commentators) was subjected to criticism only after a century which "was too late to be effective." See 
Reuven Firestone, Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999) 90, 105, 107. 
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Because ofthat, We decreed upon the Children ofIsrael that whoever kills a soul unless 
for a soul slain, or for corruption [done] in the land, it is as if he had slain mankind 
entirely. And whoever saves one, it is as if he had saved mankind entirely. And Our 
Messenger had certainly come to them with clear proof. Then indeed many of them, 
[even] after that, throughout the land, were transgressors.68 
These lines present a broad prohibition against manslaughter; they promote respect for 
life through rich metaphors. Yet, because of these metaphors, they create the possibility 
of different interpretations by different scholars in different eras. 
Over the course of four centuries (from lOth to 14th cent ury CE) classical 
exegetes, have treated this verse in diverse ways. For example, al-Tabad (d. 922 CE), by 
reference to a selection of qadith, decides: first, that the de cree is univers al (binding not 
only for the Jewish community) , secondly that the rule has a rational justification (a 
moral conclusion from the first murder of one of Adam's sons by another); and third, 
that the verse means that punishment for murder must be extreme and can not possibly 
be increased by further acts ofmurder.69 
On the other hand, the ShI'! Abu al-Futuq al-Razl (d. 1131 CE) provides a more 
pacifist interpretation of the verse emphasizing that penal laws function primarily as a 
deterrent, and that the literaI implementation of penal codes is not the goal of the 
lawmaker; they serve as a moral reminder to the Muslim society.70 AI-Zamakhsharl's 
(d.1144 CE) interpretation is similar. By restricting the scope of the corruption on Earth 
mentioned in the verse, he limits the exception to the rule and maintains the gravit y of 
the offense. 71 
68 The Qur'in, trans. and ed. ~a4ee4 International (Riyadh: Abulqasim Publishing House, 1997) 
141-2. 
69 Abü Ja 'far Mu4ammad al-Tabar1, Jiimi ' al-Bayin 'an Ta'wll iyiit al-Qur'in (Cairo: Dar al-
Mu'arif, n.d.) 233. 
70 Abü al-Futü4 al-Raz1, Rawf:i al-Jinin wa Rii/;J al-Janin, vol.2 (Qum: Mar 'ash1 Library 
Publications, 1404 AH) 139. 
71 Abü al-Qasim Mal}müd, al-Zamakhshar1, Al-Kashshif 'an Haqi'iqi Ghawiimkj al-Tanzll 
(Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Arab1, n.d.) 627. 
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The subsequent scholars al-Tabarsl (d.1154 CE),n Fakhr al-Dln al-Razl (d. 1210 
CE),73 and al-Bayqawl (d. 1316 CEf4 took a legalistic approach more than their 
predecessors. They insisted on implementing all details ofpenallaw. 
The God of the moralists' world is much more flexible than the one of the 
legalists. AI-Tabarsl, Fakhr al-Dln al-Razl and al-Bayqawl did not hesitate expanding 
the meaning of 'corruption on Earth' in a manner that could encourage the legal 
execution of everyday miscreants.75 Killing another human being was evil to them not 
because of the harm it did to human society, but because it made the ultimate lawmaker 
wrathful. On the whole, al-Tabad and Abu'l Futul]. seem to be of more flexible minds 
than the exegetes who followed them. 
The weight and value of human life in the views of these exegetes have direct 
implications on their views on war and peace. Moralistic approach was less likely to 
promote war than a legalistic one. 
The ~ufi Exegesis: The Prime War is Against the Self 
Many early ~ufi commentators adopted esoteric interpretations of the Qur'anic verses 
treating. Among the most widely read of these early commentaries is Kashf al-Asrar wa-
'Uddat al-Abrar of Abu Ismail 'Abd Allah al-An~ad Heravl (d. 481/1089) with 
additional commentaries by Rashld al-Dln Abu al-Faql Al].mad Mayburn (written ca. 
520/1126). AI-An~ad emphasizes the esoteric aspects of the war-related verses. The real 
challenge and test towards one's faith for him cornes from within. In one parable, al-
An~arl relates how a senior ~ufi was once injured by a sharp tree-branch while he was 
72 Faql Ibn f,Iasan al-TabarsI, Majma ' al-Bayiin li 'Uliim al-Qur'iin, vol. 2 (Qum: Mar 'ashi 
Library Publications, 1403 AH) 187. 
73 Fakhr al-Din, al-Raz!. Mafiitli} al-Ghaib, vol. Il (Beirut: Dar al-Ihya' al-Turath al-ArabI, n.d.) 
212. 
74 Na~lr al-Din Abu Sa 'Id, al-BayqawI, Anwar al-TanzJI wa Asrar al-Ta'wJI (Gesamtherstellung: 
Prof[ & Company, n.d.) 256-257. 
75 Whereas Abu'l Futul} interprets 'the corruption on earth' as 'fighting with God,' ai-Razi and al-
1.'abarsl suggest three categories of apostasy, highway robbery, and fighting with God. 
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climbing a palm tree. "Loo king at his own tom stomach, he praised God for the 
incident al success to punish the 'self. ,,76 AI-An~arl adds: 
The reasons why the Prophet stressed that the greater Jihad Uihid al-akbar) must be 
against the camaI soul (naIS) is that wars with the infidels are occasional but the 
esoteric battle is continuous; there are possible ways to avoid the visible weapons of the 
infidels, but little chance to escape the invisible weapons of temptations of the soul; and 
that unlike the case of martyrdom in war with the infidels, there are no rewards if one is 
defeated by his inner enemy.77 
For this reason, al-An~ar1 distances himself from warriors martyred in temporal combat 
when he comments on verses Q. 2:190 and 191.78 "Martyrs in the hand ofhuman beings 
(khalq) is one thing and martyrs in the hand ofGod (iJaqq) is another," he conc1udes.79 
This view is adopted by many later exegetes such as 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Qashanl (d. 
730/1329), author of Ta'wiliit al-Qur'iin.80 al-Qashanl does not encourage external jihad 
but emphasizes the more important esoteric battlefields. 
Perhaps the most concise Slifi motto on war and peace is al-An~arl's following 
statement: 
May God bless all those chivalry-mannered Uaviinmardiin) people who walked over all 
their wishes, who made peace with the people and who stood firm in war with their own 
camaI soul.SI 
76 'Abd Allah. al-An~arl, TafSJr-e Adab! va Erfiin! Qur'iin-e Maj!d, with Commentary by Imam 
AiJmad Maybüd!, in Persian, I:Iablb Allah Amuzegar ed. (Tehran: Entesharat-e Eqbal, 6th ed. 1990), 168. 
77, Abd Allah. al-An~arl, TafS!r-e Adab! va Erfiin! Qur'iin-e Maj!d, 168. 
78 Q.2:191: "Fight in the way of Allah those who fight you but do not transgress. Indeed, Allah 
does not like transgressors." Q.2:192: "And kill them wherever you overtake them and expel them from 
wherever they have expelled you, and fitnah is worse than killing. And do not fight them at al-Masjid al-
Haram until they fight you there. But if they fight you, then kill them. Such is the recompense of the 
disbelievers." Translation is from: The Qur'iin, ~a4ee4 International trans. and ed. (Riyadh: Abulqasim 
Pulishing House, 1997),36,37. 
79, Abd Allah. al-An~arl, 78. 
SO 'Abd al-Razzaq. al-Qashanl, Ta'wilit al-Qur'iin, (Beirut: Dar al-Bay4ah al-'Arabiyya), 1968. 
SI'Abd Allah. al-An~arl, 168. 
34 
Winning in peace, however, is as important for al-An~ar1 as winning in war. Deception 
in war (al-khud 'a) is supported by 4adith literatures in contradistinction to the breach 
of any agreement (al-ghadr) contracted with the enemy. AI-An~ar1 also points to the 
permissibility of lying for peacemaking as one other exception to the general and very 
strict prohibition of deception in the Islamic ethics. 82 
Breach ofContract: the Prime Cause for Interfaith and Intra-faith Conflicts 
Despite the frequent assertions of various Muslim jurists' that there exists a permanent 
war between the abode of Islam (dir al-Islam) and the abode of infidelity (dir al-kufT), 
there are no specifie Qur'anic contentions to this effect. In fact, the Qur'anic references 
to the cause or causes for eternal intra-religious conflicts, such as verses Q. 2:10083 , 
5:1384 , 1485 and 6486 do not concern the engagements of Muslims in such conflicts. 
Rather, these verses assert that it was because of the "breach of the divine covenant" 
among the "people of book" (signifying the Jewish and Christian communities) that 
they were condemned to God' s curse (la 'na), animosity (al- 'adiwa), and hatred (al-
baghcjij until the Day of Judgment. These verses, when considered in conjuncture with 
82'Abd Allah. al-An~arl, 149. It is important to note that the strict legal and ethical ban on Iying 
and deceit in the Islamic tradition is reflected, within various Islamic traditions, in the proverbial phrase 
of: "the liar is God's enemy." There are however two exceptions: when Iying brings peace and when 
telling the truth causes conflict. 
83 Q.2: 100: "Is it not [true] that every time they took a covenant a party of them threw it away? 
But, [in fact], most ofthem do not believe." 
84 Q.5:12, 13: "And Allah had already taken a covenant from the Children ofIsrael..." "So for 
their breaking of the covenant We cursed them and made their hearts hard ... " 
85 Q.5: 14: "And from those who say, "We are Christians" We took their covenant; but they 
forgot a portion of that of which they were reminded. So We caused among them animosity and hatred 
until the Day of Resurrection." 
86 Q.5: 64: "And the Jews say, 'The hand of Allah is chained.' Chained are their hands, and 
cursed are they for what they say. Rather, both his hands are extended; He spends however He wills. And 
that which has been revealed to you from your Lord will surely increase many of them in transgression 
and disbelief. And We have cast among them animosity and hatred until the Day of Resurrection. Every 
time they kindled the fire ofwar, Allah extinguished it ... " 
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the verses Q.5:66,87 Q.5:77,88 and Q.5:80,89 clearly point to two essential notions about 
religious conflicts: first, that the 'people of the book' are condemned to etemal conflict 
among themselves--which is an entirely separate issue from the conflict between them 
and the Muslim community whatever the cause. Second, that these verses indicates that 
the motivations of intra-Christian and intra-Jewish conflicts and animosities do not 
stem from their ideological stance towards Muslims, but from their extremism and 
transgression within their own religious framework, as well as their breach of covenants. 
Verses, Q. 9: 8, 10, 11,90 12 and 13 point to the breach of contract as a cause of 
conflicts. Specifically, verse 8 criticizes the po1ytheists for their hollow lip service on 
treaties. This is yet another emphasis on the importance of treaties that must be 
unconditionally held, according to the Qur'an, without respect to the beHef system of 
the contracting parties. Verse 10 reads: 'They do not observe toward a believer any pact 
of kinship or covenant of protection; and it is they who are transgressors.' "And if they 
break their oaths after their treaty and defame your religion, then fight the leaders of 
disbelief, for indeed, there are no oaths to them ... " This verse once again emphasizes 
the importance of treaties, and the severity of breaching them in which case there is a 
cause for fighting; however, fighting is sanctioned only against military leaders who 
have direct responsibility for the breach. The following verse 13, qualifies, in most 
unequivocal terms, the same cause for Muslims-Polytheists conflict: "would you not 
fight a people who broke their oaths and determined to expel the Messenger, and they 
87 Q.5:66: "And if only they (Jews and Christians) had upheld the Torah, the Gospel, and what 
has been revealed to them from their Lord, they would have consumed (provision) from above them and 
from beneath their feet. Among them is a moderate community, but many of them-evil is that which they 
d " o. 
88 Q.5:77: "Say, '0 People of the Script ure, do not exceed limits in your religion beyond the truth 
and do not follow the inclinations of a people who had gone astray before and mi sIed many and have 
strayed from the soundness of the way." 
89 Q.5:80: "You see many of them becoming allies of those who disbelieved (polytheists). How 
wretched is that which they have put forth for themselves in that Allah has become angry with them, and 
in the punishment they will abide etemally." 
90 Q.9: 11: "And if they [the polytheists] break their oaths after their treaty and defame your 
religion, then fight the leaders of disbelief, for indeed, there are no oath [sacred] to them; [fight them that] 
they might cease." 
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had began (the attack upon) you the first time?" This verse leaves no doubt that the 
polytheists unilaterally breached their oath and peace treaty. 
The preceding verses regarding the root causes of anti-polytheist Muslim wars 
make it clear that this war, however instigated by the script ure, is completely of 
retaliatory and corrective nature. It constitutes a reaction to the campaign primarily 
initiated against the Meccan Muslim community by the polytheists, with the initial 
cause being the unilateral breach of the treaty they had with Muslims. It is important to 
note that according to Tabalaba'1, although Muslims were ordered to retaliate against 
the polytheists, they were, nevertheless ordered to always announce their adverse 
campaigns, in contrast to the un-announced and unilateral breach of the treaties by 
polytheists.91 
According to the Qur'an, it is such unprovoked misdeeds that condemns the 
perpetrators to a perpetuaI penallaw as stipulated in Q.4:79 and frequently mentioned 
elsewhere in the Qur'an: "What cornes to you of good is from Allah, but what cornes to 
you of evil, [0 man], is from yourself..." The tacit meaning is that wars and conflicts 
are the direct results of human deeds, rather than God's arbitrary sanctions. In other 
words, inter-religious and intra-sectarian conflicts and wars, in the Qur'anic context, are 
not the unavoidable and intrinsic results of the plurality of religions. 
In fact several verses complement constructive competition among various 
faiths.92 A nuanced reading of the Qur'anic commentary on religious conflicts confirms 
that what produces such conflicts are sheer acts of transgression. This is apparent in the 
ontologie al roots of war as described by the Scripture in reference to the expulsion of 
Adam and Eve from paradise. Pursuant to first couple's defiance of God's order 
regarding the ban on eating the fruits of the forbidden tree, the entire human genre was 
91 Mohammad J:[usayn Tabataba'l, TafsJr al-Mizan, vol.9, trans. Mohammad Baqer Musavi 
Hamadani (Tehran: Markaze Nashr-e Raja, 1985) 72. 
92 Q.5:48: " ... To each of you We prescribed a law and a method. Had Allah willed, He would 
have made you one nation [united in religion], but [He intended] to test you in what He has given you; so 
race to [aIl that is] good. To Allah is your retum aIl together, and He will [then] inform you conceming 
that over which you used to differ." 
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condemned to enmity except those who follow scriptural guidance as Q.20:12393 points. 
Here again, war as a curse and a vice is rooted in the breach of a covenant (the very first 
covenant between God and human being). 
The Ethics of Debating does not Support War for DisbeHef 
A popular conception of Islamic war ethics daims that unbelief in tenets of the Muslim 
faith was reason enough for going to war with others. However, the Qur'anic protocol 
for inter-religious debate and argumentation, as reflected in the following verses, 
espouse a firm refutation of war as a means of dealing with disbelief. Covering a long 
period of the early Islamic community, the Qur'anic verses 5:9, 2, 3; 2: 109;94 3: 134;95 
4:148;96 5:13;97 6:106;9x 15:94;99 16:125;100 29:46;101 42:15 102 and 50:39,103 place an 
93 Q.20: 123: "Allah said, 'Descend from it [i.e., Paradise] - all [your descendants] being enemies 
to one another. And ifthere should come to you guidance from Me- then whoever follows My guidance 
will neither go astray [in the world] nor suffer [in the Hearafter]. 
94 Q.2: 109: "Many of the people of the Script ure wish they could turn you back to disbelief after 
you have believed, out of envy from themselves [even] after the truth has become clear to them. So 
pardon and overlook Ulltil Allah delivers His commands. Indeed, Allah is over aIl things competent." 
95 Q.3: 133, 134: "And hast en to forgiveness from your Lord and a garden as wide as the Heavens 
and earth, prepared for the righteous. Who spend during ease and hardship and who restrain anger and who 
pardon the people- And Allah loves the doer of good." 
96 Q.4: 148: "Allah does not like the public mention of evil except by one who has been wronged. 
And ever is Allah Hearing and Knowing." 
97Q.5: 13: "So for their breaking of the covenant We cursed them and made their hearts hard. 
They distort words from their [proper] places and have forgotten a potion of that which they were 
reminded. And you will still observe deceit among them, except a few of them. But pardon them and 
overlook [their misdeeds]. Indeed, Allah loves the doers of good." 
98Q. 6:106: "Follow, [0 MlÙ!ammad], what has been revealed to you from your Lord- there is no 
deity except Him- and tum away from those who associate others with Allah." 
99Q.15 :94: ''Then declare what you are commanded and turn away from the polytheists." 
IOOQ.16: 125: "Invite to the way of your Lord with wisdom and good instruction, and argue with 
them in a way that is best. Indeed, your Lord is most knowing of who has strayed from His way, and He is 
most knowing of who is [rightly] guided." 
IOIQ.29:46: "And do not argue with the People of the Script ure except in a way that is best, 
except for those who commit injustice among them, and say, 'We believe in that which has been revealed 
to us and revealed to you. And our God and your God is one; and we are Muslims [in submission] to 
H · ,,, lm. 
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unequivocal emphasis on using soft and the best lang.uage (alJsan), patience and self-
control (lJi1m) , forgiveness ('afW), flexibility ($ailJ) and similar tolerant attitudes 
towards non-Muslim communities. 
Prevalent misconceptions of the scriptural view towards non-Muslims seem to 
stem from the fact that such a lenient approach to disbelievers does not match sever al 
militant verses that encourage a rather harsh treatment of non-Muslims, such as the 
verses Q.9:73 and Q.66:9. 104 One response to this question is that the non-Ienient verses 
echo the well established and increasingly powerful society of Medina as opposed to the 
soft political positions taken by the Meccan Muslims who were in sheer minority. 
This view overlooks at least two significant factors. First, that there was not and 
there could not have been any contract between the Meccan pagans and the early 
Muslim converts, given the latter's politically weak position before their emigration to 
Medina. There was no contract; no contract was breached, therefore no war was waged. 
Second, that should the harsh treatment of disbelievers have had any relations 
with their mere disbelief, treatment of the non-Muslim people of the book (ahli al-kitiib) 
must have followed a reverse order as compared with what virtually occurred. In 
princip le the Jewish faith was closer to the Muslim Unitarianism (towlJld) than the 
Christian princip le of trinity or the polytheism of the Meccans. In reality however, 
following the Muslims' control of the city, the Meccan polytheists and Arab Christi ans 
suffered much less than Jews of this peninsula. 105 The evidence therefore shows that 
102Q.42: 15: "So to that [religion of Allah] invite, [0 Mu4ammad], and remain on a right course as 
you are commanded and do not follow their inclinations but say, '1 have believed in what Allah has 
revealed of scripture, and 1 have been commanded to do justice among you. Allah is our Lord and your 
Lord. For us are our deeds, and for you your deeds. There is no argument between us and you. Allah will 
bring us together, and to Him is the destination." 
103Q.50:39: "So be patient, [0 Mu4ammad], over what they say and ex aIt [Allah] with praise of 
your Lord before the rising of the sun and before its setting." 
104 Q.9:73: "0 Prophet, fight against the disbelievers and the hypocrites and be harsh to them. 
And their refuge is Hell, and wretched is the destination." 
105 Compare the fate of the Jewish BanI Quray~a and the Christians Ied by Ukaider Ibn 
'AbdulmaIik, which is referenced in Chapter One of this work. 
39 
early Muslim-Jewish clashes simply resulted from the unilateral breach of mutual 
contracts by the latter. 
Worst than Killing: al-fitna 
There are two specific verses wherein the term fitna (sedition) has been subject 
to controversy in the Qur'anic classical exegeses: Q.2: 191 and Q.2: 193: 
And kill them wherever you overtake them and expe1 them from wherever they have 
expelled you, and fitna (sedition) is worse than killing ... 
Fight them Ulltil there is no fitna and religion [i.e., worship] is [acknowledged to be] for 
Allah. But if they cease, then there is to be no aggression [assault or animosity] except 
against the oppressors. 
These verses emphasize two essential notions about the term fitna: that it is 
more detrimental than killing, and that war should continue until fitna is completely 
uprooted. Classical exegetes have treated this term in a way that it has come to 
represent so many various meanings, such as dissention, civil strife, persecution, 
oppression, sedition, harassment, trial, torment, disbelief, and polytheism. 106 With the 
exception of disbelief (kufT) and polytheism (shirk), most of these connotations of fitna 
have something to do with conspiratorial acts that often lead to civil umest and 
insecurity. As such, the Qur'an seems to take fitna as a more serious threat to the safety 
and security of the newly born Islamic state than the act of killing (in war). 
The controversy about fitna originated when the classical exegetes added to its 
previously wide interpretation, the two notions of disbelief and polytheism that 
substantially depart from the rest of the word's original meanings. These latter 
meanings link the ward fitna directly to the situation of differing belief systems, rather 
than the hostile anti-Muslim acts that possibly resulted from these systems. I07 In fact, 
106 For the various meanings of iltna, see Abi a1-Qasim a1-I:Iusayn Ibn Mui)ammad (known as a1-
Raghib ISfahanI), AI-MufTadiit fi Gharlb aI-Qur'an (Tehran: al-Maktab a1-Murtazaviyya, n.d.) 371-73. 
107 See Abu a1-Futul} al-RazI, RawiJ al-Jinan wa RiiiJ aI-Janan, vol.2, 92-3. See a1so Faq.1 Ibn 
I:Iasan al-TabarsI, Majma ' aI-Bayan il TafsiraI-Qur'an, vols. 1-2 (Beirut: Dar al-Ma 'rifa, 1986) 510-512. 
See a1so Mohammad I:Iusayn Tabataba'l, Tafsir aI-Mizan, vol.2, trans. Mohammad Taqi Me~bii4 Yazdi 
(Tehran: Markaz-e Nashr-e Raja, 1985) 80-3. 
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the interpretive expansion overlooks the latter part of Q.2: 193, which advocates the 
inception of a ceasefire with the perpetrators of fitna once they end their conspiracies. 
The verse asserts that 'there is no hostility ('udwiin) except against wrong do ers (or 
oppressors for al-?alimJn). The phrase 'fitna is worse than killing' is proof that the 
Qur'an intends not only to justify war against those who committed fit na, but more 
importantly it establishes the principle that any war demands valid justification. \08 
Another point of exegetical confusion on fitna is the interpretation of the 
following phrase: "and religion [worship] is [acknowledged to be] for Allah ... " There is 
a great difference between what is God's futuristic prediction and His direct order for 
immediate implementation. Generally, c1assical exegetes have been inc1ined towards the 
latter interpretation; importantly, this tendency reveals their confrontational purpose 
and ignores the last part of the verse, which reads, "But if they cease, then there is to be 
no aggression [assault or animosity] except against the oppressors." If war should 
continue till the annihilation or conversion of all the polytheists -the interpretation that 
most exegetes like to adopt- then this latter part of the verse becomes completely 
optional and redundant. 
Given the rather suppressive attitude of the Umayyad regimes against domestic 
critique, it is entirely possible that the exegetical interpretive twist, being 
systematically adopted by many later commentators, was construed to protect anti-
Umayyad dissent; for if fitna was disbelief, Muslim dissent could not be a subject of the 
above verses. Nevertheless, the net result was that by adding polytheism and disbeliefto 
the meaning of fitna, the exegetes allowed for the justification of foreign primary 
(offensive) wars and the theory of a permanent war between diir al-Islam (the abode of 
peace), and diir al-kufr (the abode of disbelief). 
Against Inquisition 
Among the Qur'anic verses on the subject of war there is an exegetical controversy 
regarding the word al-saliim as it appears in the verse Q.4:94, which reads: 
108 Such justification, in the context of the philosophical arguments in Chapter Four of this book, 
would entail respect for an objective ethical system that is presumably present in every person's nature, or 
else God's decrees would be sufficient enough to establish moral values. 
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o you who have believed, when you go forth in the cause of Allah, investigate; and do 
not say to one who gives you [the word] peace, 'you are not believer,' aspiring for the 
goods of worldly life; for with Allah are many acquisitions. You were like that before; 
then Allah conferred His favor upon you, so investigate. Indeed Allah is ever, with what 
you do, acquainted. 
From its position in this stanza, al-salam has been interpreted as either to mean 'peace,' 
or 'greetings,' and the implications for its meaning bear on the treatment of the 
opposition in conflicts. In his examination of the controversy, Abu al-Futü4 al-Raz! 
asserted that the Medinese exegetes read the word as al-silm (peace), instead of al-salam 
(greetings), and therefore the verse caUs for Muslim warriors to accept peace offers from 
those they encounter. 109 Conversely, other exegetes read it as al-salam, which as a 
Muslim greeting symbolizes the Muslim believer. Whatever the interpretation, both 
c1assical and modem exegetes assert that this verse provides an unequivocal rejection 
and condemnation of assuming evil intentions among those whom the Muslims 
encountered in various situations. 
The issue of accepting a gesture of peace from a combatant is a prominent 
subject in Islamic ethical literature. For example, a number of anecdotal 4adith 
pro minent in most exegetical works assert that before this verse was revealed, there 
were a few examples where pro minent Muslim military figures such as Usamat Ibn Zaid, 
threatened the lives of a few combatants whose formaI and verbal peacemaking gestures 
(or Muslim style greetings) were not accepted on face value. 110 According to the 4adith 
literature, these militant Muslims were severely rebuked by the Prophet when he 
109 Abu al-Futlil). al-Raz!, RawlJ al-Jinin wa Rii/;I al-Janin, vol.3, 474-75. See also Faql Ibn I:lasan 
al-Tabars!, Majma ' al-Bayin fj TafSJr al-Qur'in, Vol.3 (Beirut: Dar al-Ma'rifa, 1986), 144. 
110 The story is that a Muslim warrior, Usama Ibn Zaid, despite a shepherd's verbal testimony to 
the unit y of Allah and the prophecy of Mohammad (uttering the words of shahiida), killed him and 
confiscated his flock to the benefit of the Muslim community. But once the story was revealed and Usama 
tried to justify his crime by saying that the shepherd's testimony was 'a last moment ploy,' the Prophet 
rebuked him to the verge of not accepting his repentance. See Mohammad I:lusayn Tabiitabii'!, TafSJr al-
Mizin, Mohammad 'Ali Kerami trans. vol.5 (Tehran: Markaze Nashr-e Raja, 1980) 72. See also a similar 
tragedy perpetrated by Khiilid Ibn al-WaIid as mentioned in Chapter One ofthis book. 
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emphasized that, "Since no one can read the mind of others, the mere utterance of 
shahiida (testimony) must grant amnesty to the claimant."lll 
Although sorne Muslim militants have shown skepticism and even denial at the 
peace offerings from the opposition, the Qur'anic ethical stance on the subject 
commands that any gestures of peace be accepted, no matter how disputable their 
motivations. 
Notions ofDeterrence 
Among the Qur'anic verses that deal with conflict, there are a few that appear to be 
more aggressive not only in sanctioning a general war, but also in permitting the rather 
harsh treatment of the enemy. Specifically, the verse Q. 33:61 is one of the most 
pertinent examples of this posture. It refers to the treatment of the 'hypocrites' in the 
following way: "Accursed wherever they are found [being] seized and massacred 
completely." However, as Tabatabïï'l contends, this verse is not meant to be a direct 
order to be implemented by Muslims, it only stands as a severe deterrent. ll2 
In another example, Q. 9: 123 refers to the disbelievers with a similar hostile 
tone: "0 you who have believed, fight those adjacent to you of the disbelievers and let 
them find in you harshness. And know that Allah is with the righteous." In this instance, 
the Qur'anic term 'ghil~a' is translated as 'harshness' or 'hardness,' and appears to 
allow abrasive conduct towards combatants. Conversely, Tabataba'l opposes translating 
the ward as 'harshness' in the context of war against disbelievers because, he stresses, 
"this is against the Qur'anic war ethics present in many other verses." "Instead," he 
maintains, "the word means staying firm and unyielding in the way of Allah."l13 
Despite controversy regarding the translation of the ward ghil~a> because the verse 
III See also Faql Ibn I:Iasan al-Tabars1, Majma 1 al-Bayiin fi TafSlr al-Qur'iin, vol.3 (Beirut: Dar al-
Ma 'rifa, 1986), 145. 
112 Mohammad I:Iusayn Tabiifabii'1, TafSir al-Miziin, vol.l6, trans. Mohammad Baqer Musavi 
Hamadani (Tehran: Markaz-e Nashr-e Raja, 1985) 533. 
113 Tabiifabii'1, TafSiral-Miziin, vol.l6, 642. 
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directs the believer to 'let them find in you' (i.e. you may appear to them as such, rather 
than act in aggressive ways), it points to detterent measures. 
In another example, the verses Q.9:73 and 66:9 again use the term ghil.ra: "0 
Prophet, fight against the disbelievers and the hypocrites and be harsh upon them. And 
their refuge is HeU, and wretched is the destination." In this instance, Tabii!abii'l states 
that "perhaps this verse is advocating rather harsh treatment of the disbelievers and the 
hypocrites as a measure paraUel to war.,,114 From his commentary on the term and its 
meaning in these verses, it is clear that Tabii!abii'l's view on the word ghil?8 in 
reference to the above Qur'iinic examples is that there must be a distinction between 
being harsh in war, or showing harsh treatment to the disbelievers as a paraUel measure 
to war. EssentiaUy, he categoricaUy rejects the notion ofbeing harsh in war, for it stands 
in direct contravention with verses that prohibit transgression against the enemy beyond 
h t · t· t .1 115 w a JUs lce mayen al . 
Tabii!abii'l's view agree with the Q.4:84 116 asserting the need to "restrain the 
military might of the disbelievers." Further confirmation of the Qur'iinic position of fair 
treatment towards the opposition is echoed in the verses Q. 4 :90,117 2 :193,1\8 4 :84119 
and 9 :29. 120 Each ofthese verses set clear criteria for the implementation of a ceasefire 
exactlyat the point where the actual threat of the anti-Muslim forces is checked. 
114 Taba!aba'l, TafSJr al-Miziin, vol. 16, 532. 
115 Among such verses is Q.2:190: "Fight in the way of Allah those who fight you but do not 
transgress. Indeed, Allah does not like transgressors." 
116 Q.4:84: "SO fight [0 Mu4arnmad], in the cause of Allah; you are not held responsible except 
for yourself. And encourage the believers [to join you] that perhaps Allah will restrain the [military] 
might ofthose who disbelieve, and Allah is greater in might and st ronger in [exemplary] punishment." 
117Q.4:90: " ... So ifthey remove themselves from you and do not fight you and offer you peace, 
then Allah has not made for you a cause [for fighting] against them." 
IIS"Q.2:193: "Fight them until there is no dissention and until religion is for Allah. But ifthey 
cease, then there is to be no aggression except against the oppressors." 
119Q.4:84: "So fight [0 Mu4arnmad], in the cause of Allah; you are not he Id responsible except 
for yourself. And encourage the believers [to join you] that perhaps Allah will restrain the [military] 
might ofthose who disbelieve, And Allah is greater in might and stronger in [exemplary] punishment." 
120 Q.9:29: "Fight those who do not believe in Allah or in the Last Day and who do not consider 
unlawful what Allah and His Messenger have made unlawful and who do not adopt the religion of truth 
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Sources ofGod's Hostility in the Qur'an 
Significant to an understanding of war ethics in the Qur' an are the conditions in which 
the Scripture permits antagonistic behavior towards adversaries. First, the verse Q.2: 193 
defines the legitimate source of hostility to be oppression. 121 Additionally, Q.60:8 
stresses that the difference in belief systems is not a legitimate cause for hostility; 
implicitly, this verse relays that differences in opinions and faiths do not prohibit 
friendship.122 Therefore, according to these verses, justice and injustice, rather than 
faith, stand unequivocally as the ultimate respective causes for friendship and hostility 
in the Qur'an. 
Furthermore, the verse Q.60:7 express the possibility for peace between former 
enemies. 123 Q.60: 1 and 60:9 categorically reject alliances between Muslims and the 
unbelievers who fought the Prophet and his followers and caused their expulsion from 
Mecca. 124 Q.60: 13 prohibits the Muslims to make any alliance with people at whom 
Allah has become angry. Q.9:29 clearly define what makes Allah angry: 
Fight those who do not believe in Allïih or in the Last Day and who do not consider 
unlawful what Allïih and His Messenger have made unlawful and who do not adopt the 
religion of truth from those who were given the Script ure- [fight] until they give the 
jizya (poll tax) willingly while they are humbled. 
from those who were given the Scripture-[fight] until they give the jizya willingly while they are 
humbled." 
121 Q.2: 193: "Fight them until there is no fitna (among meanings: dissention, civil strife, 
persecution, oppression, seduction, trial and torment) and religion is [acknowledged to bel for Allïih. But 
if they cease, then there is to be no aggression [assault or animosity] except against the oppressors." 
122 Q.60:8: "Allïih does not forbid you from those who do not fight you because ofreligion and do 
not expel you from your homes-from being righteous toward them and acting justly toward them. Indeed, 
Allïih loves those who act justly." 
123Q.60 :7: "Perhaps Allïih will put, between you and those to whom you have been enemies 
among them, affection. And Allïih is competent, and Allïih is Forgiving and Merciful." 
124Q.60: 1: "0 you who have believed, do not take My enemies and your enemies as allies, 
----, extending to them affection while they have disbelieved in what came to you of the truth, having driven 
out the Prophet and yourselves only because you believe in Allïih, your Lord .... " 
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Q.2:98 defines the main causes of God's enmity to be one's enmity against God, His 
angels and His prophets. 125 According to this verse, the initiator of the hostility is not 
God; rather God is on the reactive side. Q.2:99 clarify that the initiator of such 
hostilities must be quite conscious of his adversity for he denies clear divine proofs. 126 
In essence, the latter two verses emphasize that enmity between God and His subjects 
begin when a pers on denies proofs of God's command against his own conscience. In 
short it is one's revoit against his own intellect and reasoning that is tantamount to 
initiating hostility against God, and that, resuIts in God's retaliation. 
Same Verses, Opposite Interpretations 
The Qur' anie verse Q.2: 190 is widely believed to be the first verse that speaks on 
matters of war. Since early classical times, this verse regarding the cause and duration of 
war has been subject to major exegetical debate. The verse reads: "Fight in the way of 
Allah those who fight you but do not transgress. Indeed, Allah does not like 
transgressors." Briefly considered, it is obvious that this verse is unequivocally clear on 
two important aspects of conflict: the cause of battle and the extent of the war. Using 
this framework, war causality is a matter of retaliation and deterrence, and the duration 
of the war is limited to when the threat is checked, contained and the balance of power 
is achieved. Therefore, any militant measure beyond these points is considered to be a 
transgression on the part of the Muslim warriors. 
Despite the seeming clarity this verse projects, its interpretation has been 
controversial in the classical exegeses, specifically on what connotes a situation of 
transgression. Abu'l Futul]. al-Raz! contributes to the literature regarding this 
controversy. First, he reports that according to the l].adith transmitters RabI' Ibn Anas 
and 'Abdul-Ral].man Ibn Zaid, the above verse provided the framework of war only as 
retaliation, and functioned as the main law for Muslim wars until it was abrogated by 
125Q.2:98 : "Whoever is an enemy to Allah and His angels and His messengers and Gabriel and 
Michael- then indeed, Allah is an enemy to the disbelievers." 
126Q.2:99: "And We have certainly revealed to you verses [which are] clear proofs, and no one 
would deny them except the defiantly disobedient." 
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the verse Q. 9:36 ( ... And fight against the polytheists collectively as they fight against 
you collectively).127 Other exegetes, as ai-Razi notes, did not see any conflict between 
the two above verses, because the first refers to all who initiate war against Muslims 
(including the polytheists), and the latter caUs for an alI-out war only against the 
polytheists who had already initiated unrelenting hostilities towards the Muslims. In 
this interpretation, the latter, more specifie case faUs within the general rule that the 
former verse provides. Here, the key issue is the way various exegetes have interpreted 
the word 'transgression' (j'fadii). Al-Raz! observes that according to RabI' Ibn Anas 
and 'Abdul-Ra4man Ibn Zaid, j'fadii' in the verse's context means the prohibition of a 
surprise attack for the Muslims. Conversely, other 4adith transmitters such as 'Abdullah 
'Abbas and Mujahid maintain that j'fadii'refers to prohibition ofbattle against children, 
women, elder men, peace seekers and non-Muslims who have not initiated any war. 
Furthermore, I:Iasan Ba~r1 maintains that transgression refers to the prohibition of 
general, or non-war-related, immoral acts. Yet according to al-RazI, other 4adith 
transmitters have stressed that the word 'transgression' within Q.2: 190 means the 
unjustified cessation of the war against the infidels, rather than the unjustified 
continuance ofwar. 128 Notably, this last interpretation is in concordance with a militant 
4adith narrated by Abu Huraira, who is a famed in ShI'! literature as prolific 4adith 
forger. "The Apostle said," claims Abiï Huraira, "whoever who fails to participate in 
war (in a general sense of the term), he will die in a branch of hypocrisy.,,129 Such 
diverse interpretation of the term j'fadii' is also present in other classical exegeses such 
as the Majma' al-Bayiin li 'Uliim al-Qur'iinofal-Tabarsl.!30 
127 Abu al-Futü4 al-Raz!, Raw1;z al-Jiniin wa Rii1;z al-Janiin, vol. l , 90. 
128 Abu al-Futü4 al-Raz!, Raw1;z al-Jiniin wa Rii1;z al-Janiin, vol.2, 90. Toshihiko Izutsu rejects such 
a translation of the word by coupling the word i 'tada' with one of the most detested Qur'iinic vices 
namely ?ulm sharing together the meaning of 'to pass beyond one's proper limit.' See also Toshihiko 
Izutsu, Ethico-Religious Concepts in the Qur'iin (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1966) 172. 
129 Abu al-Futü4 al-Raz!, Raw1;z al-Jiniin wa Rii1;z al-Janiin, vol.2, 99, 173. 
130 Fa41 Ibn f.Iasan al-Tabars!, Majma ' al-Bayiin li 'Uliim al-Qur'iin, vol. 2 (Beirut: Dar al-Mari fa 
Publications, 1986) 510. 
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Clearly, the interpretation of a single term in four distinctively different and 
conflicting ways, at the worst, supports the proposition (as noticed in previous chapt ers) 
that sorne of the classical exegeses were exposed to and affected by political and other 
secondary motives early on after the lifetime of the Prophet Mul).ammad, and at the best, 
provides a reminder that the Scripture is open for reinterpretation. 
The above conclusion is supported also by striking opposite interpretations on 
Q.2:195 which reads: "And spend in the way of Allah and do not throw [yourselves] 
with your [own] hands into destruction. And do good; indeed, Allah loves the do ers of 
good." According to Taba!aba'l there are two distinct interpretation for the verse. The 
first reads: "do not nullify or waste your strength by not spending money in preparation 
for war." The second reads: "extravagance in expenditure would bring poverty and 
misery to such a spender, degrade him in society and make life unbearable." Taba!aba'l 
then concludes that both such extremes are prohibited by the above verse. l3l But it is 
obvious that such opposite conclusions in relation to a single verse is motivated by 
incentives beyond the text. 
Contemporary Commentaries on the Classical Exegeses 
Among contemporary Qur'anic exegetes, the commentator Taba!aba'l has conducted 
one of the most elaborate and critical treatments of the classical exegeses in Al-Mizin. 
Relevant to the subject of war, in his consideration of the classical commentators 
Taba!aba'l notably shifts his focus towards war causality rather than the quality and the 
scope ofwar. 
While Taba!aba'i acknowledges the legitimacy of limited primary (offensive) 
wars, he points out that the frequently repeated phrase 'in the way ofGod' in the Qur'an 
proves that for the Scripture, the cause of war is more important than its results. 132 This 
is not in coherence with the more result-sensitive consequentialist modem just war 
13I Tabataba'1, Al-Mizin, An Exegesis of the QUI'in, Translated to English Sayyid Saeed Akhtar 
Rizvi, vol.3, (Tehran: World Organization for Islamic Services, 1973) 91, 92. 
132 This view is a double edged sword for it can instigate an unlimited war (a war beyond 
conventional objective results), or a very limited war (a war that ends before attainment of any objective 
result). 
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theories as will be discussed in Chapter Eight of this work. Tabataba'l, nevertheless, 
takes a comparatively moderate perspective and emphasizes that the goal ofwar can not 
be total dominance or victory over the non-Muslims, rather, he daims that war is 
limited and sanctioned only to defend legitimate human rights based on what he terms 
"common sense and naturallaw embedded in the nature ofhuman being (f1.tra).,,133 It is 
within this spirit of univers al rights that Taba!aba'1 is quite conscious of the law of 
proportionality in war, and therefore supports the just-war maxim that the gains of war 
must be more than its 10sses.134 Furthermore, he does not see any need for the multiple 
abrogation proposed by militant exegetes who have sought to assert the more militant 
Qur'anic verses on the top of the lenient ones. 
Regarding the afore-mentioned controversy conceming the interpretation of the 
word j'tadii', Taba!aba'l places emphasis on the anti-transgressive nature of this word. 
Accordingly, for this commentator the term connotes a prohibition of several deeds: 
unprovoked battle, the harm of women and children in war, of warring without properly 
inviting the non-Muslims to peaceful settlements, and finally warring when the enemy is 
. l' dt d 135 mc me owar s peace. 
The above argument however does not inhibit the emergence of a fatalist and 
determinist theory in Taba!aba'1's view on the ultimate status of the relations between 
the worlds ofMuslims and non-Muslims, Le. the unavoidability of the Armageddon type 
encounter. This conviction in a final and decisive war is in part derived from his 
readings of the verses Q.22:39, 40 and Q.2:25l,136 both ofwhich view the act ofwar 
133 Tabataba'l, TafsJr al-Mlziin, voU, 80. Sorne similar traces of though was observed in the 
views of TabatabaTs student Mutahharl on justifying war on the ground of defending 'human rights.' 
See Chapter Three of this work. 
134 Tabataba'l, TafsJr al-Mlziin, vol. l, 95. 
135 Tabataba'l, TafsJr al-Mlziin, voU, 80. 
136Q.22:39, 40: "Permission [to fight] has been given to those who are being fought, because they 
were wronged. And indeed, Allah is competent to give them victory. [They are] those who have been 
evicted from their homes without right-only because they say, "Our Lord is Allah." And were it not that 
Allah checks the people, sorne by me ans of others, there would have been demolished monasteries, 
churches, synagogues, and mosques in which the name of Allah is much mentioned [i.e. praised]. And 
Allah will surely support those who support Him [i.e., His cause]. Indeed, Allah is powerful and Exalted in 
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from an instrumental perspective. 137 However, l)ba!aba'1 rejects implicit social 
Darwinism as the logic used in the above Qur'anic verses that justify wars as barriers 
against world's corruption; the Darwinist natural conflict, 1.'aba!abii'1 stresses, can not 
save humankind from corruption, for it destroys plurality. Rather, he asserts that the 
kind of war supported by the Scripture is a defense in favor of the very fabric of the 
society.138 "A perfect defense ofhuman's basic and intrinsic rights," he asserts, "entails 
the expansion of the obligation (i)ukm) for jihiid.,,139 According to this principle, which 
informs Tabii!abii'i's central social theory, the fulfillment of this obligation is intrinsic 
to the nature ofhumanity, because the desire to employ members of one's community in 
service to those in power is only natural. Essentially, it is this natural faculty in 
humankind that constitutes the central cause of societal formations. 140 Relevant to the 
matter of conflict, in Tabii!aba'i's perspective once members of the society resist such 
employment (read: exploitation), this opposition leads to war. Furthermore, in a 
consequentialist spirit, he believes that war sometimes is quite necessary to impose 
upon certain people what is deemed beneficial for them. 141 
It is important to note that Taba!aba'1 contradicts himself within this argument 
by predicting, on the one hand, an inevitable armed encounter, and by asserting, on the 
other, that the future generations of human beings will incline willingly towards the law 
of nature and through the means of religious education, will be Unitarian (muwalJi)id) 
and faithful (thus no need for conflict).142 Although Tabii!abii'l emphasizes the 
Might. Q.2:25l: " ... And if it were not for Allah checking [sorne] people by me ans of others, the earth 
would have been corrupted, but Allah is full ofbounty to the worlds." 
137 Elsewhere Tabataba'l asserts that war is an unavoidable instrument to remove aIl vices from 
human societies and that it also serves as an ultimate test to differentiate between believers from non-
believers. See TafSir al-Miziin, vol.2, 438. 
138 Tabataba'l, TafSir al-Miziin, vol.2, 430-31. 
139 Tabataba'l, TafSir al-Miziin, vol. l, 89. 
140 Tabataba'l, TafSJr al-Miziin, vol.2, 415. 
141 Tabataba'l, TafSir al-Miziin, vol. 2,415. Similar views that his student Mutahharl shares. 
142 Tabatabaï, TafSJr al-Miziin, voU, 92. 
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defensive nature of war in Islam because he believes that it serves to support the 
obligation to defend human's natural rights, he also notes the scriptural permissibility of 
primary (offensive) wars, by referring to the pre-Islamie prophetic war legacies reflected 
in the verses Q.3 :146143,5 :24144 and 27 :37. 145 
However bold Taba!aba'l proves to be in his critical view of the classieal 
exegeses and in opposing the extreme implementation of abrogation (naskh) law in the 
Qu'ranie exegesis, because of his inconsistent arguments, Taba!aba'l has failed to 
resolve the main controversy therein between the free choice of faith and the use of 
force for expanding Islamic rule. 
In essence, the above conflicting views among the classical exegetes and their 
contemporary critiques can be reduced to three official Islamic perspectives regarding 
war: limited war only as a retaliatory and deterrent measure, primary (offensive) yet 
limited war for defense and moral (corrective) expansionism, and continuing state of 
war for the ultimate and definite Islamization of the world. For the first perspective, war 
is only the last resort; for the second, it is an option; and for the third it is an ultimate 
means of total conversion. 
War within the Qur'anic Ethical Structure 
Izutsu maintains that humanitarian ethics in the Qur'an is a mirror of what he caUs the 
divine ethies conceming the basie ethical relationship of man to GOd. 146 He stipulates 
that this emulation is specificaUy exampled in the verse Q. 24: 22: 
143 Q.3: 146: "And how many a prophet [fought and] with him fought many religious scholars. But 
they never lost assurance due to what afflicted them in the cause of Allah, nor did they weaken or submit. 
And Allah loves the steadfast." 
144 Q.5:24: "They said, "0 Moses, indeed we will not enter it, ever, as long as they are within it; 
so go, you and your Lord, and fight. Indeed, we are remaining right here." 
145Q.27:37: "Return to them, for we [Solomon] will surely come to them with soldiers that they 
will be powerless to encounter, and we will surely expel them therefrom in humiliation, and they will be 
debased." See Tabataba'l, TafSir al-Miziin, voU, 92-3. 
146 Izutsu, Ethico-Re1igious Concepts in the Qur'iin, 17. 
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And let not those of virtue among you and wealth swear not to give [aid] to their 
relatives and the needy and the emigrants for the cause of Allah, and let them pardon 
and overlook. Would you not like that Allah should forgive you? And Allah is Forgiving 
and Merciful. 
From his analysis of this verse, Izutsu daims that because in the Qur'an God Himself is 
always ready to forgive; therefore, human beings should foUow this divine example and 
pardon and forgive. 147 Importantly, this methodology as developed by Izutsu is 
applicable to the understanding of the Qur'anic perspective on war and peace; 
essentiaUy, the attitude of God towards his enemies provides a paradigm of behavior 
regarding the situation of war causality and the appropriate methods in the resolution of 
such conflicts. 
In order to explore this sacred paradigm, it is necessary to explore two relevant 
arguments of Izutsu; specificaUy, it is important to understand how the Qur'an treated 
and reoriented the JihiH tribal culture's virtue of courage, and also to appreciate the 
status of 1;.ilm within the Qur'anic ethical structure. 
Regarding the Qur'anic treatment of JihiH courage, Izutsu notes that in this pre-
Islamic culture, 'blood vengeance' functioned as the greatest sign of courage and was 
the supreme law of the desert, connected most strongly with the Arab idea of honor. 
"Persistence in seeking revenge," Izutsu asserts, "was an essential constituent of the 
conception of muriiwah, or the highest moral ideal of the Bedouin."148 He notes that 
this 'disease of honor' (a phrase borrowed from Nicholson) was so "deep-rooted in the 
soul of the pagan Arabs that it could not be extirpated aU at once.,,149 In order to both 
mitigate and control the cause of and the methods implemented in these cultural notions 
of tribal hostility, Izutsu asserts that the religion of Islam introduced the concept of 
peaceful settlements through blood wit; yet more importantly, the institution of Islam 
transposed the right of taking vengeance from a function of humanity to strictly the 
realm of God. 
147 Izutsu, Ethico-Religious Concepts in the Qur'iin, 19. 
148 Izutsu, Ethico-Religious Concepts in the Qur'iin, 68. 
149 Izutsu, Ethico-Religious Concepts in the Qur'iin, 68. 
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To complete the example of divine behavior, Izutsu's argument regarding the 
nature of lJilm provides the central motivation of the scriptural approach to ethics in 
conflict. Within his arguments on Qur'anic ethics, Izutsu notes that the virtue of lJilm, a 
term that encompasses the virtues of forbearance, patience, self-control against rage and 
instant passion, is adopted by the Qur'an as the central point of its moral system. 150 It is 
obvious that the containment of Jiihili cultural predisposition towards blood revenge and 
the introduction of self-restraint as a primary Qur'anic virtue would have vast 
mitigating effects on both the cause and the methods of sacredly sanctioned wars, given 
the scriptural consistency. 
Note also should be taken that according to Q.3: 134, the acts of 'restraining 
anger (kEl?m al-ghay?), ' and 'pardoning the people ('afw 'an al-nas) are introduced as 
two important attribut es of the righteous (al-muttaqln).151 It is in this context that a 
more detailed view of God's attitude towards His enemies is necessary in order to 
provide a better understanding of the supreme role model that is supposed to be 
followed by His human subjects. 
God's Treatment of His Archenemy 
In the religion of Islam, the Satan (al-Shaytiin, or its proper name !bIis) is addressed in 
the Qur'an as the greatest enemy of God and humans in a broad sense. Notably, the 
Qur'an points that, the Satan's foremost transgression was his disobedience to God's 
150 Izutsu, Ethico-Religious Concepts in the Qur'in, 69. It is important to note that the new 
testament puts a remarkable emphasis on a similar notion to 1;ilm as an essential devine virtue. Jesus 
asserts in one of his prayers: "Blessed are the meek, for they will inherit the land." See Saint Joseph, ed. 
The New American Bible, (New York: Catholic Book Publishing Co. 1991) Matthew: 5:5, p.1706. 
Izutsu's assertion on the centrality of 1;ilm in the Qur'anic moral system also agrees with al-Ghazali's 
view in 11;yii' 'Wtim al-Din. See Abu I:Iiimid M04arnmad Al-Ghazali, 11;yii' 'Wtim al-Din, Rub'j Muhljkiit, 
Translated by Mo'ayyid al-Din Khwarazml, Edited by Husayn Khamv Jam, (Tehran: Sherkat-e 
Entesharat-e Elmi va Farhangi, 1374/1975) 363-370. 
151 Q.3: 132-134: "And obey Allah and the Messenger that you may obtain mercy. And hasten to 
forgiveness from your Lord and a garden [Paradise] as wide as the he avens and earth, prepared for the 
righteous. Who spend [in the cause of Allah] during ease and hardship and who restrain anger and who 
pardon the people-And Allah loves the doers of good. 
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order obliging aH angels to prostrate before Adam as the first human. 152 According to 
the Scriptural narration, Satan's foremost reason for his disobedience was that he is 
made from fire, a substance he viewed to be superior to soil from which the body of 
Adam was made. According to the Qur'an, subsequent to this defiance Satan was 
condemned and cursed by God till the Day of Resurrection, although at the same time 
Satan was given free reign to lead God's subjects, i.e. human beings, astray.153 The 
Qur'an reports that this requested freedom was granted to Satan through negotiations 
that he had with God subsequent to the latter's curse. 
It is notable that the greatest enemy of God, subsequent to his defiance and 
condemnation, negotiated with the angry Master and gained two concessions that were 
not insignificant: an almost etemal time to perform and an open hand to tempt the entire 
genre of God's favorite creatures to disobey their Master as Satan did himself. Despite 
the consequences i.e. proliferation of new enemies, the restraint and generosity God 
showed with his archenemy reveals yet again an exemplar of divine ethics in the 
treatment of the opposition in conflict. 
Significant to an understanding of the Qur'anic et hies of conflict is the story of 
the Divine attitude towards His worst enemy, and how this ex ample serves as a model of 
magnanimity ev en with the staunchest opposition. 
152 Q.2:36: "And when We said to the angels, "Prostrate before Adam;" so they prostrated, except 
for Iblees. He refused and was arrogant and became of the disbelievers." See also Q.7: Il. 
153 Q.7: 12-18: "[Allah] said, "What prevented you from prostrating when 1 commanded you?" 
[Satan] said, "1 am better than him. Vou created me from fire and created him from clay [i.e.' earth]." 
[Allah] said, "Descend from it [i.e., paradise], for it is not for you to be arrogant therein. So go get out; 
indeed, you are of the debased." [Satan] said, "Reprieve me until the Day they are resurrected." [Allah] 
said, "Indeed, you are ofthose reprieved." [Satan] said, "Because Vou have put me in error, 1 will surely 
sit in wait for them [i.e., mankind] on Your straight path. Then 1 will come to them from before them and 
from behind them and on their right and on their left, and Vou will not find most of them grateful [to 
You]." [Allah] said, "Get out ofit [i.e., Paradise], reproached and expelled. Whoever follows you among 
them-I will surely fill Hell with you, ail together." Q. 15:34,35 "[Allah] said, "Get out ofit [Paradise], for 
indeed, you are expelled. And indeed, upon you is the curse until the Day of Recompense." Q.15:39: 
"[Iblees] said, "My Lord, because Vou have put me in error, 1 will surly make [disobedience] attractive to 
them [i.e., mankind] on earth, and 1 will mislead them ail." See Q.17: 61-65; Q.18:50; Q.20: 116; Q. 38:74-
83; Q.72:4. 
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The Moral Mode of Mercy 
As will be discussed in the next chapter, one of the great fathers of mystic literature 
namely Ibn al-' ArabI, developed the theory of the primacy of mercy over divine wrath 
based on a Prophetie 4adith. This argument parallels Izutsu's moral view of the Qur'an. 
It is known that all the Qur'anic chapters (suras) with one exception (Surat al-
Towba) begins with the phrase: "In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the 
Merciful." One of the latest English translation of the Qur'an translates the phrase, 
~)\ ~)\ ..l!\ ~ as: "In the name of Ahllah, the Entirely Merciful, the Especially 
Merciful.,,154 The translators assert that, "Ar-RaJ;.man and ar-RaJ;.eem, are two names of 
Allah derived from the word 'raJ;.mah' (mercy). In Arabie grammar both are intensive 
forms of 'merciful' (i.e. extremely merciful)." The authors further point that, "A 
complementary and comprehensive meaning is intended by using both together.,,155 It is 
very obvious that such emphatic usage of the notion of mercy both in the beginning of 
almost all Qur'anic verses and frequently within the text itself underline the divine 
rejection of the opposite notions namely, wrath, anger, puni shment , retaliation and 
conflict. The over-emphasis on mercy in the Qur'an, therefore reveals that the Script ure 
is primarily composed under the moral mode of mercy. This notion is also in full 
concordance with the fact that 'peace' (saJam) is among God's ninty nine names as 
reflected in the 4adith literature. 
The Qur'anic Contexts of Jihad, I:Iarb, and Qital 
Among the three main terms used in the Qur'an to denote war and battle, namely jihad, 
J;.arb and qitiil, the word jihad is the most frequently used term. Notably, the root verb 
of jihad and its various derivatives are used about thirty two times in the Scripture. 156 
Within these many mentions, at least a third, use jihad in the sense of striving with 
154 The Qur'iin, Translation and Commentary by Sai}eeq International, (London: 1997) 1. 
155 The Qur'iin, Translation and Commentary by Sai}eeq International, (London: 1997) 1. 
156 Q.49:15, 22:78, 25:52,5:54,6:109,24:53,29:6,29:8,9:41,9:44,9:19, 9:81, 9:23, 61:11, 
31:15,9:73,66:9,60:1,4:95,47:31,5:35,3:142,9:16, 9:88, 9:86, 16:110,29:69,2:218,8:72,8:74,8:75 
and 9:20. 
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one's property.157 Importantly, this sense of inner striving eliminates the necessity of 
warring as the only option and means for a sacred struggle. In a few other verses, the 
related root word jahd is connoted as an 'endeavor,' completely outside of the realm of 
war. 158 Furthermore, in at least two cases jahd refers to 'strength.' 
Another term for conflict, IJarb (warring), is used around six times in the 
Scripture to connote wars (real as well as symbolic) launched by infidels against God .159 
As was mentioned previously in this chapter, in many other Qur'anic verses 
where the word qital is used for war,160 God's warring position is cast in the airs of 
retaliation, to be waged only against the already warned and conscious intransigents. In 
other words, warring is not supported by the Scripture when it is commenced without 
justification and warning, or when the oppositions are not conscious of their hostile 
actions, nor when the oppositions are not involved in anti-Muslim conspiratorial acts. 
Specifically, verse Q.5:64 reflects these conclusions on sanctioned conflicts by 
referring to the divine' s essential opposition to war: " ... every time they kindled the fire 
of war, Allah extinguished it." Furthermore, according to Q.5:15-16 the Qur'an is 
introduced as the ultimate guide to peace: "There has come to you from Allah a light 
and a clear book by which Allah guides those who pursue His pleasure to ways of 
peace." From the example that the Qur'an sets for its adherents, it would be the highest 
157 Q.9:88, 8:72, 9:29, 9:41, 9:81, 9:88, 4:95, 49: 15,9:44 and 61: Il. 
158 Q.29:8, 31: 15 and 22:78. 
159Q.9:107, 5:33, 47:4, 2:279, 8:57 and 5:64. 
160The word qita1(batt1e), its root and derivatives are used in the Qur'ân at least three times more 
thanjihad; cfQ.2:54,72, 84, 85,178,190,191,193,213,216,217,245,246,247,255; Q.3:13, 21, Ill, 112, 
146, 157, 158, 159, 180, 195; Q.4:74, 75, 76, 77, 84, 89, 90, 92, 93, 157; Q.5:27, 28, 30, 32, 95; Q.6: 138, 
140; Q.7: 141, 150; Q.8:16, 17,39; Q.9: 5,12,13,14,29,30,36,123; Q.17: 33; Q.18: 17,73; Q.22: 39, 
40,58; Q.25:68; Q.26: 14; Q. 28: 9, 15, 19,33; Q.33: 16,20,25,26,27,61; Q.40:26, 28, 29; Q.48:22; 
Q.49: 9; Q.59: Il, 12, 14; Q.60: 8, 9, 12; Q.61:4; Q.73:4; Q.74: 19, 20. M04aqqiq-Damad argues that, 
" ... the word qati1u(fight) is derived from the infinitive muqata1a. This rhymes with mufii 'a1a, which, in 
Arabie, signifies participation on both sides. In this particu1ar context, the word choice implies that 
Muslims are not allowed to fight with those who do not fight with them because muqata1a (mutual fight) 
can be realized only when one fights with the party who fights with him. Therefore, if Muslims fight with 
those who are at peace with them, this evidently cannot be called muqata1a (mutual fight), but would be 
considered a kind of invasion, raid or p1under that cannot be reconci1ed with the meaning of the verse." 
See M04aqqiq-Damad, (2005) 328. 
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degree of conceptual incoherence if wars commenced under the banner of the Scripture 
would seek anything but respect for contracts and peace in pluralistic societies. 161 That 
is why, Q.2:213 clearly points to aIl script ures as the primary means of conflict 
resolution for mankind. 162 
Conclusions 
This examination of the Qur'anic perspective on the ethics of war has progressed 
through two important tasks: first, the attempt to bring divergent exegetical extremes to 
a middle ground, and also by taking an ethicist, rather than a legalistic, perspective. 
Among the conclusions that this chapter has reached is that the Qur'an does not 
sanction unprovoked primary (offensive) wars; that the main causes of legitimate wars 
are the breach of contracts and defensive / deterrent exigencies; that reciprocation in 
war is limited to the removal of an actual threat; that in situations of conflict outbreak, 
it is the leadership of the warring party, and not its subordinates, that must be subject to 
punishment; that faith by itself can not be the motivation of physical conflict and finally 
that peace is essential in the Scripture. Importantly, a moralistic approach in Scriptural 
exegesis, such as that taken by this argument, will be much less prone to war than a 
legalistic perspective based on the traditional commentaries. 
From the points touched upon in this chapter, there is little doubt that the 
Qur'an adopts an instrumental and at times a consequentialist position on war. At times, 
within the ethical directives of the Qur'an, war loses its position as a vice; rather, it 
becomes a legitimate means to suppress other vices, such as living under oppression or 
being at the receiving end of aggression. 
There has been a tendency among sorne ofthe classical Qur'anic exegetes to take 
an essentialist position that considers war not as one among other ways of defense, 
161 The verse's reference to "ways ofpeace" conveys such sense ofpluralism in the opinion of the 
author. 
162 Q.2:213: "Mankind was one community (umma); then Allah sent the prophets as bringers of 
good tidings and warners and sent down with them the Scripture in truth to judge between the people 
conceming that in which they differed ... " 
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deterrence, and the implementation of justice, but as an exclusive means that could test 
the degree of one's religious fidelity in an epical and romantic sense. 
It is such liberalness in interpretation that has permitted certain classical 
exegetes to justify wars not only against actual threats, destabilizing conspiracies or 
aggressions, but also against passive differences of opinions and faiths. 
The fact that this tendency has its sporadic footprints even among sorne modern 
works of exegesis is owed to certain uncritical and apologetic Muslim readings of the 
classicalliteratures. This radical intellectual trend is probably rooted in the fact that the 
jurists who appeared around the beginning of the second century of the Islamic rule -
who according to Shacht were about seven at the time163 - did little critical reading of 
the Umayyad's wars. Modern ethicists such as Izutsu and jurists like ~ali41-Najafiibacfi, 
Kadivar, Muhaqqiq-Damad, and Iskandar1 164 however, by the methodological moral and 
legal deconstruction of the Scripture have been able to reveal and overcome these 
exegetical biases. 
As has been often noted in the present argument, the breach of intra-religious 
and inter-religious peace treaties is systematically noted in the Qur'an as the most 
important, if not the only, legitimate cause of war. Importantly however, such divine 
sanction is immediately checked, contained and limited to a point where security 
against the transgression is established. 
In conclusion, war in the Qur'an is only an instrument, among many others, that 
can be used only in a limited sense and only to establish peace. If 1;ilm is the most 
important Qur'anic virtue as Izutsu held, and if the most legitimate cause ofwar in this 
system is breach of contract, as this chapter established, then war can not be used within 
163It it important to note the most prominent Muslimjurists appeared between the beginning and 
the end of the second cent ury AH (al-~adiq d. 148 AH, al-Shafi'I d. 199AH). Prominent Muslim 
theologists appeared with the Mu'tazili thinkers from the beginning of the second to the beginning of the 
fourth (Wa~il ibn 'Na' d. 131 AH, Abü 'Ali Jubba'1 d. 303AH), and the Ash 'rites from the beginning of 
the fourth century AH (Abu'l I:Iasan Ash'ri d. 330AH). Major exegetes appeared from the middle of the 
third to the end of seveth century AH (al-raban d. 922CE, BaY4awl d. 1316 CE). The Medieval Muslim 
philosophers appeared between the middle of the third to the end of sixth century AH (al-Kindi d. 252AH, 
Ibn Rushd d. 595AH). As noticed above Islamic jurisprudenc and theology were about one and a half 
century ahead of Islamic exegesis and philosophy. 
164 The views of the latter four scholars will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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the same ethical system except as the most limited and the last option in reestablishing 
a contractual basis for peaceful social coexistence. 
In modem times, there appears to be a distinction between the instrumental 
views of war that looks at it as a means of deterrence, justice and defense on the one 
hand, and the essentialist view of war as a human activity with inherent values on the 
other. Indeed, too often the Islamic concept ofwar is popularized as a battle ofMuslims 
versus the unbelievers. Because of the increasing relevance of the Islamic position on 
conflict and peace, not only between Muslims themselves but also between Muslims and 
the non-Muslim world, this argument on the Qur'anic perspective ofthe ethics ofwar is 
invaluably constructive to the project of interfaith understanding and peaceful 
coexistance. 
This chapter pointed at sorne of the Qur'anic exegetical controversies about war. 
But such theoretical conflicts were not produced outside a historical context. They were 
rather the bi-products and mirrors of conflicts in other arenas of the Muslim history. The 
next chapter will reflect on sorne of the post-Prophetie conflicts and the resulting 
intellectual reactions within the ShI 'ite world throughout later centuries. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Sm'! W AR ETHICS: A CRITICAL REVIEW 
1"t."....J1 J .~I 4....b 0.0 ~I 0:!:>l1 wl~ c:L. 
"1 heard from your grandfather, the Prophet, that 
conflict-resolution (i~liilJ dhiit al-bayn) is more 
important than daily prayers (~aIiit) and fasting 
(~iyiim)"165 
• Ali Ibn Ab1 Talib in his last will to his children 
"Nothing is more inviting of divine retribution, greater in 
(ev il) consequence, and more effective in de cline of 
prosperity and cutting short of life than the shedding of 
blood without justification 
• Ali Ibn Ab1 Talib in his letter to Malik al-Ashtar 
This chapter will focus specifically on the war ethics of ShI'! Muslims. The overall goal 
is to provide a concise account of the most important factors in the formation of 
traditional ShI'! war ethics, in light of the modem critical views of this tradition. The 
study of ShI'! war ethics is important not only because the ShI'! school of law is an 
important school of law side by side with the four Sunni schools, but also because a 
greater part of Islamic ethics as a discipline has been developed by a few notable ShI'! 
authors. 166 
The Mammoth Empire and Ethical Insensitivity 
There is a general consensus among modem scholars of pre-Islamic Arabia that 
the tribal campaigns and raids were unavoidable ways of economic survival for tribal 
165 Sharlf Ra<;fi, ed, Nahju'l-Baliigha, Ahlu'l-Bayt Assembly of America, Potomac, Maryland, 
1996, p. 235. Also see Ibn A'tham, p.753. Another Prophetie 4adith goes further: "Said the Apostle of 
God: Indeed remembrance of God in momings and at nights is better than breaking the swords in the way 
of God." (J,;.. J jr:-..ill ~ ~ u~1 ~ 0.0 ~ JL.....:.YI J J~ ..ill.fi~ :..ill JY".J JI.!) See Mui}ammad Ibn al-f.lasan 
al-HUIT al-'AmiIl, Wasii'iI al-Shi 'a iIii TalJ~il Masii'il al-Shari'a, Kitiib Jihiid al-NaiS, Ali Afrasiyabi, 
trans. (Qurnm: Entesharat-e Nahavandi, 2001), 351. 
166 These authors include al-FarabI, Ibn Miskawayh, Tüsl, Dawanl, and A4mad and Mehdi 
Naraql. 
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life. Military campaigns and forays, in other words, represented a mode of economy. 
However, this incentive was gradually overshadowed by non-mundane motives among 
early Muslim warriors as the Islamic state was established under Prophet's leadership. 
Once the ideological zeal of the post-Prophetic warriors gave way again to concem for 
worldly gains, the humanitarian ideals became less important. In the early eighth 
cent ury, for example, the Muslim commander 'Aya~ Ibn Ghanam, disappointed after 
besieging the Roman city of Naslbayn unsuccessfully for one year, resorted to the 
contemporary equivalent of biological weapons in contravention with the sharJ'a. He 
managed to have baskets of scorpions thrown into the city, causing indiscriminate 
slaughter among the civilians and, thereby, reducing the city through terror and fear. 167 
Such a blind assault as weIl as any use of weapon of mass-destruction as Mol].aqqiq-
Damad asserts, is strictly forbidden by Islamic law. 168 But apparently the said 
commander was insensitive enough to the moral aspect of the war altogether. 
In political matters, the mammoth Muslim empire similarly lost its humanitarian 
sensibilities under the Umayyads and Abbasids. Most Muslim warriors saw their 
stunning victories as proof of God's support for their cause. 169 This view was shared 
among the conquerors and the conquered with serious implications for their treatment of 
enemy combatants. 170 The win-win philosophy of Muslim wars (material rewards if one 
167 Ibn A'tham, AI-FutüJ;, 199-200. Also look at Khadduri, War and Peace In Islam, 174, 
referring to the use of lethal materials in wars. Note must be taken that for their indiscriminate impact, 
the use of poison, fire, and flood in war is forbidden according to many jurists. See J:Iussaynl al-Zurbâttt, 
AI-Sayyid J:Iussayn. Akliq al-lfarb fi al-Islam, bayna al-NEJ:?ariyya wa' Talblq, (Qum: Entesharat Dar al-
Tafsir, 2002) 85. He refers to the view of al-J:IilIi, in AI-Sari'iF. 
168 See Mo~aqqiq-Danüid, Protection oflndividuals in Times of Armed ConDict under 
Intemational and Islamic Laws, (2005) 100. 
169 There might be sorne exaggerations in the war chronicles reporting the miracles of Muslim 
military victories, but given the rather fast pace of conquests, there could be no other terrn to explain the 
phenomenal military triumphs. Ibn A'tham reports in AI-FutüJ; that in a conflict with the Roman forces, 
twenty thousand Muslims against sixt Y thousand Romans inflicted a human ton of fourteen thousand 
Romans, as opposed to only seventeen Muslims. To look further into the miracles of the numbers, 
consider Ibn A'tham's reports on other battles: Persian commander Mehran with eighty thousand against 
Abü 'Ubaida with five thousand troops; Rostam with one hundred fi ft y thousand against fort Y thousand. 
See AI-FutüJ;, 91, 96, 105. 
170 For example, the statement of Hurmuzan, the Persian army commander (captured in 640 CE) 
who was brought before 'Umar, is very revealing as to how the non-Muslims conceived such thunderous 
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lives, and he aven if one dies), created a moral mix. It resulted in extreme courage and 
fearlessness of Muslim warriors in the battlefields on the one hand, but on the other, 
little concern to save lives on either of the battling sides. How could a warrior in God's 
army care much about the life or wellbeing of a perceived enemy of God, except if he 
had been warned in advance that an unjustified killing may turn a martyr into a 
murderer? 
The ill treatment of prisoners of war, therefore, was not very exceptional; nore 
was it far from the contemporary conventions outside the Islamic world. Besides Khalid 
Ibn Wand, other Muslim commanders engaged in excesses. In one instance, Abu Musa 
Ash' ad besieged and captured the Persian city Manadher and then massacred all males, 
induding many children who had not yet reached puberty.171 On another occasion, 
'Umar rebuked Abu Musa for having broken the terms of a general amnesty he had 
given to the people of Ramhurmuz; Abu Musa broke the agreement by attacking the city 
before a deadline had expired. l72 
The caliph Abu Bakr issued the last important de cree regulating the moral 
conduct of Muslims fighting in Byzantine and Persian lands. 173 The subsequent caliphs 
'Umar Ibn al-Khattab and 'Uthman Ibn 'Affiin promulgated nothing similar to it. 174 
'An Ibn Ab1 Talib, upon assuming leadership of the Muslim community, was confronted 
Muslim victories. Hurmuzan uttered to 'Umar: "In the past, God was neutral in wars, and had given us a 
free hand, thus our dominance upon you." To this assertion, 'Umar responded: "No, the reason was that 
you were united and we were not." See Khadduri, War and Peace In Islam, 196. 
171 Khadduri, War and Peace In Islam, 212. 
172 Khadduri, War and Peace In Islam, 216. 
173 See Abu Bakr's moral advice to his commander Yaz1d ibn Ab1 ~ufyan on his way to a Syrian 
conquest: "oh Yaz1d, stay firm in Jihad ... , be cognizant that you are on your way to a land which is full of 
enemies and blessings too. Do not be distracted, under any circumstances, from remembering Allah, and 
make your he art always available in his domain, never seek killing of women and children, do not uproot 
or eut palm and fruit trees; do not try to kill children and the elderly; and do not kill any-body in vain. 
Stay away from destroying buildings and developments, and be attentive to ail this so that God may grant 
you victory as He is the Omnipotent." See Ibn A'tham, AI-Futiïl}, 57. 
174 A few and very seant 4adiths reflected in the Sunn1 sources refer to a few short advices from 
'Umar that are far shorter than the elaborate war ethics command narrated from Abu Bakr and 'All. The 
author did not find similar commands to have been issued by the third caliph 'Uthman. See Al-Sayyid 
ijussayn, ijussayn1 al-Zurbatti Akûq al-Ifarb fi al-Islam, bayna al-N:qariyya wa al-TalbJq, (Qum: 
Entesharat Dar al-Tafsir, 2002) 71. 
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with the very different circumstances of civil war. The domestic insurgency he 
encountered during his caliphate lacked any precedent. As a result, it entailed new moral 
and legal codes. 
Military success under 'Umar helped influence the views of later jurists. By the 
time of 'Umar's assassination in 644 CE, the Islamic empire had managed to expand to 
include Persian and Roman territories. These stunning successes impressed the jurists of 
subsequent centuries to such an extent that they concluded a military conque st each 
year should be obligatory for any Muslim caliph. The Kharijites (an Islamic sect who 
rebelled against the fourth caliph) went further and declared jihad as one of the pillars of 
Islam. In this way, the larger political and economic gains from military conflict became 
much more important than the methods employed for its success. 
The Balance of Ruman Life and Arabism 
It is appropriate to look further into the records of 'Umar's behavior for two reasons; 
first as caliph, he stood at the top of the Islamic govemment. Secondly, he enjoyed 
renown for his ascetic and puritanical way, as opposed to his successors, such as 
'Uthman, or Mu'awiya. 
On the question of electing his successor, it is weIl known that 'Umar proceeded 
with a democratic selective process, as opposed to the method of decree by which he 
obtained office. When he became certain that he would soon pass away, he convened a 
committee of six prominent companions and placed the matter of succession in their 
hands. Out of these six, namely, 'Uthman Ibn 'Affan, 'Ali Ibn Ab1 1.'alib, 'Abder 
Ra4man Ibn 'Awf, Sa 'd Ibn Ab1 Waqqa~, Zubayr Ibn al- 'Awwam, and Tal4a Ibn 
'UbaidaIlah, only the last was not present. A committee composed of the first five then 
agreed on the selection of the next caliph. 'Umar appointed Abu Tal4ah al-An~ar1 to 
oversee the procedure with the following instructions: 
As soon you finish my burial, you will not let the committee of five go away for three 
days. By the fourth day they must have elected one among themselves. If there is one 
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who disagrees with the other four you must kill him; if there are two against three you 
must kill them, and if they aIl disagree among themselves, kill them aIl. 175 
While 'Umar might have imposed such terms as a safeguard against the 
possibility of division in the young Muslim empire, there was no guarantee the pers on 
receiving the instructions would not fail to make a distinction between a means to deter 
and a matter of obligation. These instructions, in fact, contravened the Qur'anic de cree 
in Q.5:32 which states that "whosoever kiHs a human being, except (as punishment) for 
murder or for spreading corruption in the land, it shaH be like killing aH humanity ... "176 
In other matters, according to al-Tabar!, 'Umar showed his strong preference for 
Arabs. He believed Arabs were the spirit and the essence of Islam, and that Arabs should 
not be taken into slavery.177 In a modem context, this attitude amounts to cultural 
chauvinism. It contravenes the spirit of the Qur'an represented in verse Q.49: 13. 178 
These views had implications for the war tactics, strategies and ethics. They 
undermined sensitivity for the casualties of non-Arabs and non-Muslims. It is not very 
surprising, consequently, that unlike the Prophet and Abu Bakr, 'Umar issued little 
humanitarian advice to his military commanders. 179 
With the transfer of the caliphate to 'Uthman, and the new caliph's tendency for 
favoring his relatives, power politics gained formidable roots. The govemment's 
appetite increased for rich conquests. Its interest in regulating the ethics of war 
175 Abu la 'far Mu4ammad AI-Tabar1, Tiirlkh al-Umam va'l Muluk(Persian). 2nd ed. trans. Abu 
'Ali Muqammad ibn Muqammad ibn Bal'am1 (Tehran: Zavvar, 2004) vol.3, 569. 
176 See Orooj, Al-Qur'iin: A Contemporary Translation. See also Q.4:93, which reads: "any one 
who kills a believer intentionally will be cast into Hell to abide there for ever, and suffer God's anger and 
damnation; for him a greater punishment awaits." 
177 See Khadduri, War and Peace In Islam, 203. 
178 See Orooj, Al-Qur'iin: A Contemporary Translation. "0 men, We created you from a male and 
female, and formed you into nations and tribes that you may recognize each other. He who has more 
integrity (more pious or righteous) has indeed greater honor with God". It is significant to note that the 
verse immediately following this has a critical tone against sorne of the Arabs (Q.49: 14). 
179 Against this general tendency, there are sporadic reports about 'Umar having dismissed 
Khiilid Ibn al-WaIid for his financial misbehavior in Syria and murder of a fellow Muslim in order to have 
his wife (the infamous story of Khiilid murdering Malik ibn Nuwayra to acquire his beautiful wife Umm 
Tam1m). See A4mad Ibn Ab1 Ya'qub, Tiirikh-e Ya'qubJ. (Beirut: Dar Sader, 1358 AH) vol.2, 10. 
64 
declined. As a result, within a short time, Mu'awiya, the founder of the Umayyad 
dynasty transformed what was once an accountable caliphate to an unaccountable 
monarchy. 
'Ali Ibn Ab! Talib: The Lion and the Dust 
It is important to note that 'Ali Ibn Abl Talib, who gained the epithet Abu Turab ( the 
dust-man) for his humility, assumed the office of caliph not only as a political claimant 
but a well-known man of leaming. He served as a counselor on the SharJ'a (Islamic law) 
for his predecessors. 180 He had experience and faced challenges which his predecessors 
in the caliphate could not claim. None of them had personally participated in battles 
after the Prophet's demise. Nor did any of them confront a Muslim insurgency as did 
'Ali. 18l They held an easier position in determining the ethics of fighting their enemy 
and could more easily disavow responsibility for the breach of any law. 
As Caliph, 'Ali engaged in three major battles in the first civil war in Islam. He 
personally participated in these battles and supervised the details of battle tactics, 
strategies, and rules of engagement in his capacities both as the chief commander and 
chief jurist. It is this specifie combination of factors which made 'Ali's actions 
standards for ShI'! ethics ofwar. 
'Ali did not participate in any of the campaigns of conque st after the Prophet' s 
demise. 182 Given the fact that none of the Companions participated in as many wars as 
'Ali did, his absence from these campaigns is puzzling. He he Id critical views on the 
policies and attitudes of aIl of his caliphal predecessors which may partly explain the 
180 'Umar was frequently quoted to have uttered the proverbial phrase: "Law li 'Aliyun la halaka 
'Umar (Was it not for 'AIl, 'Umar would have perished). See Ibn A'tham's report on how 'Umar used to 
consult 'AIl on matters of laws (ai}kiim); see Ibn A'tham, Al-Futiil;., 116. See also The EncycJopaedia of 
Islam, new edition, s.v. "'AIl"by L. Veccia Vaglieri. 
181 lt is weil known that the first caliph Abu Bakr confronted and successfully suppressed a few 
uprising by apostates (known as redda wars) after the demi se of the Prophet, but these sm ail scale clashes 
were never considered cases of civil war in Islamic historiographies. 
182 The EncycJopaedia of Islam, new edition, s.v. "'AIl"by L. Veccia Vaglieri. 
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absence. 183 However, he advised each of them on matters of law, ethics, and politics. 
Moreover, he had not directly encouraged any of the conquests. It is possible that he 
opposed those conquests in principle, was concerned about the authority behind them, 
and was dismayed by the methods employed in them. 
More generally, 'Ali may have been critical of the policies of Muslim 
commanders in their campaigns outside of Arabia. 'UbaidalIah Ibn 'Umar, the son of the 
second caliph, for example, joined 'Ali's opponent Mu'awiya in the battle of the Camel 
out of fear that 'Ali might prosecute him on account of his unjustified execution of 
Hurmuzan, the Persian prince who converted to Islam. This execution was the result of 
an unproved suspicion of Hurmuzan's involvement in the caliph 'Umar's assassination. 
It is the combination of the above factors, that make the study of 'Ali's wars important 
for the examination of the ShI'! ethics ofwar. 
J amai and $iffin: Two Benchmark Batties for Shl'1 Ethics of War 
There is a vast literature about the reasons, conclusions, and the historie significance of 
the three wars that 'Ali was involved in, namely the battle of the Jamal (Camel) in 656 
CE, in which he confronted the Prophet's last wife 'Ayisha, as well as the Prophet's 
companions Tall).a, and Zubayr; the battle at ~iffin (657 CE) against Mu'awiya; and the 
battle at Nahrawan (658 CE) against the Kharijites. Although these battles, especially at 
~iffin, led to the most serious theological and political schisms in the history ofIslam, 1 84 
the concern here is to search for the ethics of inter-Islamic battles and to see the moral 
patterns and codes ofbehavior these wars had established. 185 
183 A part of this criticism is reflected in 'Ali' s sermons, as reported by Sharlf RaQi in the 
Nahju 'l-Baligha. 
184 Ibn A'tham, Al-Futiil;I, 428. 
185 Elaborate accounts of laws of war with bughit as developed by Sunni and ShI'! jurists are 
provided by Khaled Abou El Fadl and ~ali41-NajaIabadi respectively. See Khaled Abou El Fadl, "AlJkim 
al-Bughit. Irregular Warfare and the Laws of Rebellion in Islam," in Cross, Crescent, And Sword: The 
Justification and Limitation of War in Westem and Islamic Tradition, eds. James Turner Johnson and 
John Kelsay (New York. Westport, CT., London: Greenwood Press, 1990) 149-176. 
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'Ali did not initiate these conflicts, rather he tried to pre vent each of them 
through peace initiatives. In the end, he won decisive victories in aIl three wars after his 
initiatives failed. 186 He, nevertheless, regretted the bloodshed. As Vaglieri put it: 
After his victory at (the battle of) the Camel, he tried to relieve the distresses of the 
vanquished by preventing the enslavement of their women and children, in face of the 
protests of a group of his partisans; when battles ended, he showed his grief, wept for 
the dead, and even prayed over his enemies. 187 
According to Ibn A 'tham, the last peace offer by 'Ali to the instigators of the Camel 
battle resulted in the murder of his envoy, Muslim of Mushiiji'. Yet once 'Amr Ibn 
larmuz, a host of Zubayr outside the warfield, killed him while sleeping and brought to 
'Ali his head and arms expecting an award (or a welcome) from 'Ali, 'Ali reportedly 
burst into tears, cursed and scolded 'Amr, sighed in deep regret and then narrated a 
Prophetic 4adith: "1 heard from Mu~tala that he promised hellfire for the killer of 
Zubayr.,,188 Ibn A'tham reflects on this mutual astonishment by pointing to the 
convention al reason brought by 'Amr as to why he killed Zubayr. "1 thought l would 
please you and was sure that he (Zubayr) would never agree with yoU!"189 For 'Ali, the 
demise of those who once had fought on the side of the Prophet was but a tragedy, no 
matter that they waged a war against himself. This paradoxical mode is perhaps best 
expressed through a proverbial description by Taoism on War: 
The enemies of the wise are not demons. They are human beings just like himself whom 
he does not want to destroy. He does not celebrate victory. He enters the war with 
kindness and sadness. As ifhe is entering a funeral. 
Another highlight of the lamaI battle was the way 'Ali arranged the safe retum 
of one of the three main instigators of the lamaI war against himself. He retumed 
186 Ibn A'tham, Al-FutiÏll, 256, 424. 
187 The Encyc10paedia of Islam, new edition, s.v. 'Ali, by L. Veccia Vaglieri. 
188 Ibn A'tham, Al-FutiÏll, 428. 
189 Ibn A'tham, Al-Futiil;J, 428. 
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'Ayisha, to her home at Medina in full courtesy while sending for her protection a group 
of women disguised as male warriors. 190 It is important to note that both Zubayr and 
'Ayisha were responsible for a war that cost more than ten thousand lives. 19l 
The battle of Siffin was considered an unparalleled tragedy. According to Ibn 
A'tham, it consumed sorne seventy thousand lives on both sides. l92 The rebel govemor 
Mu'awiya, who was allied with the shrewd 'Amr Ibn al-'A~, did not want to relinquish 
his power in Syria, even if the consequences meant the disintegration of the new Islamic 
state. For 'Ali, on the other hand, the prospects of either fighting or capitulating were 
both bitter options. 
Like in the case of J am al Battle, 'Ali pondered the moral basis of his cause 
before engaging in battle at Siffin. Given that he reluctantly accepted his position as the 
fourth caliph, 'Ali was not, in contrast to his adversary Mu'awiya, fighting for pers on al 
status. 193 He only joined battle as last resort to prevent the disintegration of the young 
Islamic state. Prior to the mobilization of his army, 'Ali called upon a number of the 
Prophet's companions seeking their views. He received their support and 
encouragement. One ofthem, Qais Ibn 'Ubada, dec1ared: 
Oh commander of the believers! Haste and take us on top of our enemies' heads and do 
not escape from this battle; 1 swear to God, that 1 welcome fighting with the insurgents 
more than with the Turks and the Romans, because the former party (Mu'awiya) 
employed tricks and deceit in faith and has humiliated the companions of the Prophet 
and their followers (tiibi'ln) including muhijjilS (Prophet's Meccan companions who 
immigrated to Medina) and an~iiIs (Medinese converts), and felt animosity against 
them, jailed them, beat them, deprived them, or sent them to exile; they also rendered 
plundering us (fellow Muslims) as a legitimate act and look at us as slaves. 194 
190 Ibn A'tham, Al-Futii/;l, 440. 
191 Ibn A'tham, Al-Futii/;l, 441. 
192 Ibn A'tham, Al-Futii/;l, 441. 
193 AI-Tabar1, Tiirlkh al-Umam, 606. He gives a full report of how 'AIT was resisting the 
acceptance of the caliphate and tried hard to encourage others, including his later adversaries Ta14a and 
Zubayr, to accept succeeding 'Uthman. 'AIT's own words on the matter is the following: "by Allah, 1 had 
no liking for the caliphate nor any interest in government, but you yourselves invited me to it and 
prepared me for it"; see Ra<;li, ed., Nailjul-Balagha, 177. See also Ibn A'tham, Al-Futii/;l, 389, section four. 
194 Al-Minqar1, Na~r Ibn Muza4im. Waq'at $iffin. (Tehran: Sazman-e Entisharat va Âmüzish-e 
Enqelab-e IslamI, 1987) 131-32. 
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Only a few showed any hesitation. 195 For 'Afi's, the initiator of the conflict was 
Mu'awiya. In one of 'AIi's many letters to him, he stated, ''You have called me to 
war ... better to leave people on one side, come out to me and spare both parties from 
fighting so that it may be known who of us has a rusted heart, and covered eyes.,,196 
However, his words had no effect and the battle commenced. 
The composition of the opposing forces at this battle points to the ideological 
divide between the two sides. 197 According to Lecker, estimates of the number of 
Prophet's companions on 'AIi's side range as high as twenty eight hundred, including 
seventy veterans of earlier wars. On the opposite side, the number is only two, and these 
belong among the last groups of Muslim converts who spent little time with the 
Prophet. 
Moral Norms of Battle: Siffin 
At Siffin, combat was a last resort in the mind of 'Ali. The most elaborate account of 
the battle refers to an extensive correspondence between 'Ali Ibn Ab1 Talib and 
Mu 'awiya and his confidante 'Amr Ibn al-'A~ reminding them of the illegitimate cause 
for their opposition. 198 A number of envoys were dispatched between the two parties to 
mediate but to no result. 199 The negative responses ofboth Mu'awiya and 'Amr b. al-
- -'A~ were not surprising. 'Amr b. al-'A~ had obtained a commit ment from Mu'awiya to 
appoint him as govemor of Egypt once' Ali was defeated.20o 
When it became clear that Mu'awiya would not settle for less than a military 
confrontation, 'Ali mobilized his troops; however, before and even during the 
195 AI-Minqar1, Waq'at $iffin, 132-44. 
196 See • AIi's letter number ten; quoted in RacfI, ed., Nhjul-Baliigha, 205. 
197 The EncycJopaedia of Islam, new edition, s.v. "Ali Ibn Ab1 Talib" by M. Lecker. 
198 AI-Minqar1, Waq'at $iffin, 166,207. 
199 AI-Minqarl, Waq'at $iffin, 259, 269. 
200 AI-Minqar1, Waq'at $iffin, 325. 
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engagement, he did not miss an opportunity to remind his commanders of the standards 
of moral behavior to which they must adhere. 'Ali demonstrated his ethical character by 
giving the following instructions to his troops: 
Do not initiate the battle before the belligerents do, for this is yet another proof of your 
right motive. In case you win the battle, do not trace a runner away, do not finish off the 
wounded,201 do not mutilate, nor disclose private parts of the deceased. If you enter the 
enemy's camp, do not tear off curtains, do not enter any house except with my direct 
order; no plunder; no harm to women ev en if they curse and insult you as they are not in 
control of their emotion; we refrained in the Prophet's time to bother polytheists 
women, and in jiihjli time if a man harmed a woman, he would have been the subject of 
blame and humiliation for a long time.202 
'Ali is also said to have commanded the following in the battlefield: 
Do not shout loud in the battlefield, nor publicly curse our opponents;203 show patience, 
forbearance and kindness to your own forces;204 do not leave your brother alone with the 
enemy;205 do not execute any of the prisoners of war;206 hatred for them (enemy) should 
not lead you to fight before inviting them to guidance, and exhausting your pleas before 
them."207 
'Ali's public pronouncements in war reflect his sense of justice. He implored 
God, "Oh God, if you make us win, protect us from transgressing our enemy; if you let 
our enemy win, then honor us with martyrdom and protect our friends.,,208 
201 Ibn A'tham narrates however, that a specifie soldier in 'Ali's camp defied this order and did 
finish off sorne of the wounded. 
202 AI-Minqan, Waq'at $jffin, 174-5,212,278-79. See also Raft, ed., Nahjul-Baliigha, 207, see 
military instruction number fourteen. 
203 AI-Minqarl, Waq'at $jflin, 145,303. 
204AI_Minqarl, Waq 'at $jffin, 17l. 
205 AI-Minqarl, Waq'at $jffin, 322. 
206 AI-Minqarl, Waq'at $jffin, 64l. In fact, immediately after the termination of the war, 
'Ali, unilaterally and unconditionally, released ail the captives. See AI-Minqarl, Waq'at $jffin, 
718. 
207 Raft, ed, Nhjul-Baliigha, 206 . 
208AI_Minqarl, Waq'at $jffin, 317. 
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'Ali makes sure at the same time that his moral concern is not interpreted as 
cowardice. He is quoted by many reports as having stressed: "by Allah in who se hand 
lies the life of the son of Abii Talib, certainly a thousand striking of the swords on me 
are easier to me than a death in bed which is not in obedience to Allah.,,209 
Banning Inhumane Retaliation and Taking Personal Risk 
'Ali forbade arbitrary retaliation. His forces at one point, in defiance ofhis orders, lost a 
strategie location to the opposing side (near the Euphrates river bank in present-day 
Iraq). As a result, the forces of Mu'awiya gained control of and severed the water supply 
for 'AIi's army. After a rebuke by their commander, 'AIi's forces regained the strategie 
position in a counterattack so that they were in a situation to retaliate and sever the 
water supply for Mu'awiya's forces. Yet 'Ali refused to retaliate in kind?10 
One of the Muslims who witnessed this chivalrous action was 'Umar Ibn Sa'd al-
Waqqa~, a commander at the service of Mu'awiya. Just a few years later, 'Umar would 
sever the water supply of 'AIi's son l1usayn , his household, and about seventy of his 
encircled and heavily outnumbered troops in Karbala,.211 
According to Ibn Muzaqim, during the prolonged ~iffin battle, 'Ali requested on 
at least three occasions to duel with Mu'awlya, however his requests were turned 
down.212 Mu'awiya maintained that the "king's job is not pers on al fighting.,,213 'Ali 
taunted Mu'awiya's cowardice with the following poetry: 
.J~ ('J:l 1'1 .J~ L. 1'J:l1 ..)1 wyJl Ù" ...... J:l ($1 Ù" 
ln which of the two days should 1 escape from death? 
209 Raqi, ed., Nhjul-Baliigha, 89. 
21OAI-Minqarl, Waq'at $jffin, 219-21, 264. See also Ibn A'tham, AI-Futiif?, 526. 
211AI_Minqarl (Waq'at $jffin, 701). Reports that in fact, the famous agreement imposed on 'Ali 
at Siffin was authored by 'Umar ibn Sa'd. 
212AI_Minqarl, Waq'at $jffin, 375, 432,530. 
213 AI-Minqarl, Waq'at $jffin, 376. 
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The day which 1 am not destined to die; or the day that 1 am? 214 
'Ali' s invitation to duel illustrated his desire to take as much personal risk in battle as 
he expected from his troops. A duel could, in fact, have saved many lives on both sides. 
The Impersonality ofWar 
On certain occasions during combat, 'Ali acted exemplarily. In one encounter, he 
defeated 'Amr b. al-' As and was about to finish him off when 'Amr exposed his sexual 
organ. 'Ali then left him in disguSt.215 Mu'awiya later used to tease his confidante, 
saying, ''You owe your life to your private partl,,216 For sorne, this act may be 
understood simply as a squandered opportunity. For 'Ali, however, he was upholding an 
ethical standard more important than military victory. This act of chivalry was repeated 
once again when 'Ali later fought another warrior in Mu'awiya's army.217 
'Ali had previously acted in the same manner during one of the Prophet' s battles. 
On that occasion, he had defeated 'Amr Ibn 'Abdawud, a known polytheist. He was 
about to finish him off when 'Amr spat on 'Ali. 'Ali released him on account of the 
spitting provo king anger in him and thus corrupting the holy cause ofhis combat. 
The poet Ruml extolled this chivalry in sorne ofhis poetry: 
Jc.~ JI ~ 01~ I.J ~ ~ 
~I.:i.:;, J ~.JJI Y. ($~ ~Jj 
~ J .]A J ~.]A .J6.:i!1 
~\S ~lljë .J.l.il JI ~.fi 
~ <.si w...:....J J ."ic 0~""'; jJ 
y - ·IK, 1 .l.iS-.S1 <\..:.. '1 ~ .Y($ • .J 
Y0l,. (':!~ J~.>! 0l,. JI ~...s. 
Y~ 01.J 0~b Üul~ I.J \A~jl 
J.= IY"~I jy>1 ~ JI 
~y Üul~ ~I-k Y. ljë .J~ 
~ ($J.J .J~ û.:..1.l.i1 J~ JI 
~ 01 ~ û.:..1.l.i1 0L. j .J~ 
J.= ... \..,.. '1'1 ,-,(,~ IJ.U .J.J. U U ~ 
~I.)I j!J t!' Ù'" y. ~ 
01S....J 0fi Ji' y. ($.l,1~ ~ 01 
~ j w...:....J 0:l1 ~ ~ .J~ 
214 AI-Minqarl, Waq'at $Jffin, 540. The translation ofthis poetry into Persian has frequently been 
used in various texts ofPersian wisdom literature as a proverb: 
~ l....::.!...s. ($jJ.J J ~'-! l....::.!...s. ($jJ.J 
~ IJ.) cJ.y J.J~ ~ l....::.!...s. ($jJ.J 
215 AI-Minqarl, Waq'at $iffin, 577. 
216 AI-Minqarl, Waq'at $iffin, 577. 
217 AI-Minqarl, Waq'at $iffin, 633. 
~ IJ.J jJ.J J~ 0~.fi.Jh cJ.y JI 
~Y"".l.i$;J ~fi ~l; l....::.!...s. ($jJ.J 
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~ .JY'1.. "...l ph.~ 
Ù"'(.Gy.. ~ 4..,ÜJ ~~ 
IJ.J J>.Ù ~.JIS .Jolil uS;:;' 
1..; L;b. Ù:! ~ J tf' jI .l:!y... IJ 
Y JlwI.Po P .l..a j Ji 
The purity in deeds must be leamt from 'Ali 
Let it be known that the lion ofrighteousness is devoid oftrickery 
ln a war, he defeated an enemy warrior 
He pulled out his sword and sought to finish him off 
The defeated enemy spat on his face 
A face that was the honor of every apostle and God's friend 
'Ali dropped his sword immediately 
and lost his resolve to battle 
this act made the released warrior to wonder 
about the reason of such an unjustified mercy 
Asked he from 'Ali as to why the rise of the sword, 
the capture and the release 
"What did you see," he asked, "that was more important than existence?" 
"Why did you knock me down and then release me?" 
"What caused such a mercy where anger must rule?" 
"What norm may justify releasing a dragon free?" 
So replied 'Ali that "1 fight only in the way of the most Righteous." 
"1 am His slave rather than a server of my own physical desires." 
"Once you spat on me, my camaI soul ruined my cause." 
"My motive split in half and 1 was warring partly for my whims and partly for God." 
"And it is improper to associate anything with a divine cause." 
So many lives were saved by 'AIi's sword of self-control (i}ilm), 
The sword of self-control is indeed sharper than the iron sword, 
Or better to say, it may bring many more victories than a hundred armies. 218 
Patience and self-control (lJilm) was the most important moral value in post-
Islamic Arab culture; it kept its status in the early Islamic world. Only beliefwas 
more important. Izutsu stresses how lJilm is related to power: 
It is essentially a quality of a man who governs and dominates others, 
And not of those who are governed and dominated. A naturally weak and powerless man 
is never called i}aIlm, however much he caIrns down his anger when insulted: he is 
"weak" simply.219 
218 Jaliil al-DIn Mowlavl, Mathnavl-e Ma 'navJ, vol.!, 151-161. 
219 Toshihiko. Izutsu, God and Man in the Qur'iin, 207. 
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It is therefore within the power-wrath equation ofwar that self-control (i}ilm) as a virtue 
finds its uItimate realization. For this reason, 'Ali Ibn Ab1 Talib was known as the 
paradigm of i}ilm in war and of 'ilm (knowledge) in peace. 220 
'Ali sought to prevent combat between kin. On several occasions, it occurred that 
two brothers, or father and son came across each other in combat. 'Ali ruled that, under 
such circumstances, the warring relatives must desist.221 In one case, Uthal Ibn ijajl 
encountered his father. After a few exchanges, he recognized him and the two ceased 
fighting. Uthal then exclaimed to his father: "1 was never unthankful, at your table, to 
your good education, and to your care for me; my only fear is that 1 do not want you in 
hell.,,222 
The Sanctity of Contract and Treatment of the non-Combatants 
'Ali respected the rights of non-combatants. On one occasion, when 'Ali and his troops 
passed through a Persian village, the resident dihqans (landlord-farmers) offered to feed 
the troops. However, 'Ali refused the offer stating that he would only buy what he 
needed. He wamed his troops not to damage the farms while passing.223 He ordered 
them, moreover, to wait whenever they needed to take water, until after the owner's 
flocks have taken water, and to take the services from the local inhabitants only if they 
fully compensate the owners.224 
'Ali insisted on respect for the sanctity of agreements in war. When 'Ali' s troops 
neared victory at Siffin, Mu'awiya deceived 'AIl's troops by putting five hundred copies 
of the Qur'an on spears.225 He effectively called for arbitration according to the 
220 See Ifadiqat al-Ifaqlqa of Sana'1 (d.52511131) that is epic poetry about' AIi's wars. See 
Charles-Henri de Fouchécour, 1998, p.157. 
221 Al-Minqar1, Waq'at $iffjn, 371. 
222 Al-Minqar1, Waq'at $iffin, 607. 
223 Al-Minqar1, Waq'at $iffjn, 200. 
224 Ya'qub, Tirikh-e Ya 'qiibl, vol. 2, 200. 
225 Al-Minqari, Waq'at $iffin, 657. 
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sCripture.226 After sorne negotiation, the arbitration was left to two representatives, one 
from each side, whose verdict was to be binding and final. Tired of the prolonged battle, 
'AIi's troops forced him to accept the arbitration and the choice of Abu Musa Ash 'arl 
as their representative.227 
Abu Musa, however, was easily deceived by Mu'awiya's representative, the 
shrewd 'Amr b. al-' A~. In the end, he retumed to 'Ali and his troops with a ruling that 
dismissed 'Ali as caliph. 'Amr, on the other hand, had agreed in private ta the removal 
ofMu'awiya as a candidate ta the caliphate but then disavowed the agreement in public. 
A number of 'AIi's troops (Kharijites) now tumed against him and declared the 
armistice null and void. 
'Ali refused ta nullify an armistice which he, albeit reluctantly and under the 
pressure of these very same critics, was forced ta sign. 'Ali based his decision on the 
Qur'an's emphasis on the sanctity of contracts.228 Breaching a contract would be 
treachery/perfidy ev en in war (al-ghadr). 
In contrast to 'Ali, there are no reports in the Sunnl and ShI'! sources about 
Mu'awiya's observance of ethical conduct. Mu'awiya's troops initiated the battle.229 
His troops did not receive from him instructions to act moderately on the battlefield 
and, for the most part, acted without restraint. Mu'awiya's lieutenants undertook a 
campaign against cities and villages in order ta consolidate his power aU over the 
Arabian lands. They plundered the houses of aU those who were believed ta be disloyal 
h U d · 230 to t e mayya reglme. 
226 AI-Minqari, Waq'at $jffin, 596. 
227 According to al-Minqarl (see Waq'at $jffin, 700), 'AIT's preference for a representative in the 
arbitration was Malik al-Ashtar. 
228 According to al-Minqari, (Waq'at $jffin), 'AIT's points ofreference were Q.5: 1 and Q. 16:91. 
229 AI-Minqarl, Waq'at $jffin, 213. 
230 In Ibn A'tham, AI-Futiil!, 714-725, see how Sufyiin Ibn 'Awf, by Mu'awiya's order, attacked 
many villages in Iraq, systematically eliminated all the followers of 'AIT, and went about pillaging and 
plundering. So was the case of another Lieutenant, Busr Ibn Artat, who pursued a policy of murder and 
plunder in almost all of the major cities of Arabia, including Mecca and Medina. 
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Tabar1, Ibn Ath1r, and Ibn Abi'l ijarnd report that Mu'awiya' gave a free hand to 
his troops to kill and confiscate properties.231 The army of his son, Yazld, followed the 
same policies after the battle of al-ijarra during the second civil war. Not only were 
there massacres that the Prophet's mosque was flooded with blood but, according to Ibn 
Kathlr, a thousand Medinese women gave birth to kids with unknown fathers,z32 
In contrast to the above, 'Ali's view of killing the innocent noncombatants (salk 
al-dima) as reflected in his letter to Malik al-Ashtar ('Ali's governor in Egypt) points 
to the gravit y of murder without justification. 'Ali writes: 
Vou should avoid shedding blood without justification, because nothing is more inviting 
of divine retribution, greater in (evil) consequence, and more effective in de cline of 
prosperity and cutting short of life than the shedding of blood without justification. On 
the Day of Judgment Allah the Glorified, would commence giving His judgment among 
the people with the cases ofbloodshed committed by them. Therefore, do not strengthen 
your authority by shedding prohibited blood because this will weaken and lower the 
authority, moreover destroy it and shi ft it. Vou cannot offer any excuse before Allah or 
before me for will fuI killing because there must be the question ofrevenge in it.233 
Karbala': AI-I:Iusayn's Call for the Ethics of Liberality 
Karbala', where 'Ali's second son ijusayn Ibn 'Ali (d. 680 CE), along with seventy two 
companions and family members were martyred, marks an equally important episode for 
the moral standards of war in ShI'! tradition. This episode provides much fruit fuI 
material for the discussion of the ethics of the cause of this war Uus ad bellum), and the 
ethics of the manner in which it was conducted Ous in bello). 
The story of why and how ijusayn, the Prophet's grandson, on the eve of 
Mu'awiya's death, departed from the ijijaz towards Küfa in order to claim succession, is 
weIl covered in the many primary sources. Western orientalists such as WeIlhausen and 
Lammens are unanimous in concluding that the battle at this site was over the control of 
231 See al-Tabarl, Tiirlkh a1-Umam, vol.6, 77, also 'Izzaddin ibn Athlr, A1-Kiimil fi a1-Tiirlkh, 
vol.3, translation by Hamidre4a Azhlr. (Tehran: Asatlr Publications, 2002) 150. 
232 Ibn Kathlr, Tiirikh a1-Bidiiya wa '1 Nahiiya, vol.8, ed. Isma 'il al-Ba~r1 (Matba'a al-Sa'ada, 
1358 AH) 22. 
233 RaQi, Sharlf, ed. Nhju1-Ba1iigha. Potomac, (Maryland: Ahlul-Bayt Assembly of America, 
1996) 248-9. 
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the Muslim community. However, what occurred was more than just a show of power 
and might; indeed, this battle became a symbolic fight between righteousness and illegal 
appropriation. As Vaglieri maintains: 
There emerges from it (the literature) as a whole and, more important, from the faets 
themselves, the figure of a man impelled by an ideology (the institution of a régime 
whieh would fulfiIl the demands of the true Islam), eonvineed that he was in the right, 
stubbomly determined to aehieve his ends, as in general are aIl religious fanaties, and 
admired and eneouraged by supporters who were also eonvineed that their eause was 
just. 234 
As soon as I:Iusayn leamt about the death of Mu'awlya, he fled Medina, 
knowing that Mu'awlya's son Yazld would soon force important Muslim leaders to give 
their oath of allegiance (bay 'a). I:Iusayn went to Mecca to fulfill his pilgrimage (1;aiJ) 
but, before the completion of rituals, accepted the invitation of a large number of his 
followers to lead the Muslim community. I:Iusayn first sent his cousin, Muslim Ibn 
'Aqll, as an emissary, in order to evaluate the situation. When he informed him of Küfan 
promises of protection and assistance, I:Iusayn set off. 
Muslim Ibn 'Aql1 and a number of other followers of I:Iusayn, however, were 
shortly afterwards betrayed and executed. I:I usayn leamed of their fate while en route. 
He at first wanted to retum to the I:Iijaz but was unable. Umayyad troops had aheady 
been dispatched by the Küfan govemor Ibn Ziyad. He had ordered 'Umar Ibn Sa'd 
Waqqas to encircle I:Iusayn and his followers, and force them to give their oath of 
allegiance to Yazld, or face death. Muslim Ibn 'Aqll's brothers, moreover, wanted 
revenge against Ibn Ziyad. I:Iusayn was caught between the dishonor of flight and the 
futility of conflict with Yazld. Vaglieri describes the outcome: 
When it was repeated to him (l:Iusayn) that first of aIl he must submit to his cousins 
(Yazld), he replied that he would never humiliate himself like a slave... He then 
dismounted and commanded that his horse should be hobbled, intending by this to 
signify that he would never flee. l:Iusayn then read to his supporters a proclamation in 
whieh, after informing them of the doleful news he had received and of the treaehery of 
the inhabitants of Kiïfa, he invited them to leave him ... Those who had joined his group 
234 The Encyc10paedia of Islam, new edition, s.v. "l:Iusayn ibn' Ali ibn abi Talib" by L. Veeeia 
Vaglieri. 
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during the joumey did depart, and there remained with him only those who had followed 
him from I:Iijaz. 235 
At this point, there are sever al important questions about I:!usayn's motivations. 
First, was I:!usayn after political power, and if so, why did he encourage his companions 
to leave? Why did I:!usayn risk the lives of about seventy people against an army at 
least sixt Y times larger, though those who stayed behind knew their fate? Finally, why 
didn't I:!usayn, as a tactical maneuver, accept Yazld's caliphate, escape and then rebel 
when he had enough followers to form a real army? 
Perhaps the only justified answers are that, first, he took the Kiifan invitation as 
a political obligation rather than a matter of option. That is why he released a good 
number of his troops once it became clear that winning in the war was impossible. He 
refrained to take a false oath of allegiance to Yazld for he could not break it afterwards, 
given that perfidy (al-ghadr that is unilateral breach of contract with enemy) is 
forbidden in Islam. 
Whatever the answers to these questions, Yazld had I:!usayn's family and 
companions massacred without compunction. On the final day of the fateful encounter, 
I:!usayn invited 'Umar Ibn Sa'd's forces to examine the lawfulness of their actions and 
reminded them of Mu4ammad's emphasis on respecting Prophet's family. He also asked 
to be allowed to make his way to a country which would offer him safe passage.236 He 
sought to avoid conflict appealing to his enemy's sense ofwar ethics and morality. 
The following two legendary statements frequently found in ShI'! literature 
probably best explains I:!usayns's motivations: 
~\ ).J ~ yI 'Jj J.!l~\ ~I..bc.\ i.S~  ! 'i ..il\j 'J 
No, 1 swear to God that 1 do not give them the hand of the servile 
nor do 1 flee from them like a slave. 
..:i:i....u.,~'. J"LS;'\ 
, -r"'. i.J:l U U 
235 The EncycJopaedia of Islam, new edition, s.v. "I:Iusayn ibn 'Ali ibn abi Tiilib" by L. Veccia 
Vaglieri. 
236 The EncycJopaedia of Islam, new edit ion, s.v. "I:Iusayn ibn' Ali ibn abi Tiilib" by L. Veccia 
Vaglieri. 
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If the faith of Mu4ammad will not stand straight 
but through my slaughter, oh swords take me! 
Many ShI'! and non-Shl'l historians of Islam hold that I:Iusayn was not left with 
any other honorable option but to stand and fight. He refused to use tricks to escape an 
unwanted battle. I:Iusayn, in fact, challenged the legitimacy of the confrontation not 
only on grounds ofIslamic morality but with a common sense of justice. He stated: 
Ifyou lack any faith, be freemen in your life 237 
This appealed to the objective ethics characteristic of the Shl'ite / Mu 'tazilite 
princip le of 'justice' that will be discussed in the fourth chapter. I:Iusayn registered that 
one needs not be Muslim to judge about the wrong cause of the conflict. 
His appeal had effect. AI-I:Iurr b. Yazld al-Tamlml, a commander of Ibn Ziyad 
who had besieged I:Iusayn and his companions relented and went over to I:Iusayn's side, 
knowing the cost would be martyrdom. He apologized and asked for I:Iusayn's 
forgiveness for his previous actions, I:Iusayn gave him his blessing and said: "it was not 
for nothing that your mother named you I:Iurr (freeman), as you are a freeman here and 
freeman hereafter.,,238 I:Iurr probably remembered that when he had first encountered 
and laid siege to him, I:Iusayn allowed his horsemen to draw water nearby. In contrast, 
'Umar b, Sa'd denied I:Iusayn and his companions access to water.239 
The battle at Karbala' raises many moral questions. First, there was asymmetry 
in the strength of the two sides and in the goals and the inflicted damage. The battle 
posited an army of approximately four thousand against one of about seventy. The 
larger force, moreover, did not need to set the tents ofwomen and children afire in order 
to ensure victory. The high level of savagery perpetrated by Ibn Ziyad, 'Umar Sa'd and 
237This statement is frequently mentioned in many primary sources (i.e. al-TabarI, etc.). 
238This sentence has become proverbial in ShI'1literature. 
239For his extraordinary last-minute heroism, al-ijurr's reputation has been revered above aH 
other companions of ijusayn in the ShI'1 literature on Karbala'. See The Encyc10paedia of Islam, new 
edition, s.v. "ijusayn Ibn 'Ali Ibn Abi Talib" by L. Veccia Vaglieri. 
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their troops stands in contrast to the exemplary heroism of Busayn's camp. This then 
established a standard in ShI'! ethics ofwar, side by side with Siffin. 
The Moral Impact of Karbala' 
The Karbala' massacre undermined the development of moral standards under the 
Umayyads. Any causality for war (jus ad bellum) and methods of conduct in war (jus in 
bello) were subsequently justified arbitrarily by the various courts of the caliphate. 
Askar1 argues that before the Karbala' incident, the caliph's rulings were tantamount to 
rules of Islam in public opinion. But, afterwards poli tics and faith were separated,z40 
Jurists and scholars began to develop and explicate legal approaches to war based on the 
Qur'anic and 4adith injunctions. Rarely did a caliph or sultan follow those injunctions in 
his planning and conduct ofwar. 
These historic events, however, bequeathed heroes for subsequent generations. 
'Ali, I:Iusayn, Malik al-Ashtar, al-I:Iurr, and Zaynab (I:Iusayn's sister) were extolled as 
paradigms ofvirtue and morality while Mu'awlya, Yazld, Ibn Ziyad, 'Umar Sa'd, Shimr 
Ibn Dhi'l Jawshan and Khawli B. Yezid (the pers on who carried I:Iusayn's head to 
'UbaydaIlah) became anti-heroes in ShI'! cosmology. These figures appear frequently in 
juridical discussions and Persian epic literature. Perhaps the most important impact of 
the Karbala' tragedy on the ShI'! view regarding war and peace is summarized in the 
ShI'! proverbial phrase: kullu yawmin 'Ashiïrii wa kullu 'arqin Karbalii' ( j I.J~~ f'.J:. JS 
,,)4.fi ~) JS - aIl days are 'Ashiïrii 241 and aIl lands are Karbala'). By this slogan, that 
appeared long after the incident, the ShI'! worldview provided an alternative to a world 
view that since the eight cent ury became the standard for the majority Sunnl Muslims 
namely the division of world into the abode of peace and the abode of war (diir al-Islam 
and diir al-iJarb). Alternately the Shl'l view saw the essential divisive line in the world 
to go not only between the believers and non-believers, but to go as weIl through the 
240 'Askari, The Martyr ofthe Revival, 94. 
241 lOth of MuJ;.arram, the first month of Arabie ealendar wh en f.lusayn was martyred. 
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Muslim world itself. In other words a Muslim could be conceived far less friendly than a 
non-believer.242 
Jihad in the Mirror of ShI'! I:Iadith 
The tragedy of Karbala' permanently changed the political outlook of the Shl'ite 
leadership in the caliphate. This was reflected in the body of ShI'! l).adith that mostly 
originated from or was linked to the founder of the Twelver ShI'! school oflaw, Ja'far 
al-~adiq (d. 148/765 )?43 The most authoritative collection of these l).adith, Wasiiïl 
al-ShI 'a ilii TaiJ~JJ Masii'il al-Shari'a,244 divides its treatment of jihad (kitiib al-jihiid) 
into two sections, one on jihad against the enemy and the other on jihad against the 
camaI soul (al-nafs). 245 A doser analysis of the content of the section on 'jihad against 
the enemy' shows that the l).adith collection discourages rather than encourages armed 
struggle. 
With the exception of defensive war, which is an obligation incumbent upon all, 
armed struggle or armed jihad strictly requires the permission of the 'just authority' or 
Imam. The great bulk of the l).adith narrated from Ja'far al-~adiq in the 'Book of Jihad,' 
in fact, emphatically limits the possibility of rebellion even against illegitimate rulers. 
In this collection of lIadith, al-Sadiq makes a statement which appears to oppose 
jihad as it was understood and practiced in the day. al-Sadiq questions' Abdul Malik Ibn 
'Amr, "0 'Abdu'l Malik, 1 do not see you to have left for war in the regions your fellow 
242 For the full story of al-J:lusayn's tragedy as narrated by al-Tabarl see Gerard, Chaliand. Ed. 
The Art ofWar in World History, (Berekly, Los Angeles, London: University ofCalifornia Press, 1994) 
395-399. 
243 Al-$adiq is known in the h~dith literature by the epithet Aba 'Abd Allah. 
244 The most important contemporary source for Twelver Shl'11aw is Wasiiïl al-ShJ 'a ilii Ta/J~JJ 
Masiiïl al-SharJ'a written by Mu4ammad Ibn al-H.asan al-Hurr al-' AruiIi (d.l104 AH). This source is 
inclusive of the four original sources of Shl'lte jurisprudence, namely: al-Kiifiby Mu4ammad Ibn Ya 'qub 
Kulainl (d. 329 CE), Man Iii Yahçluruhu'l-FaqJhby Mu4ammad Ibn 'Ali Ibn Babawayh Qumml (known as 
Shaykh $adüq) (d. 381 CE), TahdhJb al-AiJkiim and al-Istib~iirby Mu4ammad Ibn J:lassan al-Tüsl (Known 
as Shaykh al-Ta'ifa) (d. 460). 
245 Mu4ammad Ibn al-H.asan al-J:lurr al-' AruiIi, Wasii'il al-ShJ 'a ilii Ta/J~JJ Masiiïl al-SharJ'a, 
vo1.6, ed. Shaykh Mu4mmad Shlrazl (Beiruit: Dar I4ya' at-Turath al- 'ArabI, 1382 AH). 
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countrymen have left for," asked al-Sadiq. 'Abdu'l Malik responded. "Where do you 
mean?" He replied "Jiddah, 'Ubbadan, al-Ma~1~a, and Qazw1n." "1 responded," 'Abdu'l 
Malik relates, "1 have waited for your command and your leadership." al-Sadiq 
answered, "yes, indeed, 1 swear to God we would have been ahead ofthem (the warriors 
who already left for jihad) if! saw any good in that venture.,,246 
Mul].ammad Ibn' Ali al-Baqir (the Fifth Sh1'ite Imam) states: "1 do not know in 
this era any jihad other than the greater and the lesser pilgrimage (/Ja)) and 'umra), and 
protecting one's neighbor (al-jiwiir)."247 
Al-Sadiq quotes 'Ali Ibn Ab1 Talib to have said: 
A Muslim will not go for jihad with those who do not believe in the rules and (who) fail 
to implement God's command regarding the booty .... such a person, once he dies in this 
place (battlefield), dies as a supporter of our enemy in the imprisonment of our rights, in 
the shedding of our blood, and therefore his death is ajanill(pre-Islamic Arab culture) 
death (i.e. ofno value or reward).248 
The above piece clearly means that the quality of jihad (jus in bello) is inseparable from 
its cause (jus ad bellum). In other words, by virtue of the above injunction, an 
illegitimate conduct in a war will affect the legitimacy of its cause. 
'Ali Ibn al-I:Iusayn (the Shl'ite's Fourth Imam) responds to a critic who has 
wondered why he went on pilgrimage instead of jihad, citing the Qur'anic verse 
Q.9:11l, 249. 'Ali asks his critic to read the verse Q.9:112, which sets the necessary 
246 al-' AmiIi, Wasa'il al-Shi 'a, 32. 
247 al-'AmiIi, Wasa'il al-Shi 'a, 33. 
248 al-'AmiIi, Wasa'il al-Shi 'a, 33. 
249 The verse III of the sura at-Tawba (Repentence) reads, "Lo! Allah hath bought from the 
believers their lives and their wealth because the Garden (he aven) will be theirs: they shall fight in the 
way of Allah and shall slay and be slain. It is a promise which is binding on Him in the Torah and the 
Gospel and the Qur'an. Who fulflleth his covenant better than Allah? Rejoice then in your bargain that ye 
,_ have made, for that is the supreme triumph." Marmaduke Pickthall, The Meaning of the Glorious Qur'iin 
(Tehran: Entesharat Salehi, n.d.). 
82 
qualities for jihad warriors,250 and reminds him that, without those qualities, jihad loses 
its legitimacy.251 
Several ~adith deal with the appropriateness of waging war in the time of the 
occulted Twelfth Imam (al-Qa'im). Among them, 'Ali Ibn al-I:Iusayn is quoted as 
saying: "1 swear to God that none of us will come out before the coming out (khuriiJ) of 
al-Qa'im, or else it will be like a newly born chicken just out of its shell that will be 
taken by kids as a plaything before it can develop its wings.,,252 
Another ~adith takes even a stronger tone limiting war in the absence of al-Qa'im. 
It quotes al-~adiq saying that "one who bears all the flags (of jihad) that are raised 
before the coming out of al-Qa'im, their bearer, is a false deity (tiqiït) who serves other 
than God the most Powerful, the Magnificent.,,253 
The bulk of~adith in ShI'! sources emphasize two essentiai points: first, short of 
the leadership of a just ruIer, jihad loses aIl its justification and religious sanctity with 
the exception of purely defensive war. Second, jihad campaigns under the Umayyads 
and the Abbasids had mainly worldly or false motivations. ShI'! authorities discouraged 
any attempt by their followers to seize political power. 
In addition to the political categories of the abode of covenant (dir a}- 'alJd) and 
the 'abode of Islam,' ShI'! 4adith adds the term, the abode of prevarication (dir a}-
taqiyya). This term reflects the circumstances of a minority Muslim community living 
in a non-Muslim state or, given its precarious situation, the ShI'! minority within the 
Islamic state or the 'abode ofpeace' as well. 
In one ~adith, 'Ali Ibn Musa al-Riga (the Eighth Shl'ite Imam) writes to the 
Abbasid caliph al-Ma'mun: 
250 Verse 112 of the sura at-Towba (Repentence) reads, "(triumphant) are those who tum 
repentant (to Allah), those who serve (Him), those who praise (Him), those who fast, those who bow 
down, those who fall prostrate (in worship), those who enjoin the right and those who forbid the wrong 
and those who keep the limits (ordained) of Allah- And give glad tidings to believers." Pickthall, The 
Meaning of The Glorious Qur'in. 
251 al-'AmiIi, Wasiiïl al-Shi 'a, 34. 
252 al-'AmiIi, Wasii'jJ al-Shi 'a, 36. 
253 al-'AmiIi, Wasii'jJ al-Shi 'a, 37. 
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... And jihad under a just Imam is obligatory (wiijib), also whoever is killed while 
defending himself in travel, his life, and his property, is considered a martyr (shahkl). It 
is forbidden (i}ariim) to kill any infidel in the abode of prevarication (diir al-taqiya), 
except in retaliating a murder or opposing an insurgent (baghl), and these latter 
measures may be taken only in case one's own life is not at risk ... it is also forbidden to 
take any property of one's opponents or others; and concealing one's belief in the abode 
of prevarication is obligatory ... 254 
The above 4adith not only reflects the ShI'! rulings on the codes of conduct for 
the minority ShI'! Muslims, but also shows, unequivocaIly, the very restrictive nature of 
the use of force in ShI'!legal and ethical opinions. The only justifiable reason to fight an 
infidel is not his disbelief; rather it is his actions against basic human rights, such as the 
right to life, property, free passage, right to free choice of dwelling and security. 
At a time when warfare in the name of jihad but for worldly gains was quite 
popular, the ShI'! authorities were at pains to disassociate the term jihad from general 
warfare. The latter part of the 'Book of Jihad' in Wasii'il al-ShI 'a ilii TalJ$ll Masii'il al-
SharI'a - where it discusses the jihad against the camaI soul - is twice as large as the 
former. It is c1ear that the ShI'! jurist considered his own soul as potentially a much 
more dangerous enemy than the forces ofinfidelity threatening him from outside.255 
This view matches the political realities of the Islamic state, as the minority 
ShI 'ites faced systematic oppression and persecution by their fellow Muslims, the other 
part of their ideological self. Each of the first eleven Imams were imprisoned, poisoned, 
or martyred. The ideological 'self,' as an extension of the 'camaI self,' was in reality a 
more significant enemy than the infidel 'other.' 
The work, nevertheless, regulates warfare with the enemy "other." As part of 
this emphasis on the enemy 'other,' Chapters Sixteen to Twenty-Four discuss the 
grounds for jus in bello, or proper conduct of war. They emphasize the sanctity of 
covenants ('ahd, 'aqd, mIthiiq), respect for amnesty (amiin) given to the enemy in 
combat, the equal position of aIl ranks of Muslim combatants to give amnesty, the 
254 al-' AmiIi, Wasa'il al-ShI 'a, 35. 
255 This reflects the Platonic sense of the inner enemy. 
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prohibition of the use of poison (samm) , the prohibition of initiation of battle, the 
prohibition of attacking the elderly, women, children and the disabled of all faiths, the 
ban on night attacks, and above all, the absolute ban on resorting to perfidy or treachery 
(al-ghadr). They distinguish between treachery/perfidy (al-ghadr) which is absolutely 
forbidden (for it involves unilateral breach of a contract or treaty) and ruse (al-khud 'a)-
that is tantamount to tactical deceit of the enemy- which is discussed in Chapter Fifty-
two, as form ofwar itself (al-iJarbu khud 'a). 256 
Chapter Twenty-Seven deals with the proportionality of forces. According to 
severall].adith, once enemy forces are more than twice the Muslim fighters, escaping the 
battle is permitted. This Chapter provides an indirect opposition against foreseeable 
martyrdom. It draws a clear line between suicidaI missions and an obligatory defense. 
Eisewhere, the Book of jihad emphasizes that while a Muslim must not initiate a battle, 
he should not escape from a battle as well unless, as the above l].adith showed the force 
.. th t . t 257 proportIOn 1S more an wo agams one. 
Finally, Chapter Sixty-Seven condemns any clash between Muslims. A Prophetic 
l].adith asserts that in case two Muslims should clash without justification, both the 
murdered and the murderer will end up in hel1.258 
The l].adith in Chapters Twenty-Four to Twenty-Seven suggest that ShI'! 
authorities had difficulty explaining to their followers why 'Ali Ibn Abl Talib treated his 
domestic enemies leniently. In response to their doubts and questions, the authorities 
argue that it was exactly because ofhis leniency that subsequent enemies of the Shl'ites 
have tolerated them so far. 
Sorne questions ask why 'Ali was more lenient towards the enemy fighters in the 
battles of lamaI and Nahrawan than ~iffin. In response, the authorities explain that, in 
256 al-'AmiIi, Wasa'il al-ShI 'a, 102. It is important to note that according to Mohaqqeq-Damad, 
such a legal distinction between ruse and perfdy, i.e. acceptance of the former and rejection of the latter is 
stipulated in the Hague Convention of 1907 and other modem international protocols. See Moqaqqiq-
Diimiid, Protection of Individuals in Times of Armed Conniet under Intemational and Islamic Laws, 
(2005) 405. 
257 al-' AmiIi, Wasa'il al-ShI 'a, 63-4. 
258 al-'AmiIi, Wasa'il al-ShI 'a, 113. 
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the former cases 'Ali was cognizant, that the remnant of the enerny forces did not have 
any center to regroup around it and would not pose a threat again. In the ~iffin, 
however, Mu'awiya had a solid base of power and could regroup his defeated forces?S9 
This suggests sorne latitude in the authority of the just ruler to adjust his prosecution of 
a war according to its peculiar circurnstances. 
However, next to such propositions, there are systernatic and ernphatic stresses 
that short of the presence and the command of a just authority, none of the cornbatants 
rnay take an arbitrary rneasure of such nature in war. Between the lines, it is easily 
discernable that rnany of the Shi 'ites of the 8th and 9th centuries (2nd and 3rd centuries 
AH), given their precarious situation and frustrations as a rninority, believed that had 
'Ali treated his various insurgent enernies260 with st ronger rneasures and had he 
uprooted thern more effectively than he did, perhaps the following generations of the 
Shl'ites did not have to live under the difficult circurnstances that they did. 
f:Iadith Five and Seven of Chapter Twenty-Five show how 'Ali resisted pressure 
frorn his troops to seize and distribute booty after the battle of the Carnel. 'Ali ordered 
all property to be returned to its owners. When sorne soldiers protested, he replied, 
"Who will take Umm al-Mu'rninln (the Prophet's wife 'Ayisha, who was on the defeated 
·d) h· h l?,,261 SI e as IS sare .. 
Other l).adith suggest that the Imam al-Qa'irn will be less lenient when he 
reappears on earth. While 'Ali feared harsh retaliation by his enernies against his 
community in the future, al-Qa'irn will have no such concern.262 
The l).adith literature dernonstrates the rnounting frustration of ShI '1s over the 
first few centuries. Staternents about al-Qa'irn's inflexible rnanner in dealing with his 
enernies, no matter when he rnight reappear, were probably reassuring to the oppressed 
Shl'ites. 
259 al-' AruiIi, Wasii'jJ al-Shi 'a, 56. 
260 Mainly, his enemies in the Jamal, $iffin, and Nahrawau wars. 
261 al-' AruiIi, Wasii'il al-Shi 'a, 58-9. 
262 al-'AruiIi, Wasii'jJ al-Shi 'a, 57. 
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Chapter Forty-Nine confirms the legitimacy of Zoroastrianism (al-majus) as an 
authentic divine religion. This is important in view of the lack of any Qur'anic mention 
about this religion.263 It is by virtue of these 4adith that Zoroastrians attain the 
protected status of 'people ofthe book', (ahlu'l kitiib or dhimml). They must only paya 
polI tax Uizya) ifthey choose not to convert to Islam. 
Chapters Twenty-Three, Twenty-Four, and Thirty-Two discuss the treatment of 
prisoners ofwar, specifically the obligations of the Islamic state to feed them well, even 
ifthey are to be executed the following day.264 
Perhaps the real spirit of the ShI'! authorities' endeavor to contain their 
constituencies' predilection for primary (offensive) war as a short eut to paradise or 
wealth could be found between two specifie Prophetie 4adiths mentioned under the title 
of this chapter and in footnote 165. The first one praises peacemaking to be more 
important than obligatory prayers and the second one diminishes the value of jihad to be 
below the non-obligatory supplications (dhikr). 
Modem Shl'l Jurists on War: Between Apology and Critique 
Among the contemporary ShI'! jurists who have written major treatise on jihad, 
Mulahhad (d.1979 CE) and ~ali41-Najafiibadi (d. 2006 CE) are most prominent. Aiso 
Tabalaba'l, the most influential contemporary ShI'! exegete and philosopher (d.l985 
CE), while produced no separate treaty on jihad, he neverthe1ess presented important 
views on the subject. So are the views ofKadivar, a reformist jurist on Islam and human 
rights, important for their implications regarding causes of discrimination, enmity and 
conflict in the Islamic and the ShI'! theology. Most recently Iskandad and M04aqqiq-
Damad have written important treaties on laws ofwar in Islam that will be discussed for 
their significance. In the following section the views of all six scholars will be briefly 
discussed. 
263 al-' AmiIi, Wasa'jJ a/-Shi 'a, 96. 
264 al-' AmiIi, Wasa'j/ a/-Shi 'a, 68. 
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Tabiitabii'l: Against the Early Caliphal Conquests 
While justifying aIl Prophetie campaigns, Taba!aba'l rejected the expansionist policies 
of the Prophet' s successors. This, he did on the account that, they spent all the energies 
of the early Muslim society on war and material gains rather than on spiritual 
development.265 He denied that such expansionist policies Cat the level of jus ad bellum), 
were substantially different from those pursued by Alexander the Great or Ginghiz-Khan 
wh en it cornes to war motives. "If Islam had sanctioned expansionism," he contends, "it 
was for the implementation of righteousness, social justice, and the spiritual education 
of people, rather than to establish Persian-like or Roman-like empires, slavery, 
collection ofbooty, and unlimitedly adding to the court treasures.,,266 
Taba!aba'l maintained that the basis of the Prophet's decision-making on 
matters of war and peace had nothing to do with revelation but was of consultative 
nature.267 Note must be taken that aIl the Qur'anic verses that rebuke the pacifism 
attributed to sorne of the Prophet's companions, criticize their reluctance to join those 
campaigns that were already decided upon through consultation. In other words there 
were no prophetie campaigns merely initiated either by Prophet' s de cree or a Scriptural 
injunction. 
Tabataba'l, stressed that according to the Qur'anic verses Q.2:212268 and Q.3: 
64,269 the primary function of aIl the prophets and their script ures was conflict 
265 Mohammad I:Iusayn, Tabataba'1, ShI 'ah: Les Entretien et les Correspondances de Professeur 
Henry Corbin avec 'Alliïmah Tabii,tabii'l (Persian), 4th ed. (Tehran: Mu'assese pazhuheshi Helanat wa 
Falsafeh Iran, 1383/1984 CE) 220. 
266 Tabataba'l, ShI 'ah, 1383/1984 CE, 220-21. 
267 Mohammad I:Iusayn, Tabataba'l, ShI 'a, (1984 ) 212. 
268 Q.2:213: "Mankind was one community; then Allah sent the prophets as bringers of good 
tidings and wamers and sent down with them the Scripture in truth to judge between the people 
conceming that in which they differed ... ). 
269 Q.3:64: "Say, "0 People of the script ure, come to a word that is equitable between us and 
you-that we will not worship except Allah and not worship except Allah and not associate anything with 
Him and take one another as lords instead of Allah." But ifthey turn away, then say, "Bear witness that 
we are Muslims (submitting to Him)." 
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resolution.27o He finds it astonishing that from about twelve thousand Prophetie 
companions who outlived him for many decades, only five hundred 4acfiths were left in 
connection to the very important matters of jurisprudence (one 4acfith per twenty four 
companions). This, Taba!aba'l believes, was because the Umayyads, for the obvious 
political benefits, banned the accumulation of the much-needed jurisprudential 4acfith 
while rewarding all traditions that promoted the personal images of the first three 
caliphs against the image of the fourth. 271 Early on, therefore, the personal dispositions 
of specifie political figures overshadowed matters of principle. As a result aIl the war 
policies of the first three caliphs were justified and left without criticism. 
He points that, importantly aIl the ShI'! Imams had discursive and philosophical 
approaches in their world views. This helped the ShI'! theology to be critical, rational, 
and selective in distinguishing the moral right from the wrong while dealing with the 
heavy mix of the unscrupulously accumulated traditions.272 
As the previous chapter showed, while Taba!aba'l was quite candid and bold in 
criticizing the Islamic traditions at the level of war causes (jus ad bellum) and the 
general war policies of the early caliphs, he did not add much, on the qualities of war 
(jus in bello), to what his medieval predecessors discussed. 
Mu!ahhar1: The Theory of Liberating Jihad, or Moral Interventionism 
Murtaga Mu!ahhar1 (d.1979), one of the most erudite Shl'!jurists of the late twentieth 
century and a student of Taba!aba'l, formulated the philosophy of jihad in a whole new 
language. Mu!ahhar1 has tried to treat wars of early Muslims in their connection to the 
Scriptural references to armed struggle Gihad), and justify them in the context of 
modem discourse. As a student and commentator of Taba!aba'l, Mu!ahhar1 was highly 
impressed by his mentor, although, from time to time, did not fail to criticize his 
philosophical views. Instead of dwelling on c1assical and medieval juristic sources, he 
270 Mohammad I:Iusayn, Tabiitabii'l, ShI 'a, (1984 ) 85, 155. 
271 Mohammad I:Iusayn, Tabiitabii'l, ShI 'a, (1984 ) 227. 
272 Mohammad I:Iusayn, Tabiitabii'l, ShI 'a, (1984) 103. 
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discussed the script ure directly and tried to establish the meaning of jihad through his 
own exegesis. After citing Q. 2:251, "and ifGod had not repelled sorne men by others, 
the earth would have been corrupted ... " and Q.22:40, " ... for had it not been for God's 
repelling sorne men by means of others, cloisters and churches and oratories and 
mosques, wherein the name of God is mentioned often, would surely have been pulled 
down ... " Mulahhad adopts a consequentialist view ofwar: "War that is transgression," 
he asserts, "is utterly bad, while war that means standing erect in the face of 
transgression is utterly good and is one of the necessities ofhuman life." He continues 
to state that, "the existence of armed forces, the dut y ofwhich is to prevent aggression, 
is an absolute necessity.,,273 
Like most modem Sunnl scholars, Mulahhad avoids matters of the conduct of 
war Ous in bello) altogether and primarily develops new insights into the causes of war 
(jus ad be11um). He enumerates here a number of legitimate reasons for jihad: first, 
giving assistance through war to oppressed people, with or without the oppressed having 
requested the intervention. Mulahhad contends "it is permissible or moreover obligatory 
for us to render aid to the oppressed regardless of whether they apply to us for help." 
Many of the wars of early Islam, according to Mulahharl, were fought for this very 
reason.
274 
Another legitimate cause for Mulahharl is the removal ofpolitical obstacles (Le. 
regimes) to the propagation and spread of Islam or in other words, fighting in favor of 
the people that, in Muslim opinion, are isolated from the call of truth and against 
regimes that suppress freedom of speech. 275 Defensive wars like the defense of life, 
wealth, property, and land, of independence, and of principles are all legitimate?76 
However, the defense of human rights, Mulahhad places above the defense of 
individuals: "There exists something superior to the rights of individual or nation," he 
273 Mutahharl, "Jihad in the Qur'ân," 88. 
274 Mutahharl, "Jihad in the Qur'ân," 97. 
275 Mutahharl, "Jihad in the Qur'ân," 97. 
276 Mutahharl, "Jihad in the Qur'ân," 104. 
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stresses, "something more sacred, the defense of which in accordance with the human 
conscience is higher than the defense of individual rights. And that something is the 
rights of humanity.,,277 He continues, "No one should have any doubts that the most 
sacred form of jihad and war is that which is fought in defense of humanity and 
international interventionist policies to promote human rights.,,278 
Finally, the last of Mutahhar1's legitimate causes ofwar (jihad) goes beyond any 
notion of defense; he supports a policy of moral expansionism. He explains, " ... there is 
a possibility that one fights not for the sake of aggression, nor in defense of oneself or a 
human value, but for the expansion of human values.,,279 Mutahhar1's view of the 
freedom of belief is a novel expression. He is, however, candidly against the freedom of 
any beliefwhich is not rooted in thought (an unthoughtful belief).280 
These principles set down by Mutahhar1 approach by implication a moral 
hegemonism. Of course none of his five categories of justified wars are void of moral 
motives. Mutahharl's justification of war (jihad) for the expansion of human values 
resembles many of the positions of politicians and sorne of the modem political 
philosophers in the West, especially their call for the pro active global expansion of 
democracy and human rights. 
Mutahhar1's view of the instrumentality of war renders war legitimate in many 
different situations. He ignores to discuss the vast tradition of ethics and laws in the 
conduct of war (jus in hello). Such shortfall may lead to broad toleration of, and 
uncritical stance towards various methods by which war is conducted. Moreover, his 
view lacks elaboration on the mechanisms of decision making on war. In theory, as 
already mentioned and by implication, he rejects the democracy of the ignorant society 
that, in his opinion, may justly be invaded in order to be informed about truth, humanity 
and human rights. But notions such as 'truth,' 'humanity' and 'human rights' if not 
277 Mutahharl, "Jihad in the Qur'an," 104. 
278 Mutahharl, "Jihad in the Qur'an," 105. 
279 Mutahharl, "Jihad in the Qur'an," 103. 
280 Mutahharl, "Jihad in the Qur'an," 113. 
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highly speculative in the age ofhermeneutics, are presently very expansive and dynamic. 
One may easily face, ev en in a specific Islamic society, questions such as 'whose truth' 
and 'whose definition ofhumanity and human rights?' Mutahharl also leaves tradition al 
views of Muslim jurists on war without fundamental criticism, and therefore leaves 
them valid from a fundamentalist perspective. His stress, however, on the essentiality of 
'humanity,' and 'human rights' in any given society brings him close to the objective 
Mu'taziIi ethics (discussed in chapter four) and modem international law that is in 
contradistinction with the traditional duty-based Islamic jurisprudence. 
Iskandan: Retaliation (qj~ii~), the Prime Cause ofWar in Islam 
Among the modern Shl'l critics of the tradition al Islam law and jurisprudence on war, 
Iskandarl has come to a new conclusion: The prime or perhaps the sole legitimate cause 
of war in Islam is the princip le of 'retaliation' or qi~ii~. Qi~ii~ is traditionally considered 
a code of penal law (J;.uqiïq al-jaza). It is a legal punitive code applied to cases of 
murder or inflicting harm to bodies of private citizens. Iskandarl however extrapolates 
the philosophical foundation of this firmly rooted code in the Qur'an and extends it to 
coyer laws ofwar. For hi m, there is little or no essential difference between murder, that 
is small scale violence and war that is the same thing only in a larger and collective 
scale. A legitimate war for him is only a retaliation-in-kind (muqi/bila bi'l mithl), and 
therefore defensive by de finit ion. 
After Iskandarl reminds his reader that the penal law of qi~ii~ has been among 
one of the most controversial questions for the classical jurisprudence, he concludes 
that, according to the Qur'anic verses, qi~ii~ or 'retaliation,' is only a 'right' (J;.aqq) and 
not an obligatory dut y (takHfwiijib) because the Qur'an unequivocally calls upon those 
who are entitled to this right to forgive and settle the case in other forms -by financial 
compensation (diya) or total forgiveness ( 'afW). 
By implication, Iskandarl cornes to the conclusion that war as a retaliation-in-
kind is only an option (not a dut y) for the Muslim community which may preferably 
seek other peaceful ways of settlement as a measure of retaliation or defense. 
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Through an exhaustive examination of the controvertial juridical views of both 
ShI'! and Sunnl scholars on qi$ii$, Iskandar1 refers to various sorts of limitation in the 
implementation of this law. He points, for ex ample, to the views of various jurists on 
the following key Qur'anic verses on retaliation: 
Q.5:45, "And we prescribed for them therin: The life for the life, and the eye for the 
eye, and the nose for the nose, and the ear for the ear, and the tooth for the tooth, and 
for wounds retaliation; but whosoever forgoes it, it shall be an expiation for him; and 
whoever did not judge by what Allah revealed, those are they that are the unjust." 
Q.2: 178, "0 you who believe! Retaliation is prescribed for you in the matter of the 
murdered; the freeman for the freeman, and the slave for the slave, and the female for 
the female. And for him who is forgiven sorne what by his (injured) brother procecution 
according to usage and payment to him in kindness. This is alleviation and a mercy from 
your Lord. He who transgresses after this will have a painful chastisement." 
Q.2: 179, "And there is life for you in retaliation, 0 men of understanding, that you may 
ward off." 
Q.42: 40, "And the recompense of evil is evil the like of it; but whose pardons and puts 
things righ (settles the case), his wage (compensation) falls on Allah; surely He loves 
not the evildoers." 
Q.16: 126, "And if you chastise, chastise in kind; but assuredly if you are patient, it is 
better for those patient." 
Q.2: 194, "The holy month for the holy month, and forbidden things in retaliation; and 
one who attacks you, attack him in kind as he attacked you. Observe your dut Y to Allah 
and know that Allah is with those who ward off (evil)." 
Q.2: 190, "And fight in the way Allah with those who fight with you, but do not 
transgress. Surely Allah does not love those who exceed the limits." 
According to Iskandar1, while the law of 'reataliation-in-kind' was c1ear on certain 
physical injuries like the loss of an eye, ear or other members of body, jurists of various 
schools oflaw could not agree on other injuries or methods ofretaliation. He refers to an 
examplary c1assical case wherin a man killed another by beating him to death with his 
cane and thus by torture. The case was then presented to various jurists to determin 
measures ofretaliation-in-kind (qi$ii$). 
According to two l).acfith cited by Iskandar1, al-$adiq ruled that the murderer 
must be delivered to the family of the murdered, but they can not execute him like-wise 
by turture and enjoy watching him suffer, rather, the execution must be simple and by 
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sword.281 AlI the ShI '1 jurists, following the above ruling, according to Iskandar1 have 
come to the same conclusion about the limits of the law of 'retaliation-in-kind.' While 
sorne of the Sunnl schools have come to the same conclusion, jurists like al-Shafi'I have 
stressed on retaliation-in-kind without much limits. Iskandar1 criticizes the 
contemporary Sunnl exegete Mohammad Rashld Rega who, based on the above ruling of 
al-Shafi'I, came to the following conclusion about war: 
.. .1 add to the ruling (of al-Shafi'I) that in war too, retaliation-in-kind must be strictly 
observed exactly as in the case of murder. Therefore, whenever the enemy fights the 
Muslim forces by canon, fire weapons, or chemical warfare, they (Muslims) must 
retaliate by the same means; or else jihad wililoose its function that is on the one hand, 
the prohibition of operession, sedition, hostility and aggression, and on the other hand 
the establishment of freedom, security, justice, and doing goOd?82 
Ekandar1 rejects such conclusion and stresses that the Qur'anic concept of 'retaliation-
in-kind' when applied to war refers to the do main of action rather than its exact 
manners. In other words, the application is war for war and not chemical weapons for 
chemical weapons. What if a pers on or a group would commit acts of raping women or 
men, be it in war or peace, he asks? Obviously retaliation-in-kind here, Iskandarl 
contends, does not make sense as much as it is ridiculous if someone says to the 
murderer ofhis brother that: "Now that you have killed my brother, 1 will kill yourS.,,283 
Iskandar1 concludes that no act of 'retaliation-in-kind' may inflict damage on an 
innocent third party, thus he categorically rejects the use ofweapons ofmass distruction 
by Muslims because indiscriminate killing has no legal or moral basis in sharJ'a. 
By referring to Q. 16:126, Iskandar1 reminds his reader that this verse (cited 
above) was revelated when the Prophet visited the mutilated body of his beloved uncle 
I:Iamza, during the battle of Ul}ud, and stricken by deep sorrow and anger vowed to kill 
281 The two l:).adith are narrated by Muhammad ibn Ya 'qub and Muhammad ibn 'Ali al-Husayn. 
See Mol:).ammad I:Ioseyn IskandarI, Qi 'edeye Moqibele be Methl dar Ifoqiiqe Beyn al-Melal az Dide 
Isliim (Retaliation Rule in Intemational Law Hom Islam's Viewpoint), (Qum: The Center of Publication, 
The Islamic Seminary of Qum: 1379/1991) 157. 
282 Paraphrased by Iskandari from Mul:).ammad Rashid Ri4a's Qur'anic exegesis al-Miniir. See 
IskandarI, Qum: 1379/1991,139. 
283 IskandarI, Qum: 1379/1991, 155. 
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in retaliation seventy of the Meccan polytheists of the Quraish tribe. The verse 
consequently reminded him that he can not go beyond a proportional measure, and that 
if he exercises patience instead, it would be more proper for him. Iskandad concludes, 
on the basis of the incident and the related verse, that the term 'retaliation-in-kind' is 
not 'similarity of the reaction,' as sorne jurists have concluded; and that proportionality 
of damage to the enemy is a solid law ofwar in Islam,z84 
On the above basis, Iskandarl cornes to sorne conclusions that by implication are 
important for ethics and laws ofwar in both domains of cause ofwar and quality ofwar 
Uus in bellum and jus ad bello). He maintains that because shari'a is quite sensitive 
about the limits of 'retaliation-in-kind,' aIl such measures at the personal or collective 
levels (civilian or international relations) must be decided by the state. He cites a l}amth 
by al-Baqir (the fifth Shl'ite Imam) saying that aIl measures of retaliation or qi~i~ not 
approved by Imam (state's legitimate authority) must be penalized.285 
In Iskandad view another factor that limits both the scope and the quality of the 
'retaliation-in-kind,' is the conventional norms (' uriJ of various societies and historical 
plains. For example, once slavory becomes universally an obsolete practice, it can not be 
applied to prisoners ofwar in the hand of Muslim forces. 286 
He rejects the political dichotomy of abode of peace and abode of war known as 
diir al-Islam and dir al-lJarb, that appeared in the Islamic political and juridical 
literatures of eight cent ury CE, and maintains that even if one would accept such a 
classification of the world into the two domains, there is no reason to see that the only 
relationship defined between the two parts of the world is limited to the state of 
war.287In his view, the basis for international hostility in Islam is act of war and 
aggression rather than disbelief.288 
284 Iskandarl, Qum: 137911991CE, 98,147. 
285 Iskandarl, Qum: 137911991CE, 163, 164. 
286 Iskandarl, Qum: 137911991CE, 281. 
287 Iskandarl, Qum: 137911991CE, 175. 
288 Iskandarl, Qum: 137911991CE, 233. 
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However bold in his views on various aspects of 'retaliation-in-kind,' its 
application to war and its limitations, Iskandarl fails to address a vague point in the 
views of most classical and contemporary jurist on war. That is the question of the real 
difference between jihad and diffense and why most jurists treat these terms separately 
rather than inclusively Uihad includes the notion of defense as reflected in the previous 
chapter).289 
Mol}aqqiq-Damad: The Immunity ofNoncombatant, Nonbeliever 
Most recently, M04aqqiq-Damad has written an elaborate treatise under the title of 
protection of Individuals in times of armed conflict under international and Islamic 
laws. The scope of his work however, vastly covers many areas of both jus ad bellum 
and jus in bello?90 Most impressive in this work is the comparative analyses through 
which he puts the entire body of the Islamic traditions on jus in bello into the context of 
modern humanitarian internationallaw. 
As for the legitimate causes of war in Islam, M04aqqiq-Damad emphaticalIy 
asserts that, "AlI Maliki and ijanafi, most Shafi'I and ijanbafi and many Imaml (Shl'I) 
faqlhs Uurists) have expressed the view that the purpose of jihad and war is to keep the 
enemy's belIicosity at bay." "Thus," he concludes, "war must be waged with the enemy 
for his aggression against Muslims and Islam, not that he must be kilIed because he is 
infidel." 291 
According to this author, killing for alternative belief system is forbidden in 
Islam simply because, "killing non-belligerent citizens is prohibited in the law 
(sharl'a)." By pointing to the unequivocal Prophetic order to save many categories of 
civilians in war including women, elderly, and children, M04aqqiq further points, "Had 
289 See Iskandarl, Qum: 1379/1991CE, 213. 
290 MO$tafii, Mol).aqqiq-Damad. Protection of Individuals in Times of Armed ConDie{ under 
Intemational and Islamic Laws, (New York: Global Scholarly Publications, 2005). 
291 Mol).aqqiq-Damad, Protection of Individuals in Times of Armed Connie{ under Intemational 
and Islamic Laws, (2005) 91. 
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merely being a non-believer been justification for death, any non-Muslim individu al 
would have had to be killed.,,292 
The author points that an opposite view has been reported from sorne followers 
of the Shafi'I, ShI '1, and z:ahid schools to the effect that the cause of fighting in Islam is 
infidelity. He Adds, "In certain works, Shafi'I has preferred this opinion.,,293 
"Proponents ofthis view also authorize the killing of the elderly, children, the blind and 
the invalid.,,294 M04aqqiq, however, asserts that this latter view is a minority view and 
solely based on a weak 4adith from a 4acfith transmitter (Samrat Ibn Jundüb) who lacks 
high credibility among the jurists, and a wrong interpretation of the Qur'anic verse 
Q.9:5.295 
On the meaning of jihad, the author conc1udes, "Taking into careful 
consideration the definition of jihad in the Islamic law and war in the intemationallaw, 
it becomes c1ear that, in both cases, jihad and war take place for public interests of a 
state, against a foreign enemy." The only difference is that war is for material goals 
whereas jihad, by definition, must pursue spiritual ends.296 
As mentioned above, the focal point of M04aqqiq is laws in war (jus in bello). 
He observes that most Muslim jurists have categorized the main questions pertaining to 
jus in bello under the following titles: Who should be fought; who should be killed; who 
should be protected; how a war should be fought, which acts are authorized and which 
are unauthorized in war; rules of dealing with prisoners of war (istirqaq); rules 
conceming war spoils; rules and conditions conceming the protection of peoples of other 
292 MoQ.aqqiq-Damad, (2005) 91, 92. 
293 MoQ.aqqiq-Damad, (2005) 325. His sources for these minority views are: Ibn Quddamah, 
MughnJ a1-Mu/;lti}, vol.4, p.223; Ibn Rushd, Bidiiyat a1-Mujtahid, p.371; Abu'lqasim al-Kho'1, Minhi} a1-
$ii1ii}Jn, vol. l, .296. 
294Mo4aqqiq-Damad, (2005) 92. 
295 Mo4aqqiq-Damad, (2005) 92,93,325-329. Q.9:5: "And when the sacred months have passed, 
then kill the polytheists wherever you find them and capture them and besiege them and sit in wait for 
them at every place of ambush. But if they should repent, establish prayer, and give zakah, let them on 
their way. Indeed, Allah is Forgiving and merciful." 
296 Mo4aqqiq-Damad, (2005) 96. 
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faiths (dhimml); rules of polI tax (jizya); rules concerning the enemy's buildings and 
properties after victory; rules concerning peace agreements and amnesty.297 
Against a minority view in the ShI'! school who permit the killing ofwomen and 
children if they take part in war, Mol}.aqqiq argues that most Twelver ShI'! jurists 
absolutely prohibit such a penalty, "even if they take part or render assistance in 
wars.,,298 
As an important methodology in Islamic law, the author refers to two kinds of 
'fixed' and 'changing' laws in Islam. He maintains that sorne obligatory rites like 
prayers and fasting belong to the first category, while alllaws granting concessions and 
permissions to Muslims such as ownership and property laws can be subsumed under the 
second category. Mol}.aqqiq asserts that, " ... most rules and regulations regarding the 
Holy war Uihad) in Islam belong to the second (changeable) category, as they do not 
constitute fixed or invariable rules, but depend upon the discretion of the Islamic 
state ... "299 
Mol}.aqqiq's comparative analyses between the traditional humanitarian laws of 
war in Islam and the modern international law ends with three general conclusions: 
First, that Islamic law is highly compatible with many details of the modern 
international law. Second, that wherever it lags behind, the changeable nature of the 
Islamic laws of war and the contractual possibilities deeply disciplined and well-versed 
within the body of the Islamic law enable Muslim states to bridge the gap easily and 
very legally. Third, that in many fields, the Islamic legal provisions pertaining to war 
and its conduct, is more progressive than the present modern International law. A case 
the author presents is the following: 
297 Mo4aqqiq-Damad, (2005) 113. 
298 Mo4aqqiq-Damad, (2005) 356. Mo4aqqiq refers to MlÙ).aqqiq I:IilIi, Shaykh Tusl, Ibn Idris 
and Mohammad I:Iassan Najafi as the prominent Shi'! jurists who strongly oppose the killing ofwomen 
and children. The on1y exception for Shaykh Tusl is when they (women and children) are used as a shield 
against Muslim forces in which case they may be targeted. See Mo4aqqiq-Damad, (2005) 356. 
299 Mo4aqqiq-Damad, (2005) 335, 336. 
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The regulations of Geneva Conventions pertaining to armed conflict of a non-
international nature are less bold (than the Islamic norms) and their guarantees are much 
weaker than those contained in the provisions pertaining to international armed conflict. 
The philosophy underlying the division of the Convention provisions on humanitarian 
law into two protocols is, itself, based on the desire to withhold the greater guarantees 
from combatants in non-international armed conflict. The Islamic system, on the other 
hand, takes a diametrically opposite stance. It takes a more sympathetic view of armed 
conflict with rebels and Kharijites, offering them rules and guarantees that it withholds 
from polytheists and apostates engaged in international armed conflict.300 
The problem with the above assertion is that terms such as 'apostates,301 or 
'polytheists' do not carry any negative weight for the modem internationallaw. In the 
context of a modem and secular international law, one may criticize just any kind of 
discrimination towards citizens of a state or citizens of the world. From this perspective 
one may conc1ude that both the present international humanitarian laws of war and the 
tradition al Islamic law suffer from one or another kind of discrimination. It is in this 
neutral context that one may address the shortcoming of the present internationallaw in 
giving protection to domestic dissent. 
What however is the strong point of M04aqqiq, is that he provides a complete 
and comparative picture of the Islamic and the modem international humanitarian laws 
of war and shows how the differences between the two are non-essential and can be 
bridged with little effort on the part of the modem Muslim jurists. On the other hand 
the author helps to shows how Muslim states may embrace the present internationallaw 
of war for it is not merely based on secular premises but on very genuine Islamic 
traditions as well. 
Kamvar: Against Discrimination in the Traditional Law 
The pro-moralist position of Kamvar will be discussed in the next chapter. It is from a 
moralist position that he juxtaposes the dec1aration ofhuman rights with the position of 
300 Moqaqqiq-Darnad, (2005) 395. 
301 Note should be taken that a senior ShI'! jurist, Husaynali Mont~er1 has recently issued a 
fatwii that denies that mere religious conversion should be penalized according to laws of apstacy. He 
asserts that the very few apostates that were subject to severe punishment in the early history of Islam 
were puni shed for their conspiracy against the state rather than for their conversion. See Ayatollah 
Montazeri, "fatwaon irtidiid(apostacy)," issued in Feb. 2005. 
http://mehdis.comltabl u/modules. php?name= News&file=article&sid= 18112 
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traditional Islamic law on the status of people. He is very candid in declaring that the 
traditional Islamic law, and specifically the Shl'l law is highly discriminatory against 
various categories of people and determines special rights for specific groups such as the 
clergy ('ulamii) versus the layman, man versus woman, ShI 'ite versus Sunnl, Muslim 
versus non-Muslim, freeman versus slave etc. 
Such discriminatory law, Kadivar argues, is not a part ofIslarnic morals; rather it 
is the production of history of Muslims who have mixed various cultural norms in 
different periods of history with their specific reading of the Script ure and Prophetic 
traditions. He concludes therefore that, "the traditional reading of Islam is not 
compatible with norms of democracy or the Declaration of Human Rights.,,302 
The only way out for Muslims to embrace modem life, in the view of Kadivar, is 
to purify the Islamic tradition from the extraneous cultural elements added to it 
throughout centuries, or in other words to hold to Islam less its history. In its moral 
essence, Kadivar emphasizes, Islam can fully embrace norms of democracy.303 He 
declares that the two eternally valid criteria by which one may accept Islam or any other 
faith are justice and rationality. "Both we and our ancestors," Kadivar claims, "have 
converted to, and accepted Islam, because it looks more just, more reasonable, and 
overall more preferable than other faiths." "It is upon the dictates of these very same 
criteria," Kadivar concludes, "that l find the Univers al Declaration of Human Rights to 
be preferable to our traditionallaw when it deals with people's rightS.,,304 
It is rather obvious that a discriminatory law can be a source and cause of 
intolerance and conflict both at domestic and international scale. But for Kadivar and 
the like-minded an objective sense of justice, reason and agreement on the fact that no 
moral value can be produced except based on free will and chice, are effective means to 
contain wars of religions. 
25-40. 
302 Moi).sen Kacfivar, "The Religious Intellectualism," Aftiib (82) AugustiSeptember 2003: 
303 Kacfivar, "The Religious Intellectualism," 2003: 25-40. 
304 Kacfivar, "The Religious Intellectualism," 2003: 25-40. 
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Salil).l-Najafiibam: A Critique ofWhen Theology Rewrites History 
The legal criticism of Ni'matollah Salilii-Najafiïbacfi (d. 2006 CE) toward both 
the Sunnl and the ShI'! traditional views of jihad is candid and ground breaking.305 He 
was a senior scholar respected for his bold views sorne of which will be discussed in this 
section.306 
On the jus ad bellum plane, He reviews the Karbala' tragedy and provides a 
whole new reading of that episode with serious implications for the ShI'! political 
philosophy. His book on the motives of al-I:Iusayn in his encounter with al-Yazld, 
namely ShahJd-e JiivJd (The Immortal Martyr )307 caused a major controversy among 
the ShI'! scholars during eady 1970s. 
There is an ongoing controversy among the ShI'! scholars about I:Iusayn's 
ultimate motive in his uprising against al-Y azld. A majority view held that his move 
was based on the Islamic principle of 'commanding the right and prohibiting the wrong,' 
with no political ambition. 
The second view, most extensively discussed and supported by Salil}.I-Najafiïbacfi 
in ShahJd-e JiivJd, is that I:Iusayn really sought to overthrow Yazid and seize the 
political power, given the initial support and invitation he had received from a large 
number of the Küfans.308 Sali41 rejected the commonly held ShI'! view that al-I:Iusayn's 
challenge against the Umayyads lacked political motive and was solely a critical 
campaign against al-Yazld's corruptive reign based on a dut y he (I:Iusayn) felt in 
response to the invitation. Sali4I posed against de-politicization of the Karbala' tragedy 
and denied that I:Iusayn had knowledge, in advance, about the timing ofhis martyrdom. 
305 Ni'matollah ~ali41-NajaIabadi, Jihiid in Islam (Jahad dar Esliim) (Tehran: Nashr-e Ney, 2003). 
Also look at Sachedina, "The Development of Jihad in Islamic Revelation" (1990); and Mutahharl, "Jihad 
in the Qur'iin," (1986). 
306 He also wrote a critique on Mutahharl's view of jihad titled lfamiise-ye lfusaynl(The lfusaynl 
Epie). 
307 Ne'matollah ~ali41-NajaIabadi, Shahld-e Jiivld, 13lh ed. (Tehran: Rasa publication, 1985). For 
an abstract of Shahld-e Jiivld see: http://www.ghadccLorg/cnglishlhistory/ashura/ashura3.htmI50. 
308 Shahld-e Jiivld was published in Qom-Iran in 1972 and, in the words of Ahmad N araqi, 
"brought a turning point in the historiography of 'Ashlïra." See Ahmad Naraqi, "A Review of 
Historiography of Ashura in Shl'1sm," in http://www.l!hadeer.org/english/history/ashura/ashura3.htmI50. 
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In Salil].I-Najafiibadi's opinion, and unlike the view commonly held by the Shl'a public, 
f.lusayn's uprising was not a response to a predetermined divine call on his martyrdom, 
rather, it was primarily after military victory over Yazld's forces in the first stage, and 
once that strategy failed, it was after an honorable peace, and only in the last stage, 
martyrdom became an imposed altemative.309 Sali41 also maintained, again contrary to 
the view of the majority, that the Muslim world did not benefit from f.lusayn's 
martyrdom, for it led to about a century of the corrupt Umayyad rule.310 
By implication, Siili41-Najafiibadi rejects any forms of suicidaI venture to be 
justified under the rubric of 'martyrdom.' A just war for him must be based also on a 
rational calculation and reasonable possibility of victory.311 He also denies that the 
political leadership of the ShI'! Imams is divinely pre-ordained; rather, he asserts, any 
justified politicalleadership (with the exception of the Prophet's case) must be based on 
popular will and vote. His view was considered as the anti-thesis of 'Ali Sharl'atl's 
opinion on martyrdom that was widely used by the underground militants in Iran before 
the Islamic revolution of 1979 (Shar1'atl is known as the intellectual architect of this 
revolution). Siili41's critics maintained that he has reduced f.lusayn's mission to a 
worldly venture. 
The third view, which has gained popularity since the thirteenth century CE, 
holds that f.lusayn knew, long in advance, that he would be martyred and therefore he 
came to Kiifa primarily seeking martyrdom given its high value in Islam. Askar1 argues 
that the oath of allegiance (bay 'a) in Islam is not necessarily always for political power 
like the allegiance of the first 'Aqaba between the Prophet and sorne of his companions 
that was for conversion to Islam rather than for politicS.312 Therefore, he denies that the 
oath of allegiance given to f.lusayn by the Kiifans established a ground for a power-
seeking political move on his part. 
3o~e'matollah ~alil).l-Najatabadi, Shahid-e Jiivid, 13th ed. (Tehran: Rasa publication, 1985) 159. 
310 ~alil).l-Najatabadi, Shahid-eJiivid, 336. 
311 ~alil).l-N ajatabadi, Shahid-e Jiivid, 45. 
312 See Murta4a 'Askarl, The Martyrofthe Reviva/ ofthe Faith (Tehran: Nashre Congereh, 
2001) 98. 
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On the jus in hello plane, Sali41 provides a new reading of the Qur'anic verses 
related to war without resorting, like almost all c1assical exegetes, to scriptural multiple 
abrogation. He maintains that all major jurists ofboth Sunnl and the Shl'1 schools, in an 
effort to be comprehensive, have neglected to scrutinize individuallegal topics. Instead, 
they have copied extensively from one another, and gradually created rigid laws 
irrelevant to the script ure, Islamic tradition, and their contemporary life. 
He c1aims that all Shl'1 jurists beginning with Shaykh Tusl (d. 1066-7 CE),313 
have acceded to al- Shafi'1's (d. 820 CE)314 erroneous rulings on jihad, while al-Shafi'I 
himself relied on a notorious 4adith forger in this field.315 All such jurists, in Siilihl's 
view, have re-written Islamic history based on their juridical views rather than historical 
and textual facts. 316 
These jurists, according to Siili41, distort both the sira and the script ure. The 
legitimacy ofprimary war in Islam and 'awkward' rulings such as the one developed by 
al-Shiifi '1 that espouses the necessity of at least one offensive war a year for the Islamic 
state are exemplary misinterpretations.317 On another ruling, Sali41 maintains, there is 
no basis for surprise attacks since there were no surprise attacks under the Prophet. 
Their sanction represents a subsequent juridical invention. 
313 MlÙ).ammad Ibn al-Hassan al-Tusl was a prominent Shl'I scholar, known as the first jurist to 
adopt a part of the Surml jurisprudence in the Shl'I school. 
314 Abu Abdallah Mul;tammad Ibn Idris, al-Shafi'I, a prominent Surml scholar, known as the first 
author of 'u~iil al-flqh (methodology in Islamic jurisprudence). 
315 $alil;tl ho Ids that the root cause of militant views on war is the sanctification of several 
unauthentic l;tadiths that came from Abu Hurayra, Ibn 'Umar and Tall;tat Ibn Zaid. "Once such radical 
views were expressed by sorne of Prophet's companions and the second generation (tabi7n) and 
established without any critical challenge within the first two centuries, they were sanctified and hard to 
change by later generations." See $alil;tl, Jihad in Islam, 158. For Tusl's import of the Surmljurisprudence 
into the Shl'I law see also l:Iossein Modarressi, An Introduction to ShJ7 La~ a bibliographical study, 
(London: Ithaca Press, 1984) 44. He contends that it was through Tusl that, "non-Shl'l concepts, which 
were alien to traditional Shl'I thought, also crept into Shl'Ilaw and created sorne inconsistencies in it." 
316 $alil;tl, Jihad in Islam, 76. 
317 $alil;tl, Jihad in Islam, 76, 83-5. 
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The Qur'an's tone in addressing the issue of prisoners of war, as refleeted in Q. 
8:70, is affable, hopeful and eonciliatory.318 Captives are treated as people who need 
pit y, guidance and benevolenee.319 Q.47:4 sets down guidelines for their treatment. They 
should be either freed unilaterally without preeondition or allowed to be bought and 
thus freed by their relatives or sorne benevolent institution, be it state, tribe or other 
. 1 .. "320 socla orgamzatlOns. 
In a striking case of misreading and misinterpretation, ~ali41 challenges 
tradition al exegetical views ofQ.8:67. This verse reads: 
No apostle should take captives until he has battled and subdued the country; you desire 
the vanities of this world, but God wills (for you the reward) of the world to come; and 
God is all-mighty and alI-wise. 32\ 
~ali41 reviews many c1assical and modem exegetical commentaries ranging from al-
Tabad's (d. 922 CE) to 1)ba!aba'1's. These exegetes conc1ude first, that the Prophet 
must have executed all of the Badr war prisoners since they were taken before the war's 
termination and secondly, this judgment established part of the permanent law for 
treating prisoners of war. However, the verse, as ~ali41 stresses, simply holds that 
Muslims in war must not foeus on the material gains (e.g. taking prisoners in the hope of 
getting ransom) before the war cornes to conclusion.322 
The grave consequence, in ~ali41's opinion, is that these scholars oftheology and 
exegesis like Taba!aba'1 have re-written sacred history against actual practice in the 
battle of Badr, where captives were released by ransom or grace. Based on their 
m Q.8:70 reads: 0 Prophet, tell the captives you have taken: "if God finds sorne good in yoUf 
heart, He will reward you with something better than was taken away from you, and forgive yOUf sins, for 
God is forgiving and kind." 
3\9 Q.47:4 reads: So, when you clash with the unbelievers, smite their necks until you overpower 
them, then hold them in bondage. Then either free them graciously or with ransom, until war shall have 
come to end." 
320 Salil).l, Jihad in Islam, 149. 
321 See Orooj, Al-Qur'iin: A Contemporary Translation. 
322 Siilil).l, Jihad in Islam, 156. 
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misinterpretation of the verse, Sali!].1 holds, these exegetes have incredibly concluded 
that aIl other prophets had their prisoners of war, captured during the hostilities,323 
executed!324 
The Jurists' Tragic War Game: The Letters/Spirit Dichotomy 
Based on the full account ofboth Sunnl and ShI'! jurists' identical, consensual opinions 
on the laws of war, Sali!].1 constructs a hypothetical war simulation to demonstrate the 
serious and vast inhumane implications of the jurists' war views. For its very revealing 
importance, the full account of the simulation as explained by Sali!].1 will be provided in 
the following: 
"Suppose in a hypothetical war case, there is a report that the Islamic forces have 
captured twenty thousand prisoners of war from the enemy of whom, ten thousand have 
been captured during the battle and the rest surrendered after war's conclusion. The two 
distinct groups ofprisoners ofwar each have been kept, in a corner of the war scene next 
to a large sign that describes their status and facing the other group. The Islamic 
commander (ruler) is also stationed in his special chair ready to command on the fate of 
the prisoners of war and close the war's chapter. His speaker reads a statement on his 
behalf. A representative of the international media is present there too, reporting on the 
details of the last stage of the war. According to the statement just read on behalf of the 
commander, the prisoners of war that surrendered at the end of war will be subject to 
Islamic graceful treatment based upon Q.8:70. The speaker continues reading the verse: 
"if God finds sorne good in your heart, He will reward you with something better than 
was taken away from you, and forgive your sins, for God is forgiving and kind" the 
speaker reads. He continues:" Now that your fate has brought you here, do not be heart 
broken because underneath Islam's protection you will receive full respect and you are 
free like all other human beings, for God has created every single of them free; The kind 
arms of Islam is wide open to embrace and serve you, and you can choose wherever you 
want to live in the abode of Islam without being forced to convert as we read in the holy 
book, Q.2:256: "there is no compulsion in matter offaith." "Or you are free" the speaker 
reiterates, "to go back to your home land as you wish." "In order for you" he continues 
"just to remember the affable position ofIslam on prisoners ofwar, we will present each 
of you with a frame quoting the Qur'anic verse 1 just read for you; at this juncture 1 call 
upon you to get your gifts and proceed to the reception arranged to honor your 
departure." At this juncture an international media reporter asks the speaker whether the 
ceremony is over. He retorts that: "this was the Islamic ruling on the first group of 
prisoners of war who were just released based on Q. 47:4 that gives us two choices of 
either releasing them on ransom or let them free by grace, and we chose the second 
option to enhance the international reputation for Islam." 
323 Jurists made a distinction between the prisoners of war captured before and after the war's 
conclusion; in their opinion, the ones captured in the middle of war must be executed, and the ones 
captured at the end released by grace or ransom. 
324 $alil).l, Jihad in Islam, 180. 
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As this scene has raised a great hope in the heart of the second group of 
prisoners of war and expecting the same ruling on themselves, suddenly a number of 
executioners enter the scene each carrying a sharp sword ready to follow orders. The 
speaker reads a new statement: "This second group of the prisoners of war who were 
captured before the termination of the battle will be executed in the form that an 
opposite hand and leg of each will be severed and they will be left to die" he announces. 
At this point the prisoners will be brought before the executioners in ten groups each of 
a thousand, and their arms and legs will be severed as ordered and their still alive bodies 
thrown in a large ditch that was prepared in advance. The moaning and crying of 
thousands of the unfortunate tortured and mutilated prisoners of war who will suffer for 
long before their death will f111 the air as millions of television spectators around the 
world are watching this dreadful tragedy, while the Islamic commander and his staff are 
observing the scene in cold blood, emotional indifference, satisfied that they have just 
implemented their religious obligation (taklif shar'iyya), and will be duly rewarded by 
the almighty. 
After a break during which ail the mutilated captives lost their lives, the floor 
was open for the media. A reporter asked, "Why did you free the first group of prisoners 
with such respect and so graciously and execute the second group by torture, did the 
latter pose serious threat against you?" The commander of the Muslim forces answers: 
"No, they did not pose any threat; we just executed them to fulfill an obligatory law 
based on a qadith from Talhat Ibn Zaid." Another reporter asked, "Does this ruling limit 
you to execute them by such torture or gives you other options as well?" The 
commander: "No, we could simply behead them instead." A reporter: "But for the first 
group, you chose to free them without ransom in order to promote the international 
image of Islam, haven't you?" The commander: "The jurists, as reflected in the text of 
'SharJ; al-Lum 'a (a collection of sharl'a rulings) in vol. l, page 260, have ruled, about the 
specifie methods of their execution, that we do not need to care for public exigencies 
(i.e. public image, interest and etc.), thus we just did what we liked to do no matter 
extra pains for the prisoners of war." A reporter: "What kind of law or social necessity 
would entail that you execute a group of captives with such a callous method, while 
releasing another group so gracefully and with utmost respect?" Another reporter adds: 
"and what amazes us further is that you delivered frames of a Qur'ânic verse to the first 
group according to which you must have been graceful to all the prisoners of war, 
without exception!" The reporter continues: "According to Arabie philologists, the word 
al-asrii used in Q. 8:70 and because of the letters al it carries before the word, becomes 
univers al and covers all types of prisoners of war; what then could possibly justify yoUf 
prejudice against the second unfortunate group?" The commander: "11 is true that the 
ruling of Q.8:70 applies to both types of the prisoners, however the ~adith of Talhat Ibn 
Zaid, excludes out the second group from the general arnnesty granted by the Qur'ânic 
verse to ail." The same reporter argues: "Does this single ~adith have such an authority 
to delimit the Qur'anic verse!?" The commander: "Well the qadith of Talhat Ibn Zaid is 
known to be among the weak qadith and therefore lacks authenticity, however, since a 
number of well-known jurists have formed and issued a consensus (ijmii' ruling on it, 
the consensus remedies the weakness of the ~adith, thus its treatment like an authentic 
~adith and its authority to delimit the Qur'anic verse." Another reporter: "Is it justice, 
that a few thousand prisoners of war, against the very text of the Qur'an, be executed 
through torture in such a tragic method, and thereby the callous act would tamish the 
international image of Islam, and all this, just on the basis of a weak qadith?!" The 
commander responds: "So far this is has been the ruling of all the well-known jurists, the 
renown Allama f,lilll (d.1325 CE) has even stressed 'this is the ruling of all our jurists', 
having said this, 1 have to conclude this session by adding that our jurisprudence is very 
progressive and welcomes new rulings on this matter, provided that we have new legal 
reasoning (ijtihiid) which rejects both the weak qadith and justifiability of remedying it 
by the jurists' consensus, in which case (in the face of the new ruling) we will treat ail of 
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the prisoners equally, gracefully, and with respect; our sincere hope is that such ijtihiid 
would take place soon and bene fit our Islamic society inshii'alliih (God willing)."- End 
of the jurist's war-gaming scenario. 
The obvious and profound dichotomies between, script ure and jurisprudence, the 
letters and spirit of law and ethics, and ends and means, as reflected in the scenario 
constructed by ~ali41, is an affront for any moral thinker. The scenario mentioned in the 
footnote proves that the inconsistencies inherent in the approaches of the tradition al 
Islamic law to war come to their full contrast and rational impasse in their modem 
implementation. 
~ali41's criticism of the views of these jurists goes beyond the above mentioned 
rulings to include the most important features ofwar. For ~alihl, law by itself can not be 
an end, rather he feels jurisprudence must be cognizant of the consequences of its 
rulings. 
Although Firestone and ~ali41 treat the questions of war in Islam from different 
perspectives, they arrive almost at the same conclusion: early militant jurists have 
prevailed and have rewritten the sacred history. Warfare lost its concem with justice 
and humanitarian values under the Umayyads,' the Abbasids,' and the subsequent 
Sullanates. 
Conclusions 
One of the most important features of all religions and ethical philosophies is that they 
exhort hum an beings to be in control of their immediate impulses and spontaneous 
actions, and abide by prudence in order to attain justice and divine rewards. Warfare, 
where wrath and anger usually rule, is the most difficult field to impose such control and 
realize such prudence. Philosophers of ethics define justice as a point between two 
extremes. Courage, as a virtue, is praised as the just point between the two extremes: 
foolhardiness and cowardice. While these definitions and categories are easily imagined, 
they are difficult to implement in practice. 
The gist of the just war theory is to fight for a just cause in a just manner. Many 
attempts have been made to define and qualify these notions but most of these 
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endeavors presuppose that the pursuers of justice will maintain sorne interest in their 
own fate. Justice is worth fighting for but the cost of victory must not be very high. 
Here they draw vague ethical lines where one should choose to lose. This is the 
boundary between practical ethics and the idealized world of epic literature and heroism. 
As a paradigm of virtue, 'Ali crossed this boundary many times. In doing so, he 
placed himself in the awkward position of appeasing his staunchest enemies and 
angering his closest associates. Yet, he turned the political victory of his opponents to a 
moral defeat, though his associates often remained frustrated. This unresolved 
frustration brought the hardening of attitudes over the course of future generations. 
Al-ljusayns's emphasis, in his last speech, on liberality (1;.urriyya) as an 
alternative to faith, remains as a perpetuaI reminder that the sense of justice is deeply 
embedded in every human being independent of the narrow sectarian or cultural 
definitions. He called for the use of this sense in judgment about one of the most tragic 
and unfair battles to be remembered by history. This was a clear calI to serious 
observation about 'just or unjust war,' as a notion that is more based on a natural sense 
than on a speculative theory. 
As the overall spirit of the ShI'! qadith collections show, ShI'! Imams undertook 
a significant effort to contain the belligerent emotions of their respective community 
against their oppressors. They accompli shed this primarily by banning any conflict that 
lacks proper ShI'! authority?25 
The Sunnl legalistic approach to laws of war, however, influenced ShI'! rulings 
on war after the tenth century CE. Similarly, like Sunnl jurists, ShI'! jurists gradually 
lost interest in regulating the conduct of wars, jus in bello. They pre-occupied 
325 On the importance of authority in ShI '1 school, Leaman points: "The distinction between 
Sunni and ShI'I Islam has only one important consequence for the laws ofwar, and that relates to the 
pers on who is authorized to declare war (Kohlberg 1976)." "For the SunnIs," Leaman notes: "any relevant 
de facto political authority can declare war, while for the ShI'I it must be an imam, a divinely appointed 
leader." Leaman concludes: "The insistence by the latter that only an imam can initiate jihad is at least 
partially motivated by the argument that it is vital to be clear about the real nature of the conflict which it 
is proposed to enter. It is aU too easy for political rulers to declare what they call jihad when aU they are 
reaUy doing is furthering their own political interests, or those of the state." See Oliver Leaman, A Brief 
Introduction to Islamic Philosophy, (Cambridge and Oxford: Polit y Press, 1999) 139. 
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themselves with consideration of the just causes of war, jus ad bellum and, with the 
advent of anti-colonial sentiments, embraced apologetic arguments. 
The opening of the gate of ijtihiid (independent legal reasoning) in ShI'} 
school,326 and the acquaintance of jurists with political realities in recent decades, seems 
to have encouraged a new critical reading of traditional sources for the laws of war. 
Modem ShI'} scholars like Mulahharl and Siilil}.I-Najafiibiidi have pioneered an ethical 
and humanist approach to the laws of war. The former has embraced a rather objective 
and cosmopolitan view of human rights as one of the highest moral features of any 
society. The latter has attempted to adapt these laws, through a genuine critical 
thinking, from their original ethical bases in sacred texts and actual history to modem 
needs and realities; and in doing so he has challenged the arbitrary militant 
interpretations of the Scripture. 
Tabiilabii'1 argued that the history of the early Muslim conquests is not a 
necessary part of Islam. For him, in fact, this traditionally considered glorious feature of 
the Muslim history has been quite harmful to the real cause ofIslam namely its spiritual 
mission for the mankind. Kadivar and his like-minded like Abdulkarim Soroush take a 
further step and declare that the whole history of Islam is not a necessary part of it. 
They put justice and reason as the ultimate and the eternal criteria for Muslims to 
accept or reject any moral codes inside or outside oftheir traditional faith. 
While Kadivar and his like-minded are engaged in a moral overhauling of the 
Islamic legal structure, other jurists like Iskandarl, through a very genuine process of 
critical thinking, help the former with deconstruction and then reconstruction of the 
Islamic law, in specifie fields such as war causes (jus ad bellum), pertinent to modem 
state of international relations and human rights. 
Despite Islam's major deviation from its otherwise much more productive 
course, as Mo1}aqqiq-Diimiid argued, Muslim jurists produced, a body of humanitarian 
326 Wael I:Iallaq argues that, despite the prevailing contemporary view, the gate of ijtihiid was 
never c10sed in Sunnl Islam as weil. Whether this gate was open or c10sed in either legal systems, it is a 
whole different argument than whether ijtihiidwas systematically and effectively used in ail walks of life. 
See Wael Hallaq, "Was the Door ofljtihad Ever Closed," In Intemational Joumal of Middle East Studies, 
16(1984): 3-41), reprinted in Law and Legal Theory in Classical and Medieval Islam, (Aldershot: 
Variorum, 1995). 
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laws ofwar (jus in hello) that matches, complements and in certain areas, surpasses the 
most advanced and modern humanitarian internationallaw. 
Altogether, the above arguments also prove that the old-aged legacy of critical 
thinking in ShI'! Islam is coming back with a new force. This is a fortunate and timely 
development not only for the Muslim world, but also for the whole body and practice of 
internationallaw which is in dire need of spiritual support at its very foundation. A law 
supported by the sacred has always been more effective. 
So far the intellectual responses of the Mulim cultures to the ethics of war have 
been explored more within the jurists's domain. The next chapter will provide a brief 
and selective account of sorne of the conceptual roots of war and sorne of the related 
responses to questions pertinent to war ethics within the philosophical, theological and 
mistycal grounds. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THEOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY AND MYSTICISM 
You desire and do not have; so you kill 
Theodore J. Koontz 
~ 1.) Jy.. ~ Ùï W...ù ï ~ ~ 4-.i... ~ ÙIJ '-"~ J..... 
It is easy for a lion to break rows of others, 
the reallion is the one who breaks the self 
RÜInl327 
This chapter deals with philosophical, theological and mystical approaches to war 
ethics. War, at its roots, starts with the conception of 'self,' in contradistinction to 
'others.' Through comparing sorne Western and Islamic theories of ethics, this chapter 
will study their similarities, differences, and the theoretical implications of these 
theories for the ethics of war. Since the very discipline of 'theoretical ethics' (akhliiq-e 
n~arJ in Persian) is traditionally a branch of philosophy in the Islamic curriculum, the 
chapter is intended to lay the foundation for sorne of the main tenets of this thesis.328 
Views relevant to war in major Islamic theological schools such as the Ash 'arl and the 
Mu 'tazili schools and of moral philosophers, and ~ufis such as al-FarabI (d. 950 CE), al-
Ghazal1 (d. 505 AH/Il Il CE), Ibn Miskawayh (d. 1030 CE), al-Tusl (d. 1274 CE), al-
Ruml (d. 672 AH/1273 CE) and Ibn al-'Arabl (d. 1240 CE) will be discussed. The 
chapter also briefly explores the relations between law and ethics. The distinction 
between these two separate disciplines is fundamental since Islamic literature on war is 
327 Jallil al-Œn Mo1!ammad Mowlavl, (Ruml) Mathnavl-e Ma 'navl, 3rd . ed., (from the 677 AH 
Manuscript), ed. Toufiq Sobhani (Tehran: Entesharat-e Rowzaneh, Tehran, 2003) voU, 59. 
328 The Aristotelian-Avicennian classification ofphiIosophical sciences adopted by most of the 
c1assical and medieval Muslim authors divide philosophy into two main branches: 1) speculative wisdom 
(al-l;ikmat al-ntJ:?ariyya) including mathematics, theology, and natural sciences, and 2) practical wisdom 
(al-1;Iikmat al- 'amaliyya) including ethics, politics and household management or economics. See Na~lr 
al-Œn al-Tusl's classification in Majid Fakhry, Ethical Theories in Islam (Lieden, New York: E.J. Brill, 
1991) 131. See also al-Ghazall's simiIar classification in Mohammad Ahmad Sherif, Ghazii/J's Theoryof 
Virtue, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1975) 3, 4. 
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often based solely on the rich legal literature of Islam to the neglect of the wider ethical 
dimensions found in other categories of Islamic literature and discourse. 
The Relations between Law and Ethics 
This thesis deals with the 'Islamic ethics of war;' importantly, the word 'ethics' is 
chosen, as a notion distinct from 'law.' Within traditional Islamic scholarship, 'ethics' 
(akhliïq) , and 'law' (sharJ'a) are separate disciplines, nevertheless the possibility of 
aUowing for such a distinction within the Qur'anic text itself has been a matter of 
controversy for sorne time; for example, Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), in the words of 
Hurgronje, is defined as a doctrine of ethics and duties.329 And even if we distinguish 
established laws from commonly accepted moral rules, they share, to a great extent, the 
same spirit, are driven by the same consensus, and foUow the same goals. 
These similarities in aspiration have resulted in sorne coincidences between law 
and ethics in many cultures, not least of aU in Islamic culture. Al-Ghazali maintains that 
fiqh is the ethics of action whereas akhliiq is the ethics of character. 330 In the view of 
Izutsu, there are two distinct levels of ethical words in the Qur'an. "the primary level," 
that he caUs objective language, is "essentially descriptive, whilst secondary-Ievel 
ethical words," what he calls metalanguage, "are essentially evaluative.,,331 He stresses 
that the pure value-words of the second type are rarely scattered in the Qur'an and "a 
system of well-developed secondary ethical terms is not to be found in the Qur'an 
itself," rather it is the subject matter of jurisprudence in its first centuries.332 Although 
329 Snouck Hurgronje, quoted in Mu4ammad Khalid Masud, "The Scope of Pluralism in the 
Islamic Moral Tradition," in Islamic Political Ethics: Civil Society, Pluralism, and Conflict, ed. Sohail H. 
Hashmi (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002) 139. 
330 Within the Western ethical discourse, such distinction exists between the Aristotelian 
character-based ethics versus the principle-based deontological and teleological ethics. See Bernard Mayo, 
"Ethics and the Moral Life," in Tom L. Beauchamp. Philosophical Ethics, An Introduction to Moral 
Philosophy, (New York, St. Louis, San Francisco, Auckland, Bogota, Hamburg, Johannnesburg, London, 
Madrid, Mexico, Montreal, New Delhi, Panama, Paris, Sao Paulo, Singapor, Sydney, Tokyo, Toronto: 
Macgraw-Hill Book Company, 1982)151-154. 
331 Toshihiko Izutsu, Ethico-Religious Concepts in the Qur'iin, (Montreal: Mc Gill University 
Press, 1966) 20. Notions of good (khayr ) and evil (sharr) are examples of evaluative Qur'anic words as 
different trom words such as good-doer (~iililJ) that is descriptive. 
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Izutsu admits that it may be hard or impossible to draw a clear line between the 
objective and the metalanguage, and that they may represent different intensity of the 
same ethical notions, yet he stresses that "difference of degree, when it goes beyond a 
certain limit, changes into a difference ofkind."333 
Indeed, these intersections have caused sorne contemporary Muslim scholars to 
modemize, de-historicize, and "purify" Islamic law from various cultural nuances in 
order to make it adaptable and compatible with modem life. The distinction these 
scholars are trying to make in Qur'anic doctrine is between what they consider the 
etemal moral rules on the one hand, and the ephemeral, culture-bound legal rulings on 
the other. 
For example, Kamvar334 has argued that the jurisprudential rule of abrogation 
(naskh) , hitherto applied to sorne of the Qur'anic verses by all the schools of Islamic 
jurisprudence, may be extended to cover the entire corpus of the legal injunctions 
derived from the Medinese suras of the Qur'an which seem to fit only the nascent 
Islamic society and its specific historical milieu.335 At the same time, Kamvar maintains 
that the Meccan moral rules of the Qur'an are etemally valid and should be used to 
codify new positive Islamic laws commensurate and relevant to life in the new 
millennium?36 Kamvar's view on the distinction between morality and law cornes very 
close to the view expressed in the mid twelfth century (c. 1140 CE) by a Christian monk 
named Gratian who is known also to be the first pers on that collected the Christian 
canon law. He maintains that, "Morality is divine ordinance, law is human 
ordinance ... Divine ordinances are established by nature, human ordinances by usage."337 
332 Toshihiko Izutsu, Ethico-Religious Concepts in the Qur'iin, 21, 23. 
333 Toshihiko Izutsu, Ethico-Religious Concepts in the Qur'iin, 22. 
334 Mol?sen KadIvar is a professor ofIslamic law and philosophy at Tehran University. 
335 Mol),sen KadIvar, 'The Religious Intellectualism," Aftiib, (82), (Tehran: AugustiSeptember 
2003) 28. 
336 KadIvar, "The Religious Intellectualism," 34. 
337 Agustine Thompson, a.p., Trans. Gratian, The Treatise on Laws, Decretum DD. 1-20, 
(U.S.:The Catholic University of America Press, 1993),4. 
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Less radical than Kadivar's extensive use of abrogation rules are proposais by 
Fazlur Rahman and Hashmi. Fazlur Rahman looks at ethics as the soul of law. He 
maintains that, "The Qur'an is not a book of abstract ethics, but neither is it the legal 
document that Muslim lawyers have made it out to be. It is a book of moral admonitions 
through and through."338 In Rahman's view, "The rise and development ofIslamic law, 
as they actually occurred, kept the Muslim's attention focused on details, at the expense 
of. .. the general requirements of the Qur'an.,,339 Hashmi suggests that Muslims must 
"disent angle Islamic ethics from medieval Islamic law" and treat the Qur'an as "a 
complete ethical system" in order to produce new rules for Muslim participation in 
internationallife?40 The common ground in the views of Kadivar, Rahman and Hashmi 
is that norms of ethics as the spirit and the foundation of law are eternal, whereas rules 
of law are ephemeral and constantly subject to change through the vicissitudes of 
history and geography. 
Conversely, Goodman, a historian of Islamic philosophy and religion, holds that 
similar to biblical Judaism, Qur'anic Islam does not make a sharp distinction between 
law and morals, implying therefore that Islamic laws and morality are having less 
fluidity that the above contenders suggest.341 For Coulson, although the dividing line 
between law and morality in the Islamic Sharl'a (jurisprudence) is not as clear as in the 
Western societies, yet Sharl'a does contain both. He shows how in certain fields such as 
sexual behavior, there is clear distinction, in his words, "between the rule which is 
enforced by the law as applied by the courts and the rule which finds its sanction only at 
the Bar of eternity.,,342 
338 Fazlur Rahman, "Law and Ethics in Islam," in Ethics in Islam, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian 
(Malibu, CA: Undena Publications, 1985) 8. 
339 Fazlur Rahman, "Law and Ethics in Islam," 1985, 12. 
340 Sohail Hashrni, "Islamic Ethics in International Society," in Islamic Political Ethics: Civil 
Society, Pluralism, and Conflict, ed. Sohail H. Hashrni (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 
2002) 170. 
341 Lerm E. Goodman, Islamic Humanism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 88. 
342 Noel J. Coulson, Conflicts and Tension in Islamic Jurisprudence, (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1969) 79, 80. 
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In order to accommodate modern life with medieval Islamic law, many 
theologians have sought to delineate between what is clear and fixed (or in Qur'anic 
term mulJkam) and what is ambiguous or fluid (mutashiibih); importantly, much of the 
modern Qu'ranie interpretation based on the expansive fluid part of the Qur'an 
reinterprets the tradition of Mu'tazilism. This is a tradition wherein law and theology 
(kaliim) in their pre-Shafi'I mode are not separated (note must be taken that the 
Mu 'tazilites did not see themselves as formulating law).343 Nevertheless, this debate 
depends on the criteria and standards that are used for Qur'anie analysis. 
Another measure, for example, is that whatever is subject to enforcement is law 
whereas the basis of morality is choice. In other words, no virtue or moral value can be 
produced under force; in fact, it can be argued that coercion is very much the antithesis 
of moral action as the Kantian ethics maintain.344 Coulson observed that a British view 
looked at law as the enforcing instrument of Morality. 345 From another perspective, law 
provides the minimal order for the sOciety.346 However, a perfectly legal society, 
wherein each member tries to follow and implement the law in aIl its details, is not 
necessarily a moral society. Rather, it is a well-functioning but a minimally moral 
society that cares for law only because of its utility rather than its inherent values. If in 
such a society, there are absolutely no instances of generosity, forgiveness, liberality, 
magnanimity, charity, or other moral values and virtues, it may be well-functioning and 
perfectly legal but is minimally moral. From this perspective, ethics hold a position 
343 George Makdisi ho Ids that it was al-Shlifi '1 who for the first time separated kaliim (theology) 
from fiqh Uurisprudence). See George Makdisi, "Ethics in Islamic Traditionalist Doctrine," in Ethics in 
Islam, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian (Malibu, CA: Undena Publications, 1985) 54. 
344According to Kant, " ... moral value (of an action), therefore, does not depend on the realization 
of the object of the action but merely on the principle of volition by which the action is done, without any 
regard to the objects of the faculty of desire." See Immanuel Kant, "The Good Will and the Catagorical 
Imperative," in Tom L. Beauchamp. Philosophical Ethics, 1982, 119. 
345See Noel 1. Coulson, Conflicts and Tension in Islamic Jurisprudence, (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1969) 77. 
346 Abdulkarim Soroush maintains that "law contains the minimal morality for the society, but 
the society's moral needs go far beyond and above that level." See Abdulkarim Soroush, "The Perfect 
Islamic Society," http://www . bbc.co. uk/persianliranlstoryl2006/0 1/060 1 08 sm-mb-soroush.shtml. 
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above law. However, the opposite situation is not possible; there cannot be a perfectly 
moral society that is lawless and chaotic. 
The task of differentiating between ethics and law perhaps reflects the axiomatic 
Aristotelian princip le that wherever friendship rules, there is no need for justice.347 By 
implication, with intra-state friendship, there is no need for war. It is obvious that 
friendship becomes the rule not in a perfectly legal, but in a moral society. 
Modem Western scholarship engages in many of the same controversies within 
the question of the relations between ethics and law; foremost among these is the debate 
between the 'formalism' and the 'content theory.' Modem Western Formalists, similar 
to the medieval Muslim adab ethicist, propose that morality is a matter of the attitude 
that a pers on takes up toward a problem, rather than the intrinsic characteristics of the 
problem itself.348 In other words, morality or ethics reflects one's outlooks and manners 
rather than any type of positive action. 
Islamic Theology, Ethics, and War 
War, an institution as old as humanity itself, has many trajectories in Islamic tradition, a 
number ofwhich have been neglected. Modem Western scholarship has produced many 
thought-provoking studies in recent yeaTs. However, it should be borne in mind that 
much of the work has focused exclusively on traditional Islamic legal discourse 
(sharJ'a) , or at best, have included sorne more recent interpretations and commentaries 
of the Qur'an and the Tradition (sunna). This neglect may be linked to a chronic bias. 
Muslim scholarship, moreover, despite its richness in substance and information, 
has not always analyzed its sources critically. The domination of the legal aspects of 
Islam over other are as of scholarship has had, and still has much to do with politics and 
the intricacies of power structures. The basis oflaw in Islam stems from the Qur'an. The 
Qur'an, however, contains only a small number of legal judgments. Among more than 
347 See Aristotle (1155a), The Nîcomachean Ethics, 120. 
348 For a concise account of these theories, see: Jules L. Coleman and Jeffrie G. Murphy, 
Philosophy of Law: An Introduction to Jurisprudence, (Boulder, San Francisco, and London: Westview 
Press, 1990). For formalist theory, see R. M. Hare; for content theory, see H. L. A. Hart; for 'Positive' 
ethics, see G. H. Warnock. 
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six thousand of the total Qur'anic verses, only less than two hundred are strictly legal-
a ratio of less than one thirtieth.349 They appeared only after the emigration of the 
Prophet and his companions to Medina. Almost aIl of the Meccan verses that are related 
to codes of behavior are of a moral character and fall in the category of ethics. 
The Fallacy of Detenninistic Moral Progress 
The emigration of early Muslims to Medina signified a change of status for them from a 
community in Mecca to a state in Medina; cruciaIly, with this development also came a 
shift in the tone of the Qur'anic verses. The verses, generated during the Meccan time, 
reflect a generally tolerant moral tone, but with the move to Medina the verses indicate 
an increasingly legalistic tone. The subsequent general tendency adopted by the 
Medinese Muslim community was to follow the legal Medinese precepts over the ethical 
Meccan ones wherever the two perspectives came into conflict. There was little or no 
effort on the part of the Medinese Muslim society to regard the Medinese verses as 
particular to the historical circumstances of the community. As a result, most cases 
which involved interpretive Qur'anic abrogation between two conflicting verses resulted 
in favor of the specifie and strict legalistic directive, rather than the earlier broad, and 
more relaxed ethical rulings.350 Remarkably, it was as ifthere was a univers al rule about 
the inherent higher value for the specifie than for the general, and for the 
chronologically later verses than for the former. 351 
In short, the ethical past systematically and unquestionably have fallen victim to 
the legalistic present. The more specifie the rulings became, the more the new Medinese 
society felt a need for experts to apply the new rulings to various cases. In other words, 
there was not so much a need for experts in ethics, as there was for the law proper. This 
349 About five hundred verses are subject of jurisprudence of which more than three hundred only 
deal with ritual devotions. 
350 A few samples were mentioned in Chapter Two. 
351 This resembles the Marxist view of the historical deterministic progress; a progress which also 
carries with itself a sense of value according to which the future mode of history and society is always 
better than the past. 
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trend soon spawned a whole new class of jurists and 'ulama. In the process, these 
experts institutionalized themselves and, through the field of their expertise, played an 
integral part in Islamic society over the course of the next few centuries. A major cause 
of this trend was the fact that the jurist al-Shâfi '1 (d. 820), had systematically refuted 
free reasoning (ijtihiid al-ra 'y) replacing it with analogical reasoning (ijtihiid al-qiyiis) 
and limited the sources of the law strictly to script ure and 4adith. This was at the cost of 
common sense in law. Subsequently most other fields of the humanities (such as social 
history) became subordinated to an abstract sense of Islamic law. The process, also 
served a poli tic al purpose; it augmented the power of later rulers such as the Saljuqs. 
According to Hourani, this legalistic trend was by no means inevitably inherent 
in Islam?52 Significantly, one of the earlier theological school that appeared in Islamic 
society was the Mu'tazilite, with its humanistic tendencies. Goodman maintains that 
"although the Mu'tazilites were hardly liberal, their kaliim is, in many ways, a form of 
humanism. For it preserves human free will and deems human reason competent to 
judge justice and injustice, ev en on God's part.,,353 To this Reinhart adds: "If the Mu 
'tazila are 'low church,' on Revelation, they are 'high church' on humanity. When the 
world is unknowable in advance of its becoming, when acts surge between good and 
352 See George F. Hourani, Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics (Cambridge, London, New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1985) 33. Here, Hourani asserts that two other incidents locked the 
fate of early freethinking in Islam. The first was when 'Abdullah Ibn al-Muqaffa (d.795 CE) went so far in 
the application offree reasoning to law as to suggest that only the Muslim leader (caliph or Imam) has the 
absolute right to interpret the law of sharJ'a; importantly, Ibn al-Muqaffa's view, by implication, became 
a reminder of the power of the ShI'! Imam. The second incident was the political blunder of Caliph al-
Ma'mÜll (d. 218 AH/833 CE) in his pro-Mu'tazila inquisition (the milJna of 218 AH/833 CE), which 
caused an extreme anti-Mu 'tazilite reaction, supported by the conservative J:Ianbalism the fourth Sunni 
school of jurisprudence, in the time of the Caliph al-Mutawakkil (d.847 CE). The al-Shafi'i understanding 
that one should act according to divine revelation, and that nothing outside of revelation could define or 
contribute to the understanding of justice, informs their view that "justice is that one should act in 
obedience to God." However, according to Hourani, this was not in accordance to the definition of justice 
from the Qur'an: "the Qur'anic definition of justice reflected in aIl its references to the term amounts to 
the fact that justice ( 'adJ) originated as an intelligible physical concept of even balance and was developed 
into a no less intelligible concept of equitable, the balance of natural justice." 
353 Goodman, Islamic Humanism, 97. 
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detestable in their context, humans stand aloof, removed, timelessly capable of knowing 
most action's moral status."354 
For the Mu'tazila, as the pro minent Ash'arite theorist Qa4i 'Aq.ud al-Dln al=ï:jl 
(d.754 AH/1353 CE) has put it, "sharJ'a does not invent good and evil, rather, it 
discovers them.,355 The Mu 'tazili authority Qa4i (judge) Abu'l I:Iusayn 'Abdu'l Jabbar 
(known as the last pro minent Mu'tazili theologist, d. 415 AH/1025 CEl56 points in his 
treaties SharIJ U$iil al-Khamsa that "Among what one must know about justice is that 
God's deeds are aIl good and He does not commit evil act, nor does He fail to do what is 
obligated (wiijib) upon Him, nor does He lie, nor does He transgress in His 
judgment...,,357 Here, appearantly 'Abdu'l Jabbar refers to justice as an objective 
univers al sense. This is just opposite to the Ash' ad view that is probably best expressed 
by the Ash'arl theologian Abu'l Ma'an Juwaynl (known as Imam al-I:Iaramayn d. 1085 
CE) in his treatise al-Irshid "Good" Juwaynl contends, "is not a domain, extraneous to 
SharJ'a, that could be discemed by it, rather, once sharJ'a praises the doer of an act, that 
action will be categorized as GoOd.,,358 Conversely as Gholamreza A'wanl has put it, the 
Mu'tazila believed in the primacy of reason over revelation in the sense that once a 
contradiction between reason and sacred text arises, it is the text that must be subject to 
interpretation (ta 'wJJ) so that it conforms to reason.359 
The main ethical debate lies between objectivists and voluntarists. The former 
believe in a universal basis for morality that is contained in but not limited to the sacred 
scripture. Voluntarists, on the other hand, believe in a subjective morality, one which is 
354 A. Kevin. Reinhart, Before Revelation, The Boundaries of Muslim Moral Thought, (New 
York: State University of New York Press, 1995) 160. 
355 See The Greater EncycJopedia of Islam, s.v. "The Philosophie al Ethics" by Gholarnreza 
A'wanl. 
356'Abdu'1 Jabbiir was appointed as chief justice in Ray during the reign of Buyids. 
357See 'Abd-ur-Ra4man, Badawl, Madhiihib al-Ismamiyin (The History of Islamic Theological 
Speculations), Translated by I:Iusayn :>abed, (Mashhad: Astan -e Quds-e Ra4awl, 1374/1994 CE) 75. 
358 'Abd-ur-Ra4man, Badawl, 1374/1994 CE, 790. 
359 The Greater EncycJopedia of Islam, s.v. "The Philosophie al Ethics" by Gholarnreza A'wanl. 
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govemed directly by God's will and revealed only through His holy writ.360 Ash'arites 
belonged to the latter group. They defined notions like justice and reason only within 
the scope of the Islamic law (sharJ'a)?61 The core of Ash'arl (870-915 CE) creed was 
that Muslims must follow the guidance of script ure closely in aIl religious matters. 
Ethical guidance in every sphere of life would have to remain within the legal limits set 
by al_Shafi'1.362 This of course resembled ethical voluntarism in the sense that there 
could be no a priori criteria outside of revelation to distinguish right from wrong. 363 
360 This debate is reflective of the Platonic idea called "Euthyphro dilemma" in ancient Greek 
philosophy that addresses the following controversial questions: "Is the just because the gods love it, or 
do the gods love the just because it is just." 
361 Goodman, Islamic Humanism, 97. For the Christian parallels of the voluntarist theologians 
see George Makdisi's reference to Peter Damian (1007-1072 CE), Duns Scotus (1266-1308 CE), and 
William of Ockham (l300-ca. 1350). George Makdisi, "Ethics in Islamic Traditionalist Doctrine," in 
Ethics in Islam, ed. Richard G. Hovannisian (Malibu, CA: Undena Publications, 1985) 50. 
362 Hourani, Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics, 272. 
363 To compare similar debates in Western scholarship, the following notes should be taken 
although the discussion is an all too brief treatment of these theories: two major ethical schools have been 
produced from the content theorists' ideology: the Kantian School, which puts 'individual freedom' and 
'self autonomy' as the most important societal value, and the 'Utilitarian' School of John Stuart Mill, 
Jeremy Bentham and others which value the greatest happiness for the greatest number. In the Utilitarian 
fashion, 'happiness' along with 'well-being' or 'welfare' are posited as the ultimate goals. The Kantian 
school values more the rights of individuals and the quality of life and the greatest self-autonomy even at 
the co st of happiness. Utilitarianism foc uses on the future benefit of the majority and the quantity of 
welfare and if necessary at the cost of the minority. For this school, virtues like justice, fairness, rights and 
merit are well defined, but importantly, they are instruments towards a higher goal; virtues lack intrinsic 
primary values. In sum, for Utilitarianism, all rights, virtues, and values are defined within the general 
framework of the public utility. For Kantian ethics, wherever there is a conflict between the concept of 
public utility and individual's rights, the latter has priority. This debate between theoretical schools is 
essentially over the individual's freedom versus the collective happiness; however, it can also be reduced to 
the Kantian 'natural-objective rights' versus the Utilitarian 'subjective-conventional pleasures.' 
Additionally, Alasdair MacIntyre asserts moral priority cannot have a 'rational' basis, as he understands 
that rationality is itself a culturally conditioned concept. For MacIntyre, in order to have such 'rational 
choice' one needs a society with shared values that in his view today do not exist. On the extreme side of 
this outlook lies the 'emotive theory of ethics,' which argues that, morality and ethics have an emotional 
rather than rational basis. According to this rationale there must be a sort of mathematical rigidity and 
proof, or else anything goes. These propositions have been rejected by John Rawls and others who believe 
in objective basis for morality and that without such objectivity, it would be difficult for various contenders 
even to communicate. See Coleman and Murphy, Philosophy of Law (1990). 
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The Intellectual Legacy of the Mu'tazilites 
A number of political factors brought the ec1ipse of Mu'tazili theology in the ninth 
century CE; however, its intellectual legacy of reason-based thinking continued under 
the Buyids. This legacy was a factor in the flourishing of knowledge and science 
between the mid-tenths to the mid-eleventh century CE. Remarkably, many branches of 
science and philosophy reached their full maturity during this period. 
As to why the spring of Islamic intellectualism and humanism emerged in this 
particular period, many authors attribute it partially to the emergence of the ShI'! 
regimes in much of the Islamic world from the Oxus to the Nile; specifically, many cite 
the Buyids' relatively high tolerance for other schools oftheology and thought, and their 
impressive patronage of philosophy, science, and art.364 Antony Black testifies to the 
Buyid reputation when he writes that "under the Buyids, religion was almost a private 
and communal affair. By pro vi ding political order without 'making windows into souls,' 
these Shl'ite regimes, especially the Buyids, facilitated a surge in intellectual energy.,,365 
To provide an explanation for this unique historical development, Black ascribes the 
ShI'! intellectual openness to the fact that it was the view of the rninority elite?66 
However, it is hardly convincing that an entire intellectual renaissance in so many walks 
of life could stern from a single political factor; therefore, the general openness could be 
better understood specifically on the basis of the two most important theological 
principles shared between Shl'ism and the Mu'tazilites: the objectivity and extra-
364 According to Joel Kramer, it is remarkable that in this period, "within the heartland of Islam, 
three Shl'l dynasties held sway: the Buyids in Mesopotamia and Western Iran, the ijamdanids in Syria, 
the Fatimids in Egypt. Even the Samanids of Khurasan, though Sunnls, were often susceptible to ShI'! 
(lsma'iTI) influence. These ShI'! regimes never made an effort to unite or ev en to impose their 
confessional preference upon the Sunnl population. But they were responsible in large measure for the 
intensive cultural expansion that went on. And the remarkable openness and readiness for the alien and 
the novel may perhaps be ascribed to their confessional orientation. This intellectual Shl'ism, which held 
political reigns while Shl'l theology and jurisprudence were being formulated, was largely responsible for 
the intensive cultural activity which the Renaissance of Islam witnessed." See Kramer, Humanism in the 
Renaissance of Islam (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986) 288. 
365 Antony Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought: From the Prophet to the Present, 
(New York: Rutledge, 2001) 50. 
366 Black, The History of Islamic Political Thought, 50. 
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religiosity of justice and reason.367 This objectivity meant that the sense of justice and 
the faculty of reason were defined outside the realm of any religion. In fact, these 
principles, as Kadivar maintains, pro vide the very basis for the credibility of any belief 
system; and therefore the incentive to accept and adopt any faith and philosophy.368 
Perhaps the theoretical flexibility of the Mu'tazila theology is best reflected in 
one of the cardinal principles of this theology known as the princip le of al-manzila bayn 
al-manzilatain (the stage between the two stage). According to this principle, between 
Paradise and Hell, there is a third stage where the sinful Muslims will be sent. This was 
opposite to the Kharijite theology which condemned Mulim sinners (committers of 
cardinal sins) along with non-Muslims to Hell. According to Watt, this principle was 
reflective of a political flexibility on the part of Mu'tazila with the goal of, attraclcting 
followers of various ShI' a and S unnl factions, or in other words, reacing a compromise 
to bridge between Shl'a and Sunnl views.369 Watt asserts however that aside from 
theoretical flexibility of Mu'tazila, their flexibility in real political life is still 
controvertial in modern Islamic scholarship.370 
In theory however, these originally Mu'tazilite standards served as the backbone 
of ShI'! theology and jurisprudence and perhaps were among the main reasons why the 
ruling ShI'! minority elites did not impose their theology over the ruled majority. 
It was al-FarabI (c. 870-950 CE) who argued that philosophy precedes religion 
both temporally and logically; temporally, because he traces the beginning ofphilosophy 
to ancient Egypt and Babylon, prior to the Prophets Abraham and Moses; and logically, 
367 Note should be taken that as 'Abdur Ralprüin Badawl asserts, ' 'adl (justice) along with 
, towi}Id' (oneness of God) is one of the two central principles of Mu 'tazilism. This is well reflected in the 
views of the prominent Mu 'tazili theorist Qa<fI 'Abdul Jabaar in his thretise AI-MughnI fi 'U~ül al-DIn. 
See 'Abdur Ra4man Badawl, Madhiihib al-Ismamiyin (The History of Islamic Theological Speculations), 
Translated by I:Iusayn ~aber1, (Mashhad: Astan-e Quds-e Raqawl, 1374/1994 CE) 69. Justice is also one 
of the two central princip les (along with imiima) of the Shl'l theology. 
368 Kadivar, "The Religious Intellectualism," 34. 
369 William Montgomery Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Abu'lfaql Ezzatl trans. 
Annotated by Jafar Shahidi (Tehran: Sherkat Entesharat Elmi, 1380/2001CE) 78, 96. 
370 Watt, Islamic PhiJosophy and Theology, 1380/2001CE, 75. 
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because aH the truths of religion had first to be understood and stated in a logical way, 
before they could be espoused by prophets.,,371 However, such philosophie al approaches 
which understood ethics as an ontologically independent field did not prevail for long, 
and subsequently gave way to the traditionalist and legalistic view of reason mainly in 
its use as a contingent supplement to revelation. 
The Objective Justice and its Implication for War 
Mu'tazilite influence in the ShI'! notions of objective, or natural justice has direct 
implications for war. Justice as an Aristotelian "master virtue" has the status of a master 
princip le in both the Mu'tazili and the ShI'! theologies as well.372 In fact, justice is the 
most important common denominator among all secular and religious theories of just 
war. In the words of Hashmi, within the Islamic context "justice may be seen without 
oversimplification to be the core value of Islamic ethics, for it runs like a binding thread 
throughout the Qur'an and the Prophetie tradition.,,373 It is obvious that once justice 
371 Hourani, Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics, 274. 
372 George Hourani argues that certain similarities of principles shared between Mu'tazila, and 
Shi'! theology on the one hand and Zoroastrian, Manichean, Christian, and Greek philosophy on the other 
should not make us think that the former schools have copied these princip les from the latter. Hourani 
maintains that the Mu'tazila and the Shi 'a based all their princip les on the Qur'an, 4adith, and 
independent reason. The similarities only show that they developed certain universally understandable 
theological and philosophie al language that the early populations of the occupied lands like all those 
mentioned faiths could relate too. Hourani argues that in fact early Christians did exactly the same. His 
quotation from Thomas Aquinas is very revealing: "Sorne of them, such as the Moharnmedans and the 
pagans, do not agree with us in accepting the authority of any Script ure, by which they may be convinced 
of their errors. Thus, against the Jews we are able to argue by means of the Old Testament, while against 
heretics we are able to argue by means of the New Testament. But the Moharnmedans and the pagans 
accept neither the one nor the other. We must, therefore, have recourse to natural reason, to which all men 
are forced to give their assent. However, it is true, in divine matters the natural reason has its failings." 
Here Aquinas gives classic expression to the necessity of developing a common language. One striking 
sample of philosophie al similarity that Hourani provides is between the Mu'tazila and Zoroastrianism. 
The barest elements are first, that their objective values are the same; second, that they share the rational 
knowledge of values; third, they are similar in everlasting rewards and purgative punishment (although 
purgatory does not exist in the Mu'taziIi tradition); and fourth they are similar in man's power (a source 
of evil for the Mu'tazila). There is only one major difference; that is, the figures of the Zoroastrian 
Ohrmazd and Ahriman, sources of good and evil (Allah is the source of good alone for the Mu'tazila). 
373 Hashmi ("Islamic Ethics in International Society," 162) refers to Q. 5:8 that reads in the last 
phrase 'be just: this is closest to piety.' Considering the fact that pi et y (taqwa1 within the Qur'anic 
context is introduced as the most important moral criteria for God's judgment on human being, Q.5:8 
brings justice to sit next to pi et y as the second most important moral trait. 
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faUs within the realm of revelation, war and peace follow, at least at the theoretical 
level, from the authority of religion; on the other hand, if justice stands outside the 
do main of faith, war and peace may logically and on the basis of natural law become a 
matter of univers al and secular decision and discretion. As Reinhart asserts, "A natural 
law position is attractive in plurality; it is subversive ofhegemony.,,374 It is important to 
note that the political philosopher Rousseau (d. 1778 CE) extended the use of the 
reason-based objective ethics, beyond the domain of war's justification, into questions 
pertaining to the qualities of war. He maintained, whether war is justified or not, by 
virtue of reason, it should not harm various categories of individu al non-combatants, 
because war takes place between states and not the unfortunate individuals who are 
caught in it simply by accident.375 
Mu'tazilite princip les provide a theoretical possibility to democratize the 
decision-making system for war and the qualities of war. Conversely, Ash'arite 
theology, which gives absolute power to religious authorities, and, unlike the Mu'tazili 
school, does not believe in human's free will, strictly limits the control systems in such 
decision-makings.376 
It could be argued that the central authority of the Imam in Shl'1 thought would 
bring about autocracy just as it does in Ash'arite theology. In theory however, this is not 
plausible because the very legitimacy of the Imam is based not only on his genealogy 
but also on his sense of justice and just performance; factors that could freely be 
374 A. Kevin. Reinhart, Before Revelation, the BOWldaries ofMuslim Moral Thought, (New York: 
State University of New York Press, 1995) 180. 
375 For Rousseau, as soon as a soldier lays down his anns and surrender, he must be immune like 
any simple man. He holds, "These princip les were not invented by Grotius, nor are they founded on the 
authority of the poets: they are derived from the nature ofthings: they are based on reason." See Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, Livre 1, (The Social Contract), Trans. by Maurice Cranston, (New 
York and London: Penguin Books, 1968),56. 
376 Note must be taken that although Shi'! theo1ogy has adopted a good part of the Mu'tazili 
principles, it has also adopted the Ash 'arl princip le of intercession which is basically a concept to 
mitigate God's punitive measures on sinfu1 men hereafter. It leaves a negotiating door between God and 
his subjects etemally wide open and by the same token - at 1east in princip1e - denies any human authority 
to condernn anyone to hellfire on God's beha1f. See Murta4ïi Mu~ahharl, An Introduction to Islamic 
Studies: Theology, Mysticism and Practical Wisdom (ashena 'J bi 'uliim-e Islaml: kaliim, 'irfiin, iJiJanat-e 
'amaIJ), (Tehran: Entesharat-e Sadra, 1371 (Persain ca1endar)11992) 79. 
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recognized or refuted by his followers-in which case the Imam would lose his 
legitimacy-and not merely on the approval and the discretion of the jurists and legal 
scholars.377 The next question is that in historical reality, to what extent have these 
theological factors determined or influenced the decision making in the ShI'! 
community regarding both the cause and the qualities of war? As discussed in further 
details in the previous chapter, the most important mitigating factor of ShI'! thought 
and practice regarding war is limiting any legitimate order of primary (offensive) war to 
the twelve infallible Imams; in other words, no ShI'! authority after the twelfth occulted 
Imam may order a primary (offensive and expansionist) war. This was perhaps among 
reasons for the ShI'! Buyids' reluctance to replace the concurrent 'Abbasid Sunnl 
caliphs in Baghdad with a ShI'! authority, whom the Buyids would have had to obey on 
matters of governance and war.378 
It is important to note that the reason-based theology of the Mu'tazila was not 
only impressive for a part of the Muslim Sunnl majority and minorities such as the 
Shl'a, but attracted non-Muslims as weIl. According to Hodgson, "many Jewish scholars 
professed a kahim that was Mu'taziIi in substance.,,379 
Theology and War in Broader Perspective 
Mu'tazilites and Ash'rites were the two predominant schools oftheology (kaliim) in the 
classical and medieval Islam. Nevertheless early-on during the internaI insurgencies of 
377Hossein Modarresi points to criteria for the Imamate other than mere genealogy connecting 
them to the Prophet. A case at point is the ShI'! controversy about the Imamate of 'Abdullah Afta4 a son 
of la 'far al-$iidiq whose authority and succession, was rejected by the Shi'i community despite his 
seniority to Musa al-K~im who became the seventh Imam. See Hosein Modarresi, Crisis and 
Consolidation, (Princeton: Darwin Press, 1993) 52,64. 
378Note must be taken that the Buyids (for example 'Açlud al-Dowla) did change a Sunni caliph 
with another. The general religious tolerance of the Shl'l administration was not confined to the Buyids, 
for the Fatimids of Egypt had many Christian ministers during the eleventh and early twelveth century 
(e.g. 'Isa Ibn Nastmus who served al-Muntasir). Al-ijiikim and al- 'Azlz also had Christian ministers. As 
Conard maintains, "Tolerance ofJews and Christians is one of the characteristics of the dynasty." See The 
Encyc10paedia of Islam, new edit ion, s.v. "Fatimids" by M. Conard. 
379Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, Conscience and History in a World 
Civilization (Volume 2: The Expansion of Islam in the middle period), (Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1974) 175. 
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mid-seventh century CE (first century AH), there appeared other minority schools of 
theology whose views had serious implications for war in theory and practice. 
Among the Kharijites (insurgents against both 'Ali -the fourth caliph- and his 
chief opponent the founder ofUmayyads, Mu'awiya), the most militant ofthem Azariqa 
maintained, as noted by Watt, that all other Muslim individuals who failed to join them 
in their war against other factions were sinful, unbeliever (kafir), had fallen outside the 
abode of Islam (dar al-Islam), and therefore must be killed in war along with their 
women and children?80 Azariqa, according to Watt, were the first political faction 
among Muslims who justified terrorism in practice and theology.381 
The philosophical and theological foundation for the militant view of Azariqa 
was based on their understanding of a Qur'anic distinction between the residents of 
paradise (a~iJab a1-Janna), and residents of hell (a~iJab al Jahlm) and the projection of 
this dichotomy into the mundane political situation within the famework of the abode of 
Islam (da1 al-Islam) and the abode of war (diir a1-iJarb). Such view did not leave any 
space for a third ground. Azariqa, consequently thought, that they are agents and 
facilitators for realization of the above Qur'anic dichotomy. 
Next to Azariqa were another Kharijite faction named Najdiya that, like Azariqa, 
easily condemned passiveness in the prevailing internaI political dispute as a camaI sin 
deserving hellfire, but were a bit more lenient than Azariqa in condemning sinners to 
death.382 Next to Najdiya were a less radical Kharijite faction in Ba~ra named Waqifiya 
or Waqifa (suspenders) who differed with the above factions in that they believed the 
execution and implementation of the above severe penal laws must be suspended 
380 Azariqa were the group of insurgents named after their leader Nafi' ibn Azraq who maintained 
that both the pro 'AIl forces and those of Mu'awiya that were engaged in war after the murder of the third 
caliph 'Uthman, have committed a camaI sin (kabJra) and are therefore condernned to HeUfire (jahlm). 
They used this theological justification to caU for an aU-out war not only against aU other formaI political 
factions, but also against any individual who fails to join Azariqa in their militant mission. According to 
Watt, a test of loyalty for anyone who sought to join Azanqa was that he was handed with a prisoner 
whom the volunteer member must kill before being formaUy admitted to the group. See William 
Montgomery Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Abu'lfa<p Ezzatl trans. Annotated by Jafar Shahiill 
(Tehran: Sherkat Entesharat Elmi, 138012001CE) 30. 
381 Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology, 138012001CE, 30. 
382 Watt, Islamic Philosophy and The%gy, 1380/2001 CE, 31. 
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Unlike Butterworth, this work does not explore how the medieval philosophers 
tried to explain "dominant opinions,,,387 rather it shows that they offered, based on their 
own view of Islam, new ideas directly or by implication. Butterworth maintains that 
"Al-FarabI, discussed just war and questions directly related to it in several of his 
writings. Avicenna and Averroes, on the other hand, discussed just war only indirectly 
and even then in no more than one or two of their writings,,388 It is therefore important 
to explore Abii Na~r Mol].ammad al-FarabI's (d. 950 CE) views on war ethics. 
Al-FarabI, the great Muslim logician, is known to have been a major proponent 
of philosophie ethics in Islamic history. Having ShI'! inclination and believing in the 
universality of reason and justice as two faculties inherent in every individual, al-FarabI 
did not hesitate to adopt a good part of the Platonic and Aristotelian ethical premises 
and definitions. He is known to be the first Muslim philosopher to have written a 
commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. 
In his On Civil Govemment, al-FarabI enumerates various political systems, 
their foundations, and their moral characters. He explains that the ideal head of state, 
following the view of Plato, is a philosopher-king. He does not provide much detail 
about how his ideal political system works, because in his view, aIl the methods are weIl 
provided by Islamic law (shari'a). The 'virtuous city' (al-madinat al-fIù;lila) is headed by 
the philosopher-king, and king/prophet/legist in pre-Islamic and the Islamic era 
respectively and stands above aIl other systems. 
AI- Farabi establishes several important points. First, he recognizes the presence 
of a multiplicity of states. 389 Significantly, this is opposite to the traditional view of the 
jihad and allows neither to encompass the other." See 'Abd al-Ra4man Ibn Khaldün, AI-Muqaddima, ed. 
W. M. de Slane, trans. F. Rosenthal, vo1.2 (Paris: n.p., 1858) 65-79, 73-88. Also see Charles E. 
Butterworth, "Al-Farabl's Statecraft: War and the Well-Ordered Regime," in Cross, Crescent, and Sword' 
The Justification and Limitation of War in Westem and Islamic Tradition, ed. James Turner Johnson and 
John Kelsay (New York, London: Greenwood Press, 1990) 97. 
387 Butterworth, "Al-Farabl's Statecraft," 80. 
388 Butterworth, "Al-Farabl's Statecraft," 70. 
389 Abiï Na~r Mo!).arnmad al-Farabi, On Civil Govemment, trans. Seyed Jafar Sajjadi, (Tehran: 
Anjoman-e Falsaf-e-ye Iran, 1979) 168. Al-FarabI uses the term al-mudun al-fiiç/ila in plural(the perfect 
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because human being is unable to draw a clear line between 'the residents of jinna 
(paradise) and those ofjahJm (heU).383 
Watt maintains that the latter faction was not an important political force in 
itself, but it signifies the trend of theological developments in the views from the most 
militant Kharijite faction Azariqa to the most libral political faction namely Murji'a. 
Murji'a, diagonaUy opposite to Azariqa, believed that the distinction between the 
residents of paradise and heU is beyond human's discresion. They rejected the 
exclusivist views of Kharijites, and expanded the field of 'faith' (iman) to be vastly 
inclusive of various Islamic political and theological views. Thus, they added a third 
new domain, the abode of faith (daT al-Iman), to the abodes of peace and war. 
The net political result of the Murji'a's view was rejection ofinsurgency against 
the ruling Umayyads.384 In other words, Murji'a, by their most exclusivist stance within 
a spectrum of Islamic theological views, produced the most liberal position of early 
poli tic al Islam and therefore the least militant among various factions. 
Philosophical Ethics, War and al-FarabI 
There is a controversy among Western scholars on whether the medieval Muslim 
philosophers understood the 'just war' theory within the concept of jihad (as Joel 
Kramer believes), 385 or conversely considered jihad as a case within the broader category 
of the former (according to Butterworth).386 
383 Watt, IsJamic PhiJosophy and TheoJogy, 1380/200lCE, 34. 
384 Watt, IsJamic PhiJosophy and TheoJogy, l380/200lCE, 49. 
385 Kramer holds that the issue of just war is amply treated by Western theologians, political 
philosophers and theorists of internationallaw, but it is not a relevant topic for Islamic political doctrine, 
for which the concept of just (or justified) war is comprehended by jihad; see, "The Jihiid of the Falasifa," 
Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam, 10 (1987): 312, n. 74. 
386 Butterworth rejects Kramer's contention by examining Ibn Khaldun's views on war which 
proves, as Butterworth holds, that Muslim philosophers observed a clear distinction between jihad and 
just war. Ibn KhaldÜll describes four kinds ofwar: the first is tribal warfare, such as that which existed in 
the Arabian desert, caused by "jealousy and envy;" the second are feuds and raids which are characteristic 
of primitive people, caused by "hostility;" the third are wars prescribed by the sacred law, caused by "zeal 
in behalf of God and His religion;" and the fourth are wars against rebels and dissenters, caused by "zeal 
in behalf of royal authority and the effort to found a kingdom." By reference to the last category 
Butterworth concludes, "contrary to Kramer's assertion, then, Ibn KhaldÜll distinguishes just war from 
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Islamic jurists who divide the world into two (or at most three) domains: the 'abode of 
peace' (dir al-Islam), the' abode of war' (dir al-lJarb), and the' abode of treaty' (dar al-
'ahd)?90 Thus, al-Faâibl's recognition of multiplicity of states removes, at the 
theoretical level, a major impediment in the way of the development of an Islamic 
internationallaw.391 
AI- Farabi also sees absolutely no conflict between the SharJ'a and natural 
reason, thus asserting the compatibility of philosophy and revelation.392 In this sense, 
and by implication, FarabI expands the philosophical notion of justice to include natural 
justice, and as we have demonstrated, natural justice belongs to the very foundations of 
the perfect-state's policies of war and peace. In other words, for al-FarabI, the concept 
of war fits more within the just war theory than the holy war in jurisprudential context, 
for justice becomes universal in the former realm. 
In mabadi ira' ahl al-madinat al-fiù/ilah (The Principle of the Opinions of the 
Inhabitants of the Perfect State), according to Walzer, al-FarabI presupposes the 
essential solidarity of mankind (considering aIl men as parts of the same species), a 
factor which facilitates the conception of a univers al state. "This demand for world 
peace," Walzer contends, "go es beyond the ideas of Plato and Aristotle, both of whom 
were content to aim at peace among Greeks only.,,393 Walzer also notes that while for 
states). See Richard Walzer, On the PeFfect State (Mabiidi irii' ahl al-madinat al-fiiç/ilah of Abii Na~r al-
Firiibi),257-258. 
390 For more details see Majid Khadduri, War and Peace jn the Law of Islam, (Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1955); it is al-Shafi '1 (d.803) who adds the third category (dir al- 'ahd). 
391 Many authors have attributed the lack of the development of an Islamic international law to 
this factor. See, for example, Bassam Tibi, "War and Peace in Islam," in The EthÏcs of War and Peace, 
ReJjgjous and Secular PerspectÏves, ed. Terry Nardin (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1996) 
15. 
392 Al-FarabI, On Ovil Govemment, 155. 
393 Richard Walzer, On the PeFfect State (Mabiidi irii' ahl al-madinat al-fiiç/ilah of Abii Na~r al-
Firiibl), Revjsed Text wj[h IntroductÏon, TranslatÏon, and Commentary, (Chicago: Great Books of the 
Islamic World Inc., Oxford University Press, 1998) 497. For details of Plato's view about war ethics see 
his chapter on Usages of War where the whole world beyond the Greek borders of Hellas is considered 
'enemy.' See Plato, The RepublÏc, Francis MacDonald Cornford trans. and ed. (New York and London: 
Oxford University Press, Twenty-Eight printing, 1965) Chapter XVII, v.466 d-471 c, pp. 168-174. 
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both Plato and Aristotle, the perfect-state is limited to 'city-state,' al-FarabI, expands 
the notion not only to 'nation- states,' but ev en to a univers al world-state."394 The 
univers al state however, does not preclude the possibility of sever al perfect states. In al-
FarabI' s own words, " .. .it is possible that excellent nations and excellent cities exist 
who se religions differ, although they all have as their goal one and the same felicity and 
h . "395 t e very same alms. 
The ultimate goal for al-FarabI's ideal city-state is the attainment of 'happiness,' 
which is achieved by replacing the intention al and non-intentional evil with the 
intentional and natural goOd?96 Importantly, it is in this formulation that al-FarabI, 
according to Goodman, adopts Aristotle's view about the natural supremacy of the 
civilized, and "justifies aggressive warfare.,,397 In al-FarabI's own words, the superior 
state may conquer nations and cities that do not submit to doing what will give them 
the happiness man is made to acquire .... the warrior who pursues this purpose is the just 
warrior. 398 
In his 'The Book of Aphorisms of the Statesman (Fu~iil al-Madanl),' there are 
references to eleven types of warfare: they include those waged for defense, acquiring a 
good the city deserves, reforming others, subjecting those suited for it, taking back what 
is rightfully the city's, punitive, deterrent, and war of extermination. Al-FarabI also 
recognizes four kind of unjust war (iJarb jawr) as the following: "Bellicose actions 
undertaken for the sake of the ruler's increasing honor or self-aggrandizement, pure 
conque st , venting of rage or achieving sorne other pleasure through victory, and 
394 Richard Walzer, On the Perfect State (Mabadi ira' ahl al-madinat al-fiiç/ila of Abü Na~r al-
Firabi) 430. 
395 Richard Walzer, On the Perfect State (Mabadi ira' ahl al-madinat al-fiiç/ila of Abü Na~r al-
Firabi), 281. 
396 Al-FarabI, On Civil Govemment, 163. 
397 Goodman, Islamic Humanism, 9. 
398 Al-FarabI in Fi Ta/;I~il al-Sa 'ada; quoted in Goodman, Islamic Humanism, 37; See also 
Butterworth, "Al-FarabI's Statecraft." Majid Falhri also asserts that for Al-FarabI, "justice is identified 
with conquest, and the dut y of the just man is said to consist, as Thraysymachos has put it in Republic 1, 
337D, in "doing what is most advantageous to the conqueror" so that the subjugation (isti 'bad) of the 
conquered by the conqueror is regarded as eminently just." See Fakhry, Ethical Theories in Islam, 84. 
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overreaction to an injustice committed by others." Little reference is made to jihad in 
these formulations. 399 
Although al-Farabl's argument justifies offensive war, it is important to note, 
and as Goodman asserts, that "the argument does not entail, indeed does not allow, mere 
military self-assertion: it justifies offensive warfare, but only on behalf of civilizing 
d "400 B h . ·1 1 t en s. utterwort Simi ar y no es: 
In the Aphorism, by referring to the ruler's or rulers' warring capability in terrns derived 
from the word jihad, he underlines that the only kind of warfare such a ruler or rulers 
may reasonably resort to is warfare that serves the virtuous city. In the virtuous city, 
however where the exceptional moral qualities of the ruler or rulers are more clearly 
stated, he eschews such usage.401 
For al-FarabI, jihad is as generic as slavery is for Aristotle; it simply takes a just 
prophet/legist to legitimize it. 
Within al-Farabl's work are also c1ear references to the use of force in the 
management of the 'ideal-city' against uncivilized minorities who act like "weeds" or 
"animaIs." According to him, these types of people de serve to be fully exploited, or "if 
they are like harmful animaIs, they should be treated in that manner" as well.402 These 
are rather harsh measures, however again their application rests on the presence and 
judgment of the just ruler. 
Opposite the virtuous city-state, as al-FarabI suggests, are other states that range 
from less-than-perfect to the thoroughly evil. Under the rubric of the ignorant city 
Uiihiliyya) are the city of honor (kiriima), the necessity city (çJarurlyya), the city of 
depravity (khissa) , the city of domination (taghallub) , the city of meanness (nadhiila), 
and the city of the unbridled masses Uamii 1yya or IJurriyya). In addition, there are the 
erring city (?iilla), the corrupt city (fiisiqa), and the changing city (mubaddila). In 
399 Butterworth, "AI-Farabl's Statecraft," 85-7. 
400 Goodman, Islamic Humanism, 9. 
401 Butterworth, "AI-Farabl's Statecraft," 94. 
402 Al-FarabI, On Civil Govemment, 169. 
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contrast to the ignorant cities, the main difference between these cities is that the latter 
group is consciously in error. 403 
AI-Farabl's dominant city, whose citizens' main drive in life is to rule over 
others, whether compatriots or aliens, by force or through trickery and deceit has 
particular relevance to this study.404 According to al-FarabI, among the citizens of this 
city are those who have a "lust for the use of force" in a way that "they even refrain to 
kill their subjects when they are sleeping, not for chivalric concerns, but to wake their 
victims up and kill them against their resistance just to maximize their joy."405 AI-
FarabI delineates here three types of inclinations among the users of force: first, those 
who use force for the very sake of it (no secondary motive), second, those who use force 
for other excessive materialistic gains, and third those who stop using force once they 
fulfill their moderate needs.406 Such a categorization ascribes little ethical value to 
acquisitive wars. In the same way, modern critiques of just war criticize the moral 
foundations of colonial wars. 
Al-FarabI rejects the notion that any kind of imperfect state can be reformed by 
force. In Walzer' s words "He rejects every form of violence and puts his trust rather in 
education through philosophy.,,407 
Close to the end of On Civil Govemment, al-FarabI considers the matters ofwar 
and peace from an important psychologie al angle that will be essential in dealing with 
the views of his philosopher successors. This draws from the Platonic notion of the 
trichotomy of the soul, a premise that is accepted unanimously by all of the Islamic 
philosophers of ethics. According to this principle, the human soul is made of three 
essential faculties: namely, the irascible or appetitive (ghaç/abiyya), the concupiscent 
403 AI-FarabI, On Civil Govemment, 170. Aiso see Richard Walzer, On the Perfect State (Mabiidi 
irii' ahl al-madinat al-fiiçlila of Abü Na~r al-Firiibl), 454. 
404 AI-Farabi, On Civil Govemment, 181. 
405 AI-FarabI, On Civil Govemment, 181. 
406 AI-FarabI, On Civil Govemment, 182-83. 
407 Richard Walzer, On the PeTfect State (Mabiidi irii' ahl al-madinat al-fiiçlila of Abü Na~r al-
Firiibl) 451. 
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(shahawiyya), and the spirited or rational ('aqliyya). In accordance with Aristotelian 
ethics, FarabI determines four cardinal virtues that can control and manage an parts of 
the soul and bring them to moderation; these virtues are temperance, courage and 
reason, corresponding with irascible, concupiscence, and rational faculties, and the sum 
of an virtues (or the most perfect virtue), which is justice.408 As Fakhry asserts "the two 
moral virtues which figure most prominently in al-Farabl's discussion are friendship 
(maJ;abba) and justice ( 'adiila).''409 
In fact al-FarabI seems to agree with the Aristotelian conviction that one may 
dispense with justice in a society that is established on friendship. The vices that are 
opposite to friendship are animosity and hatred, and these establish the psychological 
motives for war.410 
Looking at war from a psychological perspective, al-FarabI suggests that groups 
of people or the entire population of sorne city-states lose their rational faculty in the 
service of their irascible senses (that of wrath and force), and then an faculties 
ultimately in the service of their concupiscent soul (the animalistic, whimsical, 
1 .. ) 411 asclvlOus urges. 
This again is a reference to the power of vices, for example, in anger leading to 
oppression, and also war an instrument to reach material joy; these vices reflect a 
general social immoral trend, that in Farabl's view, is found mostly among the nomadic 
Arab and Turkish tribal societies.412 Therefore, FarabI concludes that such tendencies 
408 Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics. 20d ed. Translated by Terence Irwin. (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing Company, 1999) 1129b -1130a, p.69 
409 Majid Fakhry, Ethical Theories in Islam (Lieden, New York: E.J. Brill, 1991) 83. 
410 Fakhry, Ethical Theories in Islam; this point is also weIl developed in Aristotle's The 
Nicomachean Ethics. 
411 This point was also mentioned by Abu Bakr al-Razf(d. ca.925 CE) an outstanding Platonist of 
Islam in reference to Alexander the Great. In the words of Majid Fakhry, Raz! maintained in his work 
Rasail Falsafiyya, "the defect of the irascible is to fail to curb the appetitive soul (concupiscence), 
whereas its excess is to be puffed up by pride and the lust for conquest, as illustrated by the case of 
Alexander the Great." From Fakhry, Ethical Theories in Islam, 83. 
412 Al-Farabi, On Civil Govemment, 194. 
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have something to do with the socio-economic Iifestyle of those societies, in which lust 
and force are the main drives. 
It is important to note that the psychological analysis of FarabI had major 
influence on all his followers and major ethics philosophers of the Islamic world; for 
example, other philosophers like al-Ghazali, Ibn Miskawayh, and Tusl have incorporated 
al-Farabl's moral-emotional paradigm. 
As pointed out by Fakhry, al-Farabl's view of justice can be divided into two 
spheres: domestic and foreign. The concept of domestic justice relates to overall intra-
societal relations, including economic justice in the distribution of goods and services 
and honors, and the justice of maintenance that is primarily protective in all walks of 
life. Justice in foreign relations is divided into defensive justice, that is to ward off 
aggression, and offensive justice, that is to do what is advantageous to the conqueror (in 
undoing a previous injustice).413 Such categorization is reflective of the fact that al-
FarabI combines the Platonic view of justice which is of an inward, domestic essence 
(psychic harmony), and the Aristotelian outward, foreign, 'commonjustice.,414 
AI-Farabl's views here runs counter to those held by jurists ofhis time. When it 
cornes to the eradication of the 'useless' domestic classes, al-Farabi holds a severe 
position, however this severity is absent in his views of external relations. 
Notably, al-Farabl's he ad of the state, namely the philosopher-king, or the king-
prophet, follows an objective justice that is in full accord with both human objective 
reason and prophetie revelation. There is no difference in al-Farabl's opinion between 
the non-Islamic and the Islamic virtuous ruler and, between the non-Muslim and the 
Muslim virtuous warrior because the logic of virtue is universa1.415 
Several specifie factors present among the Aristotelian principles of the al-
Farabl's philosophie al thinking by implication have limiting and mitigating effects on 
war. Evil, according to this philosophy, is non-existent (it does not have a positive 
413 Fakhry, Ethical Theories in Islam, 84-5. 
414 Fakhry, Ethical Theories in Islam, 89. 
415 Butterworth, "A1-Farabl's Statecraft," 87. 
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presence) and therefore it can not be the object of any ideological war.416 Reason, 
controls anger and violence as features of the irascible soul. Justice controls aU excesses. 
Both senses of reason and justice, according to this philosophy have objective bases 
shared among aU mankind. It is only safe to conc1ude that in a world when aU nations 
have the same concept of reason, irrationality, justice, injustice, aggression, 
transgression and evil, there are less ground for ideological wars than where evil has a 
positive existence (defined in international realm as positive threat) and reason and 
justice are subjective based merely on interpretive scriptural norms (as the Ash 'rite 
theologians believed). It is this latter situation that positive threat (ev il) and subjective 
reason and justice combined open the way for authoritarian voluntarism. 
Al-Farabi seems to be very conscious of the terms he uses and the potentials for 
many terminological abuses by others. As Butterworth asserts: in al-Madina al-Fiçfila, 
"Farabi does not talk about jihad but only ofl}arb." Therefore, "he is extremely reluctant 
to dec1are it ever just to wage war upon others and that he does not rigidly distinguish 
between the term for war (l;larb) generally and the term for war usuaUy considered to be 
in defense ofIslam, jihad.,,417 
To sum up, according to al-FarabI, wars are two kinds: evil wars, motivated by 
moral defects and vices, and just wars, prompted by the need to protect or restore a just 
status. There is no mention of holy wars or religious offensive wars whatsoever. The 
fact that he distinguishes various perfect states bears witness to his pluralistic view of 
the political world. Political diversity is not just a temporary imperfect stage in history. 
Ibn Miskawayh: The Philosopher of Intimacy (uns) 
It was Ai}mad Ibn Miskawayh (d. 1030 CE) who inherited al-Farabl's legacy on ethics 
and brought philosophie ethies to its peak in his Tahdhlb al-Akhliq (Purity of 
416 According to most of the Islamic philosophers such as Ibn Sina and others, evil is the lack of 
good or perfection, or in Fakhry's words, "evil, as a 'cosmic' entity, is entirely non-existent." See Fakhry, 
Ethical Theories in Islam, 85. Also See The Greater Encyc10pedia of Islam, s.v. "Ibn Sina" by Sharafuddin 
Khorasanl, Tehran. 
417 Butterworth, "Al-Farabl's Statecraft," 92-3. 
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Dispositions). Miskawayh, like al-FarabI and the Brethren of Purity (lkhwan al-~afii), 
was of Shl'ite inclination.418 His significant achievement in Tahdhlb was that he 
synthesized Islamic ethos with Greek philosophie al precepts,419 the pre-Islamic Persian 
adab literature, and Indian moral views; in his work he weaves them into a unified, 
consistent and systematic moral structure. Ibn Miskawayh did not expand his synthesis 
to political ethics or philosophy; nevertheless his views on the essence of friendship and 
humanity's sociability have important implications for war and peace. 
According to Goodman, Ibn Miskawayh shares with Ibn 'Adi (d. 974 CE)420 the 
view that a chief goal of ethics is control of our natural irascibility, allowing our deeper 
unit y to surface in acts of love and compassion.421 Notably, he also shares with Ibn' Adi 
the view that the aim underlying the commands and admonitions of script ure is the 
refinement of character; importantly, the directives regarding character become a 
significant le aven to the legalism and legal positivism that often dictates scriptural 
ethical thinking.422 
For Ibn Miskawayh, friendship, following Aristotle, has greater stature than the 
source of all virtues, justice. It is not merely a virtue; rather, it distinguishes the very 
humanity of human beings. Ibn Miskawayh points out that insiin, the very name of the 
human being in Arabie, derives from root for uns, meaning intimacy, or in the words of 
Fakhry, 'gregariousness. ,423 According to Fakhry, "Ibn Miskawayh insists that man's 
supreme happiness cannot be achieved without the fellowship of friends and associates, 
418 Goodman, Islamie Humanism, 102. 
419 Miskawayh explains that Greek ethics is more in accord with Islamic teachings than is pre-
Islamic Arab morality. See Masud, "The Scope ofPluralism," 139. 
420 There is nothing much, to the best of my knowledge, in Ibn' Adi's works that can relate to 
war. 
421 Goodman, Islamie Humanism, 105; cf. Al-Farabi, On Civil Govemment, 77-80; cf. Richard 
Walzer, Greek into Arabie: Essays on Islamie Philosophy(Oxford: B. Cassirer, 1962) 33, 222; cf. Richard 
Walzer, On the Perfeet State (MabinJ Arii'i Ahli Madinat al-Faç/ila) (Oxford: 1985) 482-84. 
422 Goodman, Islamie Humanism, 105. 
423 Fakhry, Ethical Theories in Islam, 118. 
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for being a 'political animal' by nature, he could not fulfill himself in solitude.,,424 In 
this theoretical scheme, religious law devises even public worship to foster human 
fellowship. Ibn Miskawayh makes humanity (al-insiiniyya) the goal of ethics, to be 
achieved through the perfection of our identity (dhiit) as human beings.425 
One may infer that war-mongering must be, in Ibn Miskawayh's opinion, the 
source of all vices, as it is contrary not only to human beings, but also the humanity at 
large. He States: 
Recklessness and cowardice, like courage, are grounded in the irascible power of the 
soul; when it is over stimulated by anger, or the desire for vengeance. Passionate anger 
and arrogance are the principal causes of oppression and other social ills, and the essence 
of arrogance is a false opinion of one's self, as deserving a higher rank than the one it 
has eamed.426 
Only through reason one can control his irascible faculty and therefore his 
arrogance. Yet for Ibn Miskawayh, reason is a natural and objective reason not subject 
to the legalistic interpretation. He offers as support a Mu'tazili reading of a familiar 
oath from the Qur'an: 'By the soul and that which shaped it and breathed into it its 
wickedness and impiety.' 
For Ibn Miskawayh, "adab is the content of wisdom and knowledge, tested by 
experience about the good life and its means of attainment; importantly, without this 
experience reason is not reason.,,427 Culture, Ibn Miskawayh argues, makes the man.428 
Additionally, in his interpretation culture (adab) is not external, but organic to 
morals.429 In other words, the manner in which one carries out an ethical act is at least 
424 Fakhry, Ethical Theories in Islam, 118. 
425 Goodman, Islamic Humanism, 111. 
426 Quotations from Tahdhlb al-Akhliiq wa Tahiirat al-A 'riiq by Fakhry, Ethical Theories in 
Islam, 126. 
427 Goodman, Islamic Humanism, 108. 
428 Goodman, Islamic Humanism, 110. 
429 Goodman, Islamic Humanism, 110. 
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as important as the outcome ofthat act. This parallels the standard relation of the means 
and the ends. One can thus conclude that Ibn Miskawayh believes that the ends can not 
justify the means. Goodman states that "unlike Marx, or even Plato in sorne moods, but 
like the scriptural ethics of Judaism and Christianity, the Qur'anic ethics do not 
countenance breach of its standards in pursuit of its aims.,,430 For Ibn Miskawayh, it is 
through adab founded on objective reason that one is able to have an accurate self-
image, and by implication, an image of 'others' (as equals), and thus able to avoid war 
and conflict. 
AI-GhaûiTI: a Dual Approach to 'Others' 
Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (d. 505 AHI1111 CE), unlike sorne of our other philosophers was 
not a Shi'ite, however as an Ash'arite al-Shafi'I, he tried to synthesize philosophie 
ethics with Sharl'a law and mysticism. By adopting sorne Platonic and Aristotelian 
ethieal concepts, he redefined sorne of their standard notions that were reintroduced by 
al-FarabI and Ibn Miskawayh, as has been discussed previously. Importantly, al-Ghazali 
fills the gap created by a major theological rift between the ShI'I / Mu'tazili / Greek 
philosophy on the one hand, and the S unni/ Ash' ari/ Shafi '1 tendencies on the other. For 
example, al-Ghazali adopted Aristotle's concept of the rational 'mean' in determining 
the optimum ethical position of a virtue between the two extremes,431 however, he 
applied the Qur'anic notion of the 'straight path' (al-~irii.t al-mustaqJm) in order to 
identify it as Islamic. Instead of relying solely on reason as a moral standard like other 
philosophers, al-Ghazali asserted the need for both divine guidance and reason.432 
Al-Ghazali defines three domains for justice: the political, moral, and economic. 
Like Greek philosophy, he believes justice is a paramount virtue, though in his 'Mirrors 
of Princes' (Na~JiJat al-Muliik), he prefers an unjust ruler to civil disorder. Justice looses 
its primacy when social stability is threatened. The source of all vices lie in worldly 
430 Goodman, Islamic Humanism, 88. 
431 For example, courage as a virtue is the moral mean between the two extremes of this virtue 
namely, recklessness and cowardice. 
432 Fakhry, Ethical Theories in Islam, 199. 
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pleasures derived from a list of eight main pleasures enumerated by the fourth Caliph 
'Ali Ibn Ab1 Talib.433 Among them are 'social or political' pleasures, such as the lust for 
conquest or social position.434 In this way, he condemns many kinds of war pursued 
outside of sharJ'a. According to Hourani, al-Ghazali does not deviate from the view: 
"killing is not evil when it is punishment for crime, or when the victim is to be 
compensated in the next life.,,435 But he condemns all extremes. He dedicates a quarter 
of his main moral work IlJyii' 'Uliim al-DIn, to the pathology of vices, the quarter on 
peri/ous vices (rub 'i muhlikiit), where a full chapter treats wrath (al-ghaçfab), rancor (a/-
intiqiim) and jealousy (al-qasad). Al-Ghazali asserts that the surest moral position is the 
mean between the extremes. However, he adds, while moderate measures of anger (a/-
ghaçfab) or use of force (al- 'unfj are necessity on their appropriate situation, self-control 
(al-qilm), forgiveness (a/- 'afw), clemency or condone (a/-~af1;.), and soft-attitude (layyIn) 
are further emphasized because of the natural inclination of man towards roughness.436 
The best use of anger for Ghazali however is not against others but in an esoteric sense 
against the self in containing the personal lasciviousness (al-shahwa). But then the 
virtue of self-control (qilm) must be used to check anger against others.437 Goodman 
notes: "lfilm is a crucial virtue for al-Ghazali as for Ibn Miskawayh and ibn 'Adi 
because it offers control of anger.,,438 
433 These pleasures are: eating, drinking, sex, attire, habitation, smell, hearing and sight. From 
Fakhry, Ethical Theories in Islam, 201. 
434 Fakhry, Ethical Theories in Islam, 201; al-Ghazali's views on positive law in refleeted in his 
monumental book IlJyii' 'Uliim al-Din. His philosophie views on theory of ethies are mostly written in 
Mizaii al- 'Amal. 
435 Hourani, Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics, 155. 
436 Abiï f.Iamid Mo4arnmad Al-Ghazali, IlJyii' 'Uliim al-Din, Rub'i Muhlikiit, Translated by 
Mo'ayyid al-Din Khwarazml, Edited by Husayn Khadiv Jam, (Tehran: Sherkat-e Entesharat-e Elmi va 
Farhangi, 1374/1975) 383. 
437 Al-Ghazali, IlJyii' 'Uliim al-Din, Rub'i Muhlikiit, (1975) 363. 
438 Goodman, Islamic Humanism, 117. Aiso see Abiï f.Iamid Mo4arnmad Al-Ghazali, IlJyii' 'Uliim 
al-Din, Rub'i Muhlikiit, Translated by Mo'ayyid al-Din Khwarazml, Edited by Husayn Khadiv Jam, 
(Tehran: Sherkat-e Entesharat-e Elmi va Farhangi, 1374/1975) 363-370. 
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It is very important to note that this chapter (of al-Il}ya) is rich with so many of 
Prophetic and other traditions which, covey, more or less, two essential points: That 
there must be no retaliation in kind against vices committed by transgressors, such as 
cursing, vituperation (sabb) , backbiting (al-ghlba) and snooping (tajassus), and that 
measures of self-control vis-a-vis such vices will be rewarded here and hereafter. A 
Prophetic tradition transmitted by 'Uqbat Ibn 'Amir and narrated by Al-Ghazali reflects 
the above points: 
1 heard from the Prophet, said 'Uqbat Ibn 'Amir that, "yi 'Uqba, ali ukhbiruka bi afçlali 
akhliqi ahli al-dunyi wa'l ikhira? Ta~il man qala'aka wa tu~tl man ftaramaka wa ta'fü 
'amman ?alamaka (Oh 'Uqba, shaH 1 inform you of the best morality ofboth worlds? It 
is, to rejoin whoever that disconnected from you, to give to whomever who deprived 
you, and to forgive whomever who transgressed against yoU)."439 
From this and many other traditions and Qur'anic references made by al-Ghazali along 
similar moral lines, one may conclude that the non-confrontational, non-reciprocal 
tendencies are very important part of the backbone of the Islamic moral structure. It is 
hardly concievable that the same moral system suddenly and inconsistently changes its 
attitudes just when it reaches the state's border. War and use of force therfore must 
remain as the last resort within this tradition. 
AI-Ghazali's more detailed views on war appear in the second chapter of his 
Book ofCounsel for Kings (Na~ll}at al-Muliïk), where he discusses the functions of the 
minister, or vizier. He specifically mentions that the 'worst minister' is the one who 
encourages his master (king) to wage a war where it is avoidable, and the goal could be 
achieved by other means. He also stresses that while the enemy is defeated during the 
war, the victors must not hasten to kill them for they (the enemy subjects) too were 
courageous men. "It is possible to kill the living," al-Ghazali stresses, "but impossible to 
bring the dead back to life."440 He recommends that it is a minister's dut y that once a 
soldier becomes captive, he (the minister) must promptly arrange for his freedom by 
439 Al-Ghazali, 11;yi' 'UlÜfl1 al-Din, Rub'i Muhlikit, (1975) 375. 
440 Paraphrased from Charles-Henri de Fouchécour, Moralia: Les Notion Morales dans la 
Litterature Persan (in Persian) (Tehran: The University Press ofIran, 1998) 552-53. 
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ransom so that other soldiers have firm hope in their hearts.441 These assertions show 
that al-Ghazali was fully supportive of what nowadays is called 'war as a last resort.' 
His concems for the fate of the prisoners ofwar on both sides of the battle (in theory the 
Islamic versus the infidel forces), places him on the humanist side of war ethics that 
deals with jus in bello. Al-Ghazali distances himself from sorne of his contemporary 
jurists, whose literaI approaches to script ure and 4amth, as will be discussed in Chapter 
Four, were detrimental to the unfortunate fate of the prisoners. 
On a deeper level of philosophie al analysis however, a major question remains: 
What was al-Ghazali's view of 'Others?' It is this specifie notion that determines the 
foundation of one's attitude towards wars in physical or non-physical realms. Here al-
Ghazali has a dual approach. In a book written for the caliph al-Musta~har BilIah (d. 
487 AHII 094 CE) and at the latter' s request, named A1-Must8?harl, he becomes quite 
militant in condemnation of the Batinls (the Isma'1li Shl'ites).442 Chapter eight of A1-
Must8?harl is entirely focused on the rule of Sharl'a law on charges of unbelief (taklir) 
and the corresponding punitive measures which could be as severe as execution.443 Later 
on however, in accordance to his tendency at the end of his life to stay aloof from 
politics, he changes his radical views on other faiths and sect s, cuts his previous view of 
'others' short, and accepts that people of other ideological and theological orientations 
may well reach salvation. This view is well developed in his book On the Boundaries of 
Theo1ogica1 Tolerance in Islam (Fay~a1 a1- Tafiiqa bayn al-Islam wa 'l-Zandaqa) where he 
441 Paraphrased from de Fouchécour, Moralia, 553. 
442 Hodgson maintains that al-Ghazali refuted the Isma'1Iis over and over because, "he found 
something in their position to be persuasive." In Hodgson's view the role of the ~üfi in validating a 
kerygmatic, historical vision and his mystical role is not far from the role of Imam in the Isma 'ili 
theology. See Marshall G. S. Hodgson. The Venture of Islam, Conscience and History in a World 
CiviJjzation (Volume 2: The Expansion of Islam in the middle period), (Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1974) 184-5. 
443 The range ofvarious sects that al-Ghazali condemns to infidelity inc1ude: Batiniyya, 
Qaramita, Qarmatiyya, Khorramiyya, Khorramdiniyya, Babakiyya, Isma '1liyya, Shi 'iyya, Ta 'Iimiyya, 
and 'Amara. See Abü I:Iamid, AI-Ghazali, Al-Must;J?harJ fi Faç/ii'il;1 al-Bii.tiniyya wa Façlii'il al-
Must;J?hariyya, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1916) 146-168. 
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drops his previous radical positions.444 This later opinion of 'Others' of course was in 
much better harmony with his esoteric and mystical view that looked at one's own 
camaI soul as the number-one enemy. 
The moderation of al-GhazaIi's position toward 'Others' follows from his 
revision of his judgment of those 'saved' (al-niijiya) and those condemned to etemal 
Hellfire.445 He broadened the categories of believers eligible for salvation and, by the 
same token, reduced the categories of 'infidels' puni shed in Hel!. Only those people who 
had full and authentic information about Islam yet failed to believe in what he 
considered the three main cardinal principles of Islam, namely the Ullity of God, the 
prophethood of Mul}ammad, and the existence of the Day of Judgment, were 
condemned. Those who misperceived or erred in their faith could claim a measure of 
salvation as long as they did not attribute lying to the Prophet and do not expose the 
contenders to unbelief (kufT).446 Al-Ghazali frequently wamed against the hast y and 
unscrupulous condemnation of people. He questioned the jurist's self-proclaimed 
authority to distinguish between the unfaithful and the believer. He asked: 
" ... how could the jurists, purely on the basis of his mastery of Islamic law (flqh), 
assume this enormous task?" "In what branch of the law does he encounter the skill and 
sciences (necessary to distinguish between belief and unbelief)," Ghazali questions."447 
Tuming to the theologians, he raises the same question: "Why should one of these 
parties (Mu 'tazila or 'Asha 'ira) enjoy a monopoly over truth to the exclusion of the 
other?,,448 
96 Abü f.Iamid, Al-Ghazali, On the Boundaries of Theological Tolerance in Islam (Fay~al al-
Tafhqah bayn al-Islam wa'l-Zandaqa), trans. Sherman A. Jackson., (Oxford University Press, Karachi, 
2002). 
445 Al-Ghazali, On the Boundaries ofTheological Tolerance in Islam, 125. 
446 Al-Ghazali, On the Boundaries ofTheological Tolerance in Islam, 112. 
447 Al-Ghazali, On the Boundaries ofTheological Tolerance in Islam, 120. 
448 Al-Ghazali, On the Boundaries ofTheological Tolerance in Islam, 89. 
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Within the above context, what is most relevant to our subject matter is al-
Ghazali's stress, in his own words, that "most of the Christians of Byzantium and the 
Turks of this age will be covered by God's mercy.,,449 This last position has important 
implications for the just cause of war, for in theory it deprives the military authorities 
from a well-founded religious ground for declaring jihad against an enemy that is 
innocently ignorant about Islam. In fact al-GhazaIi's most militant position in the 
Fay~a/ a/-Tafhqa tums not to be against the infidel aliens but against sorne of the 
philosophers, theologians and ~ufis. 
One may conclude that al-Ghazali is politically a realist. Initially, war in the 
hands of the ruler does not need justification; it is a matter of his discretion. This is 
tantamount, in modem parlance, to military realism, which is decidedly more radical 
than the theory of the 'just war.' However, al-Ghazali became a pluralist in the last 
years of his life. The mystical interpretation of Islam came to have precedence over aIl 
other views. According to Goodman, he is "far more interested in the spiritual and moral 
struggle for self-conquest than in the worldly struggle for dominion-even in the name of 
his faith.,,45o Sorne of al-Ghazali's views, as discussed, may have been inconsistent, but 
the evolution ofhis views brought him, increasingly, from a battle with the 'others' to a 
battle with the 'self,' a change indeed very consistent with aging and political maturity. 
Naslr al-Dln Tusl and Political Ethics 
The Shl'ite NasIr al-Dln Tusl (d. 1274 CE) largely followed Ibn Miskawayh's steps. 
However, he developed his own moral philosophy, known as the Niisirl Ethics (Akh/iiq-e 
Niisirl). Tus! was in full agreement with his predecessors on the importance of friendship 
and love as a cardinal virtue: he claimed "what ho Ids people together and welds them 
into a single community is the bond of love. This bond, grounded in natural union, is 
449 AI-Ghazali, On the Boundaries ofTheological Tolerance in Islam, 126. 
450 Goodman, lslamic Humanism, 16. 
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superior to justice, which is grounded in artificial union, and only where love is wanting, 
does the need for justice arise.,,451 
Al-TUSl'S main contribution to ethics is his work regarding politics, namely in 
his discussion of 'the management of states' (tadbIr mudun). When he describes the five 
classes making up the 'virtuous' city, he refers to the fourth as the 'holy warriors,'452 
who defend the city's ramparts against the aggression ofnon-virtuous cities. Noticeably, 
there is no reference whatsoever to primary (offensive/expansionist) war in his 
definition of holy war. Majid F akhry emphatically states that war for Tus! is only self-
defense, and that in such a case war must be the last resort.453 Tusi, however, discusses 
situations when diplomacy has already failed, and the ru 1er is compelled to initiate 
hostilities for the sake of the pure good and the quest ofreligion.454 The vague quality of 
terms like 'good' and 'quest' opens various ways for war initiation. This takes Tusl 
farther from 'just war theories' and brings him close - in modem parlance - to the 
realism. These are categories to be mentioned in the next chapter. Importantly, TUSl'S 
view is an example of the ideology of war which sees war, in a practical sense, as a last 
resort; therefore, his war ethics reflect a realist outlook towards the enemy. 
Apart from the question of the cause or causes of war, 1USl has clear advices on 
the moral conduct of war in a chapter on 'The Conduct of Kings,' (SJrat-e Moliïk in 
Persian) known as the genre of 'mirrors of princes.' He recommends that while in war, 
"no effort should be spared to capture the enemy's warriors alive rather than killing 
them, for there are lots of benefits in prisoners of war, like receiving ransom, or 
exchanging him with the captured friends, or release them and make them morally 
indebted. There is no benefit whatsoever in killing them.',455 Tusl adds: "There must be, 
451 Nas!r al-DIn Tus!, Akhliiq-e NiisirJ, ed. Ali Asqar (Tabriz: Dar as-Saltaneh, 1320 AH) 310. 
Also look at: Fakhry, Ethical Theories in Islam, 138. 
452 Fakhry, Ethical Theories in Islam, 139. 
453 Fakhry, Ethical Theories in Islam, 142. 
454 Fakhry, Ethical Theories in Islam, 142. 
455 TUS!, Akhliiq-e NiisirJ, 376. 
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of course, no murder after achieving victory over the enemy, nor subjecting them to any 
prejudice, for the defeated subjects would be tantamount to slaves and subordinates.,,456 
In the dosing part of this section Tusl refers to a war ethics legend attributed to 
Alexander the Great and Aristotle who was his teacher. The legend daims that when 
Aristotle leamed that Alexander was killing residents of an already defeated and 
surrounded city, he (Aristotle) criticaIly questioned such behavior and reminded 
Alexander that forgiveness as a virtue was expected from the kings much more than 
from the commoners.457 
~ufism: Against War For Belief 
It was al-Ghazali who launched the first major criticism of philosophers from a position 
of mysticism. His own posture vis-à-vis the domain of unbelief (kufT) , as already 
discussed became more moderate as he became more tolerant of other sects and faiths. It 
seems therefore, that there was, at least in the case of al-Ghazali, sorne correlation 
between mystical convictions and religious tolerance. This inference may be examined 
for other major Sufi thinkers 
Ibn al-' ArabI: The Primacy of Mercy 
Muqya al-Dln Ibn al-'Arabl (d.1240 CE), known as al-Shaykh al-Akbar or the 'Greatest 
Master', is undoubtedly the father of theoretical Sufism in Islam. Religious pluralism is 
an integral part ofhis theories. Such a pluralistic world view, of course by definition and 
implication oppose war on the basis of belief. As Chittick has noted, Ibn al-' ArabI looks 
at Islam not in contrast and conflict with other religions. He rather, conveys how aIl 
religions are not in competition with each other by using the metaphor that aIl religions 
are like stars in the universe with no conflict. He states: 
"all the revealed religions (shariiyi' , Arabie plural for shaii'a) are lights. Arnong these 
religions, the revealed religion of Mul;1ammad is like the light of the sun among the 
456 Tus!, Akhliiq-e Niisiri, 376. 
457 Tus!, Akhliiq-e Niisiri, 376-77. 
145 
lights of the stars. When the sun appears, the lights of the stars are hidden, and their 
lights are incl uded in the light of the sun. "458 
F or Ibn al-' ArabI, the abrogation of other religions is no more than the hiding of 
stars in the presence of the sun; he says, "This explains why we have been required in 
our aH-inclusive religion to have faith in the truth of aH the messengers and aH the 
revealed religions. They are not rendered null (bii!il) by abrogation--that is the opinion 
of the Ignorant."459 He goes further by stressing on the one hand, the necessity of every 
individual's distinctive and unique belief, and on the other hand their imperfect 
understanding of things (i'tiqiid). Aceording to Chittick, as the word i'tiqiid literally 
means 'to tie a knot',460 he suggests that Ibn 'ArabI views the various beHefs of people 
resembling imperfect knots in existence (wiïjiïd). In other words, aH personal beHefs are 
imperfeet but they are so within a necessary diversity similar to the pieces of a puzzle. 
Ibn' ArabI states: 
Beware of becoming delimited by a specifie knotting and disbelieving in everything 
else, lest great good escape you ... Be in yourself a matter for the forms of aU beliefs, for 
God is wider and more tremendous than that He should be constricted by one knotting 
rather than another.461 
Ibn al-'Arabi eonstruets a univers al concept of divine 'merey' and 'wrath' 
related to peace and war on the basis of a proverbial Prophetie l}adith: 
"Oh He whose mercy takes precedence over His wrath (~..:l...:.....J ~ u.- \,l)."462 
458 William, Chittick. The hnaginai Worlds: Ibn ai- 'Arabi and the Probiem of Religious 
Diversity (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994) 125. 
459 Chittick, The Imaginai Worlds, 125. 
460 Chittick, The Imaginai Worlds, 164. 
461 Translated from Fu~iï~ ai-Hikam by Chittick in The Imaginai Worlds, 176. 
462 Translated by Chittick in The Imaginai Worlds, 176; the qamth reads in Arabie: "yi man 
sabaqa ralfmatahu ghaç/abahu." 
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Chittick explains how Ibn al-'Arabl, while accepting God's wrath as a necessity, for 
example, to implement justice (in concordance with Q.2:251 463), stresses on the primacy 
of mercy.464 Therefore, the peaceful symbiosis of various cultures, in Ibn al-'Arabl's 
world view is rooted in diversity and mercy both essential in the univers al construct. 
Ruml: The Essential Inner War 
Next to Ibn al-'Arabi, Jaliil al-Dln Mul).ammad Ruml (d. 672 AHI1273 CE) is one of the 
most highly regarded figures in ~ufism, and therefore worth examining. With regards to 
war, Ruml holds the following: 
AlI particles ofthis world are in war,465 
just like the etemal battle between faith and infidelity 
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We can observe an awesome and ongoing battle between all particles of the universe: 
war in deeds, war in natures, and war in words 
The essence of man therefore is based on intrinsic controversies, 
and war over loss and benefit has bec orne inevitable.466 
How can 1 be in peace with others, 
When 1 am in war with myselr67 
463 Q.2:25l: " ... And if God had not repelled sorne men by others, the earth would have been 
corrupted ... " 
464 Chittick relates the l}adith to other philosophical fields, in The Imaginai Worlds, 171. 
465 See Aristotle's reference to a similar statement by Heraclitus: " ... aU things come to be in 
struggle." Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics. 20d ed. Translated by Terence Irwin. (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1999) 1155b, p.120. 
466 Richard Walzer traces the roots of this view in the Platonic literature that was elaborated by 
Al-FarabI in Mabiidi irii' ahi ai-madinat ai-fiùjila. See Richard Walzer, On the Perfect State, 482-83. 
467 Aristotle only finds vicious people to be in conflict with themselves. See Aristotle. The 
Nicomachean Ethics. 20d ed. Translated by Terence Irwin, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 
1999) 1166b, p.l43. 
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See the wave of the armies of my moods, 
How in war and revenge with each other they are. 
Ifyou are in such a full fledged war with yourself, 
What is the logic of fighting with others? 
Or perhaps, through this outer war God may want to take you, 
To the world of pure peace 
The CUITent mundane wars, therefore, have resulted from the inner wars, 
The outer controversy is born from the inner one 
Vou may find certain wars that are the foundation of peaces, 
Like the Prophetic wars that are in the way of God 
The next world however is eternal and lively, 
For that compound is not made of contradiction 
The reason why we decease, is for living on controversy, 
But once such contradictions vanish, the existence becomes eternal 
The colorlessness (purity) is the foundation of ail colors, 
And peaces are the sources ofwars.468 
The views expressed here are deterministic; they present human beings as prey to 
the forces of nature. The very essence of the uni verse is based on conflict and this 
conflict, in Ruml's view, is the ultimate driving force behind aU beings. The ongoing 
conflict cornes from the fact, that aU the four elemental substances, namely water, fire, 
air, and soil, are in conflict.469 This runs contrary to the view held by the philosopher 
Ibn Sina. He believed that the driving force of the universe and aU therein was 10ve.47o 
Ruml's views about war, though philosophicaUy deterrninistic, concur with a 
Qur'anic verse asserting the necessity of war to eliminate the roots of corruption on 
earth.471 He contends that wars may be a purifying process through which God takes 
human beings to the next world where there is no intrinsic conflict in its nature and 
substances. War therefore, may bring human beings etemal peace. 
468 Mowlavl, (Ruml) Mathnavl-e Ma 'navl, vol.6, 810-11. 
469 The extentions of this view into biology lead to the long-survived view that "war is in the 
blood." According to primatological findings of Sapolsky, "Sorne primate species, it turns out, are indeed 
simply violent or peaceful, with their behavior driven by their social structures and ecological settings. 
More important, however, sorne primate species can make peace despite violent traits that seem built into 
their natures." He further asserts that, "Contrary to what was believedjust a few decades ago, hum ans are 
not "killer apes" destined for violent conflict, but can make their own history." See Robert. M. Sapolsky, 
"A Natural History ofPeace," in From Foreign Affairs, January/February 2006. 
470 The Greater Encyciopedia of/siam, s.v. "Ibn Sina" by Fathollïih Mojtabiï'i 
47\ See Q. 2: 251, " ... and ifGod had not repelled sorne men by others, the earth would have been 
cOITupted." 
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Yet on another level, Ruml is conscious and emphatically support ive of the just 
cause for war. First within the above lines, he questions how warriors engage in 
temporal battles when a more important esoteric battlefield exists within the soul of 
every individual. Eisewhere in Mathnavl, Riiml refers to the story narrated by a zealous 
warrior named 'Abbaqi (or perhaps a member of an Islamic sect in this name) who 
participated in seventy campaigns (ghazws) with bare che st in hope of reaching 
martyrdom, but without success. Riiml continues the story in 'Abbaqi's words: "Once l 
did aIl that l could with no success, l tumed to esoteric battle against my camaI soul," 
'Abbaqi narrates. "But as l was busy with the 'greater jihad (jihiid al-akbar), l heard 
once again that the army drums are calling volunteers for a campaign; my camaI soul 
was moved and l desired to join." He continues: "But then l rebuked my soul and 
reminded myself that of course it is an easy way out through one strike, while people 
watch me in praise." 'Abbaqi concludes: "It was then when l noticed the depth of my 
soul's hypocrisy." Riim1 refers to a couple of similar anecdotes, seriously questions the 
motives of the warriors and concludes with the following lines: 
~.J. y.il,.. ü1 • .li j ~ c..S...;l 
.li~ U..,=. -,..sY' ~.) w.....1 • .lij ~ 
How so many immature there were, 
who appeared having lost their blood for good cause, 
While, their camaI souls escaped untamed 
Their essences lost physical arms (their bodies), 
however their innate camaI thieves lived on.472 
~.J Jj;J..,=. yu.:.....s e,sA1..:.. \...,;-sl 
.lit... • .li j uj • .J J ~ J:.:ili 
Eisewhere Riiml appreciates the importance of the legitimacy of war by depicting 
a heroic war scene where 'Ali Ibn Abl Talib releases a defeated enemy just because the 
enemy angered the latter by spitting on him. 'Ali' s reason for the chivalrous act was 
that his personal anger spoiled the pure religious motive for which 'Ali was originally 
fighting.473 
472 Mowlavl (RÜtnl), Mathnavi-e Ma 'navi, vol.5, 787-88. 
473 Mowlavl (RÜtnl), Mathnavi-e Ma 'navi, vol.5, 151-53. This story will be mentioned in details 
in Chapter Three. 
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Additionally, Ruml comments on a prophetie legend, wherein the Prophet 
reminded Muslim warriors who were just retuming from a jihad that the greater jihad 
Uihiïd al-akbar), consisting of fighting with the very inner camaI self, was still ahead: 
ÙJ.J~I.J.:l y~ ~ Jj ~l... 
~ J:.j.-?~ ùb4 y,:;, 
Oh masters! We managed to destroy the outer enemy 
But much worse lives inside 
Killing the latter is impossible by wisdom and intellect 
The lion of inner-self is not rabbit's game474 
ÙJY. F l...~ Ù~ (.$1 
~ J:.JA J Ji.=.).5. ùÏ ~ 
In his comment s, Rüml asserts that the second, greater struggle is indeed a much more 
important task than the first; to illustrate, he juxtaposes a mountain with a needle to 
explicate the enormity of the task: "it requires divine assistance to uproot the mountain 
of the 'self with a small needle that is the only instrument availahle to humanity.,,475 
In this way, the ~üfi must he permanently conscious that the 'Self is hy far a 
more dangerous enemy than the 'Other.' In theory, therefore it is hard to aceept that the 
~üfi warrior would leave the more dangerous enemy and engage with the lesser 'Other.' 
He eategorieally rejeets using the warfield as a short eut to paradise. In the entire 
Mathnavl there is no eommentary in promoting or praising jihad, except in an esoterie 
sense. This refleets, to a large extent, political pacifism and is not far removed from the 
Christian pacifist sehools that will he examined in the next ehapter.476 
474 Mowlavl (Rillnl), Mathnavi-e Ma 'navl, vol. 1 , 58. These lines are base on a Prophetie qadith. 
See Muqammad Ibn al-l1asan al-J:[urr al-' Aruili, Jahiid bii NaiS, of Wasii'il al-Shi 'a ilii TalJ~il Masii'il al-
Shari'a, Ali Afrasiyabi, trans. Section II from vol. 6. qadith number l, Nahavandi, (Tehran: Nahav andi, 
2001) 8. 
475 Mowlavl (Rillnl), Mathnavi-e Ma 'navl, voU, 65. 
476 The $üfi determinism and pacifism are compatible, but Abdulkarim Soroush argues that 
because $üfism does not recognize anY inherent rights for human being, it becomes very dangerous if it is 
mixed with poli tics. He points that such denial of any rights for human being can help a suppressive and 
despotic regime and a ruler who rules in the name of God. See Abdulkarim Soroush, Akhliiq-e Khodiiyiin 
(Gods' Ethics), (Tehran: Entesharat-e Tarq-e Naw, 1380/2001 CE) 180- 82. 
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Conclusions 
Many 'Western' arguments about ethics resonate with the philosophie al and ethical 
debates of the Mu'tazila (Arabie plural for Mu 'tazifi), the Asha'ira (Arabie plural for 
Ash'ad), Muslim ethicists, mystics, philosophers and jurists. The proposition of the 
moral relativists, that rationality is itself a culturally conditioned concept, for example, 
is not far from the Ash'arite notion of moral voluntarism, according to which nothing is 
morally valid if it is external to the sharl'a. Both groups of thinkers reject any basis for 
objective reasoning and natural ethics. How different are the Mu'tazifi arguments about 
justice and reason from those of the modem Western rationalists? They both believe in 
univers al and objective reason. For 'Abdu'l Jabbar, al-Farabi, Ibn Miskawayh and Tus!, 
objective reason is rooted in human nature as human beings are social animaIs. Without 
society, man loses his humanity. By implication, this approach leads to the primacy of 
the welfare of the society over individu al. This is not far from the Utilitarian school for 
which the happiness of the greater number is a prime consideration. Islamic ethics, 
~-~ however, are closer to the deontological Kantian than the teleological Utilitarian ethics. 
The ends generally do not justify the means. The formalist argument that ethics is 
tantamount to manners and attitudes seems close to Ibn Miskawayh's view on adab. In 
fact, the predominant part of the adab literature, for example in the Mirror for the 
Princes 477 emphasizes this aspect of ethics, rather than the positive content of its moral 
action.478 
Despite the similarities, two major differences may be noted. First, although as 
Hodgson maintains, "In sorne ways, freedom was greater in Islamdom than in the 
üccident,,479 the virtues of 'freedom' or 'autonomy' that lie at the core value in Kantian 
ethics have little or no precedent in Islamic ethical discussions. Western ethics are 
generally 'rights-oriented,' whereas tradition al Islamic ethics emphasize duties. 
477 All the genres of Na~JlJat al-Muliik, (Ni?iim al-Mulk, Ghazali, Qabiis-Niima etc.) 
478 Adab ethics and its implications for war will be further discussed in Chapter Five. 
479 Marshall G. S. Hodgson. The Venture of Islam, Conscience and History in a World 
Civilization (Volume 2: The Expansion of Islam in the middle period), (Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1974) 358. 
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Nevertheless, as Murphy and Coleman point out, 'dut y' is the negative side of 'right,' 
because for every 'right' there is a question of against whom that right is claimed.480 In 
a secular system, the right-duty association is applied to state-citizen relations; while in 
a religious system, these relations are between God, state, and the citizens. Moreover, 
MacIntyre notes that one of the characteristics of modem Western moral philosophy is a 
shift away from the tradition al Greek concern with virtue (excellence of the human 
pers on) to a concern about dut y or obligation.481 Given that Qur'anic ethics is 'dut y-
oriented,' can it be concluded that with such a shift, modem Western theories of ethics 
have come closer, in certain respects, to the Qur'anic scriptural ethics? The modem 
defenders of moral objectivity in the West, such as William Gass, stress that "we will 
reject any ethical theory that does not accord with our most fundamental intuition about 
ethical matters.,,482 It seems that this 'fundamental intuition' is identical to the Qur'anic 
term «tra (the fundamental nature), that has been used by a majority ofIslamic ethicists 
exactly in the same objective moral context. 
A tension exists between Kantian and Islamic mystical ethical positions. Kant 
cares more about the rights of the individu al than the society. The ultimate success for 
Kant is to grant the individual's external freedom. ~ufis, in contrast, oppose the self. 
They seek the internaI imprisonment of the self. Yet despite this contrast, they both 
place the individu al above the society. A Kantian fights for his personal rights. A ~ufi 
fights for the refinement of his sou!. They move on opposite sides of the same circle; 
they have distanced themselves from each other to such an extent that they find their 
positions in close proximity once again. An important implication of ethics that focus 
on the individual is their resistance to social authoritarianism which, as history has 
shown, has a st ronger propensity toward war than other systems. 
These thinkers meet on a ground where war for beHefs makes little sense. AI-
Farabi, Ibn Miskawayh and most Muslim ethicists maintain that without society, human 
480 Coleman and Murphy, Philosophy of Law, 82. 
481 See Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981). 
482 See William Gass, "The Case of the Obliging Stranger," Philosophical Review 66 (1957); 
quoted in Coleman and Murphy, Philosophyof Law, 96. 
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beings lose their essence. Al-Ghazali, Ibn al-' ArabI, and Ruml, on the other hand, 
maintain that the esoteric world is both bigger and more important than the exoteric 
world; so is the battle-ground within one's soul by far more serious than the external 
wars that person may encounter. Most of these thinkers, however, employ objective 
ethics in support of political pluralism. Objective ethics undermines the assumptions of 
subjectivism in determining justice, and thereby curt ails its authority in promoting war. 
It is this very same concept of objective justice that is employed both by Rousseau and 
Muslim jurists alike to provide immunity for vast categories of non-combatant 
individu ais on the opposite sides of states at war. 
As al-Ghazali has demonstrated, the backbone of Islamic ethics is formed by the 
master virtues of self-control, forgiveness and flexibility (iJilm, 'afiv and ~aflJ ). These 
virtues protect man against anger, vengefulness, quench for negative accounting and 
rigidity of mind. As these virtues are univers al, it is unimaginable that they terminate 
once they reach a collective level and at the border of the Islamic state. With their 
universal application, such ethics may only promote tolerance and peace in the 
international arena. 
Measuring the Muslim intellectual response to the questions and notions ofwar, 
peace, self, other, enemy and friend needs an overview ofyet another realm oflife. It is a 
realm where theology, philosophy, history, art, politics, ethics and sorne other aspects of 
intellectual and actual life meet. This realm is named adab literature or the most 
influential litrary means developed by the Persian court elite and administrators to 
influence state's decision making, behavior, and ethics in various walks oflife. The next 
chapt ers will provide a brief account of the above realm. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
W AR ETHICS IN AnAB AND EPIC LITERATURE 
~ 4.,> i,Sjw ~J ~ i,Sj'W ~ ~..>" J jt:i.. Jjw.. J jt.;.. 
Be not greedy, do not sell pride, 
nor transgress, nor cause suffering, 
What vain revenge, what a temporary wealth! 
Abülqasem Ferdowsl 
1 believe in the faith ofworshiping Mazda (God), 
the one who defeats wars and destroys weapons 
Zoroaster483 
This work has thus far examined various theoretical and practical perspectives of 
Islamic ethics ofwar. Adab and epic literatures are important fields that will pro vide yet 
another framework for inquiry. This literature encompasses codes of moral conduct, 
chronicles, and other narrative poems, in short much of the written culture of medieval 
Persia. This chapter focuses on the ethics of war in the didactic works of adab literature, 
such as those by Ni~am al-Mulk (d. 485 AH/1092 CE), Kai Kavus Ibn Iskandar (d. 1085 
CE), Fakhr Modabbir (d. 602AH), Rudakl (d. 329 AH), Mul}ammad Rawandi (d. early 
thirteenth cent ury CE) and Mu~lil} al-Dln Sa'di (d. 1291CE). AIso, references will be 
made to the most important work of epic literature in the Eastern lands ofIslam namely 
the Shahnameh of Ferdowsl (d. 411 AH/1020 CE), which in itself can be regarded as a 
book of ethics. The adab genre provided a perfect medium through which the learned 
authors could express their ethical concerns obliquely at a time when the threat ofbeing 
accused of heresy and blasphemy, proved an effective gag on open discussions. Written 
at courts with the intended aim of pleasing the prince, they could also influence the 
moral behavior in war of the most important figures on the battlefield, the amirs and the 
sultans, who frequently engaged in wars for land or booty. The chapter will also look at 
contemporary and pre-Islamic collections of anecdotes and legends known as the genre 
of 'mirror for princes' (Na~J1;at al-Muliïk or Siyar al-Muliïk). These works often cite 
norms for their moral and political discourse. 
483 Jalil Doostkhiih, Avesta: the Oldest Persian Psalms, 20d ed. (Tehran: Murvarid Publications, 
1995) voU, 275. 
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The Significance of Adab for Ethics 
Gabrieli defines adab in its medieval peak as a literature that was composed of "Iranian 
world with aIl its epic, gnomic, and narrative tradition, the Indian world with its fables, 
and the Greek world with its practical philosophy, and especially its ethics and 
economics." He maintains that this literature was centered above aH on "man, his 
qualities and his passions, the environment in which he lives, and the material and 
spiritual culture created by him.,,484 Goodman defines adab as "the literary tradition of 
the secretarial or administrative class, the culture of the professionalliterati who looked 
past the lampoons and boasts, which reflected urban values of the court and chancery. 
Manners were their mores and history their meat. They loved style and relished wit. 
They knew how high a man could claim in the world, and how fast and far he could faH. 
Reason in adab means sound judgment, deference to experience, that is, to the history, 
learning, and wisdom of the nations, which Islamic civilization has inherited from its 
predecessors and made over in new forrn.,,485 Hashmi maintains that "the adab tradition 
is more open than 4adith, as it derives its ethical values from various sources: pre-
Islamic Arabie, as weH as Persian literature, the Qur'an, Islamic history, ancient Persian 
history, and Greek and Indian literature. "The adab tradition," says Mas'ud, "represents 
a humanist moral approach to morality.,,486 Yet, perhaps the best synopsis of the realm 
of adab is provided by Ibn Miskawayh (d.l 030 CE). He believes that manners make the 
man and that adab is tantamount to humanism, manners, discipline, and culture, or in 
short adab is the content ofwisdom.487 
The autonomous rule of the Samanids (206-395 AH/819-1005 CE) in Eastern 
Iran and Tranoxiana has been praised by sorne of the modem historians as the foremost 
of aH medieval courts that in promoting the Persian adab literatures, a major factor that 
halted the Arabization of Iran after its Islarnization. M04arnrnad 'Ali Eslaml 
484 The EncycJopaedia of Islam, new edition, s.v. "Adab"by F. Gabrieli. 
485 Goodman, Islamic Humanism, 83-7. 
486 Mas 'ud, "The Scope ofPluralism in the Islamic Moral Tradition," 139. 
487 Goodman, Islamic Humanism, 107-110. 
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, ~ N adoushan, a historian of medieval literature and an authority on Shahnameh of 
Ferdowsl, is quoted by Heravl as follows: 
As a result of the Samanid policies, a kind of revivalism of the past Persian memories 
became fashionable and led to a culture of composing various Shahnameh epics, starting 
with Abu'l Mu 'ayyid Balkhl, 'Ammareh Marvazl, Daqlql, the Abu Man~Url Shahnameh 
and the Shahnameh of Ferdowsl, which brought the genre to its peak.488 
Among the most important adab texts in Persian are the Shih-Nimeh (hereafter 
Shahnameh) of Ferdowsl, the Qibiis Nimeh of Keykavus (ca. 475 AHIl082 CE), the 
Siyar al-Muliik of Khwaja Ni~am al-Mulk (ca. 484 AH/I091 CE), the RilJat-u.~-$udiir 
wa Ayat-us-Suriir dar Tirlkh-e Al-e Saljiiq of Mul}ammad Ibn Sulayman al-Rawandi 
(ca. 599 AHI1202 CE), and the Adib (plural of adab) al-lfarb wa'l-Shuji 'a of Fakhr 
Mudabbir (d. 602 AH). The most important Arabie texts are the works ofIbn Muqaffa' 
(d.756 AH), Ibn Qutayba (d.889 AH), al-Mawardi (d.1085 CE), and al-Qalqashandi 
(d.1418 CE). Here a number of the most important adab texts relevant to ethics of war 
will be exarnined.489 
War Ethics and Heroism 
As mentioned in the first chapter, ShI'! Islam has shown a strong inclination towards 
objective ethics in many of its various disciplines. Despite this tendency, it was in epic 
literature, rather than in the strictly religious sphere, that a ShI'! poet found the scope to 
express the most ethical and profound views on war. It gave him the ideal space to 
explore the difficult moral dilemmas faced by warriors on the battlefield. Here ethics of 
war could be shown through concrete examples and the repercussions of choices 
488 Javad Heravl, .The Samanid History: The Golden Era of Iran ADer Islam (Tehran: Amir Kabir 
Publications, 2001) 61. 
489 Sorne of the above rnentioned texts have little to offer on this subject. For ex ample Ibn 
Muqaffa' has only one short comment regarding 'enemy' in his work of ethics, Adab al-Kabir wa Adab al-
$aghir. He stresses that "the best that can go between you and your enemy is justice, and between you 
and your friend is contentrnent." He emphasizes that it is through judgrnent that one rnay subdue his 
enerny, but there should be no judgment among friends. See 'Abdullah Ibn Muqaffa', Adab al-Kabir wa 
Adab al-$aghir, trans. M04ammad Vahld Gulpayegânl (Tehran: Nashr-e Balkh, 1996) 60. 
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meditated upon in a way that would have been impossible within the more limited and 
clearly defined boundaries of jurisprudence, theology, philosophy, or historiography. 
Since the advent of Islam, various ethical systems have appeared under a unified 
rubric of "Islamic ethics of war," each with its own particular protagonists. It is 
otherwise difficult to imagine figures such as Khalid Ibn al-Walid, 'Ali Ibn Abl Talib, 
Yazld Ibn Mu 'awiya, al-I:Iajjaj, Ma1}.mud Ghaznavl, ~ala4 al-Dln Ayyubl, aIl supporting 
similar norms and values. The images of these figures were molded from their peculiar 
views of Islam by them, those of their biographers and the expectations of readers, as 
weIl as other factors. Epic literature provides different heroic images, based on 
communal memories and veneration for pre-Islamic heroes, thereby inducing a new note 
of legitimacy and moral authenticity. The process, being a complementary one in 
conception, soon becomes fused into one: with Islamic heroes assuming pre-Islamic 
codes ofhonor and the pre-Islamic ones embracing Islamic virtues.490 
Shahnameh of Ferdowsl, the Paradigm ofPersian Epies 
Abulqasim Ferdowsl's (d. 1020 CE) masterpiece, the Shahnameh, (lit. the Book of 
Kings) is an epic work of literature, based partly on the Persian myth, and partly on 
historical events. Following a common medieval tradition of historiography, the 
Shahnameh begins with an account of creation, in particular explaining how man and 
civilization came to be. War is introduced as a consequence of the division of the world 
among the three sons of Fereydun, who had once ruled the world with divine support 
(farrin Persian). He divided the world between his sons, Salm, Tur and Iraj so that Salm 
received the Western lands, Tur inherited China and the Central Asian Turkish lands, 
and Iraj became the ruler of Iran. But instead of bringing peace, the tripartite division 
led to fratricide. Iraj, the intended ruler of Iran and depicted as a man of peace, is killed 
by his two brothers. This vile deed is the cause of a cycle of revenge that then occupies 
490 There are many published edit ions of the Shahnameh. A cri tic al edition begun by Khiileql 
Mopaq is near completion. Here the Moscow edition published in 1966 by Andrei Bertels and Yevgeny 
Bertels, Shahnameh FerdowsJ: A Critical Edition, eds. M. N. Othmanof, and O. Smirano, will be used. 
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much of the earlier part of the Shahnameh.491 In the process of relating these conflicts, 
Ferdowsl describes not only the horrors of war but its heroism. The cycles of revenge 
and the redressing of grievances occupy much of the poem but war itself is never 
idealized and aggression never ultimately rewarded: it is peace and univers al harmony 
that remain the allusive but coveted ideals. 
Sources of Ethical Norms in Persian Epic Literature 
Ferdowsl's work reflect on a mixed range of ethical norms from pre-Islamic Persian 
myths and moral ideologies to Islam, and particularly ShI'!sm. Ferdowsl was weIl 
acquainted with the medieval court system; in his early years, he had been at the 
Samanid court, yet most ofhis great epic was written at the time of Ma4mud Ghaznavl. 
Mahmud was known to be fervently anti-ShI'!, regarding ShI'!s as little better than 
infidels. Ferdowsl, on the other hand, was undoubtedly Twelver ShI'!. This is not simply 
because he praises 'Ali Ibn Abi Talib in the most laudatory words; after all, many Sunni 
authors also wrote admiringly of him. It is because, as Mahdavi Damghani has pointed 
out, he uses a key epithet for 'Ali, namely al-wa~jy, "executor"( ~)I); a term which 
identifies 'Ali as the designated heir to the Prophet.492 
Dadestan-e Menog-l Xrad 
One source of pre-Islamic ethics known to Ferdowsl was the aphoristic Pahlavi text 
Diidestiin-e Menog-J Xrad This text presents sixt Y two questions with their answers; in 
491 According to QadarnaIi Saram1, of about two hundred wars reflected in the Shahnameh, one 
hundred and thirty seven are international, rnost of which (eighty four wars) are the pre-historic Iranian-
Turkish (Tillan1) wars. Iranian-Roman (reflecting historic wars), and Iranian-Arab wars are ten each. 
Qadarnali Saram1, Az Rang-e Gal ta Ranj-e Khiir, (Tehran: Sherkat-e Entesharat-e Elmi va Farhangi, 
1990) 444. 
492 A4mad Mahdavi Darnghani, lfa~el-e Owghat (Tehran: Sorush Publications, 1999) 576, 586. 
Darnghani asserts that it was the frequent usage of this very term w~iy by Ferdows1 that caused his 
forfeiture of payment for writing the Shahnameh and subsequent persecution by Malpnud .See reference 
to al-wa~iy in lines 100 and 107 of Shahnameh, Andrei Bertels and Yevgeny Bertels, Shahnameh 
FerdowsL A Critical Edition, ed. M. N. Othmanof and O. Smirano, several vols. (Moscow: The Soviet 
Union Academy of Sciences, 1966) voLl, 19, vol. 3, 169. 
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each, a Dana (wise man) directs his query to Menog-J Xrad (soul of wisdom) who then 
gives the answers.493 
To illustrate, questions sixteen to nineteen in chapter one of this work read as 
foHows: "do not be wrathful; for when a man is in anger he neglects good deeds, prayers, 
and worshipping the gods. AH kinds of sins and misdeeds overcome his thoughts till his 
anger might subside. Wrath is known to be equivalent to the Devil (Ahrlman)."494 This 
notion, of course, is quite close to the Platonic division of soul where wrath (the 
irascible or ghaçfabiyya faculty) is one ofthree main faculties of the human soul. 
Other questions in the same chapter make related points. Questions fi ft y two, 
fifty four and sixt Y one state: "Fight the enemy fairly. Do not fight with the revengeful 
man, and with the stupid.,,495 Questions eight and nine of chapter fort Y assert that the 
most courageous man is the one who can struggle with his own demon (camaI soul).496 
Clearly, this is similar to the Islamic notion of jihiid al-akbar (the greater struggle). 
Questions nine to eleven of chapter fort Y four declare that the devil lives among 
revengeful people and is in the company ofwrathful subjects. "His greatest pleasure," it 
states, "is in people's animosity with each other.,,497 Questions three and eight of chapter 
fi ft y eight refer to the worst attributes of military personnel: "their defect is that they 
can be oppressive, unforgiving and brutal and tum into renegades.,,498 
AH of the above assertions taken from the Menog-J Xrad condemn important 
fOot causes of wars. References to the necessity for faimess with the enemy, moreover, 
treat the notion of jus in bello. 
493 The compilation of Menog-l Xrad is estimated to be about 531-579 CE. See Al].mad 
Tafaçl4uIi, Tiirlkh-e Adabiyyiit-e Iran-e Pish az Isliim, Zhaleh Amoozegar ed. (Tehran: Sokhan, 1376/ 
1996) 198. 
494 Al].mad Tafaz?oIi, trans. Menog-J Xrad, ed. Jaleh Amoozegar (Tehran: Nashre Tus, Tehran, 
2000) 21. 
495 Tafaçl4uIi, trans. Menog-l Xrad, 22. 
496 Tafaçl4uIi, trans. Menog-J Xrad, 56. 
497 Tafaçl4uIi, trans. Menog-l Xrad, 59. 
498 Tafaçl4uIi, trans. Menog-l Xrad, 67. 
159 
• 
• 
r 
The Avesta 
The oidest Persian religious text is the Avesta, which is the holy book of 
Zoroastrianism. Various parts of this book were collected in the middle of the second 
millennium BCE and Iater periods; however, the final text was completed at the time of 
the Sasanids. The life period of the founder of this tradition, Zoroaster is still a matter 
of controversy; the most recent opinion maintains that he lived sometime between 1500 
and 800 BCE. 
In the oidest part of Avesta, the holy book of Zoroastrianism (namely the 
Gathaha), there are frequent references by Zoroaster to war with infidels and demons 
(Durvands and DJvs respectively).499 The cause ofwar against these infidels is not their 
faith; rather, it is their aggressive destruction of farms, villages and their inhabitants. 
There are a few references to fighting specifically on behalf of God.500 Yet these wars 
were fought in order to end wars, thus reflecting their just cause.50l The c1earest verse 
condemning war is: "1 believe in the faith of worshiping Mazda (God), the one who 
defeats wars and throws away weapons ... "502 God himself (Ahuri Mazdii) is a warrior, 
but again he is a warrior against war and aggression. In a chapter called Hiinnazd -
Yashat, verse four enumerates God's names: "The Defeater ofwar is My name; the one 
who Triumphs over the enemy with one strike is My name; the Defeater of every 
t · "503 crea ure lS my name. 
Yadgar-e Zanran 
Another source for Ferdowsl's Shahnameh was the Yidgir-e ZarJrin (lit. Memory of 
Zarlran), the oldest Persian epic literature in the Pahlavi language. This work was 
compiled during the time of the Sasanids, but originated earlier in oral forms, possibly 
499 Doostkhah, A vesta, vol. 1 , 21. 
500 Doostkhah, Avesta, voU, 23, 53, 65, 92. 
501 Doostkhah, Avesta, voU, 141, 143. 
502 Doostkhah, Avesta, voU, (Hat 12, verse 9) 157. 
503 Doostkhah, Avesta, voU, 275. 
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during the Parthian dynasty (226 BC-234 CE)504 The Yiidgiir-e Zarlriin is a tragic play 
about ideological wars between Goshtasp, the king of Persia, and Arjasp, the King of 
Khyiinan (Xy6nan in Pahlavi), who resents Gushtasp's conversion to Zoroastrianism and 
commands the Persians to leave their new faith or else prepare for a battle. Goshtasp's 
brother Zadr (Zarer in Pahlavi) is the Persian general who, by the permission of the 
king, formally responds to the military challenge and declares that the Persians would 
rather fight than leave their newly adopted faith. 505 
The conflict results in a tragedy. As predicted by a court astrologist both Zarlran 
and his son are martyred, in the battle between Arjasp and the Persians. Yet, eventually 
aIl of the enemy forces, save for Arjasp, are destroyed; Goshtasp's son Esfandiyar then 
captures Arjasp, severs one of his ears and arms, bums one of his eyes, and then sends 
him back to Khyiinan to tell his countrymen about the fateful encounter and serve as an 
example for future generations. 
Essentially, Esfandiyar's ethics of war has both negative and positive aspects. 
On the one hand, he mutilates an enemy commander as a prisoner, yet he establishes 
justice by bringing the war to its end and punishing its perpetrators. This hero later 
confronts Rostam, the chiefhero of the Shahnameh, and shows other ethical failings. 
The rather short text duly inspires the Shahnameh texts of both Daqlql (d. 365 
AH) and Ferdows1. For Ferdowsl, almost aIl heroes fall victim to moral shortcomings 
and are puni shed for them. Esfandiyar blinds his main enemy Arjasp but soon is blinded 
at the hands of the Shahnameh's hero Rostam. 
Prestige and honor are important motivations in these conflicts. Several warriors 
from both camps come to battle after the kings Goshtasp and Arjasp each promise as 
rewards their own daughters along with high positions of power 
On the whole, however, the Persian court rejects the various financial incentives 
offered by their adversaries before battle. Their preference for 'fighting to death' is very 
close to the Islamic notion of venerating martyrdom. 
504 Yahya Mahyar N avabi, Yadegar-e Zariran, The Pahlavi Text with the Persian Translation and 
Comparison with Shahnemeh (Tehran: Asatir Publication, 1995) 7. 
505 Navabi, Yiidegiir-e Zaririin, 8. 
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The above sources are among the most important morally charged sources that 
Ferdowsl used, but as de Fouchecour mentions, Ferdowsl made the selection of his 
moral themes from a large body of the pre-Islamic aphorisms, while consciously 
censoring the sorne of the pre-Islamic ethical norms that were not feasible in his 
contemporary milieu.506 De Fouchecour stresses that the foundations of the ancient 
Persian ethics as reflected in the Avesta (of Zoroaster) have great similarity to the views 
of Socrates and Democritus.507 
Heroes and Anti-Heroes in the Shahnameh 
There are various heroes and anti-heroes in different episodes of the Shahnameh. First 
and foremost stands Rostam, from the Persian province of Zabulistan. He is a great 
warrior who serves several kings. Other heroes include Sohrab, Rostam's son, 
Esfandiyar, Tus, etc. None of these are presented in the Shahnameh of Ferdowsl as 
faultless; each, has his own specific moral shortcomings. The opposing side has its 
share of good character, such as Plran Veys eh who finds himself a counselor to a tyrant. 
He is caught therefore in a situation where his senses of loyalty and reason clash. 
Aghr1rath, one of Afrasiyab's (king of Turan and the chief enemy of Iran) brothers, is 
praised as a peacemaker but this position costs him his life.508 He takes a firm stance in 
protection of prisoners of war. 509 Plran's brother Pllsam who is a Turkish general is 
presented as a respect fuI pers on with good virtues. He tried, for example, to save the life 
of Siyavash the Iranian prince, his wife Farangls, and their son Kaykhosrow.5 \O 
Many of the warriors on the two sides are close relatives. Rostam, the main hero, 
is a descendent, from his mother side, of Oahhak, a major demon. Kaykhosrow, one of 
506 Charles-Hemi de Fouchecour, Moralia: Les Notion Morales dans la Litterature Persan 
(Persian), Mohammad Ali Amirmoezzi trans., (Tehran: Markeze Nashr-e Daneshgahi, 1998) 63, 116. 
507 de Fouchecour, Moralia, 7. 
508 He saves the lives of hundreds of Iranian prisoners of war captured by his brother Afrasiyab. 
See Shahnameh Ferdowsl, Moscow Edition, vol.2, 12,41,42. 
509 Shahnameh Ferdowsl, Moscow Edition, vol.2, 36. 
510 Shahnameh Ferdowsl, Moscow Edition, vol.3, 147, 154, 155. 
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the most respected Iranian kings of Shahnameh is the grandson of Iran's chief enemy 
Afrasiyab.511 It seems through these examples that Ferdowsl refrained from depicting 
moral and immoral absolutes among his heroes. 512 He brought close kin and relatives to 
confrontation, aIl so that his epics would not stay far from accessibility in real life. On 
the other hand, to Ferdowsl, authentic history is a tale of morality in which evil faces 
good, but many times in the same individu al. 
Moral judgments are less problematical when a flawless hero clashes with 
villainous anti-hero. Episodes which involve figures like Rostam and Esfandiyar, or 
Rostam and his son Sohrab, however, provide unique occasions for illustrating and 
commenting on the most difficult moral judgments on war and war ethics. 
This notion should sound familiar for Homer' s readers, for in lliad too, none of 
the heroes on either sides of the battle (Hektor and Akhilleus) seem to be moraIly 
perfecto This is not surprising for one finds Zeus, the supreme Greek god, to be 
supportively active on both sides of the Trojan and the Achaian wars. 513 
On the Primacy of Diplomacy: The Anti-war Leopards and Mountains 
By definition, epic literature is inclined towards war; for without war, there are few 
measures with which to test heroism. Heroism in the classical sense, in fact, is more 
about how to win a war than how to win a peace. Most peace initiatives in Shahnameh 
fail. Chubineh points to an observation of Ferdowsl that seems to be one of the core 
themes ofhis epics: 
511 Rostam's father Zal married Riïdabeh, the daughter of Mehrab the King of Kabiïl and who 
was a descendent of the Arab Zahhak. Kaykhosrow's mother was Farangis, daughter of Afrasiyab the king 
of Tillan. See Shahnameh FerdowsJ, Moscow Edition, 1966) vol. 1 , 157. 
512 Qadamali Sarami points that, from time to time, sorne of the most praised heroes of 
Shahnameh such as Iraj, Siyavash, Forud, Esfandiyar and even sacred figures such as Zaroaster, Mazdak 
and ManI commite, acts that do not follow any morallogic. He concludes that there is no perfect human 
being in the Shahnameh world. See Qadamali Sarami, Az Rang-e Gol ta Ranj-e Khiir, (Tehran: Sherkat-e 
Entesharat-e Elmi va Farhangi, 1990) 774, 775. 
5l3See Robert Fitzgerald, Trans. Homer: Iliad, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974) Book Nine, 
467,468, Lines 280-345. 
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The way of self-sufficiency, you must seek, only by the sword 
By the sword cornes the honor of the king in the country 
Soldiers must be as many as stars 
By sword men seek virtue.S\5 
Eisewhere in the epic work, un der the influence of Prophetie 4adith such as 
"He aven is under the shadows of swords" (u~\ J~ ~ li;J\) Ferdowsl reemphasizes 
the importance of military alertness in the following couplets: 
.l y.. i.S.J:!b LO .. ~ jI ..s 
.l~ w.:..l J f'j.J ~ ùl...A 
.l.il ()J..b.. J Ù.lj"';".J.l ..:i..~..s 
~ ~~ i.S.l1l. 6fi Ù."... '-1 
~1.J.l.iI..J...l..., J:lj..y.Y" ~.fiJ 
~I 0'" .J~ Jj ..... J 6fi J J.l 
Be lion-like where it fits to be a lion 
For kings are expected to be courageous 
A man becomes lion-like only by defeating lion 
That is to look for fighting and the battlefield 
Women's names are not heard of 
For aU ofwhat they care is eating and sleeping 
But if you care for the honor of chivalry 
You must wash a sharp sword with blood 
The world conqueror has his life in his hand 
Or else his head lies under rocks 
The world's creator is on my side 
And my fortress is my heart, my sword and my arms.516 
.ly.. i.S~..s 4Ji i.S~ cf-..! 
.l.>" ~I ~ ~ ù.l.i5..!1 jI 
-4 .l;w f'w ù i jI I.J ùwj 
~ ~YH i.S.l.>" f'w.fi ..s 
~1.J.l.i1 ~ '-1 ù4-l.J i.Sp.-i~ 
~I 0'" ).. c.l.Ï.l:l.Ji ù~ 
Chubineh asserts, however, that while war is important, it is a matter of last 
resort. This is reflected in the following couplets: 
~I .J.l.il f' ~ '-1 ..::... J~ ..s cfi. -&.i 
f'j.J ..... ~.J ~ .l.>!.N ~ 
.JI j.J\S ~..;-oS ~.J..s 
~ ..s .ll..;i ÙIJ:lJ ùl.l.J...-. 
~Jf'w J C.lJ.l jl ~.l.il..)i 
Ùyj .l,>y.; jj .fi jl.. ù~ 
~I Jit.! ù~..r. ~i ~ j 
f' Y. J .JY"" J .l;Y-" ~\S ~ 
.Jy~ ~ .l."....J j.l~ '-1 
~.l .ll.l;!i '-1 i.S.Jy.; 'U~ 
~ i.S~ ~ .l,> ).lfi'-l 
ù'-:!-o .l~ ~ '-1ft ~ 
514 Sajjad Chubineh, The PracticaI and TheoreticaI Wisdom in Shahnameh FerdowsJ (Shiraz: 
Entesharat-e Navid, 1998) 224. 
515 These translations those of the thesis author, and are intended to give an accurate 
interpretation of the original without being over-literal. 
516 Shahnameh FerdowsJ, Moscow Edition, vol.2, p.140. 
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.J~.J~ l.. J ~ ~ 
0S~y J;,A~ ~ 0bj) j 
~.J~ J~.J ~.JJj ~J:Ù J S..i..i...s 
Peace, no doubt, is better than war 
Enjoy life as long as your good fortune is with you 
If peace, feasting, and happiness are sought 
How wrong it is for one to engage in battle 
Said the king to Giidarz 
That once you are prepared for war 
Beware not to commit any injustice 
Nor destroy buildings 
Do not open your hand to any misdeed 
And care for the reputation ofyour ancestors, for honor and for shame 
Behave in such a manner that no harm is inflicted upon 
the one who is not fighting with you 
For the AIl-just God does not like any transgression 
And life, of course, is only a few short days, while we are passing anyways 
Do justice with aIl under any circumstances 
And remember the AIl-giving God 
Thirdly, beware not to take pride in shame and battle 
For shame and war lead to suffering and pain.517 
Ferdowsl condemns transgression, no matter who commits the act. In one of the 
episodes in the Shahnameh, the Persian King Kaykaviis was tempted by demons to seize 
the autonomous northem province of Mazandaran, without any political justification. 
Zal, the father of the main hero, namely Rostam, advises the king against this campaign 
in the following verse: 
).5-... uh.J~ u-Ï J..}! ..*!j 
~~ ~ 0\A1...:. ~j-.; 
Beware not to cultivate a tree of transgression that 
is watered by the blood of many honorable men 
For its fruit and growth will be accursed 
This is no tradition of earlier kings.518 
).l.oW .Y-" 0.l~ 0..p- jI jj 
~~ 0.l~~.ill; J )·i ...s 
Rostam's advises his own son Faramarz, on the importance of diplomacy: 
517 Chubineh, The Practical and Theoretical Wisdom in Shahnameh FerdowsJ, 223-25. Chubineh 
maintains that Ferdowsl, in his ethical views on war and peace is heavily impressed by 'Ali Ibn Ab! Tiilib. 
Also see a similar assertion by Sa'ed Hosseini, Shahnameh: Shiihkiir-e Andisheh (Shahnameh, the 
Masterpiece ofThought) (Shiraz: Entesharat-e Navid, 1995) 63. 
518 Shahnameh FerdowsJ, Moscow Edition, vol.2, 139, 82 
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Wherever you find an honor-seeker 
Send him an emissary to follow him step by step 
First, use soft diplomacy 
Be generous to your own men 
But if diplomacy fails, only then 
Use harsh language and resort to force. 519 
tJ.'-I <.h~ f'~Y' Y. ~Ij ~ 
<.S §j ~~..J:, <.S'" Y "-! û).5. .>'t 
In one episode Plran, a pro minent Turanl (Turkish) general, negotiates a peace 
with Rostam while the latter is on his way to fight the Turanls. This is in revenge for 
their killing the innocent Persian prince Siyavash.52o Plran questions why armies, 
composed of so many different ethnie groups, should face the prospect of destruction for 
the sake of the blood of an innocent prince. Ferdowsl depicts the conversation as 
follows: 
Plran: 
.K..jj 0.11 Y..~ <.S"'~ 
~ ,lS .. .. ~.t .lJw.; 
..; ~ u-Y __ 
<.Sywlji <.S~JA! J jJY. 
0! ~I ~\,J Jj)Y. "-.j 
.L.:z ul~~ '-1 f'1 ~ yS. 
~ji ~ Ji)) ulSJi j 
~J·ft u-'"".l..iI~J ~~"-.j 
For the blood of Siyavash we have brought 
So many innocent troops to the battlefield 
For me, being burned is better than waging war 
It does not fit us to commit such a shameful act 
But let me hear your view for you are more wise 
For you are more powerful and chivalrous than me 
Once Rostam heard Plran's view 
He did not give a response based on whims 
And replied that as long as 1 have come to this 
battlefield along with other warriors of the king 
1 have not seen from you except kindness 
You are the least harmful of all the Turks 
And of course, even leopard and rock-mountain 
know well that war is not good.521 
519 Hosseini, Shahnameh, 56. 
520 Hosseini, Shahnameh, 67. 
521 Shahnameh FerdowsJ, Moscow Edition, vol.4, 233. 
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Rostam agrees to sorne extent with Plran. He insists, however, on fighting on the 
grounds that he has a mission to accomplish. He is constricted by a univers al sense of 
dut y even ifhis own conscience dictates the opposite. 
Ferdowsl opposes haste and rage as two of the most frequent causes of war. He 
relates the advice of the Iranian hero Gudarz to his fellow commander Tus and 
companion Giv: 
J:!-Ï ,jbj. J ,j1).lAÜ ,j~ 
,:, y. ~.liS i.S.l.iJ <\S ~ 
),S"-! .l:!~ i.S j!> J i.S.ill 4.S 
.)1Sv. i.S.l.iJ ~ ,j'U.., y. .),:, i' 
,j\.,y. J JYJ jy. 0.11.) 0.1~ 
,:,Ij,i .)~y)~ ,ji ~.)j 
So advised Gudarz, his prominent fellow commanders 
Tus and Giv: 
That rage should not be the attribute of a general 
A venge fui general is a bad one 
An effective man must resort to wisdom 
F or rage and haste are of no use 
rage will only bring you regret 
So beware not to plow the seeds of anger in your garden 
It was for rage and haste that you (Tus) wasted such a 
.,j.J i,Y'..,.b ,-!j.)':'J. ~ ~ 
,:,y. ~ ),S <\,j i.S.ill 4.S 
),S ':'y Y" .).l.il .l:!'-! ,:,ft 
.)'-! ü,:,) ...-i~ i.S.l.iJ 4.S 
,j\.,F. ~ j ,jl...û;~...-il Y." 
,:,'-! "-! i.Sj!> J i.S.ill "-! i.S,:,I~ 
perfect and charismatic descendent of the Kiyanl dynasty (i.e. Forud).522 
Through haste, Tus had previously brought the downfall of F orud. This dissident Iranian 
hero was inadvertently attacked and killed as a result of Tus' actions. 
Jus in Bello in Ferdowsl's Shahnameh 
Ferdowsl was conscious of the concept of jus in bello in his epic. In his Shahnameh, he 
reveals his humanitarian concems in war: 
~.J. .),:, Jlli. ~ i' j ~'-!» 
).lA #J.f. J J:.'-!.,:, .)~ j i' 
~ L.. .l.J\..,j.',:,' y. __ IY""' .) 
~.J. tY...r. )..i;. y..~ JI <\,j 
~y ,jlA~ Y",j'? 4.S 
.l:!y. .l:!l,ü ,jlA ~ Y" 
cfofi IY':'.)Ji .).l.iI..>.U"-! 
522 Shahnameh Ferdowsl, Moscow Edition, vol.4, 67. 
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.)~j ~~,:, j ':"\I.? » 
w..,,:, ~ '-!J f':!..*" J ,:,1,:, '-! 4.S 
~y ,jl.)y~ Y" ,j.? jj 
j;.l ('I.M "-! ~yo ~ ~ 
~ .l:!4-! J,:, ~.) ,j.? j 
cfo~i .~ ,:,y. i.S':'y <\,j 
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Once you are victorious, stop bloodshed 
While the evil foe is escaping 
If the foe would seek arnnesty from you 
Drop aU the hatred and grant the arnnesty523 
As long as we do justice and kindness 
There are no worries for we are safe from defeat 
Do not shed the blood of kings' heads 
Nor seek refuge to endless caves 
So advised the Mübad (Zoroastrian priest) also to Bahrilln 
That you should not shed the blood of the innocents 
Blood shedding must be abandoned 
And the innocents must not be beheaded 
It is unmanly to strike the defeated 
and beat the already faUen foe. 524 
Ferdowsl comments further: 
Killing prison ers is not honorable 
Jy' '1'-1 4.S ..;.~ w.u.1 ~ 
.»"1 ,jJy' Jbjl ... i yy... 4.,j 
Jj.fi c.s! i.S~ jlJ i.S~ ....:;, yi 
Jjl .Jy.,ji jJjI )y... ~ ~ 
• J~ ... 4i ,j1.»"1 w.u.J j 
jl;.i c.s! "':;"'1 y... jI J JWi JJ "-! 
The high position of power is indeed on a slippery road 
It is against justice to hold women, children 
and old men as prison ers, 
Another person said "0 honorable king," 
"may you be on the si de of good and safe from evil." 
"As they brought the Roman prisoners, 
there are many infants among them." 
He (the king) so ordered: "AU the underaged, 
may not be counted among prisoners." 
"We shaU return them to their mothers," said the king 
"Happily without any need for ransom." 525 
J Y. '1IJ <IJ ~ jW! .}. 
~ J..)" '-1 J.ft J ....5.Jfi J,jj 
~ )":l~ i.StS ~ .}.J 
Jjl .J jJi 4.S <..s'" Jj ,j1.»"1 
J.ft.lli....A ~i ~~.i>"-! 
j'-l~';! ,jt...:üljJL.. i.SY" 
Ferdowsl ascribes humanitarian attitudes in war not only to the Iranian 
side but their enemies too. In one of the most poignant scenes of the Shahnameh, 
Sohrab, as the commander of the Turkish forces, is engaged in a fateful clash 
with an Iranian force, which includes, unbeknown to him, his father Rostam. In 
523 Shahnameh FerdowsJ, Moscow Edition, vol.4, 67. 
524 Shahnameh FerdowsJ, Moscow Edition, vol.S, 321-22. 
525 Shahnameh FerdowsJ, Moscow Edition, vol.S, 321-22. 
168 
his last minutes of life, Sohrab tells Rostam that the Turkish troops must be 
saved from any vengeful acts: 
.~ .l.ily ,jlS.y ~ i.SY" 
i.SJ.) .l.iJ4J ,j1.).!1 j.>" i.SY" 
.K.; ,j~1 .)J ~ "-! y,...lJ5.... 
Expand your most kind effort so that your king, 
might not target the Turks 
They (the TÜflliiis) are engaged in this war and have come 
to the Iranian border for my cause 
Therefore they must not suffer 
And you (Rostam) should not treat them 
except with kindness.526 
.~ ..s (fi ,ji y. u-iYJ6-" "...0.\ 
i.S~ 1.>".Jf-! j ,j~1 ..s 
.Iy' ~.) ~ ..s ~y:, 
Later, when the Iranian forces have seized the Turanl capital and defeated their 
enemy Afrasiyab, the victorious king Kaykhosrow orders his soldiers to treat the 
captured city in a just and compassionate manner: 
~ ,j~1 .)y:;& 0.11 .).l.il J6-" "-! 
~.)Ji)+I t... Y"' ~~J ~ 
i.S~ J)J .~~ ..s ~i ~ 
~ .Jf-! jI u..., JJ J Y. ~J ..s 
.l.i fi ,jtA ~ Y. .l.Ï:1.P-- ..s 
Ù" i.S4- .liS ,j1.).!J ..s ~y:, 
f'y. Jyi ~ .liS ,j1.).!J ..s 
Cast out aU spite from your hearts 
And seek to seize hearts through the magic of kindness 
Do your best in kindness 
And bring the spring wherever you see winter 
Turn your eyes away from people's spouse 
And respect people's properties 
For love ofproperty will even turn your friends into enemies 
Whoever seeks my advice 
Must not undermine my position 
And beware that the destroyer of cities, 
will be caUed an 'unjust and bad omen.' 527 
~ ,jJY.:! ~ "...0.\ 4lJ j 
~')Ji .)~ ~ J ~~ 
i.SJ.) ~ ,j'yJ.) .~j 
..J:!.i ~ Y"' ,jl....& ~ j 
~ 1.) 0.I.Ji ,j~ ~l:i 
Ù" i.S1.) (.S""À ~.P-- oIS u.& ,ji ~ 
f'''':;' J JI~ .l.i.il..-? ..s .J...:.JJ 
It is worth noting that Kaykhosrow is a paradigm of moral kingship in the pre-
historie Persian legend. Kaykhosrow's last advice to his successor Luhrasb on war's 
526 Shahnameh FerdowsZ Moscow Edition, vol.2, 240. 
527 Shahnameh FerdowsZ Moscow Edition, vol.5, 321-22. 
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aftermath is very significant for it shows the ideal war as perceived in the Persian epic 
literature and as depicted by Muslim historiographers like 'Abdulmalik al-Tha'alibl: 
So asserted Kaykhosrow in his poli tic al will to Lohrasb, "It is incumbent upon any king 
to remedy the damages ofwar, and to use ail his powers for reconstruction and reform." 
"During war and its aftermath," Kaykhosrow continues: " the king must act like a kind 
surgeon, operating free of charge, dismembering the ruined body-parts, out of no other 
choices, closing ail open wounds and curing ail injuries as fast as possible."528 
Ferdowsl most strongly condemns the excesses ofwar upon reaching the climax 
in his work. The chief hero, Rostam, stabs his own son, Sohrab before realizing his true 
identity. Ferdowsl cautions his protagonist and indirectly, his reader: 
Beware! 
0hl ~ 01 i.SJ."ll,;; 
Jy::, ~J i.SY' Y l''\.l,j\ Ji 
That whenever you become bloodthirsty, 
And spoil your sharp sword with blood. 
Then the universe will tum thirsty for your blood, 
And will tum ail the hairs on your body into sword. 529 
0Y>-! ~~ ~ oIS ~I.JA 
J y::, ~ y 0Y>-! 'ÛL.. j 
Ferdowsl's condemnation ofhis own hero in this instance is unequivocal, though 
Rostam seemed to have had justification for his actions. He was defending the Iranian 
forces against their Turanl enemies led by Sohrab. In the same way, the larger war is a 
fratricidal conflict as it pits the three brothers: Iraj, the king of Iran; Salm, the king of 
the Romans; and Tur, the king of Turan against each other. The futility of war is 
summed up by the last words of the Iranian hero Bahram. This hero loses his life in 
Turan by accident when he leaves his lash in his enemy's land. His enemy then fatally 
attacks him when he returns to recover it. As a revenge, a friend of Bahram then 
attempts to kill his killer. In reaction Bahram declares: 
.l,j\Ji 0"';" ~ 1"1.Jf-! 0J;J JJj 
0~ .J.l,j\S J .JJI Ji ~ J-? 
528 'Abdulmalik Tha 'alibI, Tiirikh-e Tha 'iilibi (known as Ghurar Akhbiir Muliik al-Furs wa 
Siyarihim), M~arnmad Fa4a'eli trans. (Tehran: Nashr-e Noqreh, 1988) 157-8 
529 Shahnameh FerdowsJ, Moscow Edition, vol. 2, 237. 
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Bloody tears, then, rolled down from Bahrarn's eyes 
As he was stunned by the tricks of the Ulliverse 
He arnazingly, uttered loud with a sigh, 
That whether 1 kill him or you do so in my presence, 
The victim is inevitably my brother or another relative.53o 
These Hnes and Ferdowsl's recognition of the iron law of nature against murder 
of human fellows are perhaps influenced by the first poet of Middle Persian language 
namely Riidaki Samarqancfi (d. 329 AH). Riidakl who served in the court of A1].mad Ibn 
Na~r Samani, depicts the following story in his poetry: 
One may not commit murder when one reaches a sword 
Evil act will not perish from God's memory. 
The sword is not made to serve the oppressors, 
Just as grape that is not created for wine. 
Jesus once saw the corps of a murdered man fallen on the road, 
He bit his finger in perplexion. 
~ 0 1jij f'Jy..s) w....~ &i 0.,». 
::JJ..ft 01)~ .)f-! j\ ~ &i 0.11 
oJill ...:;.:;.s ~.l;J <..s"'Y. ~ 
)j..s~...:;.:;.s\.:i~I.)...s ...s~ 
And asked the dead man: "Whom did you kill that caused your own miserable death?" 
"And then wait to see who will kill your murderer."531 
There are several references to the treatment of prisoners of war in the 
Shahnameh. The Iranian King Kaykhosrow upon retuming from war with a Chinese 
ruler orders his prisoners to be treated with care, if not compassion: 
They prepared a pleasant porch 
And sat the Chinese king therein 
.l..i:i.:>.l..u. ~ 0l!1...;". ..s4- 0ï .)J 
.J:!'-"I ~4 ~ .)J ...s '-! 01...A 
W .l;ï .)\:i....,Iy>. ..s.)yS.S. .J~ 
j\.)J ~ '-! ::JI"':; r.? ~ 
~ w..:).s o\Xjï j 0..f>..! 0.J:!Y. 
530 Shahnameh FerdowsL Moscow Edition, vol. 4, Ill. 
.l..i:i.:>.IJ.Jf. 01,,;1 f'Y-~ 
y-~b ~ Iy .l.o~ 
w.l;ï )~ .::J j ...s IJt,.... 
j4 J:.jJ..ft .::J j J Y. ...:;.:;.s .,». 
~ 1 wu.:;.. \S 
__ ..s. .).)f-! 
531 Manouchehr Daneshpazhooh, Divan-e Riidakl (Poetry Collection), (Tehran: Tus publication, 
1374/1984 CE) lines150-153. These lines are reflective ofChrist's statement: "Put your sword back into 
its sheath, for all who take the sword will perish by the sword." See Saint Joseph, The New American 
Bible, (New York: Catholic Book Publishing Co. 1991) Matthew, 26:53, p.1741 
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I did not like to kill him, 
It is better to have him imprisoned 
Lest he may be useful one day ifhe stays alive 
And astate may request him from you 
But once he is dead, to bring him back to life 
would not be possible for one in a long life. 
Oh fortunate one, do not hurry in anything! 
especially in shedding blood for it is such a harsh act.532 
At the same time, Ferdowsl condemns cowardice. He insists on combatant being 
fully cognizant of the just causes of his battle and confronting his enemy face to face 
without the use of tricks and deceit. For this reason, he opposes surprise attacks, 
particularly at night. 
In one instance, Rostam seeks to free a countryman imprisoned by a demon. 
When he finds the demon deep in sleep in a cave, he finally chooses to wake him and let 
him prepare for battle before killing him.533 
In a letter to his enemy King of Hamavaran, Rostam similarly admonishes the 
king of his moral shortcomings, for this king had tried to use tricks ta win battle. 
Rostam states: 
The fact that you trick your enemies 
is good enough a sign to show your evil soul 
That is why you must be ashamed ofyourself 
For you are inexperienced about the vicissitudes oflife 
You tried to ambush the Iranian king in the battlefield 
And this is your constant way 
It does not agree with manliness 
To be tricky in war 
You did not fight like the courageous leopard 
that would never waylay, 
ev en ifhis heart were craving revenge. 534 
532 Shahnameh FerdowsJ, Moscow Edition, volA, Ill. 
533 Shahnameh FerdowsJ, Moscow Edition, vol.2, 107. 
534 Shahnameh FerdowsJ, Moscow Edition, vol.2, l39. 
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Eisewhere Ferdowsl declares: 
.::.~ LJI.::.y ).::...,s 4..i LJ~ 
~')Jl ~ u...,1 ~ ($1.) ';:".)J 
Of manly ways is the one who faces affliction directly 
Night attack is not the ways of chivalrous men 
If you are for peace, we welcome you 
And ifyou go to war, let us fight honestly. 535 
.::.~ LJl .::.fi ~ ~ft ~ 
~')Jl ..J...:,.).::. ..}.:;.).::. ~ fi .; 
Ardeshlr, the founder of the Sasanian dynasty, established an elaborate code of 
conduct for his army. The following is a sample ofits rules as depicted by Ferdowsl: 
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..;1. .::.y J J:ùl.::. ~ J .4.'::'-.? 
y Y" .::.I~ "-! "';;l,ü \.:i LJI.l! 
'.::. .' ~ ~\.;j \.:i ·1.lJ f".) (jl, . u. 
($.P--"I) J )~ J .4.'::'-.? 
.K; .J...:;J .::.I~ j .::.).::....s 
~~y-'::'y~~LJl jJ 
~ lJI).l.4W ($\S..J...:,~ ($.::.j 
~.) ~J')'::' ~ y-...s ~l,ü 
~.::. J ~.)y.. .).::. u-1 y... .)6-! 
u...,,::, ~j~ u.s. LJ~ ~ 
~.::.~...s ~1.JA~.l! 
r:.f.-. ~ ...s ~.) 'lL..,; 
~,::,y.. lJ:l\S($J.~~ 
J:!y LJy.. u.s.j ($.::.fi jJ~ ». 
.)~j ~ ~.::. j .lA1y.. ». 
~ ~~.::. ~.;». 
~~ft~LJI.l!~ 
..»"1 üi..u>.l! .::..::.fi...s ~l .JA 
LJw.....)1..:;, ~ LJ~I.)6-! j\ Ü" 
.::..).::. J~') <si'; ~L....s u-'Iy..». 
($WA..) LJ~ .;:,,"';;~ JI ...s 
~ ~4-! ..;î!.) J;. P ». 
Y-!'::' ($~.fi Y- ($1 • .::.w.....;i 
y -E.' J lJ:l.'t. ($.::.I.l! ...... \-:.:i 
f".)'::' Y"IY" ($.::.I.l! 1.) ~ 
($.P--"W ~Iy.. lJI.~ ~ 
.~.::. ~ J lJ:l.'t. ($y-!'::' 
J.;... J'::' .;.:;. J-.? ..;î! .) ...s ~ 
~J f"wJJ.::..::.).::....s~l.JA 
~ Jf"w,::,~ ~l Y- fi,l...,.) 
~ U""'~ LJw....'::'.):lJ lJi Y-
u...,.J; LJI.::. J:! ..:.......A. JI ...s ~l .JA 
~.).::. J;.}~jJ') ~ lJij'::'yii 
r:.f.-. ~~ J ($jfJ LJI....A 
~ Y- LJJ.)olil .IL j.) lJ:l.l! 
J:!fi .).::. ~.l! ~.::....;;...s 
).l.4 ~J J:.~ • .::. J~j'; 
j;.i ($4- j\ r-A.)~ J j 1.::. Jf' 
~ lJ:l~ LJ4- j\ J.::. ($'::'.>"' 
y-.fiw J;. .)Jl .~.)~ lJ:l.l! 
LJw....}~.l! ...s ...... ~ "-! f") Y-
.::..Jv. 4..iJ. ~ I.A~ lJ:lj\ 
($Ifi lJI.::. J:!; .)olil ($jJ..)#! 
Whenever his (Ardeshlr's) army was dispatched on a military mission, 
He relied on wisdom, consultation, and patience 
He selected a learned secretary who was wise, knowledgeable, and studious 
He then sent him detailed instructions, 
against any unjust war. 
He paid his military weil, so that no one would feel unsatisfied 
Then he appointed an honor-seeking commander; 
a wise, vigilant, peace seeking 
and learned secretary who was weil aware of the rules 
who could keep the troops from transgression; 
And then a man who rode on the top of an elephant 
whose voice was so loud that it could be heard two miles away, 
He called upon the troops, 0 whoever 
535 Shahnameh FerdowsJ, Moscow Edition, vol.4, 91. 
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/ among you honorable heroes who has courage, honor and pride, 
Must be aware that no honorable non-combatant ofwealth 
should be harmed during battle 
Wherever your are fed, you must be generous and thankful to the subjects 
Do not touch the properties of anyone who worships god 
Anyone who turns his back to the enemy will have a difficult life 
The commanders were advised that they must neither be relaxed nor take hast y and 
preemptive measures. 
You inform the troops about who they are and why they are in the battlefield 
Once you become victorious, stop the bloodshed 
And let the vicious enemy escape 
If anyone among the enemy troops seeks arnnesty 
Grant him arnnesty and do not be venge fuI 
If you find properties abandoned by the escaping enemy 
Do not follow them to seize their properties 
Share the booty among those warriors who risked their lives 
Bring the prisoners of war to this court 
1 will build, in an undeveloped land, a city for them wherein they shalllive 
Do not turn your face away from any ofthese counsels 
If you do not want suffering and pain 
Once you become triurnphant, turn towards god 
So that, no doubt, he might give you guidance. 536 
The code of ethics in Ferdowsl's Shahnameh goes so far as to regulate the 
treatment of enemies' corpses. Virtuous kings or warriors respect the body of the slain 
enemy and sometimes arrange a funeral where the deceased is a nobleman or royalty. An 
example is when Kaykhosrow slays the King of Mokran. He rejects the suggestion that 
he sever the head ofhis vanquished foe. Ferdowsl relates: 
~~ J.).J..i1 .Wi ~ J~ 
i.JA y.1 ~ jl j:j .J..-. 
~.Y!- .)~  0~ d,}! 
yi.,.:.. i.S4- 1.).Wi ~y. Ù""-' 0~ 
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A soldier so suggested to the king: "we should sever his head," 
The king responded: "we must not look down at him. 
~..}! 1')~Y"\AWi~~ 
Û' j~..r.ü (1).:l~ Y" 
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Heads of kings must not be severed, except by the progeny of Evil. 
And the corps of my deceased counterpart may not be uncovered in contempt, so you 
must prepare his tomb with musk, rosewater, and proper enough to hold a king. Coyer 
him then with best Chine se silk, for so must the death of the higher ranks be treated. "537 
536 Shahnameh FerdowsJ, Moscow Edition, vol. 1, 174-77. 
537 Shahnameh FerdowsJ, Moscow Edition, vol. 5, 348. 
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Here, Kaykhosrow's ethics ofvictory is far superior to that of Akhilleus in lliad, for as 
Homer narrates, Akhilleus rejects the request ofhis counterpart Hektor that the victor 
should give a pledge to treat the corps of the vanquished with honor and return him to 
his family.538 Akhilleus indignant behavior with Hektor's body is reflected in the 
following statement ofPhoibos Apollo who expresses it in full rage: 
... first he (Akhilleus) took Prince Hektor's life and now he drags the body, lashed to his 
car, around the barrow of his friend (Partroklos, an Akhaian warrior who was killed by 
Hektor), perfonning something neither nobler in report nor better in itself. Let him take 
care, or brave as he is, we gods will turn against him, seeing him outrage the insensate 
earth!539 
Ferdowsl's Objective Ethics and the Norms of Javanmardl 
The war ethics of Shahnameh, as Sarami points, is notably impressed by the notion of 
JavanmardJ (manliness) in various episodes. The disposition is even extended to animal 
and demon wars. "From time to time in Shahnameh," Sarami holds, "even beasts take 
measures of chivalry and sacrifice for the benefit of others.,,540 Other Shahnameh 
scholars, such as Chubineh and Hosseini argue that Ferdowsl was heavily influenced in 
his view of war ethics by the conduct of the venerated figure of' Ali Ibn Ab1 Talib as the 
paradigm of the Islamic chivalry (futuwa in Arabic andjavanmardJin Persian).541 
538 Hektor requests: ''l'Il not insult yOuf corps shoul Zeus allow me victory in the end, yOuf life as 
prize. Once 1 have yOuf gear, l'Il give yOuf body back to Akhaians. Grant me, too, this grace." But swift 
Akhilleus frowned at him and said: "Hektor, l'll have no talk ofpacts with you, forever unforgiven as you 
are. As between men and lions there are none, no concord between wolves and sheeps, but all hold one 
another hateful through and through, so there can be no cOUftesy between us, no swom truce, till one of us 
is down ... " Robert Fitzgerald, Trans. Homer: Iliad, Book Twenty-Two, 523, Lines 254-262. 
539Robert Fitzgerald, Trans. Homer: Iliad, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974) Book Twenty-
Four, 569, Lines 16-22. 
540 Qadamali, Sarami. Az Rang-e Gol ta Ranj-e Khiir: Shekl Shenasy-e Qessehay-e Shahnameh 
(From the Color of Flower to the Sting of Thom: The Morphology of the Tales of Shahnameh), (Tehran: 
Sherkat-e Entesharat-e Elmi va Farhangi, 1990) 753. 
541 Compare this instruction with 'Ali' s similar instructions to his troops, mentioned in Chapter 
Three of this work. De Fouchécour refers to an 'Afi-niima written by an anonymous author on the model 
of Shahnameh, about 482 AH/l089 CE. He also refers to the Ijdiqat al-IjaqJqa of Sana'i (d.525 AH/l131 
CE), that includes epic poetry about' Ali's wars. Among the exalted attributes of 'Ali, he stresses, was 
that "In time of peace, he was with full knowledge, and in time of war with full forbearance (hilm)." See 
de FouchécoUf, Moralia, 157. See also Mohammad-Reza Shafi'I-Kadkanl, "Hamasa'l Shi '1 az Qam-e 
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Ifyou look to the hereafter 
..s4- ..;t (.)c ) ~ J J <..si' J'y-! 
ü.uù.. 01.) J Ù;!J Ù;!IJ w...,1 ~ (' .)* .....;....sb <iS ù lJ ù4-
Vou must stand with the Apostle and his executor 'Ali 
Ifyou despise my view, leave my thoughts to myself 
This is how my faith is and my way 
1 am born on this belief and will pass away thereby 
..s1Y" .h~ ..s)J ~ .}.I 
w...,1 l,)A o~ J,!i ~ Ù;!j w.}. 
('.)~ Ù;!I Y. r-A J ("JIj Ù;!I Y. 
Consider me as the dust of the Lion's (an epithet of' Ali) footsteps. 
While he was undoubtedly influenced by Islamic and ShI'! cultures, the very 
foundation of Ferdowsl's moral system, like that of his fellow Mu'tazilites, gives great 
importance to wisdom. This is illustrated in Ferdowsl's aphoristic statements, most of 
which are quoted by Buzarjomehr, the wise minister of the Sasanid king Anowshirvan. 
The minister begins each quote with an invocation to wisdom (kherad in Persian). 
Indeed, the introduction to Ferdowsl's Shahnameh stresses that the entire work should 
agree with wisdom, or be taken symbolically whenever it does not: 
ùb ... .sJ'+! J ù~ Jw y. 
J Y. ~ Jj..o.) 0.) y. .}.J 
Vou do not call this (Shahnameh) false and fable 
And in such colors. 
It agrees either with wisdom 
Or else take it as a metaphor and allegory. 
ùlJ... .sJ1.....! J b.)J I..}:I jj 
J Y. '-! J.)y. .)~I ~ y> J) 
Ferdowsl quotes Buzarjumehr (Bozorgmehr in Persian): 
w...,1 ~ lfi ~ w...b. )Jly... 
~ )J,!y. 1.) JI u..s ~ 
w..., Ifl Jjh w...,1....s~ ù4- Jy. 
Jj!-Ï J ~ 4..! JJ.}. J)IY" 
Wisdom is man's God-given robe ofhonor 
Look to see who deserves such a mantle 
Once the physical power of a man is uncoupled with wisdom 
He is not desired anywhere in the world 
Where there is no wisdom, it is better that there is no life 
Wisdom is the pure soul as God testifies 
Once a man learns the foundation ofmanliness 
w...,1 JJ:l1 w...b. 1.) J.)A Jy. 
~ j-J. Jy. ù.».I.)~.,r; 
w...,1 J.) ~'-:ü ù4- J Y. ~'-:ü 
J.)A ~JA\.,!; ..sJ.)A J'-:!l!.». 
Panjom, " Journal of the Faculty of Literature and Human Sciences, Autumn/Winter 1379 AH (Mashhad: 
Ferdowsl University Press) 425-494. 
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He is respect fui in war and adversities. 542 
The Shahnameh generally asserts the importance oftolerance and wisdom as follows: 
Tolerance is like the brother ofwisdom 
Wisdom is the crown of the soul.543 
According to F erdowsl, the chief reason that the Sasanian king Yazdgerd (d. 651 CE) 
became a villain (bezehgar) and ultimately lost his reign was that he belittled wise men: 
He belittled the wise men 
So his kingly traditions became ineffective.544 
Finally, when Alexander the Great came to the throne, Ferdowsl reports that he praised 
wisdom with the following words: 
When Alexander sat on his throne, he exc1aimed: 
"May kings' souls be paired with wisdom!,,545 
The objective ethics of Ferdowsl, founded on wisdom, justice, and compassion, 
take his principles beyond the formaI lines of religious thought and juristic norms. As 
the next chapter will discuss in detail, the pre-Islamic Persian moral culture of 
javiinmardi (lit. young-manliness) not only lived on after the fall of the Sasanid empire, 
but in fact was reinvigorated under the new name of futiiwa, and found strong 
institutional forms during the entire middle ages.546 The frequent usage of the term 
542 Shahnameh FerdowsJ, Moscow Edition, vol.8, 139-40. 
543 Shahnameh FerdowsJ, Moscow Edition, vol.8, 118. 
544 Shahnameh FerdowsJ, Moscow Edition, vol.7, 265. 
545 Shahnameh FerdowsJ, Moscow Edition, vol.7, 6. 
546 It was the caliph al-Na~ir who strongly backed and reformed the fùtiiwa institutions at the 
turn of the twelfth century CE. 
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javiinmardi (or its shortened term mardi) was possibly a reminder to the medieval 
reader that war ethics rested on the univers al dictates ofwisdom. 
In the era of Ferdowsl, spanning the end of the tenth until the beginning of the 
twelfth century CE, newly independent amirs and sultans from such dynasties as the 
Samanids, the Buyids and the Ghaznavids sought new forms of legitimacy. By holding 
up the Sasanids as models ofright conduct, Ferdowsl reminded them that from whatever 
source that they may derive this legitimacy, they are nonetheless bound to observe 
specific codes of conduct in warfare. Ferdowsl calls attention to the virtues of wisdom 
and manliness (kherad and javiinmardi). On the occasion of the burial of Alexander, the 
poet by addressing the deceased king reminds the audience present in the funeral that: 
<..5""'ftJU~J":"J\.S~~I~ <..5""'~Y' J ~l; \.SN ~ 
\.SI o~ P J ~ï Ji6.S pl \.SI O.Jf-! ~ ~ -..; ~I fi. 
At this moment the only things that can help your soul are: 
Kindness and assistance to people 
Manliness, appreciation of life and being pleasant 
1 do not see how you may carry with you (to the next world) 
virtues other than these, 
be you a layman or a noble.547 
Justice and Jus ad Bellum in the Shahnameh 
The main purpose of wisdom and manliness in the Shahnameh' s moral system is to 
spread justice (diid). In the same way, the main legitimate cause for war is to establish 
justice. 
Generosity (bakhshandegl) is also important. It is, in fact, a form of financial 
justice. From an Islamic perspective, Ferdowsl believes that man has a divine soul and 
must attain godly attributes; therefore, the two most important attributes of God, whom 
man emulates, are generosity and justice. This is evident in the following verse: 
The Generous and the Just Lord 
The Lord of chivalry, intellect, and, virtue. 548 
547 Shahnameh Ferdowsl, Moscow Edition, vol.7, 110. 
548 Shahnameh Ferdowsl, Moscow Edition, vo!.7, 20. 
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In the same vein, a wise king declares: 
It is better for me to promote justice in the world, 
rather than to unjustly add to treasure. 549 
The Shahnameh enumerates two legitimate and just causes for wars: first, 
defending land and dignity, and secondly, implementing justice, an act done mostly in 
the context ofpunishing a pers on or a state for a crime or aggression they cornrnitted.550 
Most other causes are condernned, even if pursued by an Iranian countryman of 
Ferdowsl.551 
Rage and vengefulness are unsatisfactory motives for war. They are ranked 
among the ten most serious demons, or cardinal vices, upon which the minister 
Buzarjumehr expounds to Anowshlrvan: 
Lion-like demons are ten 
That can strike wisdom and soul 
y-y. 1.) Jft J ù4- .li) o,S 
~-fi ~~ 1.) Jft ù~1 jS 
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Which are these ten demons that make wisdom weep? 
So he (Buzarjomehr) responded: 
The two most powerful of them are avarice and neediness 
Next are rage, jealousy, indignity and rancor. 
Then cornes the gossip-monger, the hypocrite, and the heretic 
~ i..SJ.Ji'..! rA ÙAy\1 .liloJ 
~ J:!J OJo,S i..S~~J.l; 
j\..iJ J jl o,S ~\i JiJ ~ 
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The tenth is the one who is thankless for any kindness and who is an infidel to God.552 
549 Shahnameh FerdowsZ Moscow Edition, vol.7, 262. 
550 Justice for Ferdowsl, like for many other medieval thinkers, as de Fouchecour stresses, is the 
most important moral foundation for development of the state. See de Fouchecour, Moralia, 62. 
551 As already mentioned, Rostam vehemently protested the unprovoked invasion of Mazandaran 
by Kayqubad. 
552 Shahnameh FerdowsZ Moscow Edition, vol.8, 195-96. 
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True, rage and rancor are evil, but they are often main drives for heroes and perhaps, in 
the words of Homer, too sweet to resist. Therefore, for Ferdowsl, fighting against anger 
is a great fight. He sits next to Homer's hero Achilleus when he prays: 
Ai! Let strife and rancor perish from the lives of gods and men, with anger that 
envenoms ev en the wise and is far sweeter than slow-dripping honey, c10uding the 
hearts ofmen like smoke.553 
Against Blind War 
It is customary for most warriors of Shahnameh to ask their foe's identity before they 
engage in battle. This is an emphasis by the poet that a just warrior must avoid blind 
wars, ev en if the foe is a dragon: 
('~ ~ ~.; I.Y':! Ü;ll fi ('u i.SJ. y. ~ \.A~j1 â ... 
So asked (Rostam) the dragon "you should reveal your name (identity), 
For you will not enjoy life hereafter.,,554 
Leaders typically announce their reasons for war, whether justified or not, before 
initiating hostilities. Kaykhosrow, for example, declares the causes for his 
campaign against Afrasiyab as follows: 
.~ ü...~ y. ~ ~ oiS J:.J~ 
('.lAI ~ J .~ ~ j1 '-Ï 
1 am the heart-burned bereaved son ofthat innocent 
Siyavash who was killed in Shah's hand. 
1 have come from Iran to this plain only for revenge, 
not for power nor for wealth. 555 
.~ ül .J~ J~ tl~ ~ 
('.lAI ~ Ü1y,1 j1 w.:;,~ Ü;l'" 
In other sections, Kaykhosrow delivers a full list of grievances against Afraslyab 
including the murder of Aghrlrath, Afraslyab's own brother, Nowzar, Kaykhosrpw's 
553Robert Fitzgerald, Trans. Homer: Iliad, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974) Book Eighteen, 
439, Lines 78-85. 
554 Shahnameh Ferdowsl, Moscow Edition, vol.2, 96. See also how a demon (Owlad) asks Rostam 
to introduce himself before they start their battle. Vol.2, 100. 
555 Shahnameh Ferdowsl, Moscow Edition, vol.5. 272. 
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father Siyavash and others.556 Kaykhosrow believes he has legitimate cause for war; ifnot, 
he prays before God that he should not be successful as follows: 557 
01";' .ll.l ~ .l.iJI.l;i,. ~ 
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Leaving his troops aside, he (Kaykhosrow) went to a corner, 
To present his case before God. 
And uttered the following: 
o~~j~.l.ol:!i 
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"Oh! You who are greater than the knowledge of the ascetic! You are the Lord of the 
world, and the king of all! 
IfI am not a wronged party, 
And not burning from inside just like a hot iron, 
Then, 1 do not want victory in war, 
Nor do 1 desire to suppress justice in the world.558 
Oh! IfYou the most just, are content with him (Afrasiyab), 
May You cut short my confrontation with him! 
Extinguish the tire of revenge in my heart! 
And guide me towards Your preferred way!"559 
Uttered Kaykhosrow all these words and prostrated himself on earth before the Lord, 
And the world was fraught with his moaning. 
Ferdowsl's Definition of Infidelity (kufi) 
The most frequently alleged cause of medieval wars in Muslim cultures, though seldom 
the true cause, was infidelity (kufT). Ferrdowsl defines his own version of infidelity as 
follows: 
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556 Shahnameh FerdowsJ, Moscow Edition, vol.5, 308, 309, 374, 375. 
557 Qadamali Saraml points that the main war cause in Shahnameh is revenge (kJn) to establish 
justice, however, he asserts that such revenge is asked for and sanctioned by the Divine. "In fact," he 
maintains, "the tirst act of revenge in the epic is directly ordered by God (AhUra Mazda). See Qadamali 
Sarami, Az Rang-e Gol ta Ranj-e Khiir, (Tehran: Sherkat-e Entesharat-e Elmi va Farhangi, 1990) 650. 
558 Shahnameh FerdowsJ, Moscow Edition, vol. 5,293. 
559 Shahnameh FerdowsJ, Moscow Edition, vol. 5,359. 
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Whoever, within aIl the seven states of the world 
Whoever alters the tradition and turns away from faith. 
Whoever inflicts suffering upon the dervish 
and servitude upon his own people. 
Whoever stands arrogant in excesses and wealth, 
Whoever makes the oppressed people suffer. 
They aIl are infidels in my view, 
And are worst than the vicious AhrIman (Devil).560 
Infidelity is more than unbelief; it is universal error of arrogance, oppression, and greed 
which undermine divine justice. 
Heroes in Conflict: A Moral Dilemma 
Another tragic episode is the retum of Esfandiyar, an Iranian crown prince, to Iran after 
defeating the enemy Arjasp. Esfandiyar claims the throne as promised by his father 
Goshtasp, but Goshtasp conspires to thwart his claim. He orders him to bring back the 
hero Rostam to answer for alleged offenses. Although Rostam agrees to visit the king's 
court on honorable terms, Esfandiyar rejects these terms since his father insisted on him 
bringing Rostam in restraints. 
The two most respected heroes in the Shahnameh are now trapped in a moral 
dilemma. They are bound by circumstance to fight or to face dishonor. Seeking advice, 
Rostam debates the problem with Simurgh, a mythical bird which protected his family, 
as follows: 
"11 is easier for me," ut1ered Rostam, "to be killed if 1 am 
locked in a combat, rather than suffer indignity." 
So he (Simurgh) responded: ifyou obey 
a hero like Esfandiyar, it is no indignity 
Said Rostam to Simorgh: "Lo! Beloved of the 
world, what is wrong ifwe suddenly leave this world?" 
"The world will remain and we wilileave anyhow; 
nothing will be left ofus except manliness." 
"1 welcome dying in good name, 
for ultimately the name is mine just as my body 
belongs to death.,,561 
560 Shahnameh FerdowsJ, Moscow Edition, vol. 1, 136. 
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Slmorgh reminds Rostam that whoever kills the hero Esfandiyar will be cursed 
and remorseful, and will suffer the rest of his life. However, it guides Rostam in the 
fatal battle in targeting the only vulnerable spot in Esfandiyar's body, his eye. In a 
similar way, Esfandiyar pulled out the eye of the Turanl king Arjasp, and killed him 
after his defeat. 
The battle ends with no absolute victor, no impeccable hero, and no one saved 
from the pain of tragedy. Esfandiyar is killed, but so is the soul of Rostam. This is a 
battle that involved blind obedience to the king, a hero's personal pride, a destiny that 
settles the accounts of every actor on every side, and enemies who are all brothers or 
cousins. There were good souls on both sides, along with good motives, and much 
courage was wasted in vain. Perhaps it was against this dramatic background that 
Ferdowsl decided to remind his readers that they may be subject to the same fate, and 
with this in mind, he often wams against hast y judgments about what is right and wrong 
in war and peace. He appeals to his audience to consider the middle ground in their 
judgments: 
The moderate succeeds everywhere, 
both in connection to matters of dignity and in war.562 
But war, although a hard and seemingly a permanent feature oflife and the main drive 
for c1assical heroism, it is not the middle ground of an ideallife. Davidson shows how 
Ferdowsl makes his hero Rostam to speak in criticism of a life all spent in war, while he 
nears his last days. The following is Rostam's song about himself: 
~I ~ • J6-! J:.:. JI...:;, j.J.J jI 4.S 
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Rostam is an out cast and ill-signed, 
561 Shahnameh FerdowsJ, Moscow Edition, vol.6, 297-98. 
562 Shahnameh FerdowsJ, Moscow Edition, vol.6, 298. 
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For from his days of joy his portion is grief. 
Every battlefield in his arena, 
the bush-land and mountains are his flower garden. 
There is always sorne battle with a lion or a male dragon, 
And the type of dragon that spreads fire from its hands 
The wine, the cup, the scented rose, and the drinking companion 
Are not what the Omnipotent has appropriated to him. 
"Here Rostam sings about himself in the third person," Davidson contends, "How hard 
his life is fighting all alone in the wildemess, like an outcast, where the wildemess must 
serve him as a cultivated garden. He will always be an outsider, that is, a liminal 
figure."563 Davidson notes similar bitter confessions uttered by other heroes of 
Shahnameh such as Esfandiyar: 
)~ J <.sA ~ .fi.]A...s 
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Ill-starred Esfandiyar said continuously: 
He never sees wine or drinking companions. 
He sees nothing but lions and male dragon, 
He finds no escape from the claws of calamity. 
He never finds any gain from this world, 
In the beautiful sight of a fairy face. 
l will find from God aIl my heart' s desire, 
Ifhe gives me the face of a heart-breaker, 
In statme like a cypress and with a face like the sun, 
With musk-scented hair hanging to her feet. 564 
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Esfandiyar is a prince who, in the words of Davidson, "potentially embodies the 
very essence of the body politic," just like Rostam is, "a loner, an outsider, and always 
will be out of synchronization with society." "Both heroes," Davidson holds, "complain 
that they are away from ordered society and comfort of a civilized life.,,565 
Here, by subjecting his heroes to sheer humanism outside and above war, 
Ferdowsl transfers them from a mythical domain to real life. This is where the full 
563 Olga M. Davidson, Poet and Hero in the Persian Book of Kings, (Ithaca and London: Comell 
University Press, 1994) 164. 
564 Davidson, Poet and Hero in the Persian Book of Kings, 164. 
565 Davidson, Poet and Hero in the Persian Book of Kings, 165. 
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spectrum of the contemporary life cornes to picture and heroes become honest critics of 
war and of their own lives. It looks as if it is the very pers on of the poet who walks out 
of the war-stricken life of his time, goes to solitude in full conscious, and expresses his 
sorrows, indignations, and his craving for civilized life. 
Ferdowsl's powerful and penetrating language has played many different roles 
after his death. It has been used to ce1ebrate war and peace, and as a reminder to rulers 
about the importance of justice. Perhaps the two most important aspects of Ferdowsl's 
work are his fusion ofpre-Islamic Persian and Islamic ethics and his use of narrative and 
poetic meter to disseminate his ethical system. He stresses on the importance of human 
dignity, bringing the 'self under scrutiny and reminding his reader that the 'other' may 
have great virtuous men on its side too. 
A Medieval War-Ethics Manual 
Another important text of adab treating the ethics of medieval wars is the Adiïb al-lfarb 
wa'l Shujiï 'a of Fakhr Mudabbir, also known as Mubarakshah. A descendent of the 
Ghaznavid dynasty, Mudabbir served Sultan Shamsuddin Iltatmish oflndia who reigned 
between 607 to 633 AH, at the time of the caliphate of al-Mustan~ir Billah (623-40 
AH/1226-42 CE). 
A didactic work, Adiïb al-lfarb wa'l Shujiï 'a draws on Persian and Islamic 
history in relating an ethical protocol of war. Mudabbir's work has a moral force since 
much of the history it discusses is sacred. It treats many of the core pers on ages and 
events which shaped these civilizations. 
Like many other 'mirrors for princes' works, Mudabbir begins his treatise 
expounding the virtues of justice (' adJ), compassion, and forgiveness. He states that "if 
the King implements justice, he has no need for war.,,566 He uses a number of anecdotes 
to show that ev en the most callous and savage rulers, such as al-I:Iajjaj, the Marwanid 
govemor of the I:Iijaz and Iraq, had to temper justice with compassion. This was a 
reminder to contemporary rulers. Whether or not these narratives are historically factual 
was secondary to Muddabir as the moral message was much more important. The 
566 MlÙ).ammad Ibn Man~Ur Ibn Sa 'id Mubarakshiih (Fakhr Mudabbir), Adiib al-lfarb wa'l 
Shuji'a, ed. A4mad Soheily (Tehran: Iqbal, 1965) 164. 
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-- emphasis on justice is a common feature of the entire adab genre and a departing point 
from its opposite moral system, best defined by Machiavelli (d. 1527 CE) in the 
following words: " ... a battle that you win cancels any other bad action of yours. In the 
same way, by losing one, all the good things worked by you before becomes vain.,,567 
Mudabbir believed that, besides being just, the Sultan should also be personally 
involved in war. He praises, for example, Ma4mud Ghaznavl as a warrior because in the 
course of one of his campaigns in India he made such a "river of blood in Lahore by 
killing so many infidels and Qarmatis568 that it was very hard after the war to separate 
his hand from his sword stuck together (as they were) by clotted blood.,,569 According to 
Mudabbir, al-I:Iajjaj ordered and personally observed the beheading of many prisoners 
while at the same time wept during the process out of 'compassion! ,570 
On the qualities of the vizier (minister), Mudabbir paraphrases the Sasanid king 
Anowshirvan (d. 579 CE) who is said to have stressed that "the worst vizier is the one 
that involves his master in a war.,,57! ln chapter six, he elaborates at length on the need 
to prevent war using all diplomatie means, including the exchange of able ambassadors 
and gifts. He asserts that war must be the last resort and that it is much preferable if one 
can win one's aims by diplomacy.572 Peace is superior to military victory since it saves 
many lives.573 Moreover, "once war sheds blood, it becomes very difficult to reach 
567 Nicco10 MachaveIli, Art ofwar, Trans1ated, edited, and commentary by Chritopher Lynch, 
(Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2003) 20. 
568 The Qarmaties were one of the ShI'! sects who main1y ru1ed in Bahrain as weIl as parts of 
Yemen and 'Umman during the tenth century CE. 
569 Mubarakshah (Fakhr Mudabbir), Adab al-lfarb, 268. 
570 Mubarakshah (Fakhr Mudabbir), Adab al-lfarb, 37. 
571 Mubarakshah (Fakhr Mudabbir), Adab al-lfarb, 135. 
572 Mubarakshah (Fakhr Mudabbir), Adab al-lfarb, 372, 454. 
573 Mubarakshah (Fakhr Mudabbir), Adab al-lfarb, 278. 
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peace."574 He further emphasizes the need to meticulously observe any treaty that is 
signed with one party or another.575 
The Causes and Conduet of War in the Manuals 
Mudabbir divides war into five types oflegitimate war (1;.arb) depending on their causes, 
wars against infidels, intra-Muslim wars, wars against rebels, wars against subject 
religious minorities who refrain from paying the poU tax (jizya), and finaUy, wars 
against high-way robbers. In Mudabbir's framework, only wars against infidels amount 
to primary (offensive) wars; the rest are of a defensive nature. 
Muddabir elaborates more extensively different categories of martyrs. He 
includes in this categorization aU sorts of people who die as the result of natural 
disasters, such as floods, fires, and earthquakes, by the actions of vicious or poisonous 
animaIs, through disease, - or by decree of a Sultan. He further disregards circumstances 
such as whether or not the one who is murdered is defending his, person, property, 
spouse or children, or is languishing in prison.576 This serves to diminish the importance 
ofwar as a path for otherworldly rewards. 
Mudabbir's treatise comments extensively on jus in bello. Citing many historical 
precedents, he recommends that the executions of prisoners of war be delayed for as 
long as possible. According to the Prophet' s instructions, these prisoners may convert to 
Islam in the future and be useful to the Muslim community.577 Nevertheless, Mudabbir 
states that "in case that the execution is inevitable, the prisoner's mouth must be tied for 
they may utter blasphemous curses once they face death. "578 
Mudabbir's text foUows the advice of both the Prophet and Abu Bakr in the 
treatment of the elderly, women, children, as weU as the sick and insane; these groups 
574 Mubarakshah (Fakhr Mudabbir), Adab al-lfarb, 349. 
575 Mubarakshah (Fakhr Mudabbir), Adab al-lfarb, 149. 
576 Mubarakshah (Fakhr Mudabbir), Adab aJ-lfarb, 37. 
577 Mubarakshah (Fakhr Mudabbir), Adab al-lfarb, 345. 
578 Mubarakshah (Fakhr Mudabbir), Adab al-lfarb, 345. 
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are to be spared the violence of combat. Nevertheless, Mudabbir departs from their 
example in two matters. First, the Muslim commander may breach a peace agreement he 
has signed and resume war if sees benefits.579 Secondly, the Muslim commander may 
kill, enslave or free prisoners of war to serve the M uslim community as he so wishes. 58o 
In both cases, critical war decisions are left to the arbitrary will of the commander 
without requiring widely-recognized just cause or well-defined criteria. Such attitudes 
agreed with the actual practices of Sultans in their conduct of war. However they lack 
firm legal foundations, though works such as Shaybanl's Siyarare cited in many parts of 
the text. 
Mudabbir perhaps tried to reconcile Islamic tradition with the world he lived in. 
Although he was familiar with l}adith and earlier historical experience, he served a court 
led by Sultans who acted very differently. He also provides a number of l}adith and 
historical anecdotes claiming that the length of one's life is destined once he is born so 
that one cannot escape death by avoiding war.581 
As a result, Mudabbir sometimes contradicts himself. The last chapter of Adiib 
al-lfarb is focused on general moral advice that goes far beyond the realms of the 
military sphere. It points out, for example, that the ruler or commander must refrain 
from personal participation in battles as long as it is possible, for any injury to the 
commander could inflict irreparable harm to the morale of the army.582 This attitude 
directly contradicts Muddabir's earlier statements about Mal}mud Ghaznavl whom he 
praised for his personal participation in battles. One similarly recalls 'Ali challenge to 
Mu'awiya at ~iffin. Mu'awiya maintained that the 'commander's job is not fighting.' 
Muddabir's ethics of war, consequently, varies from the practical to the 
idealistic. He is sometimes caught between two irreconcilable extremes. For example, 
he spends a chapter on how specific prayers and supplications may change the fate of 
war and guarantee the victory. Yet at the same time, he advocates breaching a peace 
579 Mubarakshah (Fakhr Mudabbir), Adiib al-lfarb, 400. 
580 Mubarakshah (Fakhr Mudabbir), Adiib al-lfarb, 40l. 
582 Mubarakshah (Fakhr Mudabbir), Adiib al-lfarb, 488. 
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/~ contract unilaterally, and initiating a war if a Sultan desires so. One may therefore 
conc1ude that Muddabir's war ethics is morally mixed and controversial, yet it is very 
elaborate and provides full details of forms, tactics and strategies of the medieval 
Muslim wars in an exceptionally unique way. These mixed war ethics, in which the lines 
between virtues and vices in the act of warriors are not so sharp, is an accurate 
representation of the medieval warrior. Mudabbir's warrior observes sorne Islamic 
norms of war as he carries the flag of jihiid Nonetheless, he fights only for military 
victory with aIl of its worldly privileges. 
War Ethics in Saljuq Literature 
It has previously been mentioned that the Saljuqs' moral attitude in war was not much 
different from that of the Ghaznavids. This is reflected generally in the literature of the 
period. Two of the main adab works of this era in the genre of Mirror for the Princes are 
the Siyar al-Muliïk (written 484 AHIl091 CE) of Khwaja Ni?am al-Mulk (d. 485 
AHII 092 CE) and Qiibiïs Niimeh written by Kai Kavus Ibn Iskandar (c. 1020-1085). The 
former work is a comprehensive political treatise addressing the details of court policies. 
It has little to offer on military ethics except for a few words at the end advising the 
king to "fight with the enemy in such a manner that leaves a space for peace, and make 
peace in such a way that leaves an excuse for war.,,583 This ambivalent judgment about 
war, in the same spirit as Muddabir's, is plainly pragmatic. This pragmatism may be 
explained by the division in the Ghaznavid and Saljuq courts between the men of the 
pen (mostly Persians) and men of the sword (Turkish in origin). In Bayhaql's history for 
example, whenever there is a question of going to war, the Vizier says at once that the 
king should first seek the advice of his Turkish military commanders since they are the 
ones who know the business better than anyone in the more bureaucratic and divan part 
of the court. 584 
583 Abü 'Ali I:Iasan Tüs1 (Khwaja Ni~iim ai-MuIk), Siyar al-Muliik ed. Hubert Darek (Tehran: 
Sherkat-e Enteshiirat-e EIm1, 1999) 330. 
584 Bayhaq1, Abü'I FaqJ MlÙ).ammad Ibn I:Iusayn, Tiirlkh Bayhaifi, 8th ed., ed. Ghani and Fayyaq 
(Tehran: Arghavan Publishing, 2002). 
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Qibiis Nimeh written by Kai Kavus Ibn Iskandar for his son covers a wide range 
of mostly moral topics with special emphacis on manners of conduct in a spirit similar 
to modem formalism. The small section of the book on war advises against cowardice 
and supports strong resolve in the battle. Then the author tums to the matter of just 
cause for the bloodshed and wams his son against unjustified killing. He stresses on the 
following: 
Do not be over-hasty in shedding innocent blood, and regard no killing of Muslims to be 
lawful, unless they are brigands, thieves and grave-robbers or such whose execution is 
demanded by the law. Torment in both worlds is inflicted for shedding of innocent 
blood; you will find retribution for it on the Day of Resurection, but also in this world 
your name will be besmirched. None ofyour subjects will trust you, those who serve you 
will despair ofreward from you, your people will conceive hatred for you and will in 
their hearts become your enemies. Retribution for the shedding of innocent blood will 
assuredly not be confined to the next world, for 1 have read in books and ascertained by 
experience that the punishment for evil may also be inflicted on men even in this world. 
When they are gone, even if their own stars chance to be favourable, misfortune will 
befall their children. Therefore spare yourself and your offspring by shedding no 
innocent blood. 585 
The author then informs his son that his great grandfather was a bloodthirsty man, ne ver 
able to forgive an offense, and therefore lost his life as a vengeance.586 
Another important adab text of the Saljuq era is the RilJat-u~-$udiir wa Ayat-us-
Suriir (written 599 AH/1202 CE) of Mul].ammad Ibn 'Ali Ibn Sulayman Al-Rawandi (d. 
early thirteenth century CE). In this work, he provides an account of the latter part of 
Saljuq history (1037-1194 CE), however he does so with little information on their 
military campaigns. Nevertheless, it is an appropriate text for examination here for its 
norms are more Islamic than those of the early Saljuqs which drew from nomadic and 
Turkic traditions. 
Like other works of this genre, Rawandi begins with a statement on the 
importance of justice for kingship. In doing so, he cites the following Prophetic l].adith: 
585 Gerard, Chaliand. Ed. The Art ofWar in World History, (Berekly, Los Angeles, London: 
University ofCalifornia Press, 1994) 430. The piece is originally translated by Reuben Levy (New York: 
Dutton, 1951) 219-221. 
586 Gerard, Chaliand. Ed. 1994,430. 
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'An hOUT of justice is better than seventy years of prayer' 
Rawandi refer to poetry to support many of his moral statements, including the poetry 
of Ferdows1. In commentating on hostility, for example, Rawandi cites the following 
line: 
~JJj "-! Jy' üb 4.S ~J 4.S 
'F or a knowledgeable enemy is preferable to an ignorant friend.' 
The notions of the 'self and the 'other' revolve around knowledge and ignorance. 
Knowledge makes what is essentially disagreeable agreeable. It sets down new criteria 
for evaluating relationships offriendship and hostility. 
Sa'di: On Enmity and Tolerance 
The most important poet of thirteenth century in Iran and standing next to Jaliil al-Dln 
Mowlavl (Rüml) was Muslih al-Dln Sa'di (c. 1209-1291 CE) still most popular poet in 
Iran for his didactic literature reflected in poetry in his first book Bi/stan (Orchard) and 
in prose in his second book Gulistan (Rose Garden). 
Sa 'di's poetry, mostly proverbial in Persian literature, promotes tolerance and peaceful 
coexistence with 'Others.' One ofhis frequently quoted maxims is the following: 
The comfort in both words result from two words: 
Treating friends with ail knightly virtues (specially generocity) and enemies with 
tolerance 
In Sa'di's view, "Resolving a conflict by flattering the enemy is better than launching a 
war."S87 He emphacises on war as a last resort: "If all political tactics prove useless, 
however, drawing the sword becomes legitimate. Nonetheless, if the enemy asks for 
peace, be conciliatory, but ifhe persists in being bellicose, you must take up the 
challenge."S88 For Sa'di, the legitimacy of the conflict is very important. "Ifhe (the 
587 Gerard, Chaliand. Ed. The Art ofWar in World History, (Berekly, Los Angeles, London: 
University of Califomia Press, 1994) 451. 
588 Gerard, Chaliand, 1994, 451. 
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/---- enemy) is the one who seeks an armistice," Sa'di asserts, "your authority is a thousand 
times greater, and it is he who unleashes war, you will have no accounts to render to the 
supreme ruler of the universe on the day ofresurrection." He concludes, "But, faced 
with a vengeful enemy, you must prepare for war; kindness to a hate-filled man is an 
,,589 
error. 
Conclusions 
Islamic beliefs and local norms, which often lie rooted in pre-Islamic traditions, proved 
to be mutually dependent, and play as factors in shaping attitudes toward the cause and 
conduct of war in adab literature. These attitudes often varied from the legal precepts 
fixed in books of jurisprudence. A close reading of Iranian literature shows that there 
was no facile celebration of war as an aristocratic pastime. Instead the literature 
presents many arguments for avoiding wars. When conflict was inevitable, the texts 
emphasize its horrors as weIl as its contradictions, and that it fundamentally opposed 
the notion of kherad, the wisdom that was regarded as the well-spring of a better 
society. However, much of the literature is the work of scribes, people of 'the pen' who 
served the people of 'the sword.' As a result, the texts are full of paradoxes and 
contradictions reflecting the different outlooks of the authors and their intended 
audiences. These writers interjected Islamic notions of war ethics among peoples and in 
circumstances very different from those of the early Muslim world. 
So far a selective overview of the intellectual responses of the Muslim world has 
come to a full cicle. The next chapter will put these responses and reflections into a 
theoretical and comparative perspective. 
589 Gerard, Chaliand, 1994, 451. 
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/- CHAPT ER SIX 
THEORIES OF W AR ETHICS: 
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
For war is the harde st place: 
if comprehensive and consistent 
moral judgments are possible there, 
they are possible everywhere. 
Michael Walzer'90 
This chapter looks, in a comparative manner, into the Western and the Islamic just war 
and jihad theories and provides a brief comparative history of their relative 
developments. The impacts of various Islamic schools of jurisprudence and poli tic al 
philosophy on the theory and the practice of war ethics will be discussed. In the end, this 
chapter will examine three distinctly different theories of Islamic war ethics that 
represent relevant tendencies among the Muslim scholars. The relevance of these 
theories to sorne modem Western theories will also be tackled. 
The concept of 'just war' may sound modem; however the contextual arguments 
embedded in the notion are as old as the history of humanity. The story of war and 
humanity has origins in sacred and biblical history; the mythical first sin committed by 
a human being on earth, after being thrown out of paradise, was the killing of Abel by 
Cain. This murderous act, of course, cannot be defined as war, for the vietim (Abel) did 
not exercise any resistance; however, if the killing of a pers on constitutes a cardinal 
sin591 , as it does in almost aH religions, the act of war, for many lives that it takes, 
should therefore be considered as the worst of aH crimes. It is ironie, then, that so many 
wars through the course of human history have been inspired by and exeeuted in the 
590 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, A Moral Argument with Historical Illustration 
(Basicbooks, USA, 1977) 3. 
591 The most severe Qur'anic prohibition of murder appears in Q.5:32, and Q.4:93. The former 
reads: "that is why We decreed for the children ofIsrael that whosoever kills a human being, except (as 
punishment) for murder or for spreading corruption in the land, it shall be like killing all humanity; and 
whosoever saves a life, saves the entire human race"; Q.4:93 reads: "any one who kills a believer 
intentionally will be cast into Hell to abide there for ever, and suffer God's anger and damnation. For him 
a greater punishment awaits." From Al}mad Ali, Orooj. Al-Qur'in: A Contemporary Translation 
(Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1993). 
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name of the sacred. Whether they have been caused by sacred or secular motives, wars 
have also been understood as a reflection of the morality of the participants. In other 
words, no field of humanity could provide as strong a criteria to judge the morality of 
any belief or political system as wars do. 
The concept of war as the ultimate test of morality is illustrated by Michael 
Walzer when he asserts that war "strips away our civilized adomments and reveals our 
nakedness."592 If morality can be defined as self-discipline against our instinctive 
emotions, impulses, and rages, then it follows that the most difficult place to show this 
self-discipline is when the conflict of interests reaches the highest degree; that is in war 
when life itself is at risk. This is how and why war becomes the ultimate moral test for 
any moral system, ideology and epic literature. 
The just war tradition stands between two extremes: the first is the pacifist 
position, which is ideally against any use of force. This stance is close to the Platonic 
position, illustrated by the following sentiment: "But the best is neither war nor faction 
(civil war) -they are things we should pray to be spared from-but peace and mutual good 
Will.,,593 A modem example of this position is reflected in the proverbial statement of 
Mahatma Gandhi: "1 object to violence, because when it appears to do good, the good is 
only temporary; the evil it does is permanent." The opposite extreme is the unlimited 
support for war based on an ideological justification, that could also be called 'national 
interest' and the goals therein.594 Holy and epic-literature wars, as they are 
contextualized within religious or nationalistic ideologies, fall somewhere between the 
realms of limited or unlimited wars. The goal of this chapter is to understand where, 
within this spectrum ofvarious attitudes regarding war and the methods ofwar conduct, 
592 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars,4. 
593 Plato, Laws, 16th Ed., eds. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, book l, 628c (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989) 1230. 
594 See James T. Johnston, "Historical Roots and Sources of the Just War Tradition in Western 
Culture" in Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Westem and 
Islamic Traditions, eds. John Kelsay and James T. Johnson (New York, Westport, Connecticut, London, 
Greenwood Press, 1991) 3-3l. 
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and in the general context of Western 'just war' theories, Islamic ethics of war are 
situated. 
When discussing war ethics, it is sometimes necessary to discuss legal matters, 
though strictly speaking these matters are outside of the scope ofthis chapter.595 Finnis, 
in discussing the mutual opposition of war and peace asserts that "sound moral and 
political deliberation (practice) and reflection (theory) are not legalistic.,,596 Morally, 
peace has two important aspects: first, it is 'the point of war, ,597 and second, within 
Islamic and Christian princip les, it is defined by 'justice,' or the 'tranquility of order'. In 
other words, peace without justice or tranquility of order, is not peace. Interestingly 
enough, the terms 'justice' and 'tranquility of order' have almost identical definitions in 
Islamic and Christian traditions.598 
Western Theories ofWar Ethics 
Western theories of war ethics, inc1uding the 'just war' theory, revolve around three 
prime questions: first, to what extent is morality relevant to the matters of national 
interest; second, what are the moral justifications for resorting to war; and third, what 
are the moral codes of behavior within war. These questions may be subsumed under 
the rubrics of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. The first of these questions addresses the 
595 For a comprehensive and comparative view ofIslamic laws ofwar See Mo~tafii, Mo4aqqiq-
Damad. Protection of Individuals in Times of Anned Conflict under Intemational and Islamic Laws, (New 
York: Global Scholarly Publications, 2005). 
596 John Finnis, "The Ethics of War and Peace in the Catholic Natural Law Tradition," in The 
Ethics of War and Peace, Religious and Secular Perspectives, ed. Terry Nardin (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1996) 15. 
597 A term used by John Finnis. 
598 St. Augustine defines the 'tranquility of orders', paraphrasing from John Finnis, as "the 
arrangement of things equal and unequal in a pattern which assigns to each its proper position." See St. 
Augustine in De civitate Dei, ed. and trans., P.G. Walsh (Oxford: Oxbow Books, 2005) 19. 'Justice' on 
the other hand is defined, within the Islamic tradition, as positioning everything in the place that it was 
created for (ma wuç/i'a lahu). The ShI'! school of Islam however, views 'justice' as an intrinsic faculty 
born with every human being which stands outside the faith and according to which aIl human and divine 
actions are measured. By implication, such an a priori and independent definition of justice, brings the 
ShI'! concept of peace close to the Christian view. Shl'ites similarly hold that lasting peace and justice 
will be established by the reappearance (second coming) of the Shl'l Twelfth Imam accompanied by Jesus 
Christ. 
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causes and goals of war. These causes and goals comprise six main topics: just cause, 
right authority (who decides for war), proportionality (between the inflicted damage and 
war's ultimate goals), last resort (war is used only after aIl other means of conflict 
resolution have failed), the reasonable hope of success, and right intention.599 The 
rubric jus in bello addresses the conduct ofwar and consequently is concemed with: the 
boundaries or limits of war, the legitimate extension of war to combatants or 
noncombatants, the types of weapons used (conceming intended, impact and level of 
destruction), the treatment of wounded and prisoners of war, and so on. Three main 
positions may be identified in the discussion ofwar. They are: 'pacifist,' 'just-war,' and 
'realist. ' 
Pacifist Theories 
The perspective of pacifism rejects the ethical validity of the use of force in absolute 
terms. Indian 'Gandhism' and sorne strands of Süfism consider the use of force as evil, 
tantamount to washing blood with blood. Evil cannot be repulsed or deterred by evil. 
Koontz argues that the proponents of war usuaIly find a necessity or emergency, and 
therefore justify war under the excuse that "the heavens are about to faIl," but he points 
out that "there is simply no way to hold the heavens up in the long run.,,600 He adds that 
no one has the "responsibility to violate standards revealed to us in order to help 
God.,,601 
Many Christian pacifists, like Muslim Mu 'tazila, believe in the inherent value of 
actions (al-J;.usn wa'l qubJ;. al-dhiïtl); it is from this very principle that they conclude that 
the 'inherently wrong' cannot bring any good. This view replaces 'the power of force' 
with 'the power of vulnerability.' In much the same way, Shl'ites claim the proverbial 
'victory of blood over sword' after I:Iusayn Ibn 'Ali's martyrdom in Karbala' (d. 680 
599 These six pre conditions for just war appeared in the first major treaty on war written by 
Alexander of Hales (ca. 1240). See John Finnis, "The Ethics ofWar and Peace," 18. 
600 Theodore 1. Koontz, "Christian Nonvio1ence: An Interpretation," in The Ethics of War and 
Peace: Religious and Secular Perspectives, ed. Terry Nardin (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 
1996) 192. 
601 Koontz, "Christian Nonviolence: An Interpretation," 191. 
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CE). Although ijusayn knew the futility of winning in battle, he organized an armed 
resistance as a matter of principle. In fact, striking similarities are also found between 
the Christian apocalyptic view and the ShI 'ite pacifist; notably, bath believing in the 
use of sword to help usher in the retum of Christ and the ShI'1's Twelfth Imam (al-
Mahdi), and therefore the kingdom of Gad. Incidentally, according ta ShI 'ite theology, 
when the occulted Twelfth Imam retums in arder ta bring back justice to the world, he 
will be accompanied by Jesus Christ.602 
The condemnation of war by Christian pacifists precludes most discussion of jus 
in bello. The aim of Christian pacifists, according to Terry Nardin, "is not to develop 
casuistry of fighting but ta re-center the debate by drawing the hne between war and 
peace rather than between fighting fair and fighting dirty.,,603 Like for the Mushm ~üfis, 
the real war for the pacifist Christians is in one's thought and his weapon is intellectual. 
St. Paul writes the following ta the Corinthians as reflected in the Bible: "For although 
we are in the flesh, we do not battle according ta the flesh, for the weapons of our battle 
are not of flesh but are enormously powerful, capable of destroying fortresses. We 
destroy arguments and every pretension raising itself against the knowledge of God, and 
take every thought captive in obedience to Christ, and we are ready to punish every 
disobedience, once your obedience is complete.,,604 
Christian pacifists comprise three sub-groups: those who believe in the power of 
persuasion and example (p aci fi st ), those who emphasize the power of reason and 
common interests, thus promoting negotiation (abolitionists), and those who advocate 
nonviolent resistance stressing the power of withdrawing consent. Essentially, their 
602 According to a Prophetie 4adith the Prophet has asserted: "A nation (umma) that has me on 
the top, Mahdi in the middle, and Jesus on its end will never vanish." This is from Mu4ammad Ibn Rasül 
Barzang, AI-Ishi 'a li Ishri.! as-Si 'a (Cairo, 1103 AH) 112. Another 4adith reads: " ... And Jesus will stay 
on Earth for fourty years (once he reappears with al-Mahdi) and will pray behind al-Mahdi." See Abü Zaid 
A4mad Ibn Sahl Balkhl, Al-Bad' wat-Tiirich, vol. 1 (Paris: leroux, 1899-1919) 192. 
603 Terry Nardin, "The Comparative Ethics of War and Peace," in The Ethics of War and Peace, 
ed. Terry Nardin (Princeton, N.l: Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1996) 259. 
604 Saint Joseph. The New American Bible, (New York: Catholic Book Publishing Co. 1991) 
2071. 
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common ground is that they are aH against the power of the gun.605 According to Finnis, 
"pacifism is not to be found in the New Testament;" rather, he asserts that the New 
Testament embodies what is known today as the Catholic natural law of practical 
reasonableness, 606 and it is this Catholic natural law that contributes to the 'just war' 
theory. 
Hebraic, Roman, and Christian Contributions to the Just War Theory 
According to Johnson, the "just war tradition is a major moral tradition of Western 
culture, shaped by both religious and non-religious forces and taking shape in both 
religious and non-religious forms within that culture.,,607 As for the religious roots of 
this tradition, Johnson refers to the Hebraic contribution that was formulated by the 
medieval commentator Maimonides. Maimonides claimed that Judaism recognizes three 
different kind of wars: first, religious wars, which are fought with destructive force, 
directly commanded by God and assert mandat ory participation for aH males;608 second, 
defensive wars in which aH males must participate, but are not as destructive; and third, 
optional wars of the kings of Israel, participation in which is excused by other 
obligations, and in which, for example, proportionality and non-combatancy matters. 609 
"On the whole," asserts Terry Nardin, "Judaism accepts resistance, fighting, and killing 
as necessary for self-defense ... and the need to fight is the normal condition of things in 
a pre-messianic world," but "there are no wars of conversion in Judaism, for a Jewish 
holy war is a war of extermination, though the conditions justifying wars like those 
fought against Amalek and Canaan may never be repeated.,,610 
605 Koontz, "Christian Nonviolenee: An Interpretation," 173. 
606 Finnis, "The Ethics ofWar and Peace," 34. 
607 Johnson, "Historieal Roots," 3. 
608 On the ethieal qualities of the se wars, David Hay points to the Book of Joshua reeording that 
the Jews exeeuted not only the noneombatants but even the animaIs they seized at Jerieho. See David J. 
Hay, "Collateral Damage?" in Christie, Niall and Yazigi, Maya eds. Noble Ideals and Bloody Realities, 
Warfare in the Middle Ages, (Lei den and Boston: Brill, 2006) 7. 
609 Johnson, "Historie al Roots," 7. 
610 Nardin, "Comparative Ethies," 249. 
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Johnson maintains that the Hebraic tradition, as developed later on by the 
Christians, only helped the concept of mitigating war or jus in bello. In his view, it was 
the Romans who contributed to the jus ad bellum, or the legitimate causation ofwar.611 
According to Johnson the contributions were several: 
The definition of just cause in terms of three conditions (defense, retaking something 
wrongly taken, punishrnent of evildoing), the idea that only the highest authorities in 
the state could authorize violence on behalf of the state, and such other ideas as the 
requirements of last resort, proportionality of good to evil done, and the goal of peace.612 
Christian attitudes evolved slowly. Christians stayed aloof of war for the first 
Christian century but, disappointed with the delay of the second coming of Christ, they 
gradually started participating in military service. By the end of the second Christian 
century, they regarded the Roman state as the provider of "peace and stability necessary 
to the continued prosperity of Christianity.,,613 St. Augustine and his mentor Bishop 
Ambrose argued this position in the fourth and fifth centuries based on the Christian 
princip les of love for one's neighbor and the obligation to defend him. St. Augustine 
emphasized the importance of the principle of 'the right intention' over concem for 
death. Koontz, deeply skeptical of views which emphasize the judgment of action based 
611 Western war ethics has little background (so far as this author is aware of) in the major 
ancient Greek works of political philosophy. Plato, for example, does not see that the non-Greek enemies 
should be subject to any principle of war ethics in battles. He does not recognize any inter-Greek war -
what he caUs faction, (470c, 470d). However, Plato develops sorne moral codes for the inter-Greek faction 
such as the prohibition ofbuming Greek cities (470b) or stripping the deceased soldiers (469c). As for the 
Greek prisoners ofwar he states: "And the man who is taken alive by the enemy, won't we give him as a 
gift to those who took him, to use their catch as they wish (468a)?" See Plato, The Republic, Francis 
MacDonald Conford trans. and ed. (New York and London: Oxford University Press, Twenty-Eight 
printing, 1965) 170-174. War ethics princip les in the practice of the great ancient figures such Alexander 
the Great is also scant in chronicles, although there are impressive literatures about his war strategies like 
the one written by the Greek author Arrian (ca. 92-175 CE). There is only one reference in his war account 
of Alexander when he confronted Drius III of Persia. According to Arrian, "" .Parmenio (one of 
Alexander's commanders) went to Alexander's tent and advised a night attack." To this Alexander 
replied: "1 will not demean myself by stealing victory like a thief. Alexander must defeat his enemies 
openly and honestly." See Gerard Chaliand ed. The Art ofWar in World History, (Berekley, Los Angeles, 
London: University ofCalifornia Press, 1994) 183. 
612 Johnson, "Historical Roots," 8. 
613 Johnson, "Historical Roots," 9. 
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on motives or intention,614 maintains that any intention that is not understood by the 
recipient of an action cannot be valued. By intention, he refers to the immediate action 
that a person may be about to commit. Motive, on the other hand, is the moral spirit 
within which and the final goal for which one may commit the action. 
The contributions of classical culture, in Johnson's view, are essential, as ancient 
Greece and republican Rome established the principles of statecraft and the concept of 
the 'use of force' therein. These shaped the codes of chivalry exercised by the Germanie 
knightly class into the growing tradition of jus in bello.615 
The concept of the just war did not gain wide acceptance until the tenth century. 
The tenth cent ury, indeed, saw unparalleled violence and lawlessness. However, during 
this century and the next, the ideas of the 'peace of God' (not harming non-combatants), 
and the 'truce of God' (prohibition of fighting on particular days) developed. Johnson 
asserts that with the convergence of these ideas under the rubrics jus ad bellum and jus 
in bello in the twelfth cent ury, the just war tradition was established in the high Middle 
Ages. The Decretum, written by a monk named Gratian in the mid-twelfth century (c. 
1140), systematized these concepts.616 It referred to such maxims as: one may not 
commit a lesser evil in order to prevent a greater evi1.617 
Before hi m, according to Hay, it was Bishop Anselm II of Lucca who in his 
Collectio Canonum (c. 1085 CE) provided the first legal collection in the Catholic 
tradition that addressed the issue of Christian warfare.618 Anselm also provided a legal 
614 Koontz, "Christian Nonviolence: An Interpretation," 187. 
615 Johnson, "Historical Roots," Il. 
616 This very general picture must not give the miss impression that the whole course of these 
humanitarian developments was steady and benign. See P.W. Edbury, "Crusades Against Christians: 
Their Origins and Early Development, c1000-1216" in Norman Housley, ed., Crusading and Warfare in 
Medieval and Renaissance Europe (Aldershot, Burlington, Sydney: Ashgate Variorum, 2001). He shows 
how the "peace of God' idea, and the work of Gratian, was heavily abused by the Church, within the 
eleventh and twelfth centuries to mobilize political crusades, in addition to the ones on 'Muslim Pagans' 
against other Christians and heretics (like the 1208 war of Pope Innocent III against surrounding regions). 
617 Thompson, Agustine O.P., Trans. Gratian, The Treatise on Laws, Decretum DD. 1-20, 
(U.S.A:The Catholic University of America Press, 1993) 52. 
618 David J. Hay, "Collateral Damage?" in Christie, Niall and Yazigi, Maya eds. Noble Ideals and 
Bloody Realities, Warfare in the Middle Ages, (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2006) 17. 
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and theological foundation for papal campaigns against the Roman emperor.619 
According to Hay, it was Anselm who by "adding a distinctly Christian gloss to the epic 
history of the Jews ... argued that campaigns directed against heretics and schismatics 
could also be acts of love and mercy.,,620 Hay points that both Augustine and Anselm 
justified war as a means to prevent greater evils.621 War therefore was introduced as a 
purfying institution. According to Hay, " ... the ideology of religious pollution and 
purification prompted sorne of the Christian chroniclers to demand the execution of non-
Christian civilians as necessary rather than collateral damage.,,622 
Johnson argues two important points. First, the corpus of the consensus 
canonical laws on just war which appeared in the mid-twelfth century set an important 
standard for future discussions. This occurred only half a century after the inception of 
the Crusades in 1095 CE. Secondly, chivalric institutions rather than the church played 
an essential role in the formulation of jus in bello laws. 623 
Absent from Johnson's analysis is the interrelationship between these laws and 
the Crusades, with the flowering of European chivalry and Islamic institutions of futiiwa 
during this period. 
Jus in bello, went through two major developments before it reaches the modem 
times. First, it was Hugo Grotius (d.1645 CE) who gave the whole do main of jus in bello 
a conceptual and moral independence from jus ad bellum. He stressed that no matter 
how just or unjust the causes of wars may be, the humanitarian aspects of war must be 
619 David J. Hay, "Collateral Damage?" 2006, 17. 
620 Hay, "Collateral Damage?" 2006, 17. Compare this view with similar ideas of Mutahharl in 
Chapter Three. 
621 Hay, "CollateriDamage?" 2006, 18. 
622 Hay, "Collateral Damage?" 2006, 19. 
623 Johnson ("Historical Roots," 15) maintains that aside from the weapons limit and protection 
of churchly persons, all other regulations such as, noncombatant immunity (covering women, children, 
aged, the infirmed, and the mentally impaired, peasants on the land, townspeople, merchants, and other 
peaceful folks), also the concept of proportionality came directly from the values and practices of 
chivalry. 
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respected.624 The second development was when Rousseau (d.1778 CE) tried to pro vide 
full conceptual protection for the individu al civilians as opposed to the states which, in 
his view, were the real party to wars.625 In this way Rousseau extended the 
independence of jus in bello, that was granted by Grotius, to its full effect and separated 
state's identity from that of individuals thereby protecting the non-combatants of all 
warring sides. 
The Realist Schools 
In its philosophical and ethical construct, Realism partially, if not completely, runs 
against the central premise shared by the pacifists and the just war theorists, for the 
Realist school pre scribes that morality should not necessarily always govern the state's 
affairs. This outlook can be termed as conditional political morality. Realists maintain 
that when it cornes to the matters of national security or survival, any moral stance may 
be broken in both realms of jus in bellum and jus ad bello. Within these two realms, 
there can be many situations defined as 'extreme' or an 'emergency;' in such cases, 
Realists argue that the state can take any defensive or offensive military measures, even 
if it costs the lives of innocent non-combatants. This extreme Realism has two 
implications: first, there is no moral value beyond the life itself. In other words, Realism 
directs preservation of the individu al or collective communal life at any cost. The 
second implication is that once in war, just about anything goes. Both ofthese tenets of 
Realism are well reflected in the words of von Clausewitz, who maintains that, "it is 
natural that the prime cause of existence will remain the supreme consideration in 
conducting it (the war);,,626 he adds that "war is an act of force ... which must le ad, in 
theory, to extremes.,,627 It should be noted that Realism in such an extreme sense runs 
624 For Grotius full discussion see Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, English Trans. by Francis 
W. Kelsey, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925). 
625 See Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Du Contrat Social, Livre J, (The Social Contract), Trans. by 
Maurice Cranston, (New York and London: Penguin Books, 1968). 
626 Karl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton 
University Press, 1976) 87. 
627 Clausewitz, On War, 77. 
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directly counter to the ethics of Christian pacifists, and its concept of unlimited war also 
goes against the just war theory. 
Mapel states that Realists "are generally resistant to any question of peace with 
justice, since this would suggest that there can be no peace in the absence of agreement 
about justice.,,628 This may reduce the peace of Realism to simply a practical truce, 
which is similar to the Hobbesian view of international relations as a state of permanent 
potential contention. However, Realists do have moral concerns, but they maintain that 
the immorality ofwar simply is inferior to a greater morality, that is the preservation of 
collective lives in the sense ofnations.629 
It is important to note that in the context of the ethical arguments in the 
previous chapter, in giving primacy to prudence over moral or even utilitarian concerns 
for war, Realists may simply fall into the realm of moral relativism if they fail to 
provide solid and absolute definitions for notions such as 'threat,' 'aggression,' 'national 
sovereignty,' and 'national security.' But such solid definitions, as is contemporarily 
understood, are a highly implausible task regarding aIl the four realms. The Realists' 
moral relativism may seem to make them more aggressive and prone to war than the 
various religious and ethical moralists. However, in Mapel's point of view, "because 
realism refuses to justify war on legal, moral, or religious grounds, it is a doctrine that in 
sorne respects limits violence.,,63o Mapel continues, " .. .in criticism ofrealism, it may be 
said that realism is more willing to permit aggression and less willing to oppose it than 
other traditions. In reply, it may be said realism is more tolerant ofpeaceful negotiation 
with the devil than other traditions, on the grounds that negotiation is usually less risky 
and less destructive than confrontation on the basis ofprinciple.,,631 
628 David R. Mapel, "Realism and the Ethics of War and Peace," in The Ethics of War and Peace, 
ed. Terry Nardin (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1996) 56-7. 
629 In showing a moral border between realism and the naturallaw that is the basis of the just war 
theory, Terry Nardin refers to natural law's principle of self-defense that is more constraining than the 
realist's expansive goal of self-preservation. Nardin, however, maintains that sorne moral principles like 
righting of a wrong, restoring a damage, or punishing the wrongdoer, may make naturallaw more violent 
that realism (Nardin, "Comparative Ethics," 250-51). 
630 Mapel, "Realism and the Ethics ofWar and Peace," 60. 
631 Mapel, "Realism and the Ethics ofWar and Peace," 61. 
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As is the case for other war ethics theories such as pacifism and just war school, 
the questions of 'intention' and 'motive' play an important role within Realism. The 
Realist schools believe in the primacy of motive over intention.632 War, in their view as 
a form, means, or intention (however evil it might be), is justified in the way of 
attaining, and in the spirit of, security. It is within this equation that realists justify the 
ends ofboth preventive and pre-emptive wars. 633 
Two important conclusions can be drawn: first, Realism, by having an open hand 
in resorting to war, and avoiding the ideological or religious demonization of the enemy, 
has greater flexibility in international affairs than its rival ethical schools. Secondly, 
because of the above factors, realism makes international transformation more possible 
and desirable, which may explain why Realism is the predominant norm in 
contemporary international relations. However, critiques of Realism maintain that the 
Realist moral ground is not necessarily satisfactory. Realism in fact seems to be 
religiously and fanatically state-centric to the extreme that it can easily come to conflict 
with the wish of the individu al subjects; in this way it is a form of ideology. The Realist 
Niebuhr, consequently, has posited two distinct moral systems, one for the individu al 
and the other for the society or the state.634 Conventional Realists, nevertheless, prefer 
morality of the greater society to that of the individual. In this sense they disagree with 
the autonomy-centric Kantian and Utilitarian ethics that were discussed in the previous 
chapter. For the Kantian school, citizens' freedom is superior to any social values. 
Besides, as Finnis has asserted, for Kant there is no end beyond the very pers on of 
human being.635 For Utilitarianism, the majority may decide that their happiness is 
achieved by something other than the fixed ultimate value of the realist school Le. the 
state's security or national interest. Strong Realism, moreover, denies the relevance of 
632 As menti one d, motive is the ultimate goal for a venture but intention is the immediate act one 
implements in order to reach that goal. 
633 Preemptive war is known conventionally as a war waged in the face of an immediate threat. 
Preventive war, on the other hand, seeks to check a threat that may come in the long run. 
634 Mapel, "Realism and the Ethics ofWar and Peace," 71. 
635 Finnis, "The Ethics ofWar and Peace," 21. 
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morality to the matters of international relations including war and peace. 636 As Jeff 
McMahan explains, 'weak Realism', conversely, does away with morality only in cases 
of national emergency.637 
The Proliferation of Theories and Vague Conceptual Boundaries 
The previous discussion of this chapter has summarized the most important features and 
arguments of the principal Western war theories. However, these theories have 
developed so extensively that it is virtually impossible to reduce them to discrete 
schools ofthought. It has been noted that Pacifism has three subdivisions. According to 
McMahan there are three major tendencies within the Realist school, namely the 
'strong', the 'moderate,' and the 'weak' Realism. The 'moderate' tendency has four 
subdivisions of its own.638 The same is true for just war theory. The increasing 
complexity and fluidity of international relations has, moreover, blurred many 
conceptual boundaries. As McMahan observes, it is hard today to consider 
'humanitarian intervention' as an act of aggression.639 Though it is often violent, Finnis 
has identified problems in distinguishing between defense and offense, punishment and 
defense, and militant and non-militant.640 However, given that the purpose of discussing 
these theories is solely to establish a conceptual framework for the study of Islamic war 
theories, the above generalizations may be useful. 
One of the principal questions in Western theories of war ethics is the extent to 
which morality is relevant in the decisions leading to the initiation of war and peace, 
and in their inherent qualities. The degree of relevance varies from one school to 
another. For example, the Pacifist school believes in the absolute primacy of morality. 
As one moves from Pacifism to just war theories, and then, within Realism, from the 
636 Jeff McMahan, "Realism, Morality and War," in The Ethics of War and Peace, ed. Terry 
Nardin (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1996) 79. 
637 McMahan, "Realism, Morality and War," 83. 
638 McMahan, "Realism, Morality and War," 82. 
639 McMahan, "Realism, Morality and War," 84. 
640 Finnis, "The Ethics ofWar and Peace," 21-2, 27. 
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'weak' to the 'strong' tendencies, the relevance of morality gradually erodes. Strong 
Realism, in fact, condones 'war for the love of war.' This resembles the City of 
Domination described by al- FarabI. While no clear school can be identified in Islamic 
tradition with Pacifism,64l there are many parallel theories to just war and, to sorne 
extent Realism. 
War Ethics in Islamic Traditions 
As mentioned in Chapter Two and Four, it is difficult to draw a clear line between 
ethics and law as separate disciplines; however there are many possible overlaps 
between the two realms. This section tries, however, to examine the Islamic ethical 
tradition on war in the sense that the spirit, and not the body of the positive laws on war 
will come under scrutiny. The Islamic tradition also refers to a vast and rich 4adith, slra, 
(words and deeds of the Islamic role models specially of the Prophet), and tafslr (the 
Qur'anic exegetical) literatures; again, these traditions will be examined through their 
ethical perspective. The adab literature as noticed in the previous chapter is also a major 
contributor to the Islamic tradition on war. The sixth source of Islamic ethics, namely 
the philosophical tradition has already been tackled in Chapter Four.642 Therefore, the 
following discussion is confined to the contributions of the ethical spirit of fiqh, 4adith, 
slra, and tafsirto Islamic war ethics. 
The Questions of 'Militant Ethos' and 'Total Community' 
A number of Western scholars have long suggested that political interest in combination 
with the possibility of forging \ladith, and coercing favorable legal judgments 
suppressed humanitarian concerns in jurisprudence regulating Muslim warfare. Sorne, 
like Hodgson, have claimed that "Mu4ammad's prophethood, in fulfilling the 
641 Except, however, if one considers the attitude of the early Meccan Muslim community, or 
sorne of the theoretical ~ufi approaches called 'total peace' (~ullJ kul/) as separate war ethics schools. 
642 The six sources of Islamic ethics are: first, the Qur'an and its exegesis (tafSIr), second, 
jurisprudence (fiqh), third, the words of the Prophet and other authorities -such as Imams (4amth), fourth, 
the practices of and precedents by the Prophet and other authorities (sIra or its Arabie plural Siyar), fifth, 
_-, the traditions of aphorism, and collective visions based on historie and intellectual experiences (adab) , 
and sixth, philosophie al thoughts. 
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monotheistic tendency toward a total religious community, at the same time, left his 
community with that temptation to a spirit of exclusivity that went with any vision of a 
total community and that received appropriate expression in warfare.,,643 In response, 
Martin has argued that such views can be misleading. They have led Western scholars 
"to the conclusion that there is a discernible ethos of violence in Islamic society, not the 
pathos of ideals leading to tragic consequences but a conscious ethos of violence.,,644 
This essentialist line of analysis claims simply that if Muslims failed, then something 
should be amiss in the very moral core of Islam. More profound analyses, however, reach 
different conclusions. 
Militants and Texts at War 
Recent scholarship pro vides a more nuanced view. Firestone is far less text-sensitive 
than reader-sensitive; he maintains that script ures by themselves carry various 
possibilities of misinterpretations. He writes: 
Anyone who can read is able to find excerpts in translation from the Bible and from our 
Talmud and midrash that would curdle the blood of any innocent reader who doesn't 
know the context of the citations. Our great King David arranged the murder of an 
innocent man because he lusted over the poor man's wife (2 Samuel: Il). Rabbis 
incinerate their opponents (Shabbat 34a, Sanhedrin IODa). The Torah even calls for mass 
extermination, for genocide of the native Canaanite inhabitants of the land 
(Deuteronomy 7). It is just as easy to find violent materia1 in the Qur'an and in the 
second most important source of Islamic religious teaching: the \1adith literature 
(parallel to Oral Law in Judaism).645 
643 Richard C. Martin, 'The Religious Foundations ofWar, Peace, and Statecraft in Islam" in Just 
War and Jihid Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Westem and Islamic 
Traditions eds. John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson (New York, Westport, London: Greenwood Press, 
1991) 91-119. 
644 Martin, "Religious Foundations," 108. 
645 Reuven Firestone, "Islam Hijacked," The Jewish Journal ofGreater Los Angeles, September 
28, 200l. Also the following statement by Jesus Christ faUs into the same category of militant statements: 
"Do not think that 1 have come to bring peace upon the earth. 1 have come to bring not peace but the sword. 
For 1 have come to set a man 'against his father, a daughter against her mother, and a daughter -in-law 
against her mother-in-law; and one's enemies wiU be those of his household. ,,, See Saint Joseph, The New 
American Bible, (New York: Catholic Book Publishing Co. 1991) Matthew. 10:34-36, p. 1714. 
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,-- After examining a wide range of sources, Firestone argues against the 'evolutionary 
theory' which asserts the graduaI appearance and dominance of militant Islam. Instead, 
both the militant and pacifist or moderate groups existed from the beginning vying with 
one another and justifying their respective positions by Qur'anic citations. Firestone 
contends, in the end, the militant groups won out.646 He argues that "their program is 
supported by militant scriptural passages, especially in what are dated as the 'later' 
revelations according to the 'evolutionary theory' ... but because Scripture can not be 
erased, something had to be done ... the theory of naskh (abrogation) accounts for this 
problem." 647 The institution of the 'sacred months' (al-ashhur al-i}urum)648 moderated 
this victory.649 Firestone's discussion focuses on the initiation of war, rather than laws 
and ethics for the conduct ofwar, that is, the obligation of a Muslim warrior or state to 
conquer the world and impose the laws of Allah. 
Jurists' Approach to the 'Self' and to the 'Other' 
Approaches of various legal schools toward the ethics of war depended on their 
perspective of the 'Other,' whether non-Muslims or non-conformists. The tolerant and 
humanistic approach of Abu I:Ianlfa to the cultural circumstances of various Muslim 
communities, and the personal opinions of other jurists reflected concurrently his 
moderate view about the 'Other,' and the 'Self.' 
Khadduri suggests six different stages of development for Islamic civilization 
thus far. 650 At each stage, the various jurists attempted to reconcile the socio-political 
realities with Islamic ideals. Sunni jurists in particular developed a distinct 
646 Reuven Firestone, Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam (New York, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999) 68. 
647 Firestone, Jihad, 68. 
648 The four months in which war were forbidden. This law ofwar was inherited from pre-Islamic 
Arabian society. 
649 Firestone, Jihad, 68. 
650 These stages are: first the City-State (622-632), second the Imperial (632-750), third the 
Univers al (750-ca. 900), fourth the Decentralization (ca. 900-c.a. 1500), fifth the Fragmentation (c.a. 
1500-1918), and sixth the National (1918- ... ). Stages are taken from Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in 
the Law of Islam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1955) 20. 
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interpretation of the Qur'an which may be read, at least in part, as an apologia for the 
conquests of the mid to late seventh century.651 Moral and non-moral (political, religious 
and military) factors both played a role in the development of the concept of justice in 
war.652 AI-Mawarm (d.1058 CE), one of the most pro minent Islamic political 
philosophers, living in a period of social and political decentralization and 
fragmentation, developed a theory which modified the monistic doctrine of the caliphate 
to the political realities ofhis time.653 AI-Mawarm states that self-appointed provincial 
rulers must receive recognition from the caliph stressing the latter's ultimate authority. 
Many independent and semi-independent states existed in the Islamic world. Perhaps, 
because of the relatively free intellectual space resulting from this multiplicity, al-
Mawarm was able to imbue his poli tic al philosophy with humanism as did his 
contemporary, Ibn Miskawayh. 
Once al-Mawarm accepted the reality of multiple political states and the 
separation of religious from political authority (though such political power was gained 
by usurpation), his conception of the Islamic 'Self approached a pluralistic vision.654 
The change of the unified 'Self to multiple 'Selves,' inevitably broke the monolithic 
image of the 'Other,' and, along with it, the sharp lines between the 'abode of peace' 
(dM al-Islam) and the 'abode ofwar' (dar al-fJarb). 
651 Abdulaziz A. Sachedina, "The Development of Jihad in Islamic Revelation and History," in 
Cross, Crescent, And Sword' The Justification and Limitation of War in Westem and Islamic Tradition, 
eds. James Turner Johnson and John Kelsay (New York. Westport, CT., London: Greenwood Press, 1990) 
35-50. 
652 John Kelsay, "Islam and the Distinction between Combatants and Noncombatants," in Cross, 
Crescent, And Sword: The Justification and Limitation of War in Westem and Islamic Tradition, eds. 
James Turner Johnson and John Kelsay (New York. Westport, CT., London: Greenwood Press, 1990) 198, 
200. 
653 Khadduri, War and Peace, 21. 
654 Abu al-f.lasan al-Mawardi, Kitiib al-AiJkiim al-Sultaniyya, ed. M. Enger (Bonn: n.p., 1853). 
Mawardi's critics such as, H. A. Gibb, maintain that by theorizing and legitimizing the separation of 
politica1 authority of the sultan and the religious authority of the caliph/imam, Mawardi has weakened the 
ru1e of the SharJ'a (Is1amic law). Perhaps a better conclusion is that by theorizing this separation, he has 
injected a measure ofhumanism into the body oflaw and helped it, at the generallevel, to get rid of some 
of its unnecessary edges both within the 'Self,' and also between the 'Self and the 'Other.' For Gibb' 
criticism of Mawardi, see H. A. R. Gibb, "al-Mawardi's Theory of the Khilafah," Islamic Culture, Vol. 
XII, 1937,291-302. 
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This view is echoed among later jurists. One of the most important authorities of 
Sunn1 Islam during the twentieth cent ury, Shaykh Ma4miid Shaltiit of al-Azhar 
University supported this idea ofpluralism referring to the Qur'anic verse Q.49:13: "we 
have created you as peoples and tribes to make you know one another," as the source of 
scriptural support for his pluralism.655 By understanding 'Others,' one may recognize 
and know the 'Self.' 
The Ethics of the Siyar Literature 
Early on, the extensive Islamic traditions in each of the four authoritative fields fiqh, 
4acfith, sJra, and tafsir, contributed to the first major Islamic legal treatise on war, which 
appeared in Mu4ammad Ibn al-I:Iasan al-Shayban1's (c.189/804) Siyar. 656 This treatise 
appeared about four centuries before the first collection of the Christian canon law, 
Gratian's Decretum (c. 1140 CE).657 For Siyar's content that goes beyond mere 
regulations on war, Philip Jessup compares it with the work of Hugo Grotius (d. 1645 
CE), known as the father of Western internationallaw.658 
Al-Shayban1, a disciple of Abii I:Ian1fa (d.l50 AH/768 CE), a founder of one of 
the four formaI Sunn1 legal schools, inherited the latter's flexible approach to legal 
matters relative to the other three Sunn1 schools (Malik1, Shafi '1, and I:Ianbali) which 
were stricter in certain areas of legal approach. 659 According to Majid Khadduri, Abii 
655 Tibi, "War and Peace in Islam,"136. 
656 Shaybanï, Mu4ammad ibn al-f,Iasan. The Is1amic Law of Nations: Shaybiinï 's Siyar, trans. 
Majid Khadduri, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966). Shaybiinl's Kitiib a1-Siyar a1-KabJrreceived an 
elaborate commentary by M04ammad Ibn A4mad Sarakhsl (d. 483AH/l090CE) called ShariJ a1-Siyar a1-
Kabir. 
657 According to Khadduri, Shaybiinl was the most important jurist writing on Siyar but not the 
first one; among the first authors he mentions: IbrahIm al-Nakha'l (d. 95 AH/714 CE), f,Iammad b. 
Sulaymiin (d. 120 AH/738 CE), al-Sha'bl (d. 104 AH/723 CE), Sufyiin al-Thawr1 (d.161 AH/738 CE), 
Malik b. Anas (d.179 AH/796 CE) Zuhr1 (d. 124 AH/742 CE), Rabl'a (d. 136 AH/754 CE), 'Abd al-
Ra4miin al-Awza '1 ( d. 157 AH/774 CE) and Shaybiinl's teacher Abu f,Ianlfa (d. 150 AH/768 CE), from 
Shaybânï, The Is1amic Law of Nations, 22; Note should be taken that Abu f,Ianifa was a student of Ja'far 
al-$adiq (d. 148 AH/765 CE) known to be the founder of Twelver Shl'1te jurisprudence. 
658 Shaybanï, The Is1amic Law of Nations, vii. 
659 AI-Shafi'I opposed non-Prophetie sources of q.adith, Malik stressed on the authenticity of the 
Medinan 4adith, and Ibn f,Ianbal was relying solely on q.adith but on the entire body of q.adith literature 
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f:Ianlfa, in representing a higher level of juristic speculation, was perhaps the first jurist 
who set of principles governing Islam's external relations with other communities.660 
Abu f:Ianlfa is known to be a cultural conformist for the incorporation of various 
customary rules ('urfj into the body of Islamic law, and also for relying on pers on al 
opinion (ra y) as a source of his jurisprudence. His school therefore was closest, among 
all other Sunnl schools, to naturallaw and objective ethics as discussed in the previous 
chapter. 
The very flexible approach of Abu f:Ianlfa, reflected in the views of his student 
al-Shaybanl, influenced the moderation of the most important Siyar literature in Islam. 
When al-Shafi '1 rejected non-Prophetic traditions as reliable source oflaw, certainly the 
body of SharJ'a was shorn not only of many l].arnths, sorne of which possibly forged to 
serve certain interests of the various successor regimes after the Prophet, but of early 
Muslim social history as well. His position against personal opinion rigidified the 
structure of his jurisprudence with negative ramifications in the fields of war and 
peace.661 It is because of such rigidity, for example, that he (al-Shafi'I) limited the 
duration of peace with the abode of war (dir al-J;.arb) to the maximum of ten years, just 
because the al-f:Iudaybiyya peace treaty that the Prophet sanctioned, stipulated exactly 
that period of time.662 Similar approach also led him to make radical and harsh rulings 
on the treatment ofprisoners ofwar. 663 
(without filtration). As a result, Abu I:Ianlfa appeared to be the most flexible, Ibn I:I anb al the most 
traditionalist, and al-Shafi'I the best systematic and abstract thinker among the four. Ibn I:Ianbal however, 
because of his indiscriminate position on the entire body of 4adith adopted a part of early Muslim social 
history. 
660 AI-Shaybanï, The Islamic Law of Nations, 25. 
661 It is for this position, according to E. Chaumont, that "al-Ghazali attributes to him the maxim 
'whoever ventures a law based on juristic preference has forged the Islamic law-free translation (man 
istalJsana fa-qad shara 'a). This maxim is just opposite the Shl'l maxim whatever is the ruling of the 
Islamic law, is sanctioned by the reason as well- free translation (kullu ma amara bihi al-shar' amara bihi 
al-'Aql). From Encyc10pœdia of Islam, new edit ion, s.v. "Al-Shafi'I" by E. Chaumont. 
662 This treaty, signed between the early Medinan Muslims and the Meccan pagans, will be 
referred to in more details in the next chapter. 
663 Kelsay asserts: "The Prophetic reports previously cited indicate that children, women, and 
_---...... others are exempt from killing in war. But it is not altogether clear how these exemptions are to be taken. 
Sorne jurists (e.g., al-Shafi '1, d.820) distinguish between women who are polytheists and women who are 
Jews and Christians. The former should be killed, while the latter should not. See John Kelsay, "Islam and 
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J urists' Theoretical Clashes over War and Peace 
Any readers of al-Shaybanl's Siyarwould easily conclude that normal relations between 
the Islamic and the non-Islamic world were a state of war. This was perhaps, as John 
Kelsay points out, because as an Abbasid judge (qiiÇh), al-Shaybanl presupposed the 
connection ofIslam with the Abbasid's imperial state and its war pursuitS.664 However, 
as Khadduri stresses, "the object ofwar was not the annihilation of the enemy," and the 
jurists "made no explicit statement that the jihad was a war to be waged against 
unbelievers solely on account of their disbelief (kufr)."665 Further details of the laws of 
war as provided by Shaybanl confirm that an elaborate body of law under the rubric of 
bothjus in bellum (cause ofwar) and jus ad bello (conduct ofwar) was devised by the 
early jurists, apparently to regulate the conduct of war, in particular to limit and reduce 
the human casualties in wars. 
Khadduri emphasizes that Malik and the early I:Ianafi jurists appear to have 
advised the Imam to prosecute war only when the inhabitants of the diir aJ-1;.arb came 
into conflict with Islam.666 He explained: "".it was Shafi'i who first formulated the 
doctrine that the jihad had for its intent the waging of war on unbelievers for their 
disbelief and not merely when they entered into conflict with Islam ... jurists who came 
afterward, and up to the very de cline of Islamic power, merely introduced refinements 
and elaborations ofthese basic principles.,,667 It is perhaps for the wide predominance of 
this hegemonic opinion that scholars such as Emile Tyan interpret jihad as a perpetuaI 
the Distinction between Combatants and Noncombatants," in James Turner Johnson and John Kelsay eds. 
Cross, Crescent, And Sword' The Justification and limitation of War in Westem and Islamic Tradition, 
(New York. Westport, Connecticut. London: Greenwood Press, 1990), 201. 
664 Kelsay, "Islam and the Distinction Between Combatants and Noncombatants," 199. 
665 Khadduri, War and Peace, 53, 58. 
666 Khadduri, War and Peace, 58. See also Mo~tafii Mol).aqqiq-Damad, Protection of Individuals 
in Times of Armed Connict under Intemational and Islamic Laws, (New York: Global Scholarly 
Publications, 2005) 92. 
667 Khadduri, War and Peace, 58. 
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religious dut y and an institution that should help Islam to embrace the whole 
universe.668 
Like Khadduri, Mottahedeh and al-Sayyid argue that such an interpretation of 
jihad that gives it a duty-bound, univers al , and perpetuaI character, was not the only 
normative interpretation prior to al-Shafi'i. They also assert that Sufyan al-Thawrl (d. 
161 AH1778 CE), unlike in Tyan's opinion, was not the only jurist who interpreted the 
obligatory jihad only in a defensive sense.669 Mottahedeh and Sayyid, from their 
examination of Malik, Awû'i, his Khurasanl student 'Abdullah Ibn Mubarak (d. 181 
AH1797 CE) and 'Abd al-Razzaq al-San'anl (d.211 AH/826 CE) who collected the views 
of the I:Iijazl and Syrian jurists on jihad, came to the conclusion that the view of jihad 
conceptualized as obligatory aggressive war came to be the prevalent opinion in the 
second half of the second/eighth century.670 The change in outlook was influenced by 
Umayyad's need to promote their frontier war with the Byzantines. As a result, the 
Syrian school of jihad671 was more militant than the quietist Hijazl/Medinese schoo1.672 
The radicalization of jihad took two major steps: first, the militant jurists made 
an attempt to organize the relevant verses in chronological order so that the purported 
verse (or verses, according to sorne) of the sword, which made war a perpetuaI and 
permanent obligation of the Islamic community came last and therefore abrogated the 
earlier verses which could have allowed the development of a more moderate position.673 
Secondly, as early as in the first half of the second/eighth century, the term 'dir al-iJarb' 
668 The Encyc10paedia of Islam, new edition, s.v. "Djihad" by Emile Tyan. 
669 Roy Mottahedeh and Ridwan al-Sayyid, "The Idea of Jihad in Islam before the Crusades," in 
The Crusades From the Perspective of Byzantium and Muslim World, ed. Angeliki E. Laiou and Roy 
Parviz Mottahedeh (Washington D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks, 2001). 
670 Mottahedeh and al-Sayyid, "The Idea of Jihad," 26. 
671 The Syrian sect was led by Awza'1 and Ibn Mubitrak, and taken to its peak by al-Shafi'I and 
Sarakhsl (d. 483 AHlllOl CE). Mottahedeh and al-Sayyid stress that although Ibn Mubarak was as 
belligerent as his mentor Awza'i, he incorporated the role of government and individu al in the concept of 
jihad. 
672 The Hijazl/Medinese sect was led by Malik and Abü I:Ianlfa, followed by al-Shaybanl and Abü 
YÜsuf. 
673 Mottahedeh and al-Sayyid, "The Idea of Jihad," 28. 
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was created. The dichotomy between diT a1-iJaTb and diir al-Islam perpetuated the dual 
view of the self and the other which presumed a constant state of antagonism.674 
AI-Shafi '1 promoted the more militant Syrian school soon afterwards and made 
it the normative theory. Despite his militant position, he also suggested a new realm in 
international relations named 'the abode of covenant' (diir a1- 'ahd). In this way, he 
softened the belligerent content of 'Others,' and thereby reduced, to certain extent, the 
inevitability of the Muslim versus non-Muslim clash. Nevertheless, by 100 king at jihad 
as an inalienable princip le of Islam whose systematic practice and implementation was 
at least as important as other major Islamic tenets such as prayer and fasting, Shafi'I and 
his followers made the institution of jihad easily available for rulers who needed to 
resort to periodic wars for worldly motives. 
It is important to note that the position in support of primary ( offensive) war and 
the interpretation of jihad as an eternal, permanent, and collective dut y to fight against 
disbelief was so radical that even a staunch traditionalist such as Ibn Taymiya (d.l327 
CE) denied this interpretation and called jihad the greatest compulsion in religion.675 He 
stressed, "That Muslims have allowed war is because the enemy has authorized war." 676 
Preferring an ethical perspective over a judicial one, he came to the conclusion that 
compulsion cannot, by definition, attain any merit. There was a clash here between the 
spirit of the law and its body, or essentially, between ethics and law. 
Perhaps the climax of this ethical-juridical paradox appears when Islamic law 
recognizes the individu al as a subject in the international theatre. This notion provides 
the theoretical potential for modem Muslim nations to embrace the internationally 
674 It seems that Mottahedeh and Sayyid attribute the dual view to Mul;tammad Nafs az-Zakiyya. 
675 Paraphrased by Khadduri, War and Peace, 59, from Taql al-Dln Ibn Taymiya, "Qa'ida fi Qital 
al-Kufrar," in Majmü'at Rasilit, ed. M. Hamld al-Fiqql (Cairo: n.p., 1949) 123. Note should be taken 
That Ibn Taymiya, issued a fatwa that called for jihad against a few Shl'l sects inc1uding the Nosairiya (a 
group of extremist Shi 'ites that elevated 'AIi's status to divination) among the most obligatory of ail 
SharJ'a rulings (more important than jihad with infidels). See 'Abd-ur-Ra4man, Badawl, Madhahib al-
lsmamiyin (The History of lslamic Theological Speculations), 421. Since its issuance till modem times, 
this fatwa, has caused many extremist attempts to exterminate Shi' 1 communities in various regions. 
676 Quoted from Ibn Taymiya's Risila al-Qitilin Mo~tafii Mol).aqqiq-Damad, Protection of 
Individuals in Times of Armed Connict under Intemational and lslamic Laws, (New York: Global 
Scholarly Publications, 2005) 92. 
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recognized human rights. However to the contrary, sorne of the militantltraditional 
views such as the one on diir al-iJarb, inhibit the potential for participating 
constructively in international relations as weIl as for global human rights. Khadduri 
refers to this paradox from a moral perspective when he asserts that, 
The historical experiences of Islam, indeed the historie al experiences of ail mankind, 
demonstrate that any system of public order, on the national as weil as the international 
plane, would lose its meaning were it divorced completely from moral principles.677 
Hashmi similarly observes that, "much of the controversy surrounding the 
concept of jihïid among Muslims today emerges from the tension between its legal and 
ethical dimensions.,,678 He points out that the consequence of this tension is the 
stagnation of the medieval legal theory. He echoes the sentiments of other Islamic 
scholars such as Fazlur Rahman, when he asserts that "with the rise of the legalistic 
tradition, ethical inquiry became a narrow and secondary concern of Islamic 
scholarship.,,679 While it is true that the rise of Islamic legalism (and not the law) has 
resulted in a decline of ethics, as already shown in sorne details, roots of divergent views 
on war ethics existed long before medieval sharJ'a ceased to meet the needs of various 
Muslim states.680 It can be argued that various tendencies regarding both the cause and 
the conduct of war already existed in the time of the Prophet as patterns of behavior, 
and not only because of a moral shift in the Muslim community from a Meccan 
moralist/pacifist posture to the Medinese legalist/activism. These moral tendencies in 
fact had also something to do with the very character of the early companions of the 
Prophet. 
The following section of this chapter will briefly discuss these tendencies and to 
centain extent clashing views, summed up into three schools or theories ofwar ethics in 
Islam based on the evidences that this thesis has so far demonstrated. 
677 Khadduri, War and Peace, 69. 
678 Rahman, "Law and Ethics in Islam," 9. 
679 Hashmi, "Interpreting the Islamic Ethics ofWar and Peace," 147. 
680 Hashmi, "Interpreting the Islamic Ethics ofWar and Peace," 147. 
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The Islamic Just War Theories 
It has already been noted that the early jurists of the I:Ianafi school, and jurists like 
Awza'1, as well as Malik, the founder of the Sunn1 Maliki school supported only 
defensive-not offensive wars. The first four caliphs, however, did not explicitly present a 
theory on war; their combat legacies demonstrated their distinct and different outlooks 
towards war and peace. Idiosyncrasy had a clear impact. 
The Prophet Muqammad referred to these different attitudes with the 
contrasting metaphors of 'stone' for the militant minded and 'honey' for the moderates. 
The biographical tradition (sJra) does not show any systematic or coherent militant and 
hegemonic inclination. The Prophet emphatically professed that his mission was 
primarily ethica1.681 His early campaigns were, in modern parlance, either defensive or 
pre-emptive. The Prophet himself did not campaign beyond the Arabian Peninsula.682 He 
was tolerant of the systematic oppressive and suppressive policies of the Meccan 
polytheists as is reflected in the Qur'anic Meccan verses. He was later criticized by 
sorne of his Companions for concluding the I:Iudayb1yya peace treaty rather than 
fighting the Meccan polytheists. Similarly, Abu Bakr, the first caliph after the death of 
the Prophet, was well aware of the limits of war and humanitarian concerns in his 
conduct ofwar.683 'Ali Ibn Ab1 Talib the third caliph, the cousin, and son-in-law of the 
Prophet showed his full attention both to the legitimate cause ofwar Uus ad bellum) and 
the methods of war Uus in bello) during the Prophetic wars. In addition, he did not 
participate in expansionist wars. While it could be argued that this was because of his 
engagement in domestic wars, he refused to join the conquests at the peak of their 
popularity under 'Umar, and 'Uthman the second and the third caliph. 'Ali asserted to 
681 '1 was sent to perfect noble qualities of character'; a Prophetic proverbiall;\adith. 
682 Tyan maintains that "according to a view held by modem Orientalist scholarship, 
Ml!4arnmad's conception of the jihad as attack applied only in relation to the people of Arabia." See The 
Encyclopaedia of Islam, new edition, s.v. "Djihad" by Emile Tyan. 
683 Abu Bakr's elaborate ruling on jus in bellowill be discussed in Chapter One. 
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- one of his companions Kumayl Ibn Ziyad: "Oh Kumayl, there is no war except under a 
just Imam and no booty except if shared with a just Imam.,,684 
Ja'far al-Sadiq, the founder of the Twelver Shl'1legal school, who incidentally 
had Abu I:Ianlfa among his students, also did not support primary (offensive) wars. Led 
by the formulations of aH;adiq, Shl'1 jurists, for whom 'justice' and 'the right 
authority' in war were of prime legal and theological importance, dec1ined to support 
any war (other than sheer defensive actions) in the absence of an infallible Imam.685 AI-
Shaybanl's Siyar, which drew heavily from Abu I:Ianlfa, has no reference to primary 
(offensive) war. 
These examples, which show a distinctly ethical approach to war contributed to 
the foundations of Islamic just war theories with many parallels to Western just war 
literature. In Hashmi' s words, " ... there is a growing convergence in conceptions of jihad 
and just war that permits a cross-cultural dialogue on ethics of war and peace. "686 
Sorne medieval as well as modem authors of Islamic just war theories c1aimed 
that wars in the Islamic context may not be considered legally justified if they lack 
ethical cause. For this reason, Hashmi argues that the twelfth century jurist and 
philosopher Ibn Rushd, like many other Muslim writers, " .. .implicitly, if not always 
explicitly, separated the grounds for jihad from the grounds for war (1;.arb)."687 The 
difference here is not just the fact that jihad is a war sanctioned by law; rather it is 
sanctioned by law on the very moral grounds that can be comprehended and justified by 
reason. By implication, this means that war has to be oflast resort.688 The ban on 'first 
684 Mulla Mol).ammad Bagir Majles1, Bahiir al-AnwiiI; Vol. 17 , Abdulhossein Reza'1 trans. and ed. 
(Tehran: Islamiyeh Bookstore, 1364/ 1984 CE) 278. 
685 According to Twelver Sh1'1sm, twelve infallible Imams, starting with 'Ali Ibn Ab1 Talib, 
followed by his descendents and ending with al-Mahdi, the occulted Imam, are the sole legitimate leaders 
of the Islamic community with full authority. 
686 Hashmi, "Interpreting the Islamic Ethics ofWar and Peace," 147. 
687 Hashmi, "Interpreting the Islamic Ethics ofWar and Peace," 156. 
688 It was the weil known principle and practice of the Prophet that he used to write to the 
belligerent side before a formaI war would be waged. Hashmi asserts: "according to the medieval view, 
.-, Muslims are obliged to propagate this (Islam) divine law, through peaceful me ans if possible, through 
violent means ifnecessary." See Hashmi, "Interpreting the Islamic Ethics ofWar and Peace," 165. 
217 
strike,' and the fact that only one of the various meanings of jihad refers to war, are 
additional reasons that support the Islamic principle of 'war as the last resort. ,689 
As for the conduct of war (jus in bello), despite the stagnation of legal position 
since the medieval era, there is a vast and elaborate body of positive law to regulate it. 
A good part of this rather elaborate law is well reflected in al-Shaybanl's Siyar 
literature. 
This literature conveys the following regulations: the prohibition of waging the 
first strike in battle and inflicting unnecessary damage; condemning of the killing of 
noncombatants, elderly, women, children, mutilation, treacherous attacks (in breach of 
existing contracts), and the ill-treatment of prisoners of war; the legality and binding 
nature of the truce (hudna), amnesty (aman), ceasefire, peace treaty (~uI4); the principle 
limiting reciprocation-in-kind; emphasis on the sanctity of and respect for treaty (al-
'ahd), negotiations with the enemy; and the fair division ofbooty. 690 
As Nardin points out, "despite many differences ... the idea of jihad resembles the 
Western idea of just war not only in presuming that peace is the end of war but also in 
insisting that the values of peace govern the conduct of war.,,691 The example of the 
Prophet and other Muslim leaders, ShI'! formulations and the Siyar literature define 
jihad a war that is morally justified, dec1ared by a legitimate ruler, initiated with the 
right motive, pursued with the right conduct, and limited to justified ends. 
The moral foundations of Western and Islamic just war theories are identical, 
though their legal supra-structure may differ on certain points. Hashmi states: 
"The similarities between Western and Islarnic thinking on war and peace are far more 
numerous than the differences. Jihad, like just war, was conceived by its early theorists 
689 Many sources of Islarnic tradition point to a Prophetie 1;ladith that holds: "The best form of 
jihad (afçlal aljihad) is speaking out (in critical terms) in the presence of the oppressive ruler (su!tiin al-
ja'ir). ~ufi literature usually interprets jihad, based on a Prophetie 1;ladith, as an inter-spiritual struggle of 
individuals to purify themselves of their camaI souls. 
690 The greater part of al-Shaybiinl's Siyar is focused on jus in bello. See Shaybiinl', The Islamic 
Law of Nations. 
691 Nardin, "The Comparative Ethics ofWar and Peace," 259. 
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basically as a means to circumscribe the 1egitimate reasons for war to so few that peace 
is inevitab1y enhanced."692 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, conceptually and in practice there have been 
three general tendencies and trends within the Muslim traditions on war. The first 
de fines war only as a defensive measure. Here, war can not be conceived as a legitimate 
means for ideological propagation or domination. The second trend looks at war not 
only as a means for defense, but also as a legitimate institution for moral 
interventionism in international relations. Here the world still enjoys a legitimate 
political and ideological pluralism. The third view, that is the most militant of aIl, looks 
at moral, ideological and political pluralism only as a temporary stage. Here war is a 
legitimate means to ultimately convert the whole world to Islam and bring the entire 
humanity under one government and one ideology. Like various Western just war 
theories, each of the three just-war concepts within the traditional and modem Muslim 
life enjoy a spectrum of subordinate variations. Note should be taken that given the 
incoherence existing in the views of sorne of the theorists of just war in Islam, it is quite 
possible that various aspects of the views of a single theorist may fit two or three 
separate theories. The following section of this chapter will look at the above 
conceptual trends. 
Theory of Just-Defense 
One of the fundamental questions for any just war theory is the causes and grounds of 
war (jus ad bellum). Islamic Just-Defense theorists disagree with the contention of 
theorists of Total-Islamization that jihad is an obligatory and continuaI warfare against 
unbelievers (a category including Jews, Christians, Sabaeans, and Zoroastrians). 
Medieval sources show that the Muslim Just-Defense theorists used sever al arguments 
to support their views. First, they made a clear distinction between the very act of war 
(iJarb) from jihad. Secondly, they established jihad within the category of fan! kitaya, 
which is a moral obligation only for those physically and financially capable, as opposed 
to fan! 'ayn, or a legal obligation incumbent upon aU - like prayer or fasting. 
692 Hashmi, "Interpreting the Is1amic Ethics ofWar and Peace," 164. 
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Furthermore, they argued that the Qur'anic verses in support of militant jihad must be 
read in combination with the verses supporting peace rather than abrogating them. The 
Imam or caliph may decide to suspend jihad if he deems it unnecessary.693 The 
formulations of these jurists restricted the meaning and applicability of jihad, and 
therefore the causality and legitimate bases for just wars. 
Most jurists imposed conditions for jihad that restricted the institution even 
further. Among various Islamic schools, the ShI'! requirements for the Imam seem to 
have established the toughest standard, for in this school, a legitimate Imam must be 
infallible, and for Twelver Shl'ites the number of Imams are fixed at twelve. In other 
words, since the greater occultation of the Twelfth Imam, Mu4ammad al-Qa'im, also 
caUed al-Mahdi in 329 AH/941 CE and until his second coming for the establishment of 
justice in the world, the ShI'! view asserts that there is no possible authority who could 
legitimize a war. Sorne ShI'! jurists, neverthe1ess, maintain that defensive war is an 
exception to this rule, as self-defense is an obligatory rule no matter the 
circumst ances. 694 
A major controversy between the Just-Defense and the Total-Islamization 
protagonists has been over the interpretation of campaigns (Forays or ghazws and 
sariyyas) that took place under the rule of the Prophet at Medina (622-32 CE). Both 
medieval and modem just war theorists, as well as many 'orientalists,' maintain that the 
campaigns were not of an aggressive nature aimed at annihilating the pagan enemy, 
rather they were economic missions (as the collected booty was essential for the 
sustenance of the Muslims in Medina),695 pre-emptive/deterrent measures (against the 
threat of the Meccan polytheists),696 providing incentives for potential converts, or part 
of Arabian culture, where such forays were often considered legitimate war-games in a 
693 Hashmi refers to the views ofIbn Rushd's Bidiiyat al-Mujtahid See Hashmi, "Interpreting the 
Islamic Ethics ofWar and Peace," 156-57. 
694 A critical view of the Shl'l thought onjihiid will be provided in Chapter Three. 
695 Hashmi, "Interpreting the Islamic Ethics ofWar and Peace," 153. 
696 This is reflected in the views of MlÙ).ammad Haykal in The Life of MufJammad, trans. Ismail 
Ragi al-Faruqi (Indianapolis: North American Trust, 1976) 204. He is quoted by Hashmi in "Interpreting 
the Islamic Ethics ofWar and Peace," 154. 
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tribal spirit of sport,697 or reconnaisance measures. Other campaign justifications 
suggested by Moral-Intervention theorists range from defending the rights of oppressed 
societies to the expansion of human values on earth through providing and securing 
religious freedom for oppressed pagan societies.698 What is common in all of these 
suggestions is that the Prophetic campaigns were definitely not for mere territorial 
expansionism or political domination; rather, they were either outreach efforts to let 
other communities hear about Islam and join the Islamic community, or ventured for 
self-sustenance and securing freedom for aIl. 
Jihad is designed and introduced by Islam, not as an institution to promo te war, 
but as one that limits and controls it by the instrument of legitimacy, regarding both the 
cause of war and the authority that orders and leads the war. In this way, Shaykh 
Mal]mud Shaltiit asserts that war is an immoral situation, and therefore it must not be 
used to calI (da'wa) people to Islam. Referring to Q.lO:99, he asks ofhis fellow Muslims 
"had Allah wanted, all people of the earth would have believed in him, would you then 
dare force faith upon them?,,699 Shaltut stands almost at the brink ofpacifism.70o 
Modern ShI'! jurists like Mol]aqqiq-Damad take a longer step forward and sees a 
complete and genuine compatibility between the highest standards of the present 
international laws regarding the protection of individuals in war and the rules of war in 
Islam. 701 For him the highly contractual nature of the Islamic law, and the facts that 
697 Fred M. Donner, "The Sources of the Islamic Conception of War" in Just War and Jihad, eds. 
John Kelsay and James Turner Johnson (New York, Westport, CT., London: Greenwood Press, 1991). 
698 Murtaq.li Mutahharl, "Jihlid in the Qur'an," in Jihad and Shahadat: Struggle and Marytrdom in 
Islam, eds. Mehdi Abedi and Gary Legenhausen (Houston, TX.: The Institute for Research and Islamic 
Studies, 1986) 88, 103, 105; note should be taken that besides Mutahharl, Abü'l- 'Alli Maududi also 
justifies jihlid on the ground of the hurnan rights. Look at Abü'l- 'Alli Maududi, Jihad fi Sabil Alliih 
(Lahore: Idara Tarjuman al-Qur'an, 1988) 55. 
699 Tibi, "War and Peace in Islam," 136. 
700 An interesting pacifist view as M. Athar Ali reports, is the sixteenth century view of ~ulIJ kull 
held by the Mughal Emperor Akbar (d. 1014 AH/1606 CE) and his counselor Abu'l Faq.l, inspired by Ibn 
al-' ArabI, recognized religious diversity, and ordered full tolerance of all other faiths. See The 
EncycJopaedia of Islam, new edition, s.v. "$uIIJ-i Kul/' by M. Athar Ali. 
701 Mol?aqqiq-Damlid, Protection ofIndividuals in Times of Anned ConDiet under Intemational 
and Islamie Laws, (2005) 442. 
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reason is a primary and costumary practice ('uriJ is an important source (although 
secondary) of this law, give the Muslim states full flexibility to abide by binding 
international conventions on war and peace. He asserts that ideological difference can 
not be a legitimate cause ofwar simply because all the non-combatants are protected by 
Islamic law without any prejudice, and therefore a non-combatant non-believer can not 
be object of any justified war in Islam.702 
Iskandad, as discussed in Chapter Three, puts the basis of the Islamic theory of 
war on the princip le of reciprocation-in-kind (muqiibila bi'l mithl) that falls under the 
general title of 'retaliation' (qi$ii$). He therefore limits legitimate war in Islam only to a 
retaliatory and punitive measure. This view does not leave any space for corrective wars 
or wars for moral and political expansionism. It is very important to note that the 
Qur'anic injunction suggests retaliation-in-kind only as the least preferred measure on 
the top of which there are two other appearantly preferred measures: financial 
compensation (diya), and forgiveness ('afiv).703 These latter options point to humanism 
that primarily seeks to limit human sufferings as much as possible. 
It is quite conceivable that what the Qur'an suggests to be the preferred norm 
between the individuals, could be, or perhaps should be, applied in a collective sc ale to 
international relations. Such relations are highly contractual, based on mutual respect of 
all countries and applicable in an essentially pluralistic world where laws are not biased 
according to belief systems. Such a world defies the dichotomy of diir al-Islam and diir 
al-iJarb that is the foundation of the Total-Islamization theory. Conversly it inc1udes a 
multiple of abodes such as peace (al-$uliJ), contract (al- 'aiJd), amnesty (al-amiin), 
prevarication (al-taqiya), faith (al-Imiin) and others. 
The above arguments rooted both in the tradition al and modem legal, moral, and 
literary sources of Muslim cultures, suggest a genuine and consistant Islamic Just-
Defense theory. According to this theory, war is limited in its cause and quality merely 
to defense and used only as the last resort. 
702 Mo4aqqiq-Damad, Protection ofIndividuals in Times of Armed ConDict under Intemational 
and Islamie Laws, (2005) 91, 402, 440, 441. 
703See Q.5:45 and Q.2:178 in page 93 ofChapter Three. 
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Theory of Moral-Interventionism 
This theory is perhaps best elaborated on by Mutahhad and partially by Tabataba'l as 
mentioned in Chapter Three. According to this theory, the Muslim community 
worldwide has an eternal corrective, punitive and moral responsibility for the world-
order at large. Wherever there is a communal oppression, an international aggression, or 
even mere lack of ideological freedom, the Islamic community is obliged to intervene, 
by force, and protect what Mutahharl calls 'right of humanity,' irrespective of the will 
of the oppressed or disenchanted communities. Such mission in this theory is divinely 
ordained and is not contractual in nature. In its conceptual framework, this theory is 
quite similar to the modem Western interventionist policies in promoting worldwide 
'democracy. ' 
Despite its obligatory global mission, the Islamic Moral-Interventionism does 
not aim to convert the entire world to Islam, for it is against compulsion in faith. To the 
contrary the Moral-Interventionit theory allows military intervention in the name of 
liberating (not dominating) non-Muslims who are under oppression.704 !ts mission will 
end whenener and wherever the freedom of opinion is fully guaranteed so that people 
worldwide could be freely exposed to the Islamic calI. In other words, all what the 
protagonists of the Moral-Interventionism seek is that people of the world have 
complete freedom first, to be exposed and have access to Islam; secondly, to convert to 
Islam if they will; third, to be rulled by Islamic norms as they wish. 
Although this theory pursues a global mission, it nevertheless does not conceive 
war as the primary means of achieving its goal. War here, as for the Just-Defense theory 
keeps to be oflast resort. 
In the ShI'! version of this theory, given the necessity of the just authority, and 
until the coming of al-Qa'im (the Twelvth Imam), Moral-Interventionism is temporarily 
delayed. Therefore in the present circumstances, the Muslim community has no use of 
war except merely for defense. 
704 See Mutahhad, "Jihad in the Qur'an." 
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Theory of Total-Islamization 
It has previously been mentioned that the Umayyads' almost permanent contention with 
the Byzantine empire, in conformity with the expansionist legacy of 'Umar the second 
caliph, needed and helped a theory to be developed on the basis of the dichotomy of the 
'abode of peace (dir al-Islam),' and the' abode of war (dir al-iJarb).' These formulations 
had no Qur'rulic source, however according to Tibi, they were coined in the age of 
Islamic military expansionism.705 This juristic invention, dividing the world into two 
mutually hostile spheres, was established in a Hobbesian spirit of a state of permanent 
potential international contention, became the basis for a theory of war that may be 
called the theory of 'Total-Islamization,' which overlaps with both the Western just war 
and Realist theories. 
Western military realism, or as Tibi has suggested, 'conformism,' has been and 
still is the predominant model of war practice in most Islamic countries for many 
centuries. However, the philosophie al foundation of this realism, which exc1udes a part 
or the whole of the state's international relations from morality, does not conform in 
princip le to Islamic war ethics. Nevertheless, there are features of the Western realist 
war theory that share aspects of the Islamic theory of Total-Islamization. 
Realists, or at least 'weak' Realists, do have moral concerns, although they 
maintain that the immorality of war simply dissolves within the greater morality that is 
the preservation of nations. 'Weak' Realism maintains, for example, that under an 
emergency situation, the morallaws governing war may be disregarded. Likewise, the 
Islamic theory of Total-Islamization adheres to the proverbial Islamic precept that 'the 
necessities override the forbidden' (al-eJariïrit tubliJ al-Malgiïrit); though the 'necessity' 
may only be defined within a larger moral context. Since Islam has a univers al mission 
for humanity, in the hegemonic view non-believers have to be brought to submission by 
force, negotiations or by free will. For this viewpoint, truce (hudna) and peace (~uliJ) are 
of a temporary nature, while war is permanent until the global conversion to Islam is 
complete. Tibi maintains for exactly this reason, Islamic hegemonic ethics of war are 
705 There is no Qur'anic reference to diir al-J;arb, or diir al-Islam. Q. 10:25 alludes to diir as-Salim 
which is the abode of peace in eschatological sense. It does not refer to the geopolitical borders of the 
Muslim world. See Tibi, "War and Peace in Islam," 130. 
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not compatible with the Westernjust war theory, for the latter system is not based on an 
understanding grounded on a religious worldview.706 However, it could be argued that 
once a cause of war is justified in either system, any similar situation must again (and 
permanently so) lead to a just war. In other words, once a war is just, it will remain just 
under an identical moral system. Therefore, given the same circumstances that entail 
waging war in defense of a 'nation' or a 'state's security' (both ultimate goals for 
Realists, which they respect unconditionally and therefore religiously), the behavior of 
the Realists is not much different from that of Total-Islamization protagonists. 
Total-Islamization also has common characteristics with Western just war 
theory in its judgment of both the cause and the conduct of war. Like the Western 
school, the Total-Islamization school must have a moral justification to enter a war, turn 
to war as a last resort, and observe considerable constraints in the conduct of war. 
However, none of these constraints are absolute and they may be modified if the defeat 
of the enemy so requires. 
It is important to note that the Total-Islamization theory shares a very important 
tenet with the Western Realist School. For the latter, the 'national interest' stands as 
the ultimate criteria that must determine the question ofwar and peace. For the former, 
a similar concept has been developed by jurists which is called the 'Islamic Interest" (al-
ma~lalJa). This interest is a princip le by which Muslims can legally cancel any provision 
of Islamic law (sharJ'a) under the justification that by its implementation, the greater 
interest of the Muslim community may be endangered. As stated by Bassam Tibi, it was 
this same principle that was used by the nineteenth century Moroccan jurist A.4mad al-
Na~lrl to daim that "under contemporary conditions (when Muslims are weak and 
unarmed and their Christian contenders are powerful and heavily armed), the interest of 
Islam forbids Muslims to wage war against unbelievers.,,707 Interestingly, here the 
theorists of Total-Islamization use a Western Realist argument of the primacy of the 
.. t ·d 708 commumty mteres , to avOl war. 
706 Tibi, "War and Peace in Islam," 131. 
707 Tibi, "War and Peace in Islam," 135. 
708 Note should be taken that a leading contemporary ShI'! scholar Mohammad I:lusayn 
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Islamic Just-Defense theorists conceived of the greater jihad (al-jihid al-akbar) as a 
struggle against one's own camaI soul. This is why they refer to jihad in its militarist 
capacity as 'armed jihad' (al-jihid al-musalla1;.a).709 The non-militaristic view of jihad 
conforms to a widely cited hadith that states that "the highest form of holy war is 
speaking out truthfully before an unjust ruler, and being killed for it.,,710 
Conversely, theorists of Total-Islamization conceived of the greater jihad as 
exoteric and by definition an armed struggle. They are often identified as 
'fundamentalists' and included the ideologues founders of the Ikhwau al-Muslimln of 
Egypt, I:Iasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb who used jihad and qitil (fighting) 
interchangeably. War, moreover, is not confine d, for theses ideologues, to inter-state 
battles. The 'other' is understood simply in terms of religious affiliation. According to 
Tibi: 
These "fundamentalists follow the Islamic tradition of not considering states in the 
context of war and peace; the terrn war is used here to mean fighting among loose 
parties of believers and unbelievers, no matter how they are organized politically."711 
The term jihad has gained a much broader militant meaning in modern times. 
Contemporary Muslim militants have shown little hesitation in declaring jihad against 
their Muslim opponents. This has been the case not only in Iran and Egypt, where the 
Tabataba'l, considers the principle of ma~lalJa as a psudo-principle invented by the early caliphs to aquire 
an open hand in the way oftheir political ambitions. See Mohammad I:Iusayn, Tabataba'1, ShI 'ah: Les 
Entretien et les Correspondances de Professeur Henry Corbin avec 'Alliimah Taba.tabii'I (Persian), 4th ed. 
(Tehran: Mu'assese pazhuheshi Hekmat wa Falsafeh Iran, 1383/1984 CE) 214. 
709 Tibi, "War and Peace in Islam," 136, 138. 
710 Goodman, Islamic Humanism, 92. 
711 Tibi, "War and Peace in Islam," 137; Tibi quotes Qutb's important assertion as the following: 
"The dynamic spread of Islam assumes the forrn of jihiidby the sword ... not as a defensive movement, as 
those Muslim defeatists imagine, who subjugate to the offensive pressure ofWestem orientalists ... Islam 
is meant for the entire globe." It is important to note that the Iranian fundamentalists of the 1979 
revolution have shown more interest to fight and purge their domestic contest ers than the alien 
unbelievers. 
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term has been used to promote regime change, but among militant groups in post-
Saddam Iraq who systematically terrorize Muslims and non-Muslims alike.712 
Such extremes demonstrate the wide range of usage and abuse of the term jihad. 
On one side of the spectrum, the concept of jihad treats the 'self as an alien 'other' that 
must be ethically tamed. On the opposite side of the spectrum, the arrogant 'self wages 
jihad to dominate and 'correct' all the inferior 'others.' Clearly, this latter interpretation 
is a recipe for permanent war. These are, of course, two sides ofthe extremes that do not 
form the mainstream Islamic views ofwar and peace. 
Cornrnon Factors in Western and Islarnic War Ethics 
This section analyzes sorne commonalities in the thought ofWesterners and Muslims on 
war. According to N ardin, none of the Western and Islamic schools are inherently 
militarist; all view war as, at best, a means and not as an end in itsele13 In the words of 
Moqaqqiq-Damad, "AlI Malik!, and ijanafi, most Shafi 'i and ijanbaIi and also many 
Imaml (ShI 'ite) faqlhs (jurists) have expressed the view that the purpose of jihad and 
killing is to keep the enemy's bellicosity at bay.,,714 
Christian pacifism and Islamic schools of just war emphasize the preservation of 
life, though this should not be pursued just at any cost. Naturallaw, which serves as the 
basis for Western theories of just war, pro scribes inflicting damage to an innocent. 
Christian pacifists reject washing blood by blood, or fighting evil with evil means. 
Finally, Islam insists on one living with dignity no matter the consequences against 
one's life. The Realist school, however, does not recognize many of the esoteric 
princip les of other schools; it recognizes no principle above life. 
For Realists, or 'consequentialists,' Nadrin asserts that either "cost-benefit 
reasoning is substituted for the judgments of morality ... or morality is often pushed 
712 The beheading of the Egypt's ambassador to Iraq by the Iraqi militants in July of 2005, is a 
case where a non-combatant Sunn! Muslim emissary is beheaded by their co-religionists (Sunn! Iraqis), in 
direct contravention with aU of the Isiamic rules ofwar and peace. 
713 Nardin, "The Comparative Ethics ofWar and Peace," 248. 
714 Moqaqqiq-Dlirrüid, Protection ofIndividuals in Times of Anned Conflict under Intemational 
and Islamic Laws, (2005) 91. 
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aside because disaster is a possible consequence of any loss of power.,,715 Using this 
formulation, 'prudence' stands on top of 'morality.' This is very close to the notion of 
'the expediency or the interest of the system' (ma~JjlJat ni~iim) used by the Islamic 
regime in Iran to stand on the top of all other moral concerns. In other words the Islamic 
rule must be preserved at any cost. 
Catholic natural law, Christian pacifism, Judaism, and Islam share a common 
cosmology at their core on matters ofwar and peace. According to Miller, all of the four 
traditions "typically understand war and peace within a larger cosmology, one that is 
constrained by the conviction of theodicy, or divine justice.,,716 He further points out 
that with the exception of Christian pacifists, all traditions "embrace the idea that war 
can be an instrument for providing human beings their just due" through theodicy and 
that it is this very theodicy that "produces an ethical constraint on the conduct of war in 
these traditions, especially regarding the morality of means.,,717 He holds that whereas 
Catholic naturallaw looks for norms of justice through reason, Islam and Judaism find it 
in revelation. The common ground among these traditions is 'justice.' 
ShI'! Islam builds an ethical bridge between Judaism and Catholic natural laws. 
First justice is a major principle for Shl'ism, and secondly, according to the proverbial 
ShI'! principle, 'all what is ordained by shar' is dictated by reason and all what is 
ordered by reason, is ordained by law (sharj.' Indeed, both Mu'tazifi and ShI'! 
theologies maintain the objectivity of justice, whether dictated by reason or revelation. 
Against Religious Ethics: A Critique 
As expected, there are several counterarguments which bring into question the relevance 
of religious war ethics. First, religions cannot look at states as moral agents; they are 
therefore in no position to address inter-state relations, including inter-state war. 
715 Nardin, "The Comparative Ethics ofWar and Peace," 262. 
716 Richard, B. Miller, "Divine Justice, Evil, and Tradition: Comparative Reflections," in The 
Ethics of War and Peace, ed. Terry Nardin (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1996) 266. 
717 Miller, "Divine Justice, Evil, and Tradition," 267. 
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Second, for sorne theorists, there is an inherent tension between the realms of the 
human and the divine. This tension is highlighted by Niebuhr where he asserts that "the 
ends of holiness and righteousness lie beyond history, which is finally in God's 
control.,,718 On this basis, he concludes, "those who adopt an ethic of total war, or holy 
war, arrogate to themselves a power to direct history that exceeds the limits of human 
knowledge and virtue;" thus for Niebuhr, it is the limits of human capacity which 
provide an argument against the involvement of religions in war.719 Niebuhr's view 
agrees with the Shl'1 jurists like ~ali1].I-Najafiibadi and Kadivar who maintain that the 
traditional Shl'1 concept of the infallibility of Imam and even of the very person of 
prophet Mu1].ammad solely applies to the realm of the sacred and revelation. 72o Once 
the se figures enter the public domain (including political), they are bound by the 
standards of the common people and therefore could be, conceptually subject to 
criticism for a misjudgment - based on possibly wrong information they have received in 
connection to a case. Matters of public domain must be decided by public vote and this 
vote is binding, although the result might be ethically wrong.721 By implication, this 
view leaves the authority for war and peace to a legitimate political system that gains 
its legitimacy from people's agreement and vote. For ~ali1].I-Najafiibadi and Kadivar 
therefore, the notion of 'just war' becomes completely universal.722 This view perfectly 
fits the Mu'tazilite's object ethics and Shl'1 jurists like Mohaqqeq-Damad who believe 
in the sanctity and prominence of contract in the body ofIslamic law. 
718 Niebuhr Paraphrased by Miller. See Miller, "Divine Justice, Evil, and Tradition," 268. 
719 Miller, "Divine Justice, Evil, and Tradition," 268. 
720 This, Kadivar maintains, could be inferred from Q. 18: 110: "Say, '1 am only a man like you, to 
whom has been revealed that your god is God ... " See section five of the Kadivar interview with Homa 
TV on March 5, 2006: http://1384.g00ya.comlcolurnnists/archives/045081.php 
721 Kadivar interview with Homa TV on March 5, 2006. ~iiliql-Najafiibiidi' view expressed in his 
controvertial book Shahid Javid, come to the same conclusions. For more details see Chapter Three. 
7220n the opposite side of Kadivar's view is Moqarnmad Taql Me~bii4-Yazdi, who maintains that 
without Imam's approval, people's vote lacks any validity. In his words, "People are na:sir(supporter), not 
ni,s'ib (appointer) oflegitimate govemment." See Me~bii4's interview reflected in Entekhiib's news 
bullitin on March, 5, 2006: http://www.entekhab.ir/displayI?ID=16196&page=1 
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Third, Miller questions the advocacy of any religious view which allows the use 
of evil to combat evil. In his questioning, Miller refers to Michael Walzer's Talmudic 
example, wherein rabbis discuss God's immoral commands to Saul, and Bassam Tibi's 
Islamic example where 'necessity overrides the forbidden,' so that evil is condoned to 
achieve goOd.723 
A fourth argument posits an ethical dichotomy between war and the two 
distinctive sources of evil that, according to various schools, produce it. Miller 
maintains that in both Judaism and Islam, the source for the evil of war is exterior, 
because war is essentially a fight against idolatry and polytheism.724 For Western 
schools however, he contends that evil is in the Platonic spirit; it lies within human's 
psyche. This is illustrated by Koontz's statement that "you desire and do not have; so 
you kill."725 Miller suggests that in the former case, the enemy is "more other, more 
alien ... more material and tangible" than the enemy in the second paradigm. He adds 
that in Islam and Judaism, evil is a "contamination", "defilement", "largely positive", 
"more like a virus"; whereas in the Western theoretical school, evil is "a matter of 
virtue", "largely negative: it is a privation of good, a disordered intention", "driven by 
passion", "like a bodily organ that has become dysfunctional. "726 It is for these reasons 
that Miller appreciates the similar conclusions of Tibi and Walzer as to why the war 
ethics of Judaism and Islam do not conform to the categorization of the Western or 
Christian just war tradition, and in comparison seem more militant than the latter. 
Looking at the elaborate Islamic codes of conduct in war, particularly those 
provided by the Sunnl jurist al-Shaybanl, Kelsay concludes that these rules tend to limit 
the immoral acts of war, especially in respect to the immunity of noncombatants. The 
notions of 'innocence in war' or 'justice,' however, are defined within specific religious 
and political traditions and, consequently, do not correspond to the same terms in 
723 Miller, "Divine Justice, Evil, and Tradition," 268. 
724 Miller, "Divine Justice, Evil, and Tradition," 271. 
725 Koontz paraphrased by Miller (Miller, "Divine Justice, Evil, and Tradition," 268). 
726 Ali descriptions from Miller, "Divine Justice, Evil, and Tradition," 271-72. 
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Western just war theories.727 According to Kelsay, "the development of discrimination 
in classical Sunnl thought is not fully consistent with specification of the developed just 
war tradition, with its distinction between combatants and noncombatants. But it is not 
altogether inconsistent, either.,,728 
Horizontal and Vertical Moral Structures 
In response to the above critiques, two major arguments can be raised. First, by 100 king 
at the moral and legal structure of the secular law and the religious law of war at the 
macro level, it can be argued that secular law suffers a deficiency because of its vertical 
structure as opposed to religious law that follows a horizontal structure. In a vertical 
moral/legal structure, orders (positive or negative) come vertically from the top of the 
military ranks to the bottom leaving little space for a moral decision making in war by 
lower ranks. In a religious horizontal order however, if the cause of war is morally 
justified for all participant (as it should be in principle), all individuals, irrespective of 
their ranks, are directly responsible for their acts.729 Naturally the second order limits 
the impact of immoral directives far more that the vertical order. This point is reflected 
in the following story narrated by Ibn Hisham: 
It is reported that 'Alqama Ibn al-Majazaz had been ordered to pursue the enemy after 
the battle of Dhui-Qird, but the Prophet recalled him with part of the troops and sent off 
the rest under the command of Hudhafah al-Sahm1. On the way, the latter build a fire 
and said to his men, "By virtue of my rank, 1 order you to jump into the fire." But when 
sorne of the men moved to obey his command, he laughed and said, "Stay where you are, 
1 was only joking." When the incident was reported to the Prophet, the latter 
commented, "If any one orders you to do an objectionable thing, do not obey him.,,730 
727 Kelsay, "Islam and the Distinction Between Combatants and Noncombatants," 205. 
728 Kelsay, "Islam and the Distinction Between Combatants and Noncombatants," 207. 
729 It could rightly be argued that the vertical moral structure does not necessarily need to be 
secular. For ex ample the Catholic hierarchy produces a vertical moral structure. 
730 See Moi).aqqiq-Damad, Protection oflndividuals in Times of Anned ConDict under 
Intemational and Islamic Laws, (2005) 427. 
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A more serious case is the raid against BanI J adhIma tribe by Khalid Ibn WaIid a 
Muslim commander under the Prophet. Khalid was defied buy half ofhis troops when he 
ordered (without justification) that their captives must be executed. As the story, fully 
discussed in the next chapter, reveals when the case was presented to the Prophet 
Mohammad, it was the commander (al-Walid) who was rebuked by him rather than the 
defying troops.731 
The Islamic horizontal moral structure in war also reveals its strength under the 
topic of aman or granting amnesty to the enemy. Rooted in the Qur'anic Scripture, the 
institution of aman is well defined in al-~adiq's commentary on the topic as following: 
While the army of Islam is surrounding a group of infidels, if one of the latter requests: 
'Give me aman so that 1 may visit and talk to your commander -in-chief,' and if one of 
the junior commanders show him positive reaction, then the contract of aman (amnesty) 
is actualized. 732 
In other words, all the legal contracts and agreements regarding amnesty that are formed 
between an agent or agents of the enemy and lower military ranks of the Islamic army, 
will immediately become binding for the higher military ranks. 
Based on the above, Mohaqqlq-Damad conc1udes, "A Muslim cannot break 
these rules (the humanitarian codes ofwar) on the pretext that he was under orders from 
his superiors, as the rule in Islam is that a combatant is held personally responsible for 
compliance with the provisions ofhumanitarian intemationallaw, for obedience is owed 
to no man who orders another to commit a sin.,,733 
The second argument is Toynbee's view regarding the volatile and temporary 
nature of the secular humanitarian laws in general. He maintains that it was not long 
after the victory of the secular princip le of tolerance over the medieval religious bigotry 
in Europe, that a whole wave of destructive and divisive nationalism erupted all over 
731 For the full story see Chapter One. 
732 Mol:wqqiq-Danüid, Protection ofIndividuals in Times of Armed Conflict under Intemational 
and Islamic Laws, (2005) 337. 
733 Mol}aqqiq-Damad, Protection ofIndividuals in Times of Armed Conflict under Intemational 
and Islamic Laws, (2005) 426. 
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this continent. In Toynbee's view, wars of nationalism proved to be far more savage 
than wars for religion because the motive in the former case is far less spiritual. 
Toynbee's main point is that if tolerance as a moral norm is not rooted in faith, it can 
easily be overruled by other motives. 734 In other words secular norms are ephemeral and 
unstable by definition in contradistinction with religious norms that aceompany the 
actors infinitely. 
Conclusions 
It has previously been mentioned that, given the various philosophie al, juridical, 
theological, exegetical, mystical, and historical views present at various levels of 
Islamic intelleetual discourses, it is misleading to talk about a monolithic theory of war 
ethics in the Islamic tradition; rather, one may talk about Islamic 'traditions,' of whieh 
three main trends were discussed in this chapter as three distinct theories. It is virtually 
impossible to place the war ethics of Ibn Miskawayh, al-Shafi '1, al-Shaybanl, Sayyid 
Qutb, Shaltut, Ibn al-'Arabl, al-Ghazali, Mutahhad, Tibi, Sachedina, Hashmi, Salil].l-
Najafiïbadi, Iskandad, Mol].aqqiq-Damad and Kadivar in one essentialized, theoretical 
category called 'Islamic.' 
By taking a hermeneutical view of these various traditions, Miller reminds of 
how what is called today the 'Western just war theory' has experienced fundamental 
changes in its history. His presentation of the views of St. Augustine on the causes of 
war, including his support for war against heretical belief, reveals how St. Augustine's 
view is much closer, in a theoretical context, to al-Shafi '1 than to most of his Christian 
co-religionists in the twentieth cent ury. In Miller's view, one can have very divergent 
historical, ahistorical, political, aphoristic and apodictic views of the same tradition 
with very different and divergent conclusions. 735 
734 Reza'i, Khosrow. trans. Jang va Tamaddon, (Guerre Civilisation: Amold J. Toynbee 's Views 
on War and Civi/ization, ed. Albert V. Fowler, Gallimard, 1953, (Tehran: Entesharat Elmi va Fargangi, 
1993) 4. 
735 Miller, "Divine Justice, Evil, and Tradition," 273. 
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Kelsay, notes that "unlike the classical jurists, contemporary Muslim thinkers 
seem mostly interested in the jus ad bellum."736 He locates the explanation in two 
political factors; first, modem Muslims living in the era of imperialism, colonialism, and 
Zionism want to have a free hand in fighting their enemies by whatever means and in 
whatever manner. Secondly, that Islamic apologists like Mal).mud Shaltut, the main 
authority of the Sunnl world who wrote a who le treaty on war in Islam in 20th century, 
and who failed to provide much details about jus in bello, were not personally engaged 
in war.737 Shaltut's treaty focuses primarily on jus ad bellum, and denies primary wars 
in Islam on the Qur'anic dictum (Q.2:256) of 'no compulsion in religion.' 738 
Chapter Three however proved that since the 1979 establishment of the Islamic 
Republic in Iran, and the direct involvement of the clerical leadership of this country in 
the eight year war with Iraq, a new generation of jurists such as Iskandarl and 
Mol).aqqiq-Damad have seriously and elaborately dealth with various topics of jus in 
bello. 
Variation exists not only between contemporary and classical Muslim thinkers 
but within identical contemporary cultural contexts. The Iran-Iraq war (1981-1989), for 
example, took place between two predominantly Shl'ite populations. Iraq fought a 
'sovereign war,' what its leader Saddam Hussein called a 'total war,' for which there 
were no limits on its extent and its conduct. Saddam's govemment used chemical 
weapons against its Kurdish population. On the other hand, the Iranian leaders asserted 
that its war was a 'people's war.' They limited the country's air strikes to military 
targets on account of "their Islamic commitment and their des ire to protect the innocent 
and their fear of destroying property belonging to the brotherly Iraqi nation.,,739 
736 Kelsay, "Islam and the Distinction between Combatants and Noncombatants," 207. Tt is 
important to note that many modem Muslim scholars such as M04aqqiq-Damad and Sali41-Najafiibadi 
have come with elaborate views on jus in bello. 
737 Ma4mud Shaltut's war treaty, "The Qur'an and Fighting," was published in 1948. 
m Kelsay, "Islam and the Distinction Between Combatants and Noncombatants," 210. 
739 Kelsay provides a full account of this unique and morally contrasting military case. See 
Kelsay, "Islam and the Distinction between Combatants and Noncombatants," 212-16. 
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Given such observations, it is therefore, very misleading to compare various 
traditions on a single ahistoric level. In Miller' s own words, "convergences among and 
divergences between traditions operate at more than one leve1, and we would be 
mistaken to concentrate our attention (and hopes) on specifie ethical and political issues 
alone. "740 
This chapter has conc1uded an overview of the Muslim intellectual response to 
war ethics in a limited and selective, yet representative and comparative way. A major 
challenge however is to examin and measure the distance between ide ais and realities. 
The next two chapters will look at the ethics ofwar in action both at the govemmental 
and the non-govemmentallevels. 
740 Miller, "Divine Justice, Evil, and Tradition," 280. 
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CHAPT ER SEVEN 
W AR ETHICS AND P ARA-ST AT AL MILITIA 
~I wk. r..r. ùJb û fo 4.S 
Futiiwa is to be generous for no ulterior motive. 
R
- ,741 
II1m 
People are either your brother in faith or your 
brother in creation. 
. Ali Ibn Abl1lilib 
The massacre at Karbala' in 61 AH/680 CE with the tragic demi se of I:Ius ayn b. 'Ali and 
his companions should be considered a turning point in the conception and practice of 
war as an Umayyad institution. Henceforth, the lust for power undermined questions of 
the just cause and conduct of war (jus ad bellum and jus in bello) in the Umayyad 
Imperial system. What we may caU 'a humanitarian approach to war,' however, survived 
and continued to shape other Islamic institutions. 
This approach was most apparent in para-statal military groups and institutions. 
Under various titles such as futiïwa, 'ayyiiriin, asbiiriin, etc.742 These groups and 
institutions were active during and after the Umayyad dynasty. The ideology and norms 
behind these institutions loosely resemble European chivalry. In fact, the two traditions 
interacted during the years of the Crusades. European mercenaries became familiar with 
the ethics of futiïwa which later influenced Western notions of honor, respect for enemy 
and respect for women. 
The Islamic chivalry embodied in futiïwa, however, went beyond regulating the 
conduct of war. It laid the foundations for the regulation of guilds or what is caUed 
today syndicalism. It has also played an important role in ~ufi institutions, though sorne 
ofthis lies outside the scope ofthis study. 
741 In the following piece of Mathnavj~ Ruml refers to a few of the most important principles of 
futiiwa, that is to give for no ulterior motive, and that being an all-giving is a transnational quality (Ke 
futiiwa diidan-e bl ellat ast, Piikbiizl khire) az har mellat ast ..:..1...Y' JI <::}.:i.. -sj~\.; ~I wk. r..r. ùJb ûfo 4.S 
~I); This poetry is referred to by Sayyed Sadeq Gowharln, "Maktab-e Fetyan,''' in Ayln-e Javanmardi, 
ed. Henry Corbin, trans. Eqsan Naraql, (Tehran: Nashr-e Now, 1984-1363 Persian calender) 219. 
742 Referred to in the Arabic texts in the plural Arabie term of asiiwira. 
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Faith, the Military, and Questions of State Control 
It is important to shed light on a theoretical controversy about the extent of the state' s 
control over the military and questions raised within this realm about the general 
relations between Islamic faith and military service as a profession. Goitein maintains 
that the early Muslim state was no exception to the general rule that medieval 
government was primarily responsible for security and justice; welfare and other needs 
of life were the concern of GOd.743 This assertion has prompted new lines of inquiry. 
Paul, for example, has questioned the extent to which military institutions were 
controlled by the state in a given Muslim sOciety.744 In doing so, he has challenged a 
widely held theory claiming that, by setting unattainably high ideals for public life, 
Islam has discouraged and even deterred civic participation from a very early date.745 
This view holds that Muslims have been reluctant to serve in government and, 
especially, the military out of fear of failing to abide by the proper Islamic norms of 
conduct. This has forced the Islamic state, for example, to rely on slave soldiery. 
Moreover, after its emergence in the beginning of the ninth century CE, little has 
changed for nearly a millennium.746 As Cook notes, "It is remarkably hard to find in 
Islamic history instances of what might be called citizen armies -armies locally 
recruited, by astate identified with the area in question, from a settled population that 
was not tribal.,,747 
Paul's research into the military history of Eastern Iran and Tranoxiana in the 
period of 820 to 1220 CE, however, concludes that the slave army, nomadic warriors, 
743 Shlomo D. Goitein, "The Community," in A Mediterranean Society. Vol. 2, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1971) 404. 
744 Jurgen Paul, "The State and the Military: The Samanid Case," in Papers on Inner Asia (26) 
(Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1994) 3. 
745 Daniel Pipes' wording of the theory eited in Paul, ''The State and the Military," 3. 
746 Paul, "The State and the Military," 4. 
747 Michael Cook, "Comments on Garein", in Europe and the Rise ofCapitalism, eds. 
Jean Baechler, John A. Hall, and Michael Mann (Oxford, New York: B. Blaekwell, 1988) 133. 
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and volunteer soldiers generally coexisted.748 Paul argues that the use ofmilitary slavery 
reflected the need by rulers to secure the pers on al loyalty of their soldiers rather than a 
lack of urban soldiers. The rise of slave soldiery followed from the rulers' choice and 
actions, not those of urban settlers. The adoption of slave soldiery by al-Ma'mun and al-
Mu 'tasim in the beginning of the ninth century CE could possibly be traced to 
precedents in Khurasan and Eastern Iran, given that both of these caliphs spent 
considerable time there.749 
Two other pieces of evidence support Paul's argument. First, Cour identifies a 
parallel phenomenon in the Byzantine Empire. Byzantium imported large numbers of 
Turks for military service; in fact there were instances when the Turkish slave-soldiers 
of the Muslim and the Byzantine armies fought against each other. 750 In addition, the 
army of SalaQ. al-Dln Ayyubl, according to Richards, was composed only of free-born 
soldiers. 751 Although medieval and classical M uslim jurists were frequently reluctant to 
accept official appointments as qiùfl the same attitude did not apply to military service. 
Muslim mercenaries fought for sultans and caliphs. 
In describing the situation in Tranoxiana, Paul asserts that contrary to widely 
held conclusions, between the third and fifth centuries AH / the ninth and eleventh 
centuries CE, ghiizls, 'ayyiùs, and ribii.t fighters (small independent frontier groups) were 
first loyal to their communities and faith and then to their rulers. There were frequent 
occasions when the initiatives of these free warriors had little to do with the interests 
and the wills of the heads of states.752 It was as a result of massive Turkish conversion 
748 Paul, "The State and the Military: The Samanid Case," 8; Paul takes the Siimanid rule (204-
395 AH/819-1005 CE) as a case in point. He shows that military power at the beginning of the Samanid 
period was in the hands of local people led by farmers (dihqiins) and that this had been the case in 
Tranoxiana since pre-Islamic times. 
750 See The EncycJopaedia of Islam, new edition, s.v. "DJlsh, Muslim West" by A. Cour. He 
mentions that there were cases between the Islamic and the Byzantine Empires where the Turkish slaves 
of opposing sides fought each other. 
751 The EncycJopaedia of Islam, new edit ion, s.v. "Salâ4 al-Dln" by D.S. Richards. 
752 Paul ("The State and the Military: The Samanid Case," 15-19) refers to several groups: 1) 
large groups of ghiizl fighters who volunteered to confront the Byzantines; 2) fighters organized in the 
numerous ribii.ts that were active in Tranoxiana, particularly in Bukhara and Samarqand, for seasonal jihad 
with the infidels; 3) large groups of 'ayyiiriin who were active in Sistan,Kurasan, Bukhlira and Samarqand 
with little control by the state4) local city residents called mulla wi'a who were mostly organized by the 
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to Islam in the middle of the fourth century AH / tenth century CE that the number of 
independent volunteer jihad initiatives in Tranoxiana began to diminish.753 According to 
Paul's research, slave soldiery was by no means a direct consequence of Islam as a 
religion. Various institutions of volunteer warriors were widespread until fifth cent ury 
AH / eleventh century CE.754 
Arrnies of nomadic warriors and slaves were predominantly mobilized for 
purposes of economic gain under the authority of rulers. Volunteer armies, in contrast, 
were more inc1ined to support ideological causes for war. Since they often maintained 
links to the state, they may be called para-state militias. The volunteer nature of these 
militia forces was important since it he Id every single participant responsible and 
accountable for his actions. 
The Roots of the Futuwa Institutions 
The work of Paul and others show that after the Islamic conquests, a number of para-
statal and paramilitary institutions emerged which operated in both civic and official 
capacities. Zakeri has demonstrated how the history of these institutions go es back to 
the pre-Islamic Sasanid Empire of Persia. 755 He notes the works of Taeschner and 
Cahen. These scholars have revealed that futiïwa in its assorted forms such as fatii (a 
pre-Islamic term which incorporated Arab nobleman ideals) and <ayyiiriin (a pre-Islamic 
term incorporating the ideals of Persian nobility) was well-known in the centuries prior 
to al_Na~ir.756 According to Zakeri, "Taeschner conc1uded that one can assume what 
was preserved from the culture of antiquity in Babylonia and Iran was transferred to 
Islam under the rubric of futiïwa." Cahen remarks that "there was not a single town in 
private sector in cities such as Nishapur; According to Cahen and Hanaway, Jr., 'ayyiriin had nothing to 
do with holy war though they mingled with the ghiizJs in the [rontier regions. See EncycJopa:dia Iranica, 
s.v. "'Ayyar' by Cl. Cahen and W.L. Hanaway, Jr. 
753 Paul, "The State and the Military: The Samanid Case," 23-4. 
754 Paul, "The State and the Military: The Samanid Case," 32. 
755 Muhsen Zakeri, Sasanid Soldiers in Early Muslim Society: The Origins of 'Ayyiriin and 
Futiiwa (Weisbaden: Harrasspwitz Verlag, 1995). 
756 Zakeri, Sasanid Soldier, 3, 6. 
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the Iranian and pre-Iranian world from Central Asia to Mesopotamia, which did not 
have its 'ayyiiriin.,,757 Zakeri 's own thesis is that: 
The nucleus of these groups consisted of the asbiiriin who were employed by the 
Muslims as soldiers, bodyguards, and police in Ba~ra, Kiifa, and other major cities. It 
was through them that the social ide aIs of a noble warrior class were introduced to the 
Muslims, and the foundation was laid for the institution of futüwa, in which these ideals 
were synthesized with Arab and Islamic ethical virtues ... by the dihqiiniin 758 who, as 
"intellectuals," were involved in non-military engagements such as the Shu 'ub1 
disputations and the scholastic theological movement of the Mii'tazilites. 759 
In other words, the pre-Islamic Iranian middle class of dihqiiniin helped form the 
paramilitary asbiiriin, and their war ethics.76o In this way, the institution survived into 
Islamic times. 
Zakeri establishes three main points. First, the Mazdak revolutïon761 during the 
reign of Anowshlrvan marked a profound class struggle in Sasanian Iran which 
weakened it long before the arrivaI of the Muslims.762 Secondly, because of this dissent, 
large numbers of free minded asbiiriin joined the Islamic forces as volunteer soldiers 
against the remnants of the Sasanid forces. 763 
757 Zakeri, Sasanid Soldiers, 6-7. 
758 According to Zakeri (Sasanid Soldiers, 45) dihqiin is a name which covers a whole gamut of 
people, from simple cultivators, who were scarcely better off than their neighbors and subordinates, 
though higher than the ordinary peasants, to true lords of the villages. 
759 Zakeri, Sasanid Soldiers, Il. 
760 Zakeri (Sasanid Soldiers, 61) explains how asbiiriin, as a group of cavalrymen in the time of 
the Sasanid king Anush1ravan, were under the influence of Mazdak's socialist revolutionary teachings, 
thus their moral discontent with the Sasanid establishment. 
761 Mazdak was an anti-elitist and socialist revolutionary of the Sasanid era. See The 
EncycJopaedia of Islam, new edition, s.v. "Mazdak" by M. Guidi. 
762 Zakeri, Sasanid Soldiers, 95. 
763 Zakeri (Sasanid Soldier, 115) refers to information provided by al-Baladhur1's Futiif;l and 
concludes: "The se defectors indeed proved useful allies and served the Muslims at Qadisiyya, Jaliila', and 
Khuzistan ... the caliph 'Umar 1 instructed them to call in more of their kind, and they were exempted, at 
first from paying jizya . .. They participated in the conque st of Fars, Kirman, and Khurasan," thus their 
easy and much welcomed settlement early on in Ba~ra and Kiifa. 
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Zakeri also concludes that soon after the ascendance of the Umayyads to power, 
part of the newly-converted asbiiriïn settled in Ba~ra as the asiïwira and in Kufa as the 
a1;.iïmira. They later often joined forces in opposition to the caliphate. They were 
employed as guards and auxiliary forces by the anti-caliph 'Abd Allah b. al-Zubayr in 
Mecca and fought with him in the battle of Rabadha in the year 65 AH/684 CE.764 A 
second group of free converts, called mawiïa formed an important source of soldiers for 
the' Abbasid revolution. 
These para-statal institutions of futuwa followed their own moral standards in 
battle that were partly rooted in pre-Islamic Iranian culture of asbiïriïn/dihqiïniïn, partly 
influenced by Islamic norms and partly also influenced by the jiïhiliya concept of muru'a 
or muruwa.765 
The Trilateral Shl'1- Shu'ubl - Futuwa Connection 
There is a vast literature about the ShI'! and the Shu'ubi connection prior to and after 
the 'Abbasid revolution. While there remains an on-going controversy about whether 
the main forces behind the revolution were dissident Persian clients or dissident Arab 
settlers from Khurasan in eastem Iran, there is no disagreement about the fact that the 
dissidents who played a major role in the revolution came from Iran. 766 There is also no 
764 Zakeri, Sasanid Soldier, 192. 
765 According to Izutsu, "The muriiwah represents the highest idea of morality among the 
Bedouin, the virtue of virtues ... man-ness" He adds, " .. .it inc1udes various virtues as generosity, bravery 
and courage, patience, trustworthiness, and trustfulness." These virtues, Izutsu holds, were not abolished 
by Islam but were reoriented in a new moral system and were trimmed of their excesses. See Toshihiko 
Izutsu, Ethico Religious Concepts in the Qur'iin, (Montreal & Kingston, London, Ithaca: McGill-Queen's 
University Press, 2002) 27, 75. 
766 According to Zakeri (Sasanid Soldier, 209), the Mazdakites found that the Umayyads were no 
less repressive than the Sasanids. Thus, Zakeri reconfirms M. W. Watt's view about why, in Zakeri's 
words, "they sided with the ShI 'ites, who as legitimates, represented the political opposition and the 
revolutionary wing ofIslam" (Ibid., 210); Aiso note should be taken that much of the forces supporting al-
Mukhtar al-Thaqafi's revoIt of 65 AH/685 CE against the Umayyads in Kiifa, in revenge for I:Iusayn b. 
'Ali's tragedy, were Persian settlers called A4iimira, who, according to al-Mas'udi, sorne six to seven 
thousand peri shed once the revoIt was oppressed; see Ibid., 209. See also Abdolhossein Zarinkoob, Two 
Centuries of Silence 9th ed., (Tehran: Sokhan Publishing Company, 1999) 94. Zarinkoob refers to about 
twenty thousand Iranians, called lfamrii' Daylam, who were among the supporters of Mukhtar in the year 
64 AH. 
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question that 'Ali ibn Abl Talib was the chief role model for the range of futuwa 
institutions which appeared in Islamic lands. The figure of 'Ali, for example, is 
prominent in aIl futuwa constitutions. For Corbin, the centrality ofthe pers on of 'Ali in 
aIl of the futuwa institutions leaves no doubt about "the fact that the very concept of 
futuwa has complete connection with Shl'!sm and the ShI'! view of the Imamate (the 
"t Il d h')" 767 spm ua ea ers Ip . 
The Shu'ubiyya, who appeared in second century AH/eighth century CE and 
peaked in third century AH/ninth cent ury CE, consisted primarily of Iranians who 
despised the discriminatory policies of most caliphs. Sorne ev en suggest the movement 
was nationalistic. 768 The main leader and hero of the' Abbasid revolution, Abii Muslim 
Khurasanl, was a Shu'iibl and appears in the chain of the authority of aIl the futuwa 
constitutions.769 Zakeri further suggests an inteIlectual link between the Shu'iibls and 
the Mu'tazilites on the one hand, and free Persian warriors caIled Aziidmardiyya 770 
(literally "free persons" who belonged to the asbiiriin) on the other. 771 
The above-mentioned factors suggest close inter-connections among the ShI'!, 
the Shu'iibl and Futuwa institutions. There were many 'Arab ShI 'ites, as well as many 
non- ShI'! members of various futuwa institutions. There were many non-Iranian and 
non- ShI'! Shu'iibls scattered across Islamic lands. However, these groups overlapped as 
institutions and in the princip les they uphe1d. The very person of 'Ali Ibn Abl Talib as 
the legendary founder ofthese institutions is important. It was 'Ali who promoted anti-
767 Henry Corbin, "Introduction" in Ayin-e Javiinmardi, ed. Henry Corbin, trans. Ehsan Naraqi 
(Tehran: Nashr-e Ney, 1984) 8. 
768 1. Goldziher ascribed nationalistic tendencies to this movement but H.A. Gibb interpreted it 
otherwise. The Encyclopaedia of Islam, new edit ion, s.v. "Shu'übiya" by S. Enderwitz. 
769 See Moharnmad Ja'far Mahjoub, Ayin-e-Javiinmardi (Fotowwat) (New York: Bibliotheca 
Persica Press, 2000) 4; Abü Muslim was a legendary hero not only among Iranians in Iran but among 
Turks in Anatolia. 
770 As Zakeri explains, there are many other Persian synonyms for iiziidmard such as 
jawiinmard, 'ayyiir, and the Arabie fàtii aIl referring to the similar sets of ethics. 
771 Zakeri (Sasanid Soldier, 332-33) maintains that the Mu'tazilite Bashshar b. Burd was ascribed 
through a very dubious genealogy to Sasanid kings; he also shows (324-5) how the Qadarite Ma'bad b. 
'Abd Allah al-Juhanl (d.83 AH!702 CE) had learned his ideas against predestination from one of the 
asawira of Ba~ra, a man called Sinawah. 
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discriminatory attitudes toward non-Arab converts. This attracted a large numbers of 
them to his camp.772 The appearance of Salman al-Fars1, not only as a Muslim hero but 
a Persian co-founder ofmany ofthese groups and societies, is also important. 
The values these figures represented helped guide the ideologies and norms of 
these institutions. These values are embodied in the terms jawiïnmard, 'ayyiiI; fata, 
iiziïda, and the like. As Zakeri has put it, these terms reflect "the highest social and 
ethical values of noble warrior: altruism, prowess, loyalty, sustaining the poor, and 
defending the oppressed". 773 
The futiiwa associations reached their climax in the early thirteenth cent ury CE 
when the caliph al-Na~ir li D1n-Allah (d. 1225 CE) reformed them, became their 
spiritual leader, and promoted them across the eastem lands of Islam. AI-Na~ir used the 
reformed associations as a political base. The futiiwa subsequently assumed the form of 
professional and guild organizations. 
Futiiwa codes of conduct, moreover, influenced ~ala4 AI-D1n al-Ayyub1's 
behavior during the crusades before al-Na~ir's reforms. One can surmise that at least 
sorne (ifnot a good part) of the Ayyubid's moral codes were subsequently transferred to 
their successors, the Mamluks.774 
The moral mission of these free warriors varied between the early seventh to the 
mid-thirteenth century CE. At times, they served as a volunteer police force that 
protected cities and communities from crime and disorder. At other times, they were 
merely volunteer soldiers. Always, however, they observed particular codes of conduct 
for their activities. 
772 Zakeri (Sasanid SoIdier, 212) refers, in this connection, to the famous event of 'Ali Ibn. Ab! 
Talib's endeavor to establish justice for the killing of the Persian prince Hurmuzan by 'Ubayd Allah, the 
son of the second caliph 'Umar. Zakeri conc1udes that "it was no surprise that many Persians sided with 
'Ali in the war fought at Siffin, where 'Ubayd Allah was killed." 'Ali, moreover, had the Persian Salman 
al-Fars! as an associate and was concemed in general for the rights of the mawiili. 
773 Zakeri, Sasanid Soldier, 318. 
774 Cahen and Taescner mention that in fact, the Mamllik regime kept the courtly futuwa Ulltil 
the fifteenth century CE; they also refer to the fact the Anatolian form of futuwa, namely the akhis, 
ascended to prominence shortly after it disappeared in Baghdad; for more details see The EncycJopaedia 
of/sIam, new edit ion, S.V. "Futuwa" by Cl. Cahen and Fr. Taeschner. 
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Ethics versus Shan' a 
Legends conceming 'Ali Ibn Ab1 Talib's initiation of futiiwa inevitably establish the 
core values of the se associations. According to one account, the Prophet MuQ.ammad 
once heard about a Muslim man and women having an illicit encounter in a nearby 
hideaway. With his informant insisting on the immediate application of sharJ'a 
punishment, the Prophet made inquiries. The legend maintains that he dispatched 'Ali. 
'Ali walked around the premises ofthis illicit hideaway with c10sed eyes and came back 
informing the Prophet that he had seen no one. The Prophet, realizing what 'Ali had 
done, praised him. He gave him the epithet of fata (literally, well mannered young), 
drank a symbolic cup of sa1twater with him and thus set the rituals for subsequent 
futiiwa orders. 775 
The actions of 'Ali in this story have significant paradigmatic implications for 
futiiwa members. 'AIi's behavior suggests sharJ'a looks at punitive codes as deterrent 
rather than me as ures which must be strictly implemented irrespect ive of their real social 
impact. This encourages important traits like forgiveness, magnanimity and tolerating 
marginal or unusual transgressions. These qualities form an important part of for futiiwa 
ethics. 
The Esoteric-Ethicai versus the LiteraI Interpretation 
One of the core principles of futiiwa is the primacy of forgiveness ( 'afW) over retaliation 
in kind (qi$a$) sanctioned by SharJ'a. The Qu'ran allows punitive retaliation for criminal 
cases but also provides the option of forgiveness. 776There is, moreover, in this passage 
an emphasis on the proper manner for implementing these measures. 
775 The Prophet is reported to have praised An with the following: "anta fàtii hiidhihi al-umma," 
literally "you are the (courageous, well-mannered) young man of this Community"; See Henry Corbin, 
ed., trans. Ehsan Naraqi, Ayin-e JavanmardJ (Tehran: Nashr-e Ney, 1984) 21. The detailed story of the 
inception and the rituals of the futuwa order and their symbolic significance are well covered in Henry 
Corbin, "Introduction" in Morteza Sarraf, ed., Rasiiel-e Javanmardan (Tehran: The French Institute of 
Persian Studies, 1973); also see The Encyclopaedia of Islam, new edit ion, s.v. "Futuwa" by Cl. Cahen and 
Fr. Taeschner. 
776 Q.2: 178: "0 you who have believed, prescribed for you is legal retribution for those murdered-
the free for free, the slave for the slave, and the female for the female, But whoever overlooks from his 
brother anything, then there should be a suit able follow-up and payment to him with good conduct. This 
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Corbin's reading of a futiiwa charter written by Shihab ad-Dln'Umar Suhrawardi 
(d. 632 AHI1234 CE)777 led him to the conclusion that Suhrawarcfi's he Id sorne 
principles of futiiwa above SharJ'a, at least its literaI understanding.778 This 
contradiction is resolved only in Suhrawarcfi esoteric exegesis of the relevant Qur'anic 
verse. Suhrawardi claims that if the Prophet did not select another person other than 
'Ali to inquire about the illicit affair, it was because the Prophet was cognizant of the 
virtues of futiiwa which 'Ali embodied. These virtues belonged to a higher order than 
strict adherence to law. "Forgiveness" maintains Suhrawardi "does in fact conform to 
the Sharl'a but with a higher esoteric level thereof.,,779 
While Suhrawarcfi's esoteric reading of sharJ'a may help resolve sorne of the 
ideological contradictions, there are other principles that go unequivocally beyond the 
scope of the conventional Qur'anic understandings. One such is the concept of loyalty. 
Authors on the subject, almost unanimously, agree that a main principle of futiiwa is 
"the friend of the friend is a friend and the enemy of the enemy is an enemy".780 A 
second princip le is that members of the order must never commit any treacherous act 
against each other. These two principles stand outside -shari'a, as according to sharl'a, 
the only acceptable loyalty is to God. 
The Concept of Enemy 
A well known princip le of almost all futiiwa charters is the renunciation of one's rights 
and claims in favor of others due to the view of oneself as inescapably lower than all 
is alleviation from your Lord and a mercy. But whoever transgresses after that will have a painful 
punishment. " 
777 Suhrawardi or Suhrawardi in Arabic sources, is one of the most important ~ufis in Sunnl Islam 
who brought futiiwa and ta~awwiifclose to each other; see The Encyc10paedia of Islam, new edition, s.v. 
"Suhrawardi" by Angelika Hartmann. 
778 Henry Corbin, "Futiiwatnime-ye Shihabaddin Suhrawardi," in Ay,in-e laviinmarcfi ed. Henry 
Corbin, trans. Ehsan Naraqi (Tehran: Nashr-e Ney, 1984) 50. 
779 Corbin, "Futiiwatnime-ye Shahiibuddin Suhrawardi,"50. 
780 Parviz Natel Khanlari, "Ayln-e 'Ayyarl" in Ayin-e laviinmarcfi ed. Henry Corbin, trans. E4siin 
___ - Naraql (Tehran: Nashr-e Ney, Tehran, 1984) 173-4; Khanlari argues that this princip le is clearly reflected 
in the oath of allegiance, that any new member must take. 
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other creatures. It is clear within such a cosmology, establishing an antagonistic 
definition for 'other,' and therefore the enemy, is an extremely difficult task. 
According to Melikoff, these groups, referred to by historians as ghuzat (Arabie 
plural of ghazl), fit yan (Arabic plural of fàtii), 'ayyariin (Arabic plural of 'ayyar), etc., 
formed a reserve of troops always available to whoever had need of them.781 In such 
capacity they are of course merely mercenaries who live on war; however other sources 
refer to them as servants of God who "clean the earth from the defilement of 
polytheism."782 This latter capacity is highly ideological, and seems in stark opposition 
to the former. The difference in these characterizations has important implications for 
the conception of enemy by these associations and their treatment of this enemy. In 
their capacity as mercenaries, when they were hired by warlords and sultans such as 
Ma4mud Ghaznavl, 783 it is logical to expect that, as far as the ethics of war was 
concemed, their behavior would be a function of the orders and the supervision of the 
commanders whom they served. In their capacity as servants of God, when they upheld 
the law or fought holy wars, they would more naturally act according to Islamie norms. 
In reality, the se groups acted with a variety of motives and according to a variety 
of moral standards.784 There are reports that show their inclination to sheer cruelty and 
lawlessness. Yet there are also reports that show them adhering to high princip les and 
codes of chivalry. 
Positive Traits of the Para-Militia 
Although futiiwa did not exist as an institution in the time of the Prophet, there are 
Qur'anic terms which invoke its spirit. These include fàtain Q.l2: 30,18:60,21:60, and 
781 The Encyc10paedia of Islam, new edition, s.v., "Ghiiz1" by 1. Melikoff; 
782 The Encyc10paedia of Islam, new edition, s.v., "Ghiiz1" by I. Melikoff, quoting the Turkish 
poet Al)medi. 
783 The Encyc10paedia of Islam, new edition, s.v., "Ghiiz1" by I. Melikoff. He refers to one case in 
which Sultan Mal).mud took about 20 thousand of ghiizltroops to India. 
784 The Encyc10paedia of Islam, new edition, S.v. "Futüwa" by Cl. Cahen and, Fr. Taeschner. The 
authors maintain "the study ofthese movements is made difficult by the fact that, in the course ofhistory, 
they have assumed very diverse forms." 
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in the plural forms fetya and fetyiin in 12:36, 12:62, 18: 10, and 18: 13. The last verse 
ascribes to futuwa a laudatory connotation. It refers to the people of Cave (a$i}iib al-
kahfj, These people are described as "youths who believed in their Lord, and We 
d h . 'd "785 Th fi b 1 h -increase t em ln gUI ance. ey emerge as signi lcant sym 0 s in t e futuwa 
cosmology 
The Persian asbiiriin who voluntarily joined the Islamic forces after the conquests 
set conditions for their defection and conversion which point to their moral outlook. 
Their envoy conveyed to the following the commander of the Muslim forces: 
We will convert to your religion and will fight against your Persian enemy, but only on 
the condition that should there be any internai strife and war within your own camp (the 
ArablMuslim), we would be spared from taking sides, and that should there be any war 
waged against us by the Arabs, you must come to defend us, and we should have a free 
choice ofjoining any Arab tribe as we wish. 786 
The same source reports that the Muslim commander was initially unwilling to agree to 
their terms. He accepted them only upon receiving an order from the second caliph 
'Umar. They later participated in the siege of the Persian city Shushtar but did not show 
much zeal in battle.787 What is important here is that the asbiiriin sought to avoid, early 
on, from taking part in any inter-tribal or inter-sectarian clashes. 
Two important works shedding light on the ethics of these associations are the 
Shiihniimeh of F erdowsl (d.l 020 CE) and the Qiibus Niima (a mirror for princes written 
by 'Un~or al-Ma 'an Kaykavus b. Eskandar in 475 AHIl082 CE). Both texts depict the 
'ayyiilS in a positive light.788 Hanaway, Jr. notes that, from the time of the earliest 
785 A~lJiib Kahf, who are referred to as the "Seven Sleepers of Ephesus" in Christian Occident 
literature, were a group of young people who resisted the idolatrous ideology of the Emperor Decius (240-
51 BCE) and his persecution, sought refuge into a cave, sank into miraculous sleep for about three hundred 
and nine years, and then awoke under the Christian Emperor Theodosius. They became symbols of 
youthful resistance to injustice in the constitutions of many futiiwa institutions; see Henry Corbin, 
"Introduction" in Murteza Sarraf, ed., RasiieJ-e Javanmardiin, (Tehran: The French Institute of Persian 
Studies, 1973). For more, see also The Encyclopaedia of Islam, newedition, s.v. "A~4ab al-Kahf' by R. 
Paret. 
786 A4mad Ibn al-Baladhurl, Futu/;l al-Buldiin, trans. Azartash Azarnoosh (Tehran: Soroush, 1985) 
128. 
787 al-Baladhurl, Futu/;l al-Buldiin, 128. 
788 R. Levy, ed. A MirrorofPrinces: Qiibiis Niima (London, n.p .. 1951). 
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appearances of 'ayyirJ in Persian texts, the word is linked with javiinmardi.789 In the 
Qiibiïs-Niima, javiinmardi is associated with wealth, generosity, magnanimity and 
courage.790 An entire chapter is dedicated to javiinmardJ, detailing the various categories 
and classes under this rubric. The three cardinal principles of javiinmardi are: fulfilling 
one's promises, refraining from untruthfulness, and having fortitude in aIl affairs. 791 In 
this section, the author emphasizes the importance of the good treatment of prisoners of 
d ·d· 792 war an avOl mg revenge. 
An important 'ayyiirJ figure for ethical standards is Ya'qub b. Lay th Saffiir 
(d.265 AH/879 CE) the coppersmith who founded the Saffiirid dynasty in Eastern 
Iran. 793 According to SlsÛin's history (the TarJkh-e Slstiin, written by an anonymous 
author in ca. mid-fifth century AH) Ya' qub owed his power to his 'ayyiirJ attitude. This 
is perhaps tied to his origin as a coppersmith. The text relates, "... the reason for his 
ascendancy was that he always shared his provisions, in a manly manner, with others, 
hence his naturalleadership among peers in any profession he might practice.,,794 
Ya'qub has the reputation, among many scholars ofmedieval history, as the first 
ruler to challenge the very conception of the caliphate as an institution.795 According to 
the TarJkh-e Slstiin, Ya'qub openly criticized the Abbasid caliphate. He asserted, "the 
very foundation of the Abbasid caliphate has been based on deceit and treachery (ghadr 
and makr). Don't you see how they (the Abbasids) treated Abu Muslim, Abu Salama, 
789 Encyc10pœdia Iranica, s.v. '" AJYar' by Cl. Cahen, and W.L. Hanaway, Jr. 
790 Encyc10pœdia Iranica, s.v. '" AJYar' by Cl. Cahen, and W.L. Hanaway, Jr. 
791 Ibn Eskandar, Qiibüs Niima (A Mirror For Princes), 247. 
792 Ibn Eskandar, Qiibüs Niima (A Mirror For Princes), 247, 260. 
793 C. E. Bosworth maintains that Ya'qub, by establishing the first independent provincial 
dynasty (861-1003 CE), repudiated the caliphal c1aims to supreme authority and breached the fabric of 
Abbasid rule. He also had a reputation to fight with the Kharijite insurgence in Sistiiu; see The 
Encyc10paedia ofIs1am, new edition, s.v. "Wa'qub b. al-Lay th al-~afIar" by C. E. Bosworth. 
794 Jafar M. Sadeqi, ed. Tiirikh-e Sistiin (Tehran: Nashr-e Markaz, 1994) 142; see also C. E. 
Bosworth, Sistan under the Arabs: From the Is1amic Conquest to the Rise of the Saffàrids (30-250/651-
864). (Rome: ISMEO: 1968). 
795Sayyed ~adeq Gowharln, "The Social Roots of Fityiin and 'AJYiiriin," in AyJn-e JaviinmardJ, 
ed. Henry Corbin, trans. El;1siiu Naraqi (Tehran: Nashr-e Now, 1984 CE11363) 131. 
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the Barmakids, and Faql ibn Sahl despite aIl their services to that regime, lest any body 
trust them.,,796 These prominent personages had once served the regime but were later 
disgraced and executed. 
The Tarlkh-e Slstiin, at the same time, reports that Ya'qub observed a high 
standard of ethics in battle. For example, he refrained from initiating any battle against 
the infidels before exhausting aIl peaceful alternatives. He refrained from confiscating 
the property and the children of any convert, and returned the confiscated properties to 
defeated foes who converted later. He not only ceased to impose the polI tax (kharifJ) on 
subjects who had incomes below five hundred dirhams, but gave them alms (sadaqa).797 
Ya'qub was relatively mild in his treatment of captives and released many mercifuIly. 
He also had a reputation ofprotecting the weak and acting fairly. He is quoted as having 
said, "Fat is not found in a sparrow's beIly, look for it in a cow's stomach.,,798 
Ya'qub's image in the Tarlkh-e Slstiin fits the classical model of an 'AJYM. 
While he adheres to certain univers al virtues and principles such as courage, generosity, 
fairness, truthfulness, support for the weak, and maintaining sorne independence from 
official central authority, he refrained from religious bigotry and, in fact, entertained a 
number of different religious denominations in his court. 
Many 'aJYiiIs such as Y a' qub began their careers as leaders of bands of brigands 
but acquired a popular 'robin hood' image through selfless actions. Ya'qub for example, 
never left his victims entirely helpless. He never molested women, and lived simply. In 
one proverbial anecdote, he entered a house with his gang with the intent of robbing it. 
In the darkness, he picked a glittering object guessing that it was a precious gem. To his 
dismay, however, when he touched it to his tongue, he found it was only a piece of salt 
crystal. He immediately dropped it and ordered his gang to leave the house at once. He 
said, "it is utterly immoral to rob whomever has fed you." 
Another legendary 'aJYiir, Samak-e-' Ayyar, maintains a similar set of principles. 
In one legendary account, Marzbiin Shah sends him gifts hoping to win his support in a 
796 Sadeqi, ed. Tiirlkh-e Sistiin, 142. 
797 Sadeqi, ed. Tiirlkh-e Sistiin, 142. 
798 Sadeqi, ed. Tiirlkh-e Sistiin, 143. 
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war against the Chinese. Samak refrains from accepting the gift. He points out to the 
Shah's representative that he fights only for just causes and not for bread. 799 
Samak is committed by his principles to bring justice to unjust situations.800 He 
repeatedly pledges to his cornrades that he is a friend of their friends and an enemy of 
their enernies, and will not to commit any act oftreachery to a friend. 801 'AJ'Yarllegends 
sometimes identify women as heroines in battle. Samak's wife, Sorkhvard, is among 
them.802 
In battle, Samak fights in the name of God and only after receiving permission 
from the king and chief commander. Before fighting, he recounts his heroic exploits and 
declares his reasons for entering the battle. Afterwards, he carefully respects the rights 
fh·· 803 o lS pnsoners. 
Although the 'ayyiirs were notorious as outlaws, c are fui examination of the 
record shows that they fought against domestic despotism. According to al-Tabar!, 
'aJ'Yiirs joined the riots of 249 AH/863 CE in Baghdad and Samarra against Turks who 
had killed the caliph. "The populace of Baghdad," al-Tabar! reports, "gathered, shouted 
out in protest and called for action. Joining them were the Abna' and the Shakiriyyah,S04 
who openly called for their allotment."s05 
Negative Traits 
The 'aJ'Yiir also had a number of negative qualities. Cahen maintains that "our only 
information about social aspects of the futiÏwa movement in early Islamic times cornes 
799 Khanlari, Shahr-e Samak, 64. 
800 Khanlari, Shahr-e Samak, 73. 
801 Khanlari, Shahr-e Samak, 76; cf Encyc1opa:dia Iranica, s.v. " 'AnarJby W. L. Hanaway Jr. 
802 Khanlari, Shahr-e Samak, 34. 
803 Khanlari, Shahr-e Samak, 98. 
804 Note should be taken that Abna' and Shakerlyya are other names for para-statal militia that 
are caUed 'Ayyars in eastem Iran. They are aU of the same socio-military background. 
805 George Saliba, trans. The History of Al-Tabar!, Vol. XXXV, "The Crisis of the 'Abbasid 
Caliphate" (New York: State University of New York Press, 1985) 10. 
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in works by authors connected with aristocratic circles, who take no interest in it except 
in cases of its involvement in disorders, when they de scribe it as a bandit organization; 
they never credit it with ideological motives."S06 As testimony to this negative image, 
Hanaway writes that it is the fityiin who "generally appear as trouble-makers, ready in 
times of breakdown of authority to harass ri ch merchants and other worthies by 
pillaging or threatening to pillage the shops or premises of any who would not pay them 
fixed sums of protection-money."S07 Other historical 'ayyiir figures such as Ya'qub b. 
Lay th Saffiir and ahistorical figures such as Shiihuy in the Persian epic literature of 
Ferdowsl and other poets are often cast in a similar light. sOS While they could sometimes 
act as policemen, as they did in Baghdad during the years 1028-33 CE, S09 they indulged 
at other times in terrorizing the population as they did in Baghdad in the years 1135-44 
CE. 
Cahen and Taeschner maintain that "the three centuries from 4 AHIIO CE to 6 
AH/12 CE are full of tales of disturbances fomented by tremor in which they took part, 
their exploits only ceasing at exceptional times under strong rulers (the Buyid 'Aqud al-
Dawla, the three great Saljuqs).slo These and many other examples from medieval 
literature confirm such negative characterizations and traits, identifying futuwa with 
rowdies, brigands, and the plebeian part of the society that in times of weak central 
authority often harassed local populations. SI 1 
Kramer argues that the general openness that came with the Buyids and helped 
launch a renaissance of sorts, provided the 'ayyiirun with the opportunity to seize and 
abuse power. According to Kramer, "In the civil disturbances under the Buyids, the 
806 EncycJopœdia Iranica, s.v. " 'Ay'var' by Cl. Cahen and W. L. Hanaway, Jr. 
807 EncycJopœdia Iranica, s.v. " 'Ay'var' by Cl. Cahen and W. L. Hanaway, Jr. 
808 EncycJopœdia Iranica, s.v. " 'Ay'var' by Cl. Cahen and W. L. Hanaway, Jr. 
809 The EncycJopaedia of Islam, new edition, s.v. "Futiiwa" by Cl. Cahen and Fr. Taeschner. 
810 The EncycJopaedia of Islam, new edit ion, s.v. "Futiiwa" by Cl. Cahen and Fr. Taeschner. 
811 EncycJopa:dia Iranica, s.v. "'Ay'var' by Cl. Cahen and W.L. Hanaway, Jr. 
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'ayyiiriin are often mentioned as active participants."S12 It is therefore not without 
foundation to say that these associations helped bring the Buyids' downfall, though 
according to Cahen one of the Buyids, Abu Kiilijiir, had ties with them. 813 
The Moral Cornrnon Ground 
The concem of most 'ayyiiJS, with social justice, helps explain their popular support. 
Social justice was important in the third century ofIslam when they rose to prominence. 
Rekaya has tied the Caliph al-Ma'mun's miiJna (inquisition) of 218 AH/833 CE, where 
he tried to establish Mu 'tazili theology throughout the caliphate, with his desire to 
reform the tax system in the countryside. Peasants had supported him in his rebellion 
against his brother al-Amin. For much the same reasons, circles close to al-Ma'mun 
declared that 'Ali b. Abl Tiilib, who already had a well established reputation for social 
justice, was the 'Prophet's best companion.'S14 
Concem for social justice was also something in common between ShI'! and the 
Mu'tazili schools of thought early on in their formation. It was this concem for social 
justice which justified the interventionism of these groups, much like the 'ayyiirJ / 
futiiwa associations. At times, this was tantamount to denying the legitimacy of the 
head of state or, as Hodgson points, the privileges of their administrations, the noble 
kiitib c1erks.815 At times, this was tantamount to denying the legitimacy of the head of 
state or, as Hodgson points, the privileges of their administrations, the noble kiitib 
c1erks. The criticism of these groups did not come so much from their support of social 
justice but from the spontaneous and arbitrary manner in which they pursued their goals. 
This explains why thinkers like al-Ghazali preferred an unjust ruler and order over the 
chaos and disorder of competing claims to social justice. 
812 Joel L. Kramer, Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam: The Cultural Revival During the 
Biiyid Age ( Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1986) 51. 
813 The Encyclopaedia of Islam, new edition, s.v. "Futüwa" by Cl. Cahen. 
814 The Encyclopaedia of Islam, new edition, s.v. "AI-Ma'müu" by M. Rekaya. 
815 Maeshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, Volume 2, 128. 
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-- Futiiwa: Reappearance, Refonn, and Reorientation 
Hartmann maintains that by 1207 CE, there were futiiwa associations that had little 
constructive purpose in the decades before the 'Abbasid caliph al-Na~ir li-Dln Allah 
assumed power (575-622 AH/1180-1225 CE).816 AI-Na~ir's political insight, however, 
prompted him to reconsider the organization of futiiwa and to tum it into an instrument 
of power and social solidarity. He achieved this through a program of reform which 
placed al-Na~ir at the spiritual leader of the futiiwa associations. As Hartmann asserts, 
this was more effective than a strong army at his service.Sl7 This was because the 
futiiwa associations subsequently became "a framework for solidarity of an Muslims of 
aIl confessions and social ranks up to the princes."SI8 
His reforms instituted five cardinal principles in the associations: First, 'Ali b. 
Abl Talib was the model for aIl legal decisions. Second, after 'Ali, al-Na~ir held the 
highest spiritual rank. Third, the main goal of the associations was to fulfill the dut y of 
the holy imama. F ourth, unworthy conduct toward an associate would lead to dismissal 
from the association. Fifth, Prophetic l].adIth guaranteed the right of the Caliph in this 
declaration. 819 As was the case with al-Na~ir's predecessor al-Ma'mun almost two 
centuries before, the prominence of 'Ali stressed the commit ment to social justice. The 
appeal of the caliph to the authority of the imamate spared him the need to gamer a 
consensus of jurists for his actions, as is required in Sunnl SharJ'a. The reforms proved 
successful in general. al-Na~ir, however, continued to face difficulty in reconciling his 
position of legal authority with the institution of caliphate (Khiliita) on the one hand 
and the futiiwa associations on the other. He sought to combine legal, moral and 
political powers in his position. It was perhaps for this reason that he formulated a 
synthesis of Shl'1sm (representing political power), Sunnlsm (representing legal power), 
816 The Encyc10paedia of Islam, new edition, s.v. "al-Na~ir Li-DIn Allah" by Angelika Hartmann. 
817 The Encyc10paedia of Islam, new edition, s.v. "al-Na~ir Li-DIn Allah" by Angelika Hartmann; 
'Abdul f,Iusayn Zarinkoob maintains that al-Na~ir used the futiiwa association much like a political party 
in the modem sense. Look at 'Abdul f,Iusayn Zarrinkoob, "Ahl-e Malamat wa Fit yan," in Ayin-e 
Javiinmarm, ed. Henry Corbin, trans. Ehsan Naraqi (Tehran: Nashr-e Ney, Tehran, 1984) 201. 
818 The Encyc10paedia of Islam, new edition, s.v. "al-Na~ir Li-DIn Allah" by Angelika Hartmann. 
819 The Encyc10paedia of Islam, new edition, s.v. "al-Na~ir Li-DIn Allah" by Angelika Hartmann. 
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and ~ufism (representing moral power).820 In the end, however, as was the case under 
the Umayyads, lust for power trumped aH. 821 
The success of al- Naslr's reforms helped reestablish the fortunes of the 'Abbasid 
caliphate. The status of the futiiwa associations was important and attractive enough to 
prompt Key Kaus, the Saljuq Sultan of Anatolia, (d. 615 AH) and al-Kamil the Ayyubid 
Sultan to apply for membership, thereby accepting the caliph's spiritual leadership. 
The Chivalry-Crusades-Futüwa Connection 
The rise and development of futiiwa associations in the thirteenth century CE bears 
many paraUels to the rise of concepts of just war in Europe. The first chapter established 
two important conclusions about European concepts of just war: First, the standard 
works on the laws of just war appeared in mid-twelfth century--that is only fi ft y years 
after the inception of the Crusades (1095 CE), and second, the essential part of jus in 
bello laws (codes and regulations pertaining to the conduct of war) were developed not 
by the Church but by chivalric institutions. At the same time, although the roots of the 
futiiwa associations go back to the Sasanian era, the futiiwa reached its apogee in the 
early thirteenth century CE, after the reforms of al-Na~ir. The Crusades, which 
embodied European ide aIs of chivalry, consequently, may be linked to the revival of 
futiiwa by al-Na~ir. 
Hammer-PurgestaH in the early nineteenth cent ury, seems to have been the first 
to consider futiiwa as "Islamic chivalry," which in his view preceded the European 
knighthood.822 Whether the two sets of institutions share a common root has been a 
matter of controversy. However, there is a consensus on two points: first, the fact that 
futiiwa and related organizations such as 'ayyiirl preceded the European chivalry and, 
820 The Encyc10paedia of Islam, new edition, s.v. "al-Na~ir Li-Din Allah" by Angelika Hartmann. 
821 See sorne details on al-Na~ir's ethics ofwar in Chapter Six 
822 Zakeri, Sasanid Soldier 2; cf. The Encyc10paedia of Islam, new edition, s.v. "Futiiwa"by Cl. 
Cahen and Fr. Taeschner. 
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second, the striking institutional similarities (especially when the post-Mongol form of 
futiïwa intermingled with ~ufism and turned into guild institutions). 
Sorne scholars, however, have cast serious doubts about a common origin. Frye, 
for example, argues that what gave birth to European chivalry were feudal societies 
which were non-existent in the pre-Islamic Iran.823 Yet many scholars do not hesitate to 
speak of feudalism in the Near East. 824 Christensen argues that the Sasanid horsemen 
held the status of "chevalier" as in European Chivalry.825 
Almost aIl important Iranian authorities on the subject maintain that the pre-
Islamic Sasanid prototype of futiïwa inspired and influenced European chivalry. 
Ma4joub, for example, has cited evidence of a German Lord who sent an emissary to al-
Na~ir in the early thirteenth century CE requesting membership in his (al-Na~ir's) 
futiïwa. He asserts that "there is a very high probability that the European chevalerie 
order was copied from Islamic countries.,,826 Similarities in rituals and symbols suggest 
this relationship. The wearing of trousers (sariiwll), symbolizing the virtue of chastity in 
both Eastern and Western organizations, go es back to an ancient Iranian ritual, as Arabs 
do not normally wear trousers. 827 
Corbin cites d'Ors, who traces Zoroastrian ethics through a long evolution to the 
chivalric codes of the thirteenth cent ury CE. Corbin's main thesis is that philosophers 
like Shihab al-Din Suhrawardi (d. 587 AH/1191 CE) transformed Zoroastrian heroic 
epics into the Islamic mystical epics. The idea of the Shi 'ite's occulted Imam returning 
to earth to establish univers al justice is very close to the notion of Sushiant in 
Zoroastrianism. Corbin thus agrees with d'Ors in suggesting that it was Shi 'ism which 
facilitated the borrowing of ancient Persian ethos by the West. Naraqi, who translated 
823 Zakeri, Sasanid Soldier, 14; Frye argues that feudalism is a political entity rather than an 
economic one, based on the mutual obligation between the lord and his serf, something that did not exist 
in the pre-Islamic Near East. 
824 Zakeri, Sasanid Soldier, 13. 
825 A. Christensen, quoted in Zakeri, Sasanid Soldier, 59. 
826 Mahjoub, Ayin-e-Javiinmardi (Fotowwat), 66. 
827 Esmail Hakeml, "Ayin-e Futiiwa t wa 'AffarJ"in Ayin-e Javiinmardi, ed. Henry Corbin, trans. 
Ehsan Naraqi (Tehran: Nashr-e Ney, 1984) 167. 
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and annotated Corbin's introduction to a book on guildl futuwa constitutions 
(futuwatniima), also agrees with these.828 
There are a number of common values and principles between Islamic futuwa 
and European chivalric associations. These include an emphasis on truthfulness, fidelity, 
defense of the weak, generosity; and finally fighting against injustice.829 
There are, at the same time, sorne major differences. Four out of the ten main 
ordinances for chivalric orders tie to the concept of fidelity to the Church and 
commit ment to battling 'infidels.' Three provisions require scrupulous observance of the 
Law of God, feudal duties and love for the country of one's origin. In contrast, 'ayyiirl 
/ futuwa associations have little loyalty for the state or religious establishment. Islamic 
associations, in fact, have strong tendencies toward transnational solidarity since ethical 
norms emphasizing the autonomy of the individu al and judgment based on reason have 
greater influence than the Sharl'a law 
The cosmopolitan tendencies toward transnationalism and interfaith are closer to 
the humanitarian spirit of the Western just war theories than the faith-driven chivalry 
commandments. Was it then possible that the Crusades, which brought the European 
knights into contact with Muslim forces and their codes ofwar ethics, were the medium 
that facilitated the assimilation of sorne of the Islamic futuwa war ethics into the 
principles of the European just war theories? 
According to Hay, although the theoretical literature of the humanitarian 
concerns in war appeared in the works of the clerical authors and legislators from at 
least the late tenth century on, their moral influence on the knights appeared no sooner 
than thirteenth century.830 Gratian's Decretum in the mid-twelfth century CE, which 
established the Christian canon law and sorne of the principles of just war in the West 
828 Henry Corbin "Introduction" in Ayin-e Javinmardi, ed. Henry Corbin, trans. Ehsan Naraqi 
(Tehran: Nashr-e Ney, 1984) 8. 
829 Compare the main commandments as stipulated in the Qiibüs Niima and in Gautier, ChivaJry 
830 David J. Hay "Collateral Damage, Civilian Casualties in the Early Ideologies of Chivalry and 
Crudade" in Niall Christie and Maya Yazigi, eds. Noble Ideals and Bloody Realities, Warfare in the 
Middle Ages, (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2006) 9, 10. 
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by referring to Peace of God, appeared at least half a century after the beginning of the 
first Crusade in 1095 CE. More e10quent principles distinguishing between Christian 
soldiers from Christian civilians were reflected in the works of St. Bernard of Clairvaux 
(1090_1153).831 This raises the possibility of sorne Eastern influence. The Crusades 
began long before this date in theory and practice, not only against Muslims or pagans 
but rebel Christians.832 Although crusades appeared as 'Holy' wars in the European 
historiographies of later eras, the motives behind them were often a combination of 
various aspirations. Before the First Crusade, a number of like-minded campaigns were 
launched in Spain, the Baltic, and North Africa. Riley-Smith suggests a variety of 
motives for these enterprises induding a desire for land, spoil or profit, colonial 
experiments, simple-mindedness, and of course religious duty.833 France asserts that, For 
the papacy a degree of control of the European expansionism was essential to preserve 
its own position and to prevent an unthinkable outbreak of religious pluralism." He 
adds, "It was the papacy that was anxious to sanctify war, most notably in Spain and 
more dubiously in England in 1066, as an instrument of control.,,834 France believes that 
the anti-Muslim incentives of both the Spanish wars of reconquesta and crusades were 
an invention of later historiographies. 835 Cahen maintains that although the main 
831 David J. Hay "Collateral Damage, Civilian Casualties in the Early Ideologies of Chivalry and 
Crudade" in Niall Christie and Maya Yazigi, eds. Noble Ideals and Bloody Realities, Warfare in the 
Middle Ages, (Lei den and Boston: Brill, 2006) 13. 
832 Norman Housley, "Crusades Against Christians: Their Origins and Early Deve1opment, 
cl000-1216," in Crusading and Warfare in Medieval and Renaissance Europe, ed. Norman Housely 
(Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2001); Housely (p.23) identifies the period between 1148 and 
1153 CE when "the most detailed justification for directing Christian arms against other Christians 
instead of pagans" were formulated. He discusses how Pope Innocent III, in 1199 CE, proposed crusades 
against the German adventurer Markward of Anweiler, and in 1208, again against Cathars and their 
protectors. 
833 Jonathan Riley-Smith, History, Crusades, The Latin East, 1095-1204 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997) 56. 
834 John France "Thinking about Crusader Strategy" in Niall Christie and Maya Yazigi, eds. 
Noble Ideals and Bloody Realities, Warfare in the Middle Ages, (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2006) 80. 
835 John France "Thin king about Crusader Strategy" in Niall Christie and Maya Yazigi, eds. 
Noble Ideals and Bloody Realities, Warfare in the Middle Ages, (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2006) 84-87. 
257 
justification of the later Crusaders was to assist the Christians in the Holy Land, the 
result was "completely opposite to their avowed object.,,836 Cahen states that, 
From a cultural point of view, objective comparison leads to the categorical conclusion 
that where the West has acquired knowledge of Muslim civilization, it has done so 
mainly through Spain and Sicily and not through Western settlements in the East or 
Crusaders from the West; moreover, Islam as such nearly always remained 
misunderstood and the few accurate ideas about it that the West finally acquired are due 
to the efforts of missionaries, in other words work undertaken in an entirely different 
spirit from the spirit of the Crusades. 837 
An important side effect of the Frankish attacks against Egypt and the Holy land, 
according to Cahen, was that it intensified the anti-Shl'a campaigns which therefore 
resulted in the domination of an orthodox S unnism in the entire area. 838 
The Crusades, at the same time, did not provoke a counter-crusade by the 
Muslims, even by the Turks of the Asia Minor whose invasion of Byzantine lands 
instigated the Crusades.839 In fact, the religious intolerance shown by the Crusaders 
against Muslims, Jews and even Eastern Christi ans undermined the tradition of 
tolerance and cooperation that previously existed between Christians and Muslims in 
the Muslim world. The rivalry between the Byzantine and the Islamic caliphate was not 
always hostile, rather many scholars and pilgrims frequently traveled between them. 
After the Crusades, the unfortunate Christian minority under the Egyptian Mamluk 
regime fell victim to the legacy of the savagery of the Christian Crusaders.840 
836 The EncycJopaedia of Islam, new edition, s.v. "Crusades" by Cl. Cahen; Cahen believes that 
the deterioration of the situations of the Christian Maronites, and Armenians under the Mamluks resulted 
directly from these confrontations. 
837 The EncycJopaedia of Islam, new edition, s.v. "Crusades" by Cl. Cahen. 
838 The EncycJopaedia of Islam, new edition, s.v. "Crusades" by Cl. Cahen; in other words, the 
Crusades were responsible for the radicalization of the Muslim culture across a large area with lasting 
effects. 
839 D. S. Richards draws attention to an exception to the general attitude that Cahen suggests; he 
contends that Sinjars and Zangls who frequently helped ~alaq. al-Dln, did not have any other motive in 
their support of the political rival except on account of a common Islamic cause. See The EncycJopaedia 
of Islam, new edition, s.v. "~alaq. al-Dln" by D.S. Richards. 
840 Steven Runciman, The History of Crusades (in Persian), several vols., trans. Manouchehr 
Kashef (Tehran: Bongah-e Tarjomeh va Nashr-e Ketab, 1980) vol.3, 560. 
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The Christian Byzantine Empire also fell victim to the oppressive policies of Western 
Christi ans leading to the occupation ofByzantium in the fourth Crusade. 
~ala4 al-Dln's War Ethics: A Moral Legacy 
Among legendary figures in the medieval Muslim world, there is hardly anyone whose 
ethical and humanitarian attitude in war has received as much admiration by both 
Western and the Muslim authors as SalaI} al-Dln Ayyubl (d.1193 CE). Baha' al-Dln Ibn 
Shaddad (d.l234 CE),841 one of the closest jurist associates of 5?alal} al-Dln, describes 
him as "a paragon of chivalry, generous, extremely modest and had a welcoming face for 
any guests that arrived ... even if he were an infidel.,,842 Cornish,843 an early twentieth-
cent ury historian of European chivalry, writes that "Christian chivalry has only one hero 
who may be set above the courteous, the humane, the generous Saladin, in comparison 
with whom Godfrey and Tancred seem uncultured. This is Lewis IX of France ... ,,844 
Cornish goes on to note that Saladin was the only Oriental prince who practiced 
something like toleration, and looked upon both Christi ans and Muslims as his subjects 
and therefore worthy of his protection.845 
5?alal} al-Dln is reported to have shown compassion to his prisoners. "When he 
took Acre," Ibn Shaddad reports, "he released all the prisoners ... about four thousand of 
841 He wrote an authentic chronicle ofinside information about ~al~ al-Dln's war campaigns and 
day to day activities. His book is translated into English by D. S. Richards. See D. S. Richards, The Rare 
and Excellent History of Saladin (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2001). 
842 Richards, The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin, 35; Here, the author narrates how ~al~ 
al-Dln generously gave the lord of Antioch (a Christian) a territory which he had lost before the final 
peace treaty of 1192. 
843 The main Western sources used in this chapter for the history of chivalry and the Crusades are 
Christie, Yazigi, Cornish, Batty, Riley-Smith, Gautier, Housley, and Cahen. These sources are by no 
me ans exhaustive. For a historiography of the Crusades, see: Giles Constable, "The Historiography of the 
Crusades," in The Crusades fi"om the Perspective of Byzantium and the Muslim World, eds. Angeliki E. 
Laiou and Roy P. Mottahedeh (Washington, De.: Dumbarton Oaks, 2001); Constable discusses the 
difficulty or 'impossibility' in distinguishing between primary sources and secondary accounts in this 
field. 
844F. Warre Cornish, ChivaIry(New York: The Macmillan, 1908) 142. 
845 Cornish, ChivaIry, 14. 
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them; gave each expenses to allow them reaching their home town ... "846 Cornish asserts 
that "ordinary prisoners of war he treated mercifully ... his usual practice was to spare 
the common people of a Frankish town.,,847 Ibn Shaddad also mentions that "no orphan 
was ever brought before him without ... (Saladin) giving him the fief of the departed ... or 
if the orphan did not have any eIder, he would maintain for the orphan what was 
sufficient from the fiefto meet his needs and hand him over to someone who would take 
care of his upbringing ... "848 
In other narratives, Ibn Shaddad shows how Salai). al-Dln meticulously observed 
Arab chivalric traditions. 849 He was known as very pious; for example, on many 
occasions, he wept during prayer and took great joy listening to i).acfith.850 Salai). al-Dln 
is presented as trustworthy, truthful, faithful to his pledges even to the enemy, and on 
many occasions keen to settle disputes by negotiation.851 His attitude toward Jews and 
Christians was far better than the way his enemies treated Muslims under their rule.852 
As a result, ~alai). al-Dln became a mythic figure of chivalry in medieval European 
literature.853 "He is admitted by Dante," Cornish observes, "to the milder region of 
Limbo, among the company of ancient worthies: the philosophers Avicenna and 
846 Richards, The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin, 38. 
847 Comish, Chivalry, 138. 
848 Richards, The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin, 38. 
849 When he captured Prince Guy and his brother the notorious Prince Reynald in the 1187 CE 
battle of I:IaHin, Salai). al-mn offered the fonner a drink, which he passed to Prince Reynald. ~alai). al-mn 
then instructed his interpreter, "tell the King, you are the one giving him a drink. 1 have not given him any 
drink." According to the customs of the Arabs, whoever gave a prisoner food or drink extended to him a 
promise to spare his life. Salai). al-mn's intention was to strictly observe these customs. He disavowed 
any generosity toward Reyna1d because he wished to execute him for numerous treacherous attacks 
against the Muslims. See Richards, The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin, 75. 
850 Richards, The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin, 211; also Cornish, Chiva/ry, 139. 
851 Finally, as Cahen mentions, he succeeded in establishing a policy of détente with the Franks. 
See The Encyc10paedia of/sIam, new edit ion, s.v. "Ayyubids" by Cl. Cahen. 
852 This fact is weil attested not only by Muslim authors who might be biased, but by many 
Western accounts of the Crusade's history. 
853 The Encyc10paedia of/sIam, new edition, s.v. "Salai). al-mn" by D.S. Richards. 
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Averroes are there too; but Saladin sits al one and apart.,,854 AU ofthese qualities belong 
to the moral paradigm of the 'ayyiirJ/futiïwa. 
Saladin, neverthe1ess, had shortcomings. Indeed, the economic situation of Egypt 
and Syria deteriorated under his rule due to his sixteen years of continuo us campaigns 
(1177- 1193 CE) .855 This, of course, wasjust as much a consequence of the Crusaders' 
desire for war. For the Christian Crusaders, like early Muslim society, warfare had 
e1ements of faith (i.e. to remake the world in God's plan) and secularity (i.e. lust for 
conquest) that went to extremes and led to carnage and exhaustion. 856 
Most historical accounts reflect these realities. Not only did the early Crusaders 
attack Muslims and Jews but sorne indigenous Christian communities were also subject 
to pillaging and massacres. Cruelty was accepted toward those considered 'infidels'; 
according to Cornish, "to torture prisoners, to murder women and children wholesale, to 
blind, starve, maim and mutilate private enemies or prisoners ofwar, was as lawful as to 
slay men in open warfare.,,857 Similar behavior in Spanish wars shows that such patterns 
of cruelty were a widespread norm of the era.858 The systematic cruelty, nevertheless, 
contravened the princip le of clemency which both the Church and the knighthood orders 
professed. 
854 Comish, ChivaIry, 136-7; Dante's words were, "Solo in parte vi di il Saladino". 
855 This matter is stressed both by Ibn Shaddâd and Richards. 
856 Goodman, Islamic Humanism, 49; Cf. Khadduri, War and Peace in Islam, 60, 141-42. 
857 Comish, ChivaIry, 111-18; The Jewish view of the Crusades gives further affirmation to the 
fact that Muslims were not the only object of the 'Holy War.' Giles Constable rephrases Joseph Ben 
Joshua Ben Meir, a Jewish chronicler of the early fifteenth century CE, who wanted 'the children of Israel 
to know what they (the Christians) have done unto us' and saw the Muslims as the instruments of divine 
vengeance on the Christians. Giles Constable, "The Historiography of the Crusades," in The Crusades 
/Tom the Perspective of Byzantium and the Muslim World, eds. Angeliki E. Laiou and Roy P. Mottahedeh 
(Washington, D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks, 2001) 6. 
858 According to Comish, (Chivalry, 111-18), " ... the Cid's personal prowess decided the fortune 
of battles and sieges; his pride and self-will had no respect for kings; he kept or broke faith with the 
Moors according to convenience; he bumt his prisoners alive in the square of Valencia ... Bohemund killed 
and roasted sorne prisoners as a jest, to make the enemy believe that the Christians were cannibals. Sorne 
of the Christians (it is stated in their own chronicles) ate the flesh of Turks, 'making war upon God's 
enemies both with teeth and hands. ,,, 
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During the two centuries (1095-1290 CE) of intermittent wars between the 
Christians and Muslims, there were also intervals of peace, during which the two sides 
exchanged social courtesies and became better acquainted one with the other. Moorish 
(Spanish Muslim) ladies did not then veil their faces; they went hawking with knights, 
and presided at tournaments. In addition to accounts of Saracen maidens delivering 
Christian captives, many instances are found of intermarriage between Spaniards and 
Moors.859 
In sum, when European Crusaders, bearing motives intermingled with faith and 
lust, entered into protracted confrontation with the Muslims in Spain and the Holy 
Land, their moral standards failed in aH respects. However, these encounters brought 
interaction with Muslim societies and through this interaction, Europeans learned new 
standards of ethics, especiaHy in warfare. 
The Rough Chivalry Tumed Soft 
Western countries learned much about philosophy, science, poetry, and architecture 
through their contacts with Muslims in East and West. These multi-cultural influences 
changed the view of the Crusaders about the 'self,' the 'infidels' and 'others.' But 
among aH factors that moderated the conception and conduct of the Crusades and 
chivalry, the ethics of war and the status of women in Muslim societies proved most 
influential. 
As for war ethics, according to Cornish, "clemency and mercy to defeated 
enemies were no part of the knightly virtues in the time of Godfrey, and were learnt, not 
from the doctrines of the Gospel and the influence of the clergy, but from the example 
of the Saracens (Syrian Muslims) themselves.,,860 Cornish concludes, " ... rough Chivalry 
was rebuked and refined by the noble behavior of Saracens; and the character of Saladin 
himself counts for something in the sumo His fame as a knight was second to that of 
Richard alone.,,861 In Taube's words, "in an epoch when still nothing similar existed in 
859 Comish, ChivaJry, l35. 
860 Comish, ChivaJry, 113. 
861 Comish, ChivaJry, 136. 
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Europe (except perhaps certain theoretical pronouncements of sorne theologians) 
specifie principles of positive law, humane and reasonable, were formulated by Muslims 
in the domain of law of war, and their example did not fail to affect the ideas of their 
adversaries ... and helped shape the non-written laws ofwar in the late Middle Ages that 
today form the basis of Western thinking in internationallaw."862 
As for women, the Crusaders were highly impressed by the romantic literature 
and lifestyle of Muslims in the Holy Land. As a result, as European chivalry lost its 
preoccupation with war, it developed a romantic conception of women which included 
deference and respect for them. 863 Batty asserts that "after the turmoil of the Crusades 
had passed away women became preeminently the guiding star of chivalry; their beauty 
and influence over the impressive mind and actions of knight were nearly as powerful as 
that of religion ... his [a knight's] motto was 'God and the ladies'-a curious 
combination ... "864 According to David Nicolle: 
The complications implicit in the concept of courtly love hardly applied since women 
were still ail but excluded from the ideals of knighthood Courtly love, in which a knight 
or squire was dut y bound to honor and pursue the fair sex in a stylized yet still very real 
manner, developed separately under the influence of Arab-Islamic concepts of romantic 
love; only being integrated into the ideals of chivahyduring the 13th and 14th century.865 
Nicolle further notes that, "in most such verse-tales of the wars between Christianity 
and Islam, the knightly class saw their Saracen foes virtually as mirror image of 
themselves; equally brave, loyal and skilled, similarly motivated but nevertheless 
doomed simply because they fought for the wrong cause."866 
862 Quotations by Mohaqqeq-Damad from: Baron Michel Taube, Etudes sur le Developpment 
Historique du Droit Intemational dans l'Europe Orientale, 1927. See Mostafa Mohaqqeq-Damad, 
Protection of Individuals in Times of Armed Conflict under Intemational and Islamic Laws, (New York: 
Global Scholarly Publications, 2005) 54-55. 
863 John Batty, The Spirit and Influence ofChivalry(London, New York, Bahrain: Kegan Paul, 
2004) 40. 
864 Batty, The Spirit and Influence ofChivalry43-4. 
865 Nicolle, Medieval Warfare, Source Book, Warfare in Western Christendom, 260. 
866 Nicolle, Medieval Warfare, Source Book, Warfare in Westem Christendom, 260. 
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Respect for women, was itself a legacy of European contact with the Muslims. 
Yet, this legacy, at the same time, shaped conceptions of ethics in war. Cornish 
identifies two factors, 'respect for enemy' and 'romance,' adopted by the Crusaders 
through their contact with the Muslims. This led to what he concludes as the 
humanization of war and the growth of courtesy between enemies. The new conceptions 
helped make men milder in temperament. 867 
Two conclusions can be posited. First, cultural values encouraging 'respect for 
women,' and 'respect for enemy' were either non-existent or very weak in Western 
chivalry before the Crusades. Second, Muslim war ethics, and specifically the moral 
example of $aliiq al-DIn, along with the Muslim respect for women greatly influenced 
the development of 'respect for women' and 'respect for enemy' among Westerners. 
SalaI}. al-Dln's War Ethics And His Connections to the 'Ayyariïn 
$aliiq al-Dln has a special place ofrespect among historians of the Crusades for the code 
of conduct he maintained in waging war. OriginaHy a Persian Kurd, $alïiq al-Dln was 
influenced by 'ayyiiri/futuwa ethics long before his departure with his uncle to Egypt.868 
According to sorne early sources, $aliiq al-Dln was lax in his religious observance before 
he assumed military responsibilities .. 869 He was, nevertheless, extremely generous and 
owed a mu ch of his rise to power to this quality. AH of these specifications fit the 
general 'ayyirl culture that was wide-spread and popular in Iraq and Jaz1ra at that time. 
Attention must be paid that $aliih al-DIn's origin was the Jazira where the socio-cultural 
milieu was deeply influenced by the ShI'! I:Iamdiinids. 
According to Ibn Shaddiid, $alïiq al-DIn's father Ayyüb Ibn Shiicfi, was born in 
Dvin, an Armenian city under the Shaddiidid rule, a dynasty that flourished from the 
tenth to the twelfth century BCE in Northern Iran. 87o Abu'l-Aswiir Shïiwur, of 
867 Comish, Chivalry, 25, 26. 
868 Many medieval historiographical accounts (inc1uding that of Ibn Shaddiid) stress that he was 
forced to accompany his unc1e to Egypt on a military mission. 
869 The Encyc10paedia of/slam, new edition, s.v. "$alii4 al-Dln" by D.S. Richards. 
870 Richards, The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin, 17. 
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Shaddacfids ruled over Dvin (or Dwin) between 1022 to 1067 CE.871 The very name of 
this ruler identifies his ties to the pre-Islamic aswiiran (asbiiran) warriors, predecessors 
of 'ayyiiran and Javanmardan. $alal} al-Dln's ancestors came from where the culture of 
asbarl /'ayyiirlhad historic roots. This family heritage perhaps explains $alal} al-Dln's 
chivalrous norms of conduct. 
The Two al-Nasirs: The Intra-Faith Failure 
$alap al-Din battled the Crusaders on behalf of Islam and, at least nominally on behalf 
of the caliph (al-Na~ir). al-Na~ir was the spiritual leader of the reformed futiiwa 
associations. $alap al-Din paid him homage. Yet, the two were not always in solidarity. 
al-Na~ir was not always consistent in the ethical standards he maintained in this 
conflict. When 'Akka came under siege by European forces in 1189 CE and then 
remained under siege for almost two years, $alal} al-Dln appealed to the caliph for 
support.872 However al-Na~ir did not respond. He busied himself, instead, with 
conquering Arbil and Tikrit ($alal} al-Dln's birthplace). 
The same neglect happened again in 1218 CE when $alal}- al-Dln appealed for 
help in lifting the siege of Damietha. The caliph did not respond.873 al-Ashraf, $alal} al-
Dln's nephew acted in a similar manner a few years later, in 1221 CE, when al-Na~ir 
appealed for military assistance against Khwarazmshahs and Mongols. This behavior, 
however, was not necessarily the norm. Richards argues that the Sinjarids and the 
Zangids assisted $alal} al-Dln many times during his anti-Crusades campaign despite the 
potential threat that a powerful $alal} al-Dln could pose to them. 874 
The inconsistency and, at time, the duplicity of al-Na~ir eventually brought his 
doom. AI-Na~ir's treatment of the last Saljuq (Tughril III) and the Khwarazmshahs 
mark similar behavior. First, he provoked the latter against the former bringing an end 
871 The Encyc10paedia of Islam, new edition, s.v. "Shaddadids" by C.E. Bosworth. 
872 The Encyc10paedia of Islam, new edition, s.v. "al-Na~ir Li-DIn Allah" by Angelika Hartmann. 
873 The Encyc10paedia of Islam, new edition, s.v. "AI-Na~ir Li-DIn Allah" by Angelika Hartmann. 
874 The Encyc10paedia of Islam, new edition, s.v. "Sailli? al-DIn al-AyyubT' by D.S. Richards. 
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to the Saljuqs in Iran in 1194 CE. He then instigated the attack of the Mongols against 
the Khwarazmshahs who threatened his power. This brought the Mongols into Iran. 
They eventually destroyed the caliphate. 
Conclusions 
The emergence of Umayyad power and the subsequent rise of slave soldiery under the 
Abbasids had little to do with the ethics and humanitarian concerns of the early Islamic 
period. Ethical norms ofwar declined significantly after the Prophet. Irregular and para-
statal militia whose roots lay mainly in pre-Islamic Persia, however, restored sorne 
concern for war ethics. During the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries CE, $ala4 
al-Din and the Abbasid caliph al-Na~ir promoted these ethics. $aIa4 al-DIn became its 
symbol. AI-Na~ir reforrned and revived its organizational framework. 
$aIa4 al-Din's attitude toward war and peace differed profoundly from the 
univocal conception of the 'abode of peace (dir al-Islam), and the 'abode of war (diir al-
iJarb).' He acted moderately and with respect for his enemy in contradistinction with the 
conventional norrn of the day. He had his ethical counterparts among the Crusaders so 
that mutual appreciation and admiration developed between the two sides. If the scene 
of an anxious Christian mother, who embraces her daughter after losing her in the 
Muslim military camp, brought tears to $ala4 al-DIn's eyes; if he cared that Christian 
prisoners of war must be able to reach their loved ones after their release; if he treated 
the local Christi ans and Jews in such a way that they preferred to live under him than 
their co-religionists and would-be 'liberators and protectors, the Crusaders; and if he 
declared that he cannot fight with an opponent after a friendly negotiation, his concern 
for an ethical ideal must have influenced him to a greater extent than the legalistic view 
of 'others.' He must have believed that peace is not the absence of war but "the point of 
war.,,875 
Chivalry was an important impetus to Western just war theory. The basic 
treatise enshrining its most important principles appeared in the mid-twelfth century 
CE. The institution, however, reached its maturity in the thirteenth-century CE, that is 
875 Terms used by John Finnis, in "The Ethics ofWar and Peace," 15. 
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immediately after Europe's encounter with ~ala4 al-Dln and other Muslims in the Holy 
Land. Through that experience, Europeans leamed about 'respect for enemy' and were 
impressed by Muslims' romantic and respectful view of women. At the same time, the 
rise of just war theory coincided with the Renaissance of the thirteenth-century that was 
substantially inspired by Muslim intellectual contributions. 
~aIa4 al-Dln's ethics of war was exemplary, but his manners were not standard 
and conventional in the medieval Muslim history. The next chapter will look at sorne 
other examples of the Muslim war ethics in action and a comparative evaluation ofthese 
ethics in a univers al scale. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
WARIN THE MIRRORS OF COMPARATIVE HISTORY 
~.)~ 1.) "....\ ûL. JJ JtiiA. ~ 
.l.iJj.w\"""!1 0.) ~ .l.i.l,!.l.i U». 
Leave aside the squabbling sects 
and their divisions: aU seventy-two 
ofthem. 
Bereft of the Truth, they set out to 
hUllt a Chimera. 
Shamsuddln Mohammad HiifcZ876 
The one who rules others 
will never conquer himself 
Tao Te Ching 
War ethics in its conception and practice varied in the Muslim world from sect to sect 
and from one ethnic culture to another over time. The first part of this chapter aims to 
survey the extent of this variation in the war practices of classical and early medieval 
periods. In the second and last part, the overall classical and medieval Muslim war 
records will be compared with those of other cultures to provide a bird's eye view of the 
global war ethics in those eras. As mentioned in the introduction, this chapter will not 
go beyond the Mongol invasion, for the post Mongol era has its own specific 
circumstances which necessitate its independent analysis. 
War Ethics of the Umayyads and the Abbasids 
Ibn Khaldun (d. 748 AH/1383 CE), a Muslim scholar known as the father of sociology 
describes four kinds of war: tribal warfare, such as that which existed in the Arabian 
desert; feuds and raids which are characteristic of primitive people; wars prescribed by 
sacred law; and wars against rebels and dissenters. Because Ibn Khaldun considered the 
first two types to have been caused by purely selfish and material human motives, he 
condemned them as unjustified and regarded only the last two as just wars, or worthy of 
an ethical or religious standard. As Mottahedeh has noted, "many military leaders 
exploited the image of jihad in popular piety by saying that they owed their legitimacy, 
876 Khwaja Shamsuddin Mol:tammad Hafez is the most renowned Persian poet of the fourteenth 
century CE. 
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at least in part, to their successful pursuit of jihad.,,877 An examination of many so called 
'jihad' ventures of the Umayyads and the Abbasids shows that these wars did not 
conform to the conceptions and the practice ofwar ethics in early Islamic experience. 
The following selection of wars scenes as reflected in the accounts of major 
Islamic historians such as al-Tabar1 (d. 923 CE), Bayhaq1 (d.470 AH/1077 CE), and 
Jowayn1 (d. 681 AH /1283 CE) provide sorne prooffor this daim. 
AI-I:Iajjaj: The Irrelevance ofNumbers 
AI-Tabad's chronide presents evidence of war records on part of the Umayyad 
Govemor of the I:Iijaz, Iraq, and Khurasan, al-I:Iajjaj (d. 95 AH/714 CE). This leader 
massacred tens of thousands of prisoners of war in 83 AH/702-703 CE, after deceiving 
them with a false promise of amnesty. al-Tabad relates: 
ln the battle of Zawiya, al-f.lajjaj killed eleven thousand and spared only one combatant, 
whose son was one of al-f.lajjaj's secretaries. Al-f.lajjaj said to the secretary, "Do you 
want us to forgive your father for you? He replied in the affirmative, and al-f.lajjaj left 
the father to his son. Al-f.lajjaj deceived the prisoners by me ans of princip le of safe 
conduct; he gave orders to a crier, who called and singled out the saved and unsaved 
men at the defeat, and named men from those ashriif, without verbally guaranteeing 
their safety. The rank and file then protested against this exclusion and began to 
advance to al-f.lajjaj's compound. When they had gathered together, al-f.lajjaj ordered 
them to lay down their arms, and said "today 1 shall order to deal with you a man to 
whom you are not related." He ordered 'Umarah b. Tam1m al-Lakhm1 to deal with them; 
'Umarah then brought them near and then killed them. It has been related on the 
authority of al-NaÇ!- b. Shumayl that Hishlim b. f.lassan said that the number of people 
killed in bonds by al-f.lajjaj reached a hundred twenty or thirty thousand. 878 
Qutayba Ibn Muslim: Killing in Style 
Qutayba Ibn Muslim (d. 96 AH/7l5 CE) acted in a similar manner. al-Tabad reports that 
in 91 AH/709-7l0 CE, Qutayba who was then the Umayyad govemor in Khurasan, 
killed 12,000 prisoners in his Tranoxiana campaign against Nizak Tarkhan.879 In the 
877 Mottahedeh, and al-Sayyid, "The Idea of Jihad in Islam before the Crusades," 25. 
878 AI-Tabar1, The History of Al-Tabar;' The Zenith ofthe Marwiinid House, trans. Martin Hinds 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990) 67,68. 
879 AI-Taban, The History of Al-Tabar;' The Zenith ofthe Marwiinid House, 170. 
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year 93 AH/7ll-7l2 CE, Qut ayba killed sever al thousand prisoners in a war against the 
~warazmshah. 
Once the latter campaign ended, al-Tabar1 reports that "Qutayba ordered his 
throne be brought out, and he appeared before the people sitting on it. He ordered that 
the prisoners be killed; one thousand were killed in front of him, one thousand to his 
right, one thousand to his left, and one thousand behind him.,,880 
Yazld Ibn Muhallab: the Cost of Keeping an Oath on Blood: 
Yaz1d b. Muhalliib (d. 102 AH/720 CE), the governor in ~uriisiin, also engaged in the 
execution of prisoners of war. In the year 97 AH/7l5-716 CE, he raided the northern 
Iranian towns of Jurjiin and Tabaristiin. Al-Tabar1 reports that he took prisoner not only 
soldiers but their women and children. He then executed a number of soldiers, crucifying 
them at a distance of two farsakh (equivalent to twelve kilometers) to the left and right 
of the road. Yaz1d b. Muhallab also drove twelve thousand of the remaining prisoners to 
al-Andarhaz, the Wiidi (desert) of Jurjiin, and said, "whoever seeks blood revenge from 
them may slay whomever he wishes." Each Muslim slew as many as four or five men 
with the result that the water (a stream used for a watermill) in the Wiidi turned red 
from the blood. Yaz1d then was able to grind wheat with the bloody-water, made and ate 
the avowed bread and thereby symbolically released himself from an oath he made to 
himself before the war. In the end, sorne sources daim that he killed as many as fort Y 
thousand people in Jurjiin.,,881 
Caught between Faith and Death 
Although the cases of al-I:Iajjiij, Qutayba Ibn Muslim, and Yaz1d b. Muhalliib are 
obvious breaches of the original Islamic norms of behavior in war, the military 
performances of these men were perfectly matched the norm of war practices beyond the 
Islamic borders; the following cases will reflect on this daim. 
880 Al-Tabar!, The Historyof Al-Tabari.~ The Empire in Transition, trans. David Stephan Powers 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) 186. 
881 Al-Tabar!, The History of Al-TabarJ: The Zenith of the Marwiinid House, 57-8. 
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AI-Tabar1 reports that in the year 223 AH/837-38 CE, Theophilus, the son of 
Michael (the second ruler of the Amorian dynasty) the Christian ruler of the Byzantines, 
fell upon the inhabitants of Zibatrah, 882 taking them captive and devastating their town. 
He then proceeded to Malatyah and began to attack its people and successively attacked 
people ofvarious fortresses held by the Muslims. Theophilus enslaved Muslim women--
over a thousand ofthem, it is said--and made an example ofthose Muslim men who fell 
into their hands by gouging out their eyes with hot irons and cutting off their ears and 
noses.883 Muslim retaliation to this came in the same year, from the Abbasid caliph Al-
Mu'ta~im (d. 227 AH /842 CE) in his attack on Ammuriyyah. This is where he, 
according to al-Tabar1, ordered the massacre of six thousand prisoners en masse. 
Ibn Athlr similarly reports that in the year 241 AH/855 CE, the Roman Queen 
Theodore massacred twelve thousand Muslim prisoners of war. She used to offer 
prisoners amnesty if they converted to Christianity, or else they would die. Her cases of 
taking ransom to free the prisoners were rare. In 241 AH/855 CE, the caliph al-
Mutawakkil (d. 247 AH/861 CE) exchanged Christian prisoners for eight hundred and 
seventy-five Muslim soldiers, along with one hundred and twenty-five women.884 
The War Ethics of the Amirs and Sultans 
Tahir Ibn I:Iusayn (d. 205 AH/821 CE),885 who supported al-Ma'mun's (d. 218 AH/833 
CE) bid for the Caliphate in 204 AH/8I9 CE, helped lay the foundations for the 
dissolution of 'Abbasid power through the empowerment of Amirs and later Sultans. 
These dominated the caliphate by the time the Buyids (320-448 AH/931-1057CE) took 
power in Baghdad. After the Tahirids, the local dynasties such as the Samanids (204-
395 AH/819-1005 CE), the $afrarids (247-393 AH/861-1003 CE), and the Buyids 
882 Zibatrah is a fortress in al-Jazirah, the Greek Sozopetros. 
883 AI-Tabar1, The History of Al-Tabar!: Storm and Stress Along the Northem Frontiers of the 
'Abiisid Caliphate, trans. C. E. Bosworth (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991) 93. 
884 'Izzaddin Ibn Ath1r, AI-Kiimil fi'} Tiirich (in Persian) trans. Hamidre4a Azh1r, several vols. 
(Tehran: Asat1r Publication, 2002) vo1.9, 4137. 
885 Tiihir Ibn I:Iusayn is the founder of the Tiihirids (205-78 AH/821-91 CE). 
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became more autonomous and more powerful dynasties. Unfortunately, primary sources 
provide seant information about their war ethics.886 Only in the time of Sultan Mal)mud 
Ghaznavl (dA21 AH/1030 CE) do they provide sufficient detail for analysis. 
The Büyids'War Ethics 
The Buyid dynasty originated in Northern Iran and expanded gradually through Iraq and 
central and western Iran between the mid-tenth and mid-eleventh centuries (945-
1055CE). It was the first dynasty to control Baghdad and the caliphs residing there. It 
also linked its genealogy to the Sasanid dynasty. The historian and ethicist Ibn 
Miskawayh who served in the court of the most pro minent Buyid Air namely 'Aqud al-
Dawla (d. 372/983) provides a detailed account of his ru le in Tajiirib a/-Umam. 
According to Faqihi, most primary sources of the Buyid history, including Tajiirib a/-
Umam, extol the dynasty for its relatively lenient and humane behavior in war. 
According to Faqihi, when 'Imad al-Dawla (d. 338/944) defeated the 'Abbasid 
governor of Fars in Southern Iran, he prohibited the looting of the province by his 
troops.887 Ibn Miskawayh similarly reports that when Mu 'izz al-Dawla (d. 356/967) 
entered Baghdad, he banned torture, imprisonment, maltreatment of prisoners and other 
inhumane customs of the Turkish troops present in Baghdad.888 'Aqud al-Dawla acted in 
the same way when he seized Baghdad. He gave full amnesty to its inhabitants.889 
Although the Buyids were engaged in frequent wars, their "armies," according to Hugh 
Kennedy, were small, much smaller than those of the early 'Abbasid period or of the 
Seljuk Turks, and the wars do not seem to have been very destructive." 890 
886 There is one report by Ibn Athlr on the war between the Daylarnite 'Imad ad-Dowla and Yaqüt 
the governor of Shiraz. According to this report, although Yaqüt executed an the Daylarnite soldiers who 
sought arnnesty from him, Imad ad-Dowla did not retaliate after his victory in 322 AH/934 CE, rather, he 
released an ofhis prisoners. For more, see Ibn Athlr, AI-Kiimil fl'l Tarikh, voU l, 4836. 
887 Asghar. Faqihi, Shiihanshiihi-e (The Kingdom of) AçJud al-Dawla, (Tehran: Soleimani 
Publications, 1968) 33. 
888 Asghar. faqihi, Al-e Buy-e va Ozii '-e Zaman-e [shan (The Buyids and the Situations oftheir 
Era), (Tehran: Gilan Publishing, No dates) 122. 
889 A~ghar. Faqlhl, Shiihanshiihi-e (The Kingdom of) AçJud al-Dawla, (Tehran: Soleimani 
Publications, 1968) 32. 
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A Memorable Samanid War 
The Samanid dynasty, which ruled in northeastem Iran, Transoxania, and Russia for 
close to two centuries (206-395/81911005), emphasized the peaceful development of 
their lands.89 ! The dynasty, followed the I:Ianafi school of law, though Amir Na~r the 
second had Shi'i inclinations. The dynasty promoted religious pluralism and intellectual 
inquiry. This brought the emergence of many notable thinkers such as Ibn Slna, BIrunI, 
Ferdowsl, etc. 
A war broke among the Samanid princes in 275 AH / 888 CE when the 
two brothers Amir Isma 'il (d.907) and Amir Na~r Ibn A4mad (d. 892) fought for 
control of the govemment. Amir Isma 'il, the younger brother defeated Amir 
Na~r (I), but against the expectation of his troops, showed the utmost respect 
toward his defeated brother. He let him remain ruler of the dynasty, seated in 
Samarqand with all privileges till he passed away four years later. Heravi quotes 
the story from Abu'l-I:Iasan BayhaqI's Tiïrikh-e Bayhaq, as follows: 
Once Amir Isma 'II (the triumphant in war) approached his defeated older brother Amir 
Na~r, he got offhis horse, kissed his feet while the Amir Na~r was still on his horse, and 
said: "now that the bad omen is over, you must take your troops and servants and go 
back to your court in Samarqand." Amir Na~r asked: "are you joking or serious"? Amir 
Isma'Il responded: "1 seek refuge to Allah if 1 ever dare to talk to you in sarcasm." Amir 
Na~r was perplexed and left for Farghana while he had a c1ear heart about his brother 
and made him (lsma '11) his crown prince.S92 
Such an act of magnanimity was rare. Medieval historiographers often refer to cases 
where brothers or fathers have blinded their respective brothers or sons to safeguard 
their poli tic al fortunes. 
890 Hugh. Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates, (London and New York: 
Longman, 5th ed. 1992) 249. 
891 Barthold, paraphrased in Javad Heravi, The Samanid History, the Golden Era of Iran aber 
Islam, (Tehran: Amir Kabir Publisher, 2001) 67. 
892 J avad Heravi, The Samanid History, the Golden Era of Iran aber Islam, Amir Kabir Publisher, 
Tehran, 2001, p.lS!. See, Abu'I-I:Iasan Bayhaql, Tiirlkh -e Bayhaq, Aqmad Bahrnanyar, ed. Vol.3, 
(Tehran: Forouqi, 1982) 68. 
273 
Mal)mud Ghaznavl's Seasonal Wars 
In addition to being a great warrior, Maqmüd Ghaznavl was reportedly so 
knowledgeable about Islamic law that sorne ofhis associates considered him a jurist. He 
established a great empire which spanned from India to central Iran. However, despite, 
being a warrior-jurist, he often did not observe the highest standards of the Islamic war 
ethics with which he surely was acquainted. At the same time, as Bayhaql reports, 
Maqmüd's court was one of the greatest cent ers of culture and knowledge in his day. In 
fact, he was keen to kidnap scholars of other courts. Knowledge and learning did little to 
moderate Maqmüd's savagery in battle. 
Several sources report how Maqmüd massacred more than fi ft y thousand ShI 
'ites (called riifkfJ at the time) in the central Iranian town of Ray, in order to rid his 
Sunnl state ofreligious dissidents and to curry favor with the Abbasid caliph.893 Garruzl 
(443 AH) reports that many of the ShI'! prisoners of war were killed by torture 
(stoned).894 When he attacked Sistan in 393 AHIl002 CE, he hired Indian infidels (kiifii) 
as soldiers. These attacked the M uslim residents of the city. They looted and destroyed 
the great Zaranj Mosque (Masjid-e Jiimi' of ZaranJ), and killed many of the resident 
Christians of that city.895 It is perhaps for this reason that Bosworth described the 
Ghaznavid Empire (367 AH/977-8 CE to 583 AH/Il87 CE) as an army and state in a 
single entity.896 Given the fact that a predominant majority of the Muslim armies were 
composed of Turkish slaves or Turkish prisoners of war,897 it perhaps is naïve to expect 
them to observe Islamic war ethics in their numerous campaigns. 
Sultan Maqmüd's heir Mas'üd (d.431 AH/1041 CE) did not depart from his 
father's code of conduct in war. In the year of 426 AH/1035 CE, when Mas'üd won a 
893 Clifford E. Bosworth, The Ghaznavids, trans1ated to Persian by I:Iasan Anousheh (Tehran: 
Entesharat-e Amir Kabir, 1999) 52. 
894 Abu Sa 'Id GardizI, Tiirlkh-e Gardizl, 'Abdu14ayy I:Iablbl ed. (Tehran: Donyay-e Ketab, 1985) 
418. 
895 Bosworth, The Ghaznavids 86. 
896 Bosworth, The Ghaznavids95. 
897 Bosworth, The Ghaznavids 97. 
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~. battle against the Turkomens of Khuâisan, he had all prisoners thrown under the feet of 
the fighting elephants.898 During Mas'ud's attack against the northern Iranian city of 
AmuI, his troops entered a mosque and massacred all Muslims present in the midst of 
their prayer.899Mas 'ud's heir Mowdud followed similar style of savagery in war. Garmzl 
reports that when Mowdud defeated the army ofhis uncle Amir Mu4ammad, he ordered 
a number of prisoners to be killed by tying them to the tails of drunken horses.900 
As Garmzl and other sources report, during his reign Mahmud frequented his 
military campaigns in India to at least one campaign a year.901 Bosworth points that 
many primary Islamic sources cite ideological motivations for Ma4mud's numerous and 
systematic Indian military campaigns, however according to Bosworth it is beyond 
doubt that Ma4mud's successors had any motive other than financial reasons in their 
similar campaigns. For example, Mowdud Ghaznavl (d.1048 CE) continually invaded 
India because he needed new sources of income after having had lost the city of 
Khurasan to the Saljuqs (1039-1194 CE).902 Against the above assertions there are few 
reports about rare cases when Ma4mud and Mowdud backed down from their campaigns 
once the attacked parties agreed to convert to Islam, but these cases are nevertheless too 
rare to establish a moral pattern in war.903 
The history of the Saljuqs does not reveal a different approach to war ethics from 
that of Ghaznavids; perhaps to be expected as after aIl, both regimes were of common 
898 Bosworth, The Ghaznavids258. 
gY9 Abu'l Faç1 Mul).ammad Ibn I:Iusayn Bayhaqî, TiirJkh Bayhaql, eds. Ghani and Fayyaç (Tehran: 
Arghavan Publishing, 2002) 463. 
900 Abu Sa 'îd Gardizî, TiirJkh-e GardJzl, 'Abdu14ayy I:Iabîbî ed. (Tehran: Donyay-e Ketab, 1985) 
442. 
Y01 According to Gardizi, Malpnud deve10ped a habit of winter military campaigns in India. See 
Abu Sa 'Id Gardizî, TiirJkh-e GardJzl, 'Abdu1l).ayy I:Iabîbî ed. (Tehran: Donyay-e Ketab, 1985) 41l. 
902 Bosworth, The Ghaznavids, 322. 
903See Gardizî's report on Malpnud's campaigns against Qîrat (India) and Nanda (lndia) and 
Mowdud's campaign against Direhriim (Rampur India) respective1y. Gardizî, TiirJkh-e GardJzl, 
'Abdu1l).ayy I:Iabîbî ed. (Tehran: Donyay-e Ketab, 1985) 401, 403, 433. 
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origins from a Turkic nomadic steppe-culture. This thesis has aIready examined a source 
on the Saljuqs, in Chapter SiX.904 
The Mongol Eruption: A Drastic Change in War Ethics 
The deluge of Mongols which descended on the Middle East in the early thirteenth-
cent ury CE shook the foundations of its Islamic civilization. In the realm of war ethics, 
sources reveal a broad transformation away from the ethical norms which had previously 
been established toward the near absence of any code of conduct 
JuwaynI depicts the seizure of 1.'aliqan, a city in greater Khurasan or 
Transoxania, in the following way: "once Tufi, the son of Ginghiz-Khan (d.1227 CE) 
subdued Khurasan, he arrived at Taliqan and conquered the city by force, leaving no 
living species there whatsoever.,,905 In another report conceming the Mongol attack 
against the city of Khutay in Central Asia, He relates that the Mongol troops, after 
defeating their enemy, raped an oftheir prisoners on the order oftheir commander.906 
On one of their Russian campaigns, the Mongol army collected two hundred and 
seventy thousand pair of severed ears.907 After suppressing resistance in the towns of 
Zave and Khawaf on his way to Baghdad, Hulagu (d. 663 AHI1265 CE) forced the 
town's inhabitants into the nearby desert and executed anyone over the age often.908 
Perhaps the lone attitude of chivalry attributed to Genghiz-Khan is what 
JuwaynI has reported. This Mongol leader admired the courageous passage of JaIaI al-
DIn Khwarazmshah across a river. He then tumed to his sons and stated, 'such a son 
904 Mul;1ammad Ibn 'Ali Ibn Sulayman Ar-Râwandi, RiilJat-u~-$udiir wa Ayat-us-Suriir, ed. 
Mul;1ammad Iqbal (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1921). 
905, Alâ 'al-DIn 'Atâ Malek Juwaynl, Tiirlkh-e Jahiingushii, ed. Mul;1ammad Qazwini (Leiden: E.J. 
Brill, 1911) voU, 105. 
906 Juwaynl, Tiirlkh-eJahiingushay, vol. 1,153. 
907 Juwaynl, Tiirlkh-e Jahiingushay, voU, 235. 
908 Juwaynl, Tiirlkh-e Jahiingushii, voU, 103. 
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must aIl fathers have;' subsequently, he forbade his soldiers to chase or shoot Jalal al-
Dln.909 
Comparative War Ethics: A Medieval Perspective 
Thus far, this work has provided a selective, critical view of the principles and practices 
of war ethics throughout the Eastern Islamic lands from the time of the first Prophetic 
battles until the Mongol incursions. Throughout the discussion, many extreme cases 
were brought into focus, with the aim of providing a rather broad perspective of the 
subject matter. However, the understanding and appreciation of Islamic war ethics is 
not attainable unless these ethics are evaluated within the landscape of its contemporary 
international practices. In other words, the status and the value of Islamic war ethics can 
be fully realized only in comparison with war ethics in other cultures. Fortunately, the 
war sourcebooks provided by Nicolle makes this task possible. 
The Comparative Causes ofWars: Jus ad Bellum 
As previously discussed, the most important aspect of war is the justification of its 
causes and motives, or jus ad beJlum. In Islam, just war is warring in the way of God. 
Warring in the way of God, nevertheless, is controversial as various jurists, exegetes, 
theologians, sociologists, ~üfis, philosophers, politicians, caliphs, imams, sultans and 
others seek to define 'the way.' 
Nicolle notes that, while the response by many Muslim scholars to the culture of 
ghiïzl (jiham warrior) was generally one of enthusiasm, there were sorne who held more 
critical views of it. One such scholar was the Iraqi author Jahi? (d.255 AH/869 CE). 
Nicolle explains: 
His (Jiihi~) analysis of the qualities required of a commander and an ordinary soldier 
show a remarkably rational attitude. He insisted that religious commitment was rarely 
enough on its own, and had to be supplemented by anger, revenge, alcohol, stupidity, 
inexperience of the realities of war, natural blood thirstiness, hatred of foreigners, 
personal ambition or fear ofpunishment."910 
909 Juwaynî, Tiirlkh-eJahiingushii, vol.2, 143. 
910 David Nicolle, Medieval Warfare, Source Book, Christian Europe and its Neighbors (London: 
Brockhampton Press, 1998) 259. 
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It is perhaps through this multi-faceted perspective that Nicolle examined Christian 
motivations and causalities in wars. In the same way, he notes the myriad of attitudes 
and principles that shaped a conflict's denouement: 
Even in religious terms, it was the vengeful principles of the Old Testament rather than 
the forgiving one of the New Testament, which dominated military attitudes throughout 
the medieval period. This was particularly true when wars involved religion. For 
example, Charlemagne terrorized his Avar foes by widespread massacres and eventually 
slaughtered the entire population of the Avar capital.911 
One of the most important and perhaps the longe st wars waged by the Christian 
community in the name of God were the Crusades. These religious conflicts fused 
notions of the 'just war' and 'holy war.' This ideology largely developed in the Iberian 
Peninsula as the Christians re-conquered it from the Muslims.912 The pretext of the 
Crusades in the Middle East was to support the Eastern Christians against Muslim 
invasions. However, as many Western scholars have argued, these conflicts were 
instigated by many other motives, induding the desire to destroy Islam.913 
During medieval times, religion was not simply a matter of faith but a source of 
identity; it held a role that ethnicity played in later eras.914 According to Nicolle, this is 
probably why, between the 11 th and the 13th centuries, the Christian Church had such 
great influence in the instigation and direction of many of these conflicts. It sought to 
channel the 'warlike energies' of Europe's military elite in a way that would serve their 
official interests.915 During the fourteenth-century, however, the legitimation of royalty 
shifted from religion to the secular state. Nicolle goes so far as to assert that war in the 
911 David Nicolle, Source Book, Warfare in Westem Christendom (London: Anus 
and Amour Press, 1995) 246. 
912 Nicolle, Christian Europe and its Neighbors, 235. 
913 Nicolle, Christian Europe and its Neighbors, 259. 
914 Nicolle, Warfare in Western Christendom, 256. 
915 Nicolle, Warfare in Western Christendom, 260. 
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twelfth-century CE followed only religious motivations and from the fourteenth-century 
CE, only secular ideological motivations.916 
Economic gains were also an important incentive for the Europeans in these 
wars. Nicolle states that most of the European naval raids across the Mediterranean 
during the eighth and ninth-century CE were intended to seize Muslim slaves.917 He 
points out that, " .. .in the mid-13 th cent ury, for example, the Pope discovered that sorne 
Italian merchant ships were transporting captive Greek, Bulgarian, Rutherian and Vlach 
Christians into slavery, while pretending that these victims were actually Muslim 
prisoners ofwar from Crusader States.,,918 
Against such contemporary backgrounds sorne Christian and Muslim thinkers 
sought most vigorously to contain and moderate the destructive forces of war. Nicolle 
asserts that: 
Many of the leading legal thinkers of the age of the Crusades and Reconquista were 
influenced by Muslim ideas where the legal framework ofwarfare was concerned. In the 
l3th century the three preconditions laid down by St. Thomas Aquinas for Just warhad 
clear parallels in Islamic law; these being due authority, just cause, and good 
intention.919 
Certainly, not aIl jurists worked to limit the cause and the extent of war. For 
example, while the repeated failures of the Crusades convinced sorne Christian thinkers 
that they were at best misguided and might actually be practicing immoral aggressions, 
sorne experts in the canon law of Crusading maintained that Islam existed merely so 
that Christians could gain merit by waging war against them.920 This parallels views of 
Muslim jurists like al-Shafi'I, who thought doing a jihad a year was a minimal religious 
obligation. Such rulings, as mentioned in previous chapters, were sometimes exploited 
916 Nicolle, Warfare in Western Christendom, 260. 
917 Nicolle, Warfare in Western Christendom, 246. 
918 Nicolle, Warfare in Western Christendom, 247. 
919 Nicolle, Christian Europe and its Neighbors, 235. 
920 Nicolle, Christian Europe and its Neighbors, 236. 
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by Muslim rulers, according to Nicolle, to aggrandize their pers on al authority.921 
However, the legal frameworks in which these wars took place were clearer in the 
Muslim world than in the Christian world. Warring for worldly rewards was not 
justifiable in Islamic tradition.922 
Islam, moreover, since the time of la 'far al-~adiq, has discouraged popular jihad 
campaigns, firmly resisting what Nicolle calls 'the cult of martyrdom.' Martyrdom, on 
the other hand, was very much part of the spirit of the Christian Crusades. 
The idea that those Crusaders who died during the Crusades were martyrs does 
not seem to have been accepted during the First Crusades but became popular in the 
twelfth-century and central to the self-sacrificing ethos of the Military Orders, 
particularly the HospitalIers. There are, in fact, similarities between the 'cult of 
martyrdom' of these military Orders and various militarized ~ufi or mystical Islamic 
brotherhoods of this period.923 
The Comparative Qualities of War: Jus in Bello 
The view that victory in battle is proof of divine approval, and therefore a positive 
judgment from God, has been held not only by Christian culture, but by pre-Islamic 
Persian culture as exampled by the Sasanid princip le of 'might was right, ,924 and Islamic 
cultures as well. Nicolle asserts that the idea of trial by combat continued in 
Christianity up to the tenth-century CE.925 A grave consequence of this widely and 
universally held princip le was the pursuit of victory at any cost. In other words, it 
tended to disregard humanitarian concems in war Uus in bello). 
921 Nicolle, Christian Europe and its Neighbors, 236. 
922 Nicolle, Christian Europe and its Neighbors, 236-37. 
923 Nicolle, Christian Europe and its Neighbors, 259. 
924 Nicolle, Christian Europe and its Neighbors, 238. 
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The Treatment of Prisoners of War 
The question of the treatment of prisoners of war is one of the best indications of the 
humanitarian concern in war and a prime criterion of jus in hello in this work. 
Commenting on pre-Islamic Arab treatment of prisoners of war, Nicolle notes that, 
although the sexual violation of captured women was practiced both in pre-Islamic and 
Muslim Arab lands, "in both periods this involved a symbolic act of communal 
humiliation rather than sexual penetration.,,926 
ln comparison, the Persian Sasanid king was expected to show no mercy to his 
prisoners. Nicolle notes that Shapur II (d. 379 CE), was celebrated as the 'the shoulder 
man' because he dislocated the shoulders of aIl captured Arabs of military age, in order 
to debilitate them and make them incapable offurther military combat.927 
ln early Christian Europe, Nicolle states: 
The pagan-Germanie tradition of killing ail prisoners of war, inc1uding women and 
children, or of keeping only those of pre-puberty age as slaves gradually died out. 
Nevertheless, widespread and indiscriminate massacres as weil as enslavement 
continued to characterize warfare in early medieval Western Europe."928 
The enslavement of fellow Christians continued to be practiced in certain periphery 
areas; particularly in Ireland and as late as the twelfth-century CE.929 
Captives in Christian Europe were also often physically harmed as retribution. 
According to Nicolle, the mutilation of prisoners of war continued for several centuries. 
For example, one ninth-century CE Bulgarian ruler used to slit the noses of his 
Byzantine war prisoners before sending them home. In response, the Byzantine Emperor 
926 Nicolle, Christian Europe and ifs Neighbors, 243. 
927 Nicolle, Christian Europe and its Neighbors, 24l. 
928 Nicolle, Christian Europe and its Neighbors, 246. 
929 Nicolle, Christian Europe and its Neighbors, 246. 
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blinded the majority ofhis Bulgarian captives.930 Eisewhere in Europe, the treatment of 
prisoners ofwar was not any better.931 
Nicolle notes that the first real evidence of changing attitudes towards the 
captives and victims of war was in late tenth-century CE France.932 However, this 
change did not result from humanitarian concerns; rather from European interest in 
prisoners as a valuable commodity. As Nicolle explains, "by the Ithcentury ... barbarism 
towards prisoners of war was regarded as dishonorable and a waste of potentially 
valuable ransom.,,933 
From the eleventh to the fourteenth centuries CE, Christian armies enslaved 
most of their Muslim prisoners or slaughtered them.934 Nicolle adds that, "the 
HospitalIers on the island of Rhodes habitually killed aIl their Muslim prisoners of war. 
So did the Catalans, who ravaged early 14th century Anatolia, and killed aIl Muslim 
males over ten.,,935 
Nicolle admits that "compared with the brutality seen in so many Christian 
countries, the treatment of captives in the Muslim world was generally more humane, 
this being rooted in religious belief.,,936 Muslim laws prohibited the killing of women, 
children, the old or sick, the destruction of fruit-bearing trees, bee-hives and private 
houses, and the slaughter of flocks or herds except when in need for food. In addition, 
soldiers were instructed that they should not mutilate the enemy, nor break promises or 
offers of safe conduct even if the se were given by gesture rather than the spoken or 
written word.937 
930 Nicolle, Warfare in Western Christendom, 247. 
931 Nicolle, Christian Europe and ifs Neighbors, 247. 
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The conflicts between Christian and Muslim warriors resulted in more than 
violence; they brought a wide range of cultural contacts. As a result of these, Europeans 
were impressed by the humane treatment of the prisoners of war by Muslims. Nicolle 
states: " ... Christian western Europe began adopting the Islamic practice of offering 
generous surrender terms to the garrisons of fortified places, while also threatening that 
if such places were stormed their defenders williose all rights to generous treatment."938 
In contrast, the Central Asian Turks and Mongols often slaughtered prisoners 
outright, and in sorne cases, massacred on a much larger scale.939 According to Nicolle, 
TImur Lang (d. 1405 CE) "behaved more like a Central Asian pagan than a Turko-
Persian Muslim ruler, using prisoners as front-line sappers, hurling an entire garrison 
over a cliff, building live captives into-brick walls and erecting towers of mud and skulls 
as a warning to those who might oppose his power.,,940 In sum, Mongol and Central 
Asian (exampled by TImur Lang) tradition had no use for prisoners of war, and thus 
treated them harshly. 
Booty 
Economic incentives are one of the most important impetuses for war in almost all 
human cultures, hence the proverb, 'War is not about what is right; it is about what is 
left.' The plunder and looting of caravans, cities, villages and enemy camps has 
prominently motivated the armies of all warring cultures. This observation is true for 
both Christian and Islamic civilizations, though religious and ideological motivations 
often remained paramount. An important issue related to this psychological reality is the 
way the spoils of war were distributed among the soldiers and commanders who seized 
them. 
Prophet Mul].ammad established very early on the norm of distributing four fifths 
of the booty among the soldiers and taking one fifth for himself or the Islamic state. 
While other norms of Islamic law were implemented in haphazard fashion, this norm 
938 Nicolle, Warfare in Westem Christendom, 248. 
939 Nicolle, Christian Europe and its Neighbors, 244. 
940 Nicolle, Christian Europe and its Neighbors, 244. 
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/------ was systematically observed in subsequent centuries. In Western Europe, in contrast, no 
such norm existed for the division of booty. The state or king customarily received at 
least a third of the booties.941 
The Crusades exacerbated this disparity. According to Nicolle, "the Crusader 
states' continuing short age of money probably also accounted for the fact that the king 
of Jerusalem, took half ofthe loot; more than was normal in Western Europe.,,942 
Sorne Europeans may have been inftuenced by the Muslim norms. The Iberian 
booty law, for example, which was followed between the eleventh and the sixteenth 
centuries CE, brought about a more even division ofbooty. 943 
Combatants and Non-Combatants 
The Muslim distinction between combatants and non combatants may also have 
. ft dE' 944 III uence uropean practIces. In Islam, slaves were considered non-combatants. 
Furthermore, according to Nicolle, "rural civilians were generally left in peace, and 
urban civilians fared almost as weIl because the Muslims wanted to take such lands 
intact--induding their wealth-producing populace. Muslim military philosophy was 
doser to that of China than western Europe.,,945 In Europe, inflicting indiscriminate 
damage and death upon the enemy was not unusual. According to Nicolle, corpses were 
sometimes thrown into an enemy's fortification in order to spread disease.946 This is 
tantamount to the biological weapons of modem times. 
941 Nicolle, Warfare in Western Christendom, 238. 
942 Nicolle, Christian Europe and its Neighbors, 240. 
943 Nicolle, Christian Europe and its Neighbors, 239. 
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A Global Perspective 
As previously noted, the Mongol invasions brought significant changes to attitudes on 
the battlefield. According to Nicolle, battlefield savagery increased during the thirteenth 
and the fourteenth centuries CE largely due to the influx of Mamluk Turks and 
Mongols.947 The Turks, in particular, instilled a sense of military destiny to Muslim 
. 948 
armles. 
Although the Mongols and after them the nomadic Turks had a notable record 
for savagery, the White Russians and the Ukrainians were also bruta1.949 Pre-Islamic 
Arabian society had certain restraint and therefore ethics in war but, in Nicolle's 
opinion, cultivated a deserved reputation for ferocity.95o 
In the ancient world both Cyrus the Great and Alexader the Great had good 
reputation for ethics of war. An impressive period of Pax Achaemenis appeared under 
Cyrus. As Toynbee mentions, after defeating the Cresus (king of Lidia) in a war (ca. 
560-546 BC), Cyrus appointed Cresus as his advisor instead of following the standard of 
the time and bum him alive.951 As already mentioned, Alexander the Great also observed 
certain principles of ethics in war. For example he despised night attacks for he 
considered success resulting from such attacks as "stealing victory.,,952 
Successors to Cyrus and Alexander did not have similar reputations. Although 
the Sasanid king Anowshirvan gained the reputation of a just king, other members of the 
dynasty did not leave impressive records. The Byzantines were not superior to the 
Persians. Nicolle asserts that "in many ways, the Byzantine Empire was as ruthless as its 
947 Nicolle, Christian Europe and ifs Neighbors, 244. 
948 Nicolle, Christian Europe and ifs Neighbors, 59. 
949 Nicolle, Christian Europe and ifs Neighbors, 260. 
950 Nicolle, Christian Europe and its Neighbors, 241. 
951 Khosrow Reza'i, trans. Arnold J Toynbee's Views on War and Civilization, 
(Tehran: 1993)144. 
952 See footnote number 595 page 194 ofthis work. 
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Sasanid rival, though such ferocity was never given a religious sanction.,,953 Lapidus, on 
the other hand, claims that "The Sasanian Empire "was by and large tolerant of the 
various religions under its jurisdiction while the Byzantine Empire insisted on religious 
unit y and persecuted schismatic churches." 954 
The war literatures of the Byzantine however did record sorne mixed responses 
to the ethics ofwar. Onasander, a Greek author offirst century CE who had influence on 
Byzantine generals showed impressive sensitivity to the just cause for war for it brings 
gods to the side of just warriors.955 Flavius Vegetius, a Byzantine writer of the late 
fourth century CE however advises the following: "It is much better to overcome the 
enemy by imposing upon him famine, surprise or terror than by general actions, for the 
latter instance has often a greater share than valor.,,956 
The worst case of Sasanid inhumane behavior in war mentioned in most of the 
medieval historiographies is the already mentioned Shapur's treatment of the Arab 
prisoners of war when the shoulder bones of close to fi ft y thousand of these prisoners 
were dislocated so that they become disabled.957 
The Byzantine war historian Procopius (d. late fifth-century CE), who 
documented the Byzantine Emperor Blizarius' campaigns, suggests the Persian-
953 Nicolle, Christian Europe and its Neighbors, (London: Brockhampton Press, 1998) 241. 
954 Ira M. Lapidus, A History of lslamic Societies, 20d ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002) 8. 
955 Onasander wrote: "The cause of war, 1 believe should be marshaled with the greatest care; it 
should be evident to ail that one fights on the side of justice. For then the gods also, kindly disposed, 
become cornrades in arms to the soldiers, and men are more eager to take their stand against the foe. For 
with the knowledge that they are not fighting an aggressive but a defensive war, with consciences free from 
evil designs, they contribute a courage that is complete; while those who believe an unjust war is 
displeasing to heaven, because of this very opinion enter the war with fear, even if they are not about to 
face danger at the hands of the enemy. On this account the general must first announce, by speeches and 
through embassies, what he wishes to obtain and what he is not willing to concede, in order that it may 
appear that, because the enemy will not agree to his reasonable demands, it is of necessity, not by his own 
preference, that he is taking the field." See Gerard Chaliand. Ed. The Art of War in World History, 
(Berekly, Los Angeles, London: University ofCalifomia Press, 1994)156. 
956See Gerard, Chaliand. Ed. The Art ofWar in World History, (Berekly, Los Angeles, London: 
University ofCalifomia Press, 1994) 215. 
957 See 'Abdulmalik Tha 'alebl, Tarikh-e Tha 'alebJ' Ghurar Akhbiir Muliik al-Furs wa Siyarihim, 
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Byzantine wars were primarily over control of economic resources; there were few 
ideological incentives for either party. He also records the fact that neither the Persians 
nor the Romans cared much about observing their treaties.958 
The war ethics of Hinduism, according to Nicolle, was superior to the Romans or 
Greeks in the practice of enslavement. Religion played a vital role in war; for example, 
the classic symbol of Atharvaveda showed idols being carried into combat.959 In 
Hinduism, Nicolle states that, "victory for an individu al was, in fact, to die bravely 
while cowardice was a sin. Not to kill the foe was also a sin, as was begging for mercy 
ft . . d' ,,960 or eemg m lsgrace. 
Taking into consideration all non-lslamic medieval cultures, Nicolle maintains 
that Chinese culture formulated and practiced the most humanitarian code of conduct in 
war. The Confucian Chinese "hated to die violently, as one was thought to retain the 
appearance at the moment of death through the after_life"961 Furthermore, according to 
Nicolle, "the deeply anti-military character of medieval Chinese society led to warfare 
being seen in terms ofprofit and loss .... It was better to inflict the least possible damage 
on the enemy so that there would be greater profit once he was subdued."962 Chinese 
heroes "helped the poor and oppressed but paid little attention to the law and did not 
belong to military elite.,,963 According to Toynbee, the Chinese civilization had an anti-
war ethics within its ancient roots. He asserts, "In a specific period of ancient China, the 
958 Procopius, History of the Wars: The Persian Wars (Persian), 4th ed., trans. Mohammad Sa'idi 
(Tehran: Sherkat-e Entesharat-e E1ml, 2003) 67. Note shou1d be taken that ancient Iran had an impressive 
period (Pax Achaemenis) when war ethics mattered in time of Cyrus the founder of the Achaemenids. As 
Toynbee mentions, after defeating the Cresus (king of Lidia) in a war (ca. 560-546 BC), Cyrus appointed 
Cresus as his advisor instead of following the standard of the time and bum him alive. See Khosrow 
Reza'i, trans. Arnold J. Toynbee's Views on War and Civilization, 1993, 144. 
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civilization reached to such a developed level that the military personnel felt shameful if 
h . d . h bl' "964 t ey carne weapons III t e pu IC. 
Chinese and Islamic Methods of Peacemaking: A Striking Similarity 
Not only did medieval Muslims and Chinese maintain high standards of conduct in war 
but both sought the resolution of conflict on similar grounds. Ury observed: 
Twenty-five hundred years ago during a period of terrible civil war in china, the 
philosopher Mo Tzu roamed the country with his band of disciples, preaching the virtues 
of peace and teaching practical techniques for defense. When they heard of an imminent 
war, they would immediately travel to the place in order to dissuade the parties from 
fighting. If they found a city aIready under siege, Mo Tzu would of fer his services as 
Mediator to the warring parties. If the attackers rejected his offer, he and his disciples 
would take the side of the defenders and fight the battle to a standstill-whereupon he 
would offer again to mediate a peace settlement.965 
The above practice demonstrate an awareness that "unresolved conflict escalates 
because no one is paying attention to the conflict or, even if someone is, because no one 
sets limits on fighting, or, lastly because no one intervenes to provide protection.,,966 
Ury considers the Chine se method of escalating levels of intervention as constructive 
and sophisticated as it provides the most essential elements for conflict resolution 
namely, Witness, Referee, and Peacekeeper. This practice is strikingly similar to what is 
prescribed in the Qur'an in verse nine of chapter fort Y nine (surat aJ-lfujuriit): 
And if two factions among the believers should fight, then make peace 
between them. But if one of them oppresses the other, then fight against the 
one who rebels (being intransigent) until it returns to the ordinance of Allah. 
And if the latter party complies, then make settlement between them in 
justice and be fair. Verily, Allah loves those who always act according to 
faimess. 967 
964 Khosrow Reza'i, trans. Jang va Tamaddon, (Guerre Civilization: Arnold J Toynbee's Views 
on War and Civilization, ed. Albert V. Fowler, (Tehran: Entesharat Elmi va Fargangi, 1993), Edition 
Gallimard, 1953) Il. 
965 William L. Ury, The Third Side, 2nd ed., (New York: Penguin Books, 2000) 169. 
966 William L. Ury, The Third Side, 2nd ed., (New York: Penguin Books, 2000) 170. 
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A recent discovery of an important ancient Chinese war manu al has revealed 
further similarities between the Islamic and the Chinese war ethics. This manual that 
was collected by the military strategist and philosopher Sun Bin (ca. 380-316 BC) 
stresses, for example, against attacks on non-combatant city dwellers. Bin points: 
" ... the best military policy is to attack strategies; the next to attack alliances; the next 
to attack soldiers; and the worst to assault walled cities ... ,,968 Bin adds: "It is best to 
preserve the enemy's state intact; to crush the enemy's state is only a second best.,,969 
Bin's advices c1early show that the ancient Chinese culture was quite cognizant of the 
'just war' criteria as the following phrases reflect: 
The commander must be a man of rightness (YI). If he is not a man of rightness, he will 
not be severe in manner, and if he is not severe in manner, he will not be 
awesome.
970 
... Only civil virtue can bring peace to the empire; only martial virtue can 
quell disorder in the land ... the best strategy is to attack the enemy's reliance upon 
acuteness of mind; the second is to attack the enemy's daim that he is waging a just 
war; and the last is to attack the enemy's battle position (Shl).971 
As already mentioned the Chine se disliked the mutilation of corpses and because 
ofbelieving that physical defect will also cause a defective appearance in the next life or 
resurrection, they avoided physical harm in wars as much as possible. This is 
comparable with the following Prophetie 4adith in Islamic war literature: 
In a tradition of the Prophet reported by Ibn I:!atam, Mul).ammad says: "If one of you fight his 
brother, let him avoid the face because God created Adam in His own image. ,,972 
These passages c1early show that notions of 'war as the last resort,' and 
'minimal damage,' were well recognized and advised in both the Chinese and the 
968 D. C. Lau and Roger T. Ames, trans. and eds., Sun Bin: The Art of Warfare, A Translation of 
the Classic Chinese Work of Philosophy and Strategy, (Albany: State University of New York press, 
2003) 83. 
969 D. C. Lau and Roger T. Ames, trans. and eds., Sun Bin, 2003, 84. 
970 D. C. Lau and Roger T. Ames, trans. and eds., Sun Bin, 2003, 160. 
971 D. C. Lau and Roger T. Ames, trans. and eds., Sun Bin, 2003, 184. 
972 Moqaqqiq-Damad, (2005) 400. 
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Muslim cultures and establish a proofthat among the classic and medieval cultures both 
the Muslim and the Chinese war ethics were relatively more advanced than others. 
Conclusions 
It is always misleading to judge and evaluate a culture out of its historical context. A 
twenty-first century attitude would condemn medieval slavery; though slavery was a 
well-established and univers al norm in that period. A much more accurate or fairer 
judgment can be ascertained when moral systems, in theory and practice, are compared 
within the same historical period. 
This comparison, nevertheless, is difficult. For example, it is hard to believe that 
the ethics ofIbn Ziyad, al-Iiajjaj and SalaI). al-Dln Ayyubl may all be ascribed to a single 
system ofthought and mores. Ibn Ziyad and AI-I:Iajjaj did not hesitate to massacre their 
fellow Muslims in unjust wars, whereas SalaI). al-Dln was keen to forgive, set free, and 
even accommodate non-Muslims, though his enemies initiated battle. Clearly the 
personal characters and the specific perspectives with which these figures chose to 
interpret Islamic tradition matter as much as Islam itself. 
This thesis has tried to examine critically the laws, ethics, and practices of 
Muslim cultures related to war in a broad comparative framework. In this way, the 
Islamic ethics of war may along with Chinese ethics be judged superior to those in other 
medieval cultures. Although medieval Muslims fought among themselves more 
frequently than against non-Muslims, other cultures have revealed many more ethical 
failures. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
'It is far easier to fight for principles 
than to live up to them. ' 
Unknown source 
The philosopher Heraclitus is known to have believed that the entire life is made ofwar. 
If this is true, then ethics of war is ethics of the entire life. This work has sought to 
analyze the justification for and causes of war (jus ad bellum) and the methods of 
conduct in war (jus in bello) in Muslim cultures. Its comparative approach focuses on 
Islamic codes of conduct in the broad context of many other medieval systems, allowing 
us to scrutinize these developments from a wider perspective. 
The work reviews the thought of important medieval Islamic theologians, 
philosophers, mystics, ethicists, historians, and other men of letters. The main argument 
among these thinkers, especially between the Mu'tazilites, and their theological 
opposition, the Ash'arites, was whether ethics and moral values could be objectified or 
whether it was, in essence, a matter of subjective speculation based on the sacred text. 
The Mu'tazilite emphasis on 'justice' as a universally and trans-culturally discernible 
objective virtue, to which even God is supposed to conform, by implication, restricts the 
authority of jurists and political leaders in deciding matters of justice, war and peace. 
This controversy parallels the debate in the West over the concept of objective ethics. 
The Kantian emphasis on individual freedom and self-autonomy as the most 
important moral virtue and legal right in Western society makes it more difficult for a 
despotic or ev en a democratic system to coerce an individu al into war. This princip le is 
not elaborated with any clarity in Islamic writings. Nevertheless, the focus on self-
purification and individu al salvation in the Sufi esoteric world-view, as propounded by 
thinkers such as al-GhazaIi, al-An~ar1 and Ruml, often implies the rejection of exoteric 
wars fought to achieve worldly goals or even perhaps higher ideals like faith. Ruml' s 
aphorism (that if one is for war, the real battlefield is within one's soul) directs combat 
to the metaphysical realm. 
Respect for the individual is not limited to Sufism in Islam. Rostam, the epic 
hero of Ferdowsl, chooses to face the most tragic of all his battles by rejecting a request 
from another heroic figure in the Shahnameh, Esfandiyar. The request would have taken 
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away his personal dignity and honor. Ferdowsl defies the king's request for pers on al 
dignity. This code of ethics restricts the power of the head of the state to wage a war on 
his arbitrary whims. The scorn Ferdowsl heaps on Key Kavus for his irresponsible 
military decisions aside, he frequently reminds his reader of how closely related the 
soldiers are on the two sides of an impending battle. Ferdowsl never misses to praise 
heroic acts on the enemy side. Even if the enemy's cause of war is unjust, the good 
manners of the warriors on the opposite side have to be registered and appreciated. Here 
Ferdowsl cornes very close to a distinction expressed about eight centuries later by 
Rousseau between the state and the individu al and that many individual combatants 
might be quite accidentally on the one or the other side of the battle. Adab literature, in 
general, emphasizes the virtue not ofwhat one does but ofhow one does it. Form in this 
genre proves to be as important as content. This view diminishes or destroyes the value 
of victory in war at any cost. 
Wars often lead to sheer crime on both sides of the battle. But the right form of 
fighting and a just cause for it may transform the war theatre into scenes where 
magnanimity and compassion reach their climax. ~aIal}- al-Dln Ayyubi spent most ofhis 
days on the battlefield. Yet because of his conduct in those battles, he earned the 
designation of "the most chivalrous sultan." He demonstrated as much courage and 
resolve in battle as he did grace and respect toward his enemy, or ideological others. 
From this perspective, he followed 'AIi's just war philosophy. He was praised not only 
by friends, but by his Crusader foes. On the other hand, Khalid Ibn al-Walid gained the 
epithet of 'Islam's sword,' yet, was rebuked for his breach of humanitarian war ethics, 
not only by his foes but by Prophet Mul}-ammad and his Muslim comrades. 
The root cause of such ruthlessness must be sought in the character and personal 
dispositions of specific soldiers rather than Islam. Similarly, the first four caliphs' 
attitudes towards 'others' changed little before and after they become caliphs. 
It was no surprise that 'Umar Ibn al-Khan ab, the most militant of aIl the first 
four caliphs, was the most successful conqueror among them. After him, 'Ali Ibn Abi 
Talib, who had not played any IOle in campaigns outside the Arabian peninsula, was 
embroiled in domestic wars. In reality 'AIi's wars were wars within the Islamic self, an 
outward manifestation of what, centuries later, Rumi called for, in a mystical arena. 
292 
'Ali was the epitome of a mystic and a symbol of Islamic chivalry, largely due to his 
conduct rather than his lineage or honorary position (as the first Muslim convert, and 
the Prophet's cousin, son-in-Iaw, and formaI heir). 
The Persian army, appalled by the corruption that prevailed at the end of the 
Sasanid era, voluntarily deserted the Sasanid dynasty and converted to Islam. These 
warriors, named Asvirin, followed transcultural and univers al norms of ethics that 
agreed with Islamic tenets. The pro-Arab bias of the Umayyads, however, recast these 
norms as futiiwa associations. The caliph al-Na~ir reformed these associations in the late 
twelfth, early thirteenth century CE. They continued, nevertheless, to uphold univers al 
ethical principles in whatever institutions they appeared. 
The episodes of Karbala' and Siffin profoundly shaped ShI'! war ethics and 
literatures. These ethics, however, were transmitted to later generations not essentially 
by juridical works but by informaI epic literatures and associations such as javinmardiin 
and 'ayyiirin. The Karbala' tragedy redefined the notions of 'self and 'other' for the 
ShI'! community and convinced them to rely more on the human-reasoned and natural 
sense of justice than the concept defined by sheer political interests of the rulers. 
The medieval history of Muslim cultures marks the remarkably moral conduct of 
a number of dynasties such as the Samanids, Buyids and Ayyubids, but also bears 
witness to atrocities perpetrated by other medieval Muslim rulers. The overall record, 
however, stands co-equal to that of the Chinese whom Nicolle regards as the most 
ethical, as measured by a univers al and objective standard. 
Islamic ethical standards in war provided a historic moral shift compared with 
pre-Islamic norms and practices and proved influential on other cultures. Western 
institutions recognized and emulated the ethics of respected Islamic associations and 
figures such as futuwa, and SalaI]. al-DIn Ayyubl. This remolded the values of European 
chivalry during and after the Crusades instilling respect for enemy and romance for 
women. Subsequently, Islamic scholarship has gradually fallen behind Western literature 
on the ethics of war, although it initiated the original concept a few centuries earlier. 
Jurists lost touch with everyday life and politics. They also claimed comprehensive 
knowledge of all truth. This attitude gradually led to the freezing of Islamic 
philosophical tradition that in its peak laid the foundation of the European Renaissance. 
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/~ So was the fate of ethics as a philosophical discipline. The loss of the tradition of ijtihid 
exacerbated the situation, and the divorce between law and ethics deprived Islamic 
jurisprudence from a critical soul. 
Modem ShI'! jurists are presently engaged in an ongoing critique of their 
predecessors, re-examining scholarship back to the eleventh century CE and before and 
questioning the introduction of juridical concepts that they adopted from other Islamic 
schools without much scrutiny and critique. Tabataba'l denounces the early Muslim 
conque st wars and finds them damaging to Islam's real spiritual mission. ~ali41-
Najafiibadi, Iskandarl, M04aqqiq-Damad and Kadivar exercise ijtihid in full force to 
revisit, criticize, deconstruct, morallY overhaul and reform the traditional understanding 
of laws of war in Islam in full coherence and accordance with the Qur'anic morals and 
the Prophetie manners. M04aqqiq-Damad demonstrates that the views of the Muslim 
jurist majority, comprising most of the traditional Sunnl and the ShI'! legal schools, may 
easily and fully embrace the most advanced international humanitarian laws of war and 
help it even further. Like Toynbee, he points that the more the body of internationallaw 
finds religious roots, the better for its univers al influence and solidity. Sorne of the 
modem scholars of Islamic law, ethics, and Qur'anic exegesis are keen to remind their 
colleagues that the traditional body of legal norms requires fresh perspectives to meet 
the needs of the contemporary world. 
Present endeavors on the part of Muslim scholars to theorize new ethics of war 
in Islam need not necessarily emulate other traditions. Fertile sources exist not only in 
the works of great Muslim jurists like al-Shaybanl or Shaykh Tusl but also of 
philosophers like Ibn Sina and al-FarabI, moralists like Ibn Miskawayh and Tusl, ~ufi 
intellectuals like Ibn al-'Arabi and Ruml, theologists like the Mu 'tazili Qaqi 'Abdu'l 
Jabbar, and poets like Ferdowsl and Sa'di. 
Ibn Sina defines love as the primary fuel of creation and therefore envisions an 
essentially peaceful world. Al-FarabI conceives of multiple states and thus recognizes 
the basic princip le of international relations today. Ibn Miskawayh's sense of intimacy 
(uns) is a univers al princip le of society. To Tusl may be attributed the humility of the 
ruler toward his people; to Ibn al-' ArabI, the possibility of religious pluralism; to al-
Ghazali the view of the 'self as the ultimate battlefield; and to Ruml a criticism of 
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futile efforts to look at war as an opportunity of a short-cut flight to paradise. Finally, 
in Mu'tazili thought, one finds the objectivity and universality of all ethics, particularly 
justice. 
Cri tic al analysis of the classical Qur 'anic commentaries and new approaches to 
the Qur'an from an ethical perspective reveal that the main, if not the only, cause of 
early inter-faith and intra-faith wars in Arabia under Islam was breach of contracts. The 
highly ethical and contractual nature of the Qur'anic approach to human relations 
refutes the artificial juridical division of the world into the two realms of the abode of 
peace and the abode of war (dar al-Islam and dar al-iJarb). The idea of a permanent war 
between these two worlds was rather an invention serving expansionist rulers who cared 
much more about pers on al power and wealth than about the improvement of societal 
morality in the world. 
In studying the ethics of war, it became apparent how a substantial part of the 
original Islamic ideals were gradually corrupted or set aside by despotic rulers, 
voluntarist ideologues and obscurantist jurists. However, the Qur'anic moral code of 
mercy and the profound humanism deeply rooted in the primary sources and practices of 
Islam, as well as in the rational and moral nature (fifra) ofman, survived and maintained 
its vitality in philosophy, adab literature, non-govemmental institutions and 
associations, and personal codes of conduct. It is these latter parts of Islamic tradition 
which may prove instrumental in reviving the intellectual life of modem Muslim 
societies. 
Just like slavery that was once a mode of economy recognized by the entire 
medieval world (including the Muslim world), but then gradually eliminated partially 
thanks to many humanitarian provisions developed within the progressive Islamic 
jurisprudence, expansionist war has also been a mode of economy, unfortunately still in 
use. It is the common aspiration of mankind that war too should be eliminated ev en as a 
means of defense. The Qur'anic verse Q.5:32, that refers to the identical proclamation in 
the Old Testament testifies that in God's arithmetic, human beings may not be counted 
as numbers, and that killing one innocent person is tantamount to murdering aH 
mankind. This stands in the face, and reveals the crime, not only of soldiers that attack 
civilians by weapons of mass destruction, but of suicide bombers who use conventional 
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weapons as well. They also commit a crime against an essential element of mankind's 
intellectual heritage, namely the laws and ethics of war, developed during many 
centuries of deliberations by the Muslim and Western humanists. 
On the basis of the overall responses of various Muslim cultures to the question 
ofwar, its causes, qualities and the morallessons these cultures have received from their 
past, this thesis has suggested three theories of just war in Islam namely: Just-Defense 
(accepting the ideological and poli tic al plurality in the world order and justifying only 
defensive wars), Moral-Interventionism (accepting a pluralistic but free world order and 
justifying moral corrective and liberating wars), and Total-Islamization (rejecting 
pluralistic political and ideological order and justifying expansionist wars). These 
theories that address the three main intellectual and actual trends of just war in Muslim 
cultures differ mostly about the causes and ends of war rather than its qualities and 
methods. This is a testimony that in Islam, ends do not justify means and that the 
Islamic concept of damage and pain inflicted upon men in wars is impressed by 
qualitative rather than quantitative criteria. It also confirms that the implementation 
and the execution of sharJ'a law has no value in itself except in serving the moral goals 
inherent in the law. 
War as a measure of retaliation-in-kind, according to the Qur'an, is only the last 
resort or morally speaking the least preferred measure by the Script ure. Above this 
measure, the Scripture introduces two more preferred reactions: Material compensation 
(diya) and, at the most preferred level, forgiveness ('afW). Fortunately, formaI 
apologizing in international relations has become a practice although not as a 
predominant norm of reaction. Islam however, by giving a very high value to 
forgiveness in conflict, supports the institutionalization ofthis norm at all the individu al 
and collective levels. This realm contains enough theoretical ingredients for an ultimate 
pacifist theory in Islam which does not embrace a cult of victimization but promotes 
and provokes a sense of humanism that exists in the nature of all humans (fi.tra) 
including the belligerent side in any conflict. 
It is important to note that, as the colonial and the post-colonial intellectual 
reactions of the Muslim theorists of war to the predicaments and calamities of their 
constituencies are gradually shifting towards a more contemplative position in modern 
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times, their positions on wars are also shifting from more aggressive theories towards 
soft and essentially non-confrontational theories. This is not a submission to the Marxist 
theory that thoughts are merely conditioned by social and economic factors. It only 
points to the fact that these intellectuais are becoming more active in their thoughts 
than reactive and more prone to critical thinking than to accepting the Islamic medieval 
literature in a wholesale manner. Between Rashid Riq.a and ~ali1].l-Najafiibadi, there is 
indeed a cent ury of very impressive and promising intellectuai progress. 
If modem man has not yet matured enough to eliminate war altogether, and 
in scribe in his mind that, as Toynbee conc1uded, militarism has been the most important 
common cause of the downfall of twenty civilizations so far,973 he should at least be 
conscious that his behavior in war will continue to be the ultimate test of any moral 
system he c1aims to abide by and sell to the world. It was the improvement of this very 
morality that aIl religions and prophets c1aimed and sought. Therefore, acting viciously 
and in an evil manner in the name of a 'faith' or 'democratic values' is but a perfectly 
destructive and foolish oxymoron, which will not reward any with an improved life here 
or hereafter. An Islamic proverbial 1].adith states, "the mundane world is the cultivation 
farm for hereafter (ad-dunyii mazra 'atu '} iikhira)." This is a c1ear testimony that seeds of 
fire and fighting may not bear flowers of peace and democracy, nor will it provide 
tickets for shortcut flights to Firdows (paradise). 
973 Reza'i, Khosrow. Trans. Arnold J Toynbee 's Views on War and Civi/ization, (1993) 125. 
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